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Abstract
This thesis examines the e¢ cacy of markets, using both quantitative and
qualitative methods in a complementary way. Specically, it starts (in Part
II) by using the results from a quantitative analysis of initial public o¤ering
(IPO) underpricing as a barometer for corporate governance failure. This
quantitative work identied Russia, China and India as extreme outliers. The
data set used for this work was the cross-section sample of 45 countries devel-
oped by Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2008). More broadly (in Part III), the
thesis takes the lead of the quantitative evidence to examine, in a qualitative
framework, possible sources of corporate governance failure in China, India and
Russia. This was done categorically, under the headings of Globalisation, Corpo-
rate Governance, Institutional Structure and Competitive Strategy. Data were
gathered by eldwork in China, India and Russia, and these ndings were then
benchmarked against ndings from further eldwork in the United Kingdom.
This created a unique 56,000 word database, which was used for both cross-site
and within-site analysis. This indicates how both unique attributes (e.g. rule
of law, transparency, regulation, etc.), and common attributes (e.g. transition
from a socialist/Marxist regime, market immaturity, asymmetric information
etc.), combine to explain the di¤erent morphologies of corporate governance in
these three countries.
The quantitative analysis (Part II) consists of exploratory data analysis
(EDA) and econometric work. The exploratory data analysis establishes, through
graphical means and regression techniques, a negative correlation between IPO
under-pricing and globalization (as measured by the KOF index, see Dreher,
2006). Building on this, the subsequent econometric modelling suggests that
economic, demographic and institutional factors are all signicant determinants
of IPO underpricing.
The qualitative analysis carried out in Part III of the thesis, builds on and
extends the quantitative analysis of Part II. This is consistent with the multiple
method approach, which combines both quantitative and qualitative analysis
to achieve a synthesis of ndings. The qualitative analysis uses evidence from
semi-structured interviews with nance professionals and opinion makers, as
well as evidence from additional primary and secondary sources, which was also
made available through eldwork contacts. This analysis emphasises the espe-
cial importance of board composition, information ows, the judicial system,
the stock exchanges, and nancial regulators for forms of corporate governance.
Key Words: Corporate Governance, Initial Public O¤erings, Fieldwork,
Asymmetric Information, Market E¢ ciency, Equity Markets, Russia, India,
China and United Kingdom
v
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Chapter 1
Background and
Methodology
1.1 Purpose of Thesis
This thesis is concerned with one of the major economic and nancial issues of
the last decade: e¤ective corporate governance, internal and external, in and be-
tween the major economies of the world, both mature and emerging. The initial
aim of this thesis is to use global initial public o¤ering (IPO) underpricing data
as a barometer for corporate governance failure, thereby guiding the research
into a broader comparative analysis of corporate governance across three of the
BRIC economies (viz. Russia, India and China). The construction of the thesis
is twofold.
In the rst part of the thesis, a cross-section quantitative data analysis ex-
plores global market anomalies in the form of IPO underpricing. The data
set consists of average IPO returns for 45 countries.1 The data is processed
through explorative statistical tools and analysis. This is subsequently followed
by econometric modelling in which IPO underpricing is explained in a cross-
section regression model by economic, demographic and institutional variables
(e.g., market capitalisation, population and minimum capital requirements).
This modelling provides a good t to the data, and is revealing about the im-
pact of key variables on underpricing. It also indicates how data points from
a few key countries were signicant outliers from the tted model (e.g., Rus-
sia, India and China). This precipitated a further investigation into the nature
and causes of these anomalies, using direct observations by eldwork methods.
Thus, quantitative cross-section analysis gave rise to further qualitative cross-
site analysis.
In the second part of the thesis, a cross-site analysis was carried out through
eldwork in Russia, India and China. The four key topics investigated in each
location are direct extensions of the cross-section analysis and are structured
1The IPO data is provided by Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2008).
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around globalisation & corporate governance. Specically, the comparative
analysis of eldwork evidence is split into four sections: globalisation, corporate
governance, institutional structure and competition strategy in Russia, India
and China. This comparative work is benchmarked against the UK. On the
basis of the notes obtained during the four site visits, an approximately 56,000
word database is constructed in Microsoft Excel to make possible comprehensive
comparisons between interviewees and across countries.2
1.2 Background to Thesis Research
Writing this thesis within the School of Economics & Finance, The University
of St Andrews, Scotland, has proven itself to be most conducive to the empirical
and inquisitive nature of this project. The cosmopolitan and socially dynamic
milieu of St Andrews has been instrumental in securing interviewees and con-
tacts across Russia, India and China. The Centre for Research in Industry,
Enterprise, Finance and the Firm (CRIEFF), within the School of Economics
& Finance, where this research was based, also has a strong tradition in empir-
ical work, grounded in economic theory. CRIEFF has both promoted the use
of a mixed method approaches where quantitative and qualitative methods are
combined in synergy (see e.g., Reid, 1993) and the use of a multidisciplinary
approach where, for example, economics, nance and accounting know-how is
utilised for one analysis (See e.g., Reid & Smith, 2008). This thesis uses both
the mixed method and multidisciplinary methods in its approach. The eld
research carried out in this study takes inspiration from, and builds on, the
framework of Reid (1987).
St Andrews is, of course, also near the birthplace of Adam Smith, who based
The Wealth of Nations (1779) on empirical observations. Andrew Carnegie
(1889, 1900), another prominent Scot who has left a signicant mark on this
area, wrote on the importance of philanthropy and in doing so laid the founda-
tion for what we know today as corporate social responsibility. Alfred Marshall
also focused on the dynamics of society and rms, and undertook a number of
eldwork related trips. More recently, marking a renewed interest in the impor-
tance and potential of eldwork, Elinor Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Price
in Economics for her work in applied eld research in 2009.
Adam Smith (1759, 1776) was interested in corporate governance issues and
famously noted in The Wealth of Nations that joint-stock companies were fun-
damentally awed in comparison to private enterprises: Negligence and pro-
fusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the
a¤airs of such a company. (1776:607). Conict of interest notwithstanding,
public equity companies have proven successful and resilient across the world
over many years. Today it is still the ultimate goal of many company owners
to seek a stock exchange listing to tap into more a¤ordable credit facilities and
increase their company prole. However, as we witness an ever increased pace
2To preserve the absolute condentiality and anonymity of all interviewees, this database
will not be made publically available.
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of globalisation, the shortening of news cycles, and the construction of nancial
products that even industry experts are struggling to understand the implica-
tions of, a better understanding of corporate governance practises by market
participants and policy makers has become essential. The corporate governance
scandals of Enron (2001), Worldcom (2002) and Parmalat (2003) proved to be
high prole symptoms of more systemic issues that became evident around the
start of the 2008 global nancial crisis.3 Oversight and accountability of corpo-
rate governance had been sidelined in the pursuit of higher prots and market
expansions. Gordon Brown (2010) in Beyond the Crash, Overcoming the First
Crisis of Globalisation, emphasises the global interconnectedness of economies
today and stresses the need for co-ordinated global actions to remedy the crisis.
We have entered a new era of globalisation and corporate governance initiatives
will need to reect this in the future.
1.2.1 Detecting Pricing Anomalies
During the late 1960s it became apparent that US initial public o¤erings (IPOs)
were, on average, priced below their market value.4 Researchers assume that
the market value of a share is revealed after the rst day of trading in liquid
and unimpeded markets. In other words, the shares were underpriced from
the perspective of the issuer. It later transpired that the phenomenon of IPO
underpricing was not unique to the US markets. It is, on average, a global phe-
nomenon across all the main nancial markets.5 Why leave signicant amounts
of money on the table for the initial investors? This became the focus of many
subsequent theories and it will be further discussed in this thesis. Some degree
of underpricing may be justied. The shares are, by denition, unknown enti-
ties; the management of the company may not be well known to the investors
and there is an inherent liquidity risk associated with new issues. However,
underpricing becomes a problem when it is excessive. Loughran & Ritter (2004:
8) note that if asymmetric information is counteracted, underpricing will be no
more than several percent.
This thesis uses a cross-section IPO underpricing data set as an instrument
to examine market failure and corporate governance globally. In analysing the
cross-country IPO data with respect to globalisation, three countries stand out
in particular: Russia, India and China. At one end of the scale we nd Russia
(4.2 percent underpriced, 1999-2006) with little IPO activity and somewhat
dormant markets, whereas India (92.7 percent, 1990-2007) and China (164.5
percent, 1999-2005) are characterised by signicant activity in their primary
markets but with signicant mispricing of new equity o¤erings. Simultaneously,
it is evident from the data that the UK (16.8 percent, 1959-2006) and the US
3See Co¤ee (2002) on Enron. See Brickey (2003) on Enron and Worldcom. See Melis
(2005) on Parmalat.
4See Logue (1973). In addition, see Reilly & Hateld (1969), US SECs Institutional
Investor Study (1971) and McDonald & Fisher (1972), cited by Logue (1973).
5Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2011) is currently the most up-to-date global overview of
IPO country performance. It now covers 49 countries in total.
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(16.9 percent, 1960-2007) may represent a sound yard-stick for what we should
expect on average from well-developed, deep nancial markets.6
1.2.2 From the Computer to the Field
Russia, India and China share some historic market similarities. They are all
developing markets, with newly marketised economies, anchored in socialist
market forms and they are still subject to substantial government inuence.
Moreover, together with Brazil they constitute the much talked about BRIC
grouping.7 Interestingly, despite their similarities they are clearly on di¤erent
growth trajectories. To more fully analyse and understand these dynamics,
this thesis makes use of eld trips to Russia (Moscow), India (Mumbai) and
China (Shanghai). In each location, experts and opinion formers partook in
a semi-structured interview that was designed to address the functioning (and
e¢ cacy) of nancial markets in these countries and build on the key ndings
of the data analysis. Subsequently, the ndings were benchmarked against the
UK (London).
It is evident from the eld trips that corporate governance is a key fac-
tor in all three countries. With the increasingly rapid globalisation and inter-
connectedness of nancial markets, local corporate governance issues now have
global repercussions. When investors today buy into a FTSE index fund, they
are taking on the risk of signicant direct exposure to foreign companies. They
are, in some cases unwittingly, indirectly investing in Russian, Indian and Chi-
nese companies. Hence, it is of paramount importance to better understand the
dynamics that govern these markets and to more fully appreciate the specic
challenges that face these countries.
This multiple methods approachwhere quantitative and qualitative analy-
ses are combined in synergy is becoming increasingly popular as a research tool.
Jicks (1979) widely cited thesis on this method advocates the use of triangu-
lation but Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009) nd that it is particularly since 1990
that the number of, especially empirical, mixed method studies have increased
signicantly. As Bryman (2006:97) states:
In a sense, we end up with three distinct approaches to research:
quantitative; qualitative; and what is variously called multi-methods
(Brannen, 1992), multi-strategy (Bryman, 2004), mixed methods
(Creswell, 2003; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003), or mixed strategy
methodology (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) research.
Academic publications adopting a mixed method approach cover a wide
range of topics which include, but are not limited to: business management
(e.g., Claver-Cortés, et al., 2008), mental health (e.g., Barg, et al., 2006), family
economics (e.g., Mistry, et al., 2008), board of directors study (1999) and co-
operation (Poteete, Janssen & Ostrom, 2010). Moreover, The Journal of Mixed
6The IPO data is provided by Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2008).
7Brazil, however, does not share the Marxist or strong socialist background that has been
present is Russia, India and China.
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Methods Research is a dedicated publication that disseminates and discusses
best practices and developments within this area of research. In addition, in-
ternational organisations such as the World Bank Group (e.g., Bamberger, Rao
& Woolcock (2010) and Barron, et al. (2008)) have also utilised this method.
One recent prominent example applying the multiple method approach is
Buchanan, Chai & Deakin (2012), who investigate shareholder primacy within
hedge fund activism in Japan. They observe (and cite Poteete, Janssen &
Ostrom, 2010) that a multi-methods approach is appropriate when research is
conducted into complex causal processes and when data is scarce and di¢ cult
to access. Their research full both requirements, as does this thesis. Moreover,
Buchanan, Chai & Deakin note that interviews can result in access to otherwise
not publicly available information, such as institutional routines and norms. As
a result of interviews carried out in Russia, India and China this thesis contains
information that would not otherwise be in the public domain.
1.3 Fieldwork Methodology
As outlined in Chapter 4 of the thesis, the exploratory data analysis chapter,
Russia, India and China are found to be outliers in the IPO underpricing data
set provided by Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2008). We continue in Chapters
4 and 5 to analyse variables that may inuence cross-country underpricing and
use these ndings as a stepping stone into eldwork exploring corporate gover-
nance issues (the results of which will be presented and discussed in Part III
of the thesis). This section of the thesis will concisely document the method-
ology used to construct the instrumentation, obtain access to interviewees and
the subsequent storage & retrieval of the information (database design). The
methodology and instrumentation used to obtain eldwork data is based on
Reids (1993) Small Business Enterprise, An Economic Analysis book; includ-
ing the structure and layout of the semi-structred interview schedule. Lastly,
this chapter will conclude with the outline of the thesis.
1.3.1 Instrumentation
The instrumentation is divided into four sub-sections: Globalisation, Corporate
Governance, Institutional Structure and Competitive Strategy. The four section
are inspired by di¤erent sources, although they all relate back to the data analy-
sis carried out in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. In Chapter 4, we establish the link
between globalisation and underpricing, while in Chapter 5 we establish that
economic, demographic and institutional factors inuence IPO underpricing.
The instrumentation used in this thesis is a semi-structured interview sched-
ule, SSI 2011 (Appendix A). A semi-structured interview agenda allowed for
exibility, and yet at the same time, ensured consistency across the di¤erent
sites, which in turn facilitated the cross-site analysis. All interviewees were
guaranteed anonymity and the interviews were not recorded (to ensure the in-
terviewees felt comfortable sharing information). I took notes on the interview
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schedule during the interview, which I later transferred into MS Excel for analy-
sis purposes (see the Access to Fieldsection for full details). The four sections
(Globalisation, Corporate Governance, Institutional Structure and Competitive
Strategy) were colour coded in the interview schedule, as is evident from Ap-
pendix A. Reid (1993) recommends this approach, and it provides both the
interviewer and the interviewee with a visial cue when one section nishes and
the next starts. This detail was well recieved accross all sites.
Globalisation
The instrumentation used in this thesis is a semi-structured interview sched-
ule, SSI 2011 (Appendix A). For a brief overview of the content, see the semi-
structured interview agenda (Appendix B). It was constructed using several
sources and it consists of four sections. Section I is based, almost verbatim, on
the Dreher (2006) KOF Index of Globalization, with minor adjustments (words
denoted in italics, in Appendices A and B, are additional components added
to the Dreher (2006) framework). It is established in Chapter 4 that there is
a statistically signicant negative correlation between the globalisation index
and IPO underpricing. However, globalisation is, of course, a wide term and by
using the sub-segments that in their totality constitute the globalisation index,
we are better able to emphasise nuances between the sites visited. The index
is divided into three categories: economic (37 percent weight), social (39 per-
cent weight) and political (25 percent weight).8 However, these subsection are
divided into further sections:
Table 1.1: Economic Globalisation
Variables Weight
Economic Globalisation 37%
i) Actual Flows 50%
Trade (percent of GDP) 19%
Foreign Direct Investment, ows (percent of GDP) 20%
Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP) 24%
Portfolio Investments (percent of GDP) 17%
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of DGP) 20%
ii) Restrictions 50%
Hidden Import Barriers 22%
Mean Tari¤ Rate 28%
Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue) 27%
Capital Account Restrictions 22%
Table 1.1 examines economic ows between countries. The qualitative in-
terviews add signicant observations to all the variables and, in doing so, add
another dimension to the analysis. I used i) Actual Flows and ii) Restrictions
8The reader may notice that that total of the weights come to 101 percent. Professor
Dreher, in private correspondance with me, notes that this is due to rounding of gures.
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as headings, with the other variables used as probes. For example, when in-
terviewees in Russia were asked about foreign direct investments (FDI) ows,
most of them remarked that the majority of funds coming into Russia as FDI,
are in fact, domestically owned funds being repatriated (and coming into Russia
disguised as FDI).
All the variables in Table 1.1 were used in the construction of the semi-
structured interview schedule. However, the weights were not applied to the
qualitative analysis. Nevertheless, when examining Table 4.2 in Chapter 4,
outlining the globalisation index for 45 counties, it may be of interest to know
how the total gure was constructed.
Table 1.2: Social Globalisation
Variables Weight
Social Globalisation 39%
i) Data on Personal Contact 33%
Telephone Tra¢ c 26%
Transfers (percent of GDP) 3%
International Tourism 26%
Foreign Population (percent of total population) 20%
International letters (per capita) 25%
ii) Data on Information Flows 36%
Internet Users (per 1000 people) 36%
Television (per 1000 people) 36%
Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) 28%
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity 31%
Number of McDonalds Restaurants (per capita) 43%
Number of Ikea (per capita) 44%
Trade in books (percent of GDP) 12%
Table 1.2 looks at social interaction between a country and the outside world.
Small adjustments were made to these variables in preparation for the eldwork:
I added abroad and domesticallyto the tourism variable and asked about the
prominence of retail chains in general. I again used the key variables as headings:
i) Data on Personal Contact, ii) Data on Information Flows and iii) Data on
Cultural Proximity, with the other variables used as probes. The gures used
for the weights are for a country in general (e.g., per 1000 people), however,
it is clear from visiting Russia, India and China that there is a signicant gap
in global integration between their tier-one cities (e.g., Moscow, Shanghai and
Mumbai) and their vast rural areas. Indeed, as it was remarked by Hu, a
Managing Director in London:
Sitting in London you feel connected to many countries. How-
ever, London is not representative of the country as a whole. London
may be more like the Netherlands.
This quote illustrates the complexity involved in comparing and contrasting
countries. However, it can only be benecial in this endeavour to use both
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quantitative and qualitative analysis (i.e., make use of a multi method approach,
as outline in Section 1.2.2).
Table 1.3: Political Globalisation
Variables Weight
Political Globalization 25%
Embassies in Country 25%
Membership in International Organizations 28%
Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions 22%
International Treaties 25%
Table 1.3 lists the variables used to determine a countrys political integra-
tion with the world community. Throughout the pilot phase, I used these four
sub-variables to enquire about political integration. However, between the pilot
run and the rst eld trip abroad, I summarised this point di¤erently (although
I left the text unchanged). For this section I would ask the interviewees, How
do you think your country would like to be seen on the world stage?
Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is the second section in the semi-structred interview
schedule. We suspect from the (extreme) IPO underpricing data on Russia,
India and China that there may be some degree of corporate governance failure
in these countries. Fortunately, we are in the position of being able to ask se-
nior nance professionals and opinion makers,on the ground,about this topic
in order to more fully investigate this suspicion.
Table 1.4: Corporate Governance Components
Variables
i) Stakeholders
Internal Stakeholders
Probe on Managers (accountability and job prospects)
External Stakeholders
Probe on Suppliers/Lenders/Creditors (legal protection)
ii) Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
Probe on License to Operate?
iii) Business Ethics
Probe on Are corporate scandals publicised and discussed?
iv) Enforcement & Control
Probe on External Corporate Governance Controls
v) Corporate Governance & Firm Performance
Probe on Board Composition
vi) Mergers & Acquisitions and Initial Public o¤erings
Probe on Frequency and Motivation
Table 1.4 lists the key variables examined under corporate governance and
an example probe question. An overview of the complete list of probes is located
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in Appendix B and the semi-structured interview answers will be fully explored
in Part III of the thesis. While the probing questions under the globalisation
heading were directly taken from the composition of the Dreher (2006) KOF
Index of Globalization, this is not the case in the three other sections, where
the probes are constructed by me on the basis of the headings.
There were, of course, many interesting and unexpected answers to these
probes. For example, during the Russia eld trip (Chapter 6), it was suggested
by DR, Head of Banking, that CSR was used by some companies as a front
for misallocation of funds (i.e., funds were funneled into nontransparent entities
(charities) and disappeared from view). It was also interesting to learn that in
Russia there is a term known as black PR, where the media is said to be used
to discredit business and political rivals.9 This goes against the usual notion of
media scrutiny as having a positive e¤ect on business ethics and good corporate
governance practises (see e.g., Berglöf & Claessens (2006) on the positive e¤ect
of a free media).
Institutional Structure
The structure of the institutional instrumentation is an extension of the institu-
tional variables that we determined inuence IPO underpricing (i.e., Frequency
of Financial Reporting, Minimum Capital Requirements to start a business and
Freedom to use Alternative Currencies) in Chapter 5.
Table 1.5: Institutional Considerations
Variables
i) Market Inuence by the State
Probe on Is market regulation a topical political issue?
ii) Regulatory bodies
Probe on Seen as a positive force by market participants?
iii) Stock Exchanges
Probe on Seen as credible entities? Certication value?
iv) Market Maturity
Probe on Market e¢ ciency - is the market e¢ cient? Why and how?
Table 1.5 presents the four key variables covered under the institutional
structure heading, with examples of probing questions. The full outline can be
found in Appendix B. Again, there were a number of interesting issues that arose
from these questions. For example, in China, DC , a Senior Product Manager
with an asset management rm, alleged that companies could buy their way
onto the stock exchange (which, of course, diminishes the certication value of
the exchange).
9See for example Ledeneva (2006), Chapters 2 and 3, for an extensive explanation and
analysis of this phenomenon.
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Competitive Strategy
The competitive strategy section is derived from Porters (1980, 1985) three
books of competition and extended to countries in Porters (1990) The Com-
petitive Advantage of Nations. Moreover, this section also relates to contestable
markets, which are described in detail in Baumol, Panzar & Willigs (1982) book
on contestable markets. As we will discuss in chapter 2, it may be that com-
petitive forces in the market place instill discipline on managers and reduces
agency problems.
Table 1.6: Competitive Strategy Variables
Variables
Rivalry
i) Banking Sectors
Probe on Degree of competitiveness within the Retail Bank Sector?
ii) Auditor Sector
Probe on Seen as independent to audited company?
iii) Brokerage Sector
Probe on Conict of interest issues? (e.g., serve/owned by a specic bank)
Customers
iv) Institutional Investors
Probe on High prole in the markets?
v) Retail Investors
Probe on General level of nancial sophistication?
vi) Suppliers (issuing companies)
Probe on Transparency?
Potential entrants
vii) Investment Banks, Auditors and Brokers
Probe on Openness of the markets? (to domestic and foreign entities)
viii) Issuing companies
Probe on Openness of the markets? (to domestic and foreign entities)
ix) Investors
Probe on Openness of the markets? (to domestic and foreign participants)
Table 1.6 contains all the variables covered in the competitive strategy sec-
tion, but the probing questions listed in Table 1.6 are only one example. Please
refer to Appendix B for the full list of probing questions. In this section, BC ,
a retail banking Client Executive in China, noted that it is mostly state owned
enterprises (SOEs) that are currently listing in China. However, the SOEs only
list a small part of the company, which may also relate to oversight issues. As
BC remarked: They will tell you what they want to tell youwhen they list
on the stock exchange.
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1.3.2 Access to Field
A total of four eld trips were undertaken between August 5 and December 10,
2011 (in addition to piloting the interview agenda around Scotland), as outlined
in Table 1.7.
Table 1.7: Interview Dates and Locations
Period Country/Site Stage
July 12 - August 1, 2011 United Kingdom (Scotland) Pilot
August 5 - August 20, 2011 Russia (Moscow) Core Trip
September 16 - October 3, 2011 China (Shanghai) Core Trip
October 29 - November, 2011 India (Mumbai) Core Trip
November 27 - December 10, 2011 United Kingdom (London) Benchmark
It is evident from Table 1.7 that the eldwork (between ve sites) was carried
out over a relatively short time period. In total, 46 full interviews were carried
out in person. This meant that while work was being carried out on one primary
site, it was also necessary to make initial arrangements for the following one or
two sites simultaniously. By leaving approximately one month in between each
eld trip, it was possible to learn and slightly adjust strategy based on the
experiences accumulated from each trip. It also reduced the risk associated
with undertaking one single trip that connected the three primary countries,
in case of unforeseen circumstances arising in one of the locations (e.g., illness
or an accident). One small, but vital, lesson learnt from the rst eld trip
abroad (Russia) was the importance of having a local SIM card. During the
subsequent trips to India and China, it was a priority to acquired a local SIM
card at the earliest possible moment.10 Having a local phone number allowed
for interviewees and local contracts to, for example, easily reach me in case of
last minute changes to the meeting arrangements.
It became apparent in 2010 that my studies would mostly likely, funding
permitting, take me to Russia, India and China to conduct eldwork. The
substantial lead time before the actual eldwork allowed for me to establish
contact with a number of other students in St Andrews that I discovered were
interested in facilitating this project. These contacts both helped in securing
interviews in Russia, India and China, and helped me to better navigate and
understand these very di¤erent cultures.
Before any actual eldwork can be carried out, the University of St Andrews
stipulates that reearchers obtain Risk Approval (Appendix C) and Ethics
Approval(Appendix D) from their school or department. The ethics commit-
tee recommended that each interviewee should sign a participant consent form
(anonymous data) before any interview could commence (Appendix E). The
participant form briey explained the rights of the interviewee (e.g., that they
10Although both China and India are notoriously bureaucratic, it was quite simple to obtain
a SIM card. It involved some paperwork but it was not di¢ cult at all (one just needs to
remember to bring a passport).
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could terminate the interview at any point in time) and assured the participant
that the data would be stored and processed responsibly.
The next stage consisted of undertaking a number of pilot interviews to test
the ow of the questions and the design of the interview agenda, to establish
approximately how long an interview would take and also to pick up some early
indications of the issues facing the UK at that particular time. In this context
six people in total (divided between four separate interviews) were interviewed.
Two interviewees represented a governmental agency with strong international
business connections. Three interviewees, split between two interviews in di¤er-
ent parts of Scotland, were senior nance professionals. Lastly, a PhD candidate
in Economics with family ties to one of the eldwork countries was interviewed
as well. Moreover, I also met with someone who worked in academia and con-
sultancy, with extensive knowledge of carrying out international eldwork.
During the pilot run, the email template that was used in approaching po-
tential interviewees was rened (Appendix F). Moreover, each email would also
include a letter of introduction from my supervisor, Professor Gavin C Reid.
The letter provided certication value to my project and it also made the re-
quest more personable (Appendix G). The request email is somewhat long and
detailed. The reason for this is twofold: Firstly, it was designed to minimise the
distraction that it might otherwise cause interested interviewees. A signicant
number of interviewees agreed to meet on the basis of that initial email. Some
potential interviewees would ask to see the interview agenda, which I would
then email out in its most basic form (Appendix H). A time and place to meet
was arranged by email, and I would not contact them again before the arranged
time of the interview.11 Secondly, the email served as a screening process. If
the interviewee was willing to read the somewhat long email, and to agree to
the proposal (e.g., that I need a mimimum of an hour to conduct the full in-
terview), they would most likely be quite committed to helping out with the
project. In retrospect, it is clear that this strategy worked well. Out of the 46
full interviews that were conducted between Scotland, Russia, India, China and
London (in addition to having approximately 12 meetings on location and 10
telephone conversations from Scotland), only one person cancelled a meeting (in
Shanghai). Other interviewees were also called away at short notice, but they
either re-scheduled or managed to nd senior colleagues who stepped in at the
last minute.
As expected, it was a challenge across all sites (especially China) to obtain
interview appointments and I made use of the snowball sampling strategy in
each country.12 To secure interviews with senior stakeholders in the nancial
system (e.g., within asset management, accounting, investment banking, retail
banking, regulators and academics) and other opinion makers in each country,
a two-pronged strategy was used: Networking and cold emailing.
To ensure the highest possible success rate for the emails, a great deal of time
11This was the general rule. However, for India, most of the interviewees requested that I
contact them again once I had arrived in Mumbai to arrange a time and date to meet.
12 In China, guanxi, is a form of networking, with both social and cultural implications. See
for example Park & Luo (2001) on guanxis impact on Chinese rm performance.
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was invested in nding the direct contact details of perspective interviewees. The
rst step was to locate senior nancial professionals in each location. This was
achieve by accessing publicly available online material on conference atttendence
in each city (or country), looking for individuals who had given public speeches
or made statements to the media. The assumption was that outgoing people
would be more interested in engaging with my topic and that it would help
improve the chances of securing interviews. The aim was to email around 50
individuals in each country. Russia was the most open country in terms of
nding direct email addresses, whereas China proved to be the most di¢ cult.
However, there is something of a system to allocating email address in many
international organisations, which helped reach interviewees. For example, a
perspective interviewee may have been contacted for the Russia part of the
study. In order to reach someone from the same organisation in, say, Mumbai,
it would only be a matter of substituting <.in> for <.ru> in the email address.
People were contacted in this fashion from around two weeks before the eld trip
commenced. Once in the country, it was possible to make use of the snowball
sampling strategy. Interviewees would recommend other professionals contacts,
which meant that more targeted emails could be constructed once in the country.
Networking from the UK also proved quite useful in securing interviewees
and extending my network on the groundin each location. One such strategy
was to meet with students in St Andrews, who could either help with nding
suitable interviewees in their home country or help me to better understand
their culture. I made a number of new friends through this process and they
have been extremely kind and helpful during the eldwork period. Another
strategy was to contact friends, or friends-of-friends, who might have connec-
tions in these countries. I was lucky enough to secure extremely competent
facilitators for Russia, India and China (i.e., a number of people in (or from)
these countries who took a keen interest in my project and helped me greatly in
securing interviewees and in making sure that I had local people I could contact
if I had any questions). Lastly, a number of national and international organ-
isations, which were assumed to be well connected in either Russia, India or
China, were approached. British entities, European entities and Danish entities
(as I am Danish) were contacted in this regard. This strategy also resulted in a
number of interviews and contacts.
For the last site, London, the strategy employed for Russia, India and China
was simply repeated. The only di¤erence was that the email template (Appendix
I) and the letter of introduction (Appendix J) were adjusted accordingly. Across
all sites it was mentioned to the interviewees that an initial nding summary
would be written up and emailed out once all the trips had been completed.
After each meeting, normally on the same day, an email would also be sent to
the interviewee to thank them for their time. It was reiterated at that point that
they would receive a brief summary of the eldwork ndings (see Appendix K
for the thank youtemplate). The analytical summary, see Appendix L, was
emailed out to approximate 70 individuals in March, 2012 (see Appendix M
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for the follow-up email template).13 Approximately 30 individuals responded
to thank me for the summary. Out of that group, 13 individuals expressed an
explicit interest in receiving a URL link to the nal thesis.
A Few Observations on Navigating Moscow, Mumbai & Shanghai
Moscow, although a very impressive city, has not yet developed an infrastruc-
ture to accommodate foreign business visitors or tourist. The airport, Moscow
Domodedovo, which marked the start of the eldwork in Russia, was not de-
signed with non-Russian speakers in mind. It was something of a challenge to
locate the onsite train station that connected the airport with the centre of
Moscow. In the city centre the train station connects with the metro system,
although it is not an intuitive process to continue the journey by metro. Once
again, all signs were in Cyrillic. It took around ve days before it was possible
to travel on the metro without having to ask for directions (even then, this was
accomplished by mapping out each trip before hand). To compensate for the
lack of familiarity with the metro system and to ensure that I knew where to nd
each o¢ ce or meeting location, I traveled one day early to each meeting location
to ensure I knew the way. Interestingly, as discussed in Chapter 6, Moscow is
building a new nancial centre with impressive skyscrapers. However, to travel
to this area was one of the biggest challenges on the metro. Although it was
initially di¢ cult to move around Moscow, people were very helpful and keen to
give directions. Moreover, many young people spoke excellent English.
The next destination was Shanghai, China. The arrival in the international
airport in Shanghai was an e¤ortless experince, being guided through to passport
control and onwards by signs in English and airport personnel. It was very
simple and inexpensive to travel from the airport to the city centre. One could
choose between taking the bullet train or taking the metro (which was the more
inexpensive option). All stops on the metro are announced in Mandarin and
English. Shanghai was the easiest place to navigate without having to ask
for directions. The city is design to accommodate foreigners, however, the air
quality would be a problem for a longer stay.
Mumbai was the last overseas trip. From the outset, Mumbai proved to be
a vibrant and loud city. English is widely spoken in India, which made many
things simpler. However, the only realistic way of moving around the city as
a foreign visitor is by taxi. Most taxi drivers do not speak English and many
are illiterate, which complicates matters to some extent. Addresses in Mumbai
normally include a landmark. The taxi drivers would normally rst nd the
area of the city and then they would ask people on the street for directions
to the landmark. Then, once the landmark is found, you should be able to
nd the actual building. It works surprisingly well. I was impressed with the
13To manage the large volume of emails between ve sites in total, and with three rounds
of email correspondance, I used the subject line to keep track of the di¤erent emails in my
inbox. The rst round of email I called [City (e.g. London) visit], the seocnd round I called
[City (e.g. London) visit - thank you] and the third round I called [City (e.g. London) visit
follow-up].
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entrepreneurial spirit I found in India.
1.3.3 Storage and Analysis of Data
After the completion of all the eld trips, all the handwritten notes taken during
the interview process were entered into MS Excel. The system was simple and
e¤ective. All interview headings and their codes were entered in the top row.
Each heading was colour coded according to the paper colour it belonged to
(e.g., globalisation is blue). Interviewee by code, time and date (e.g., Interviewee
18, 20/09/11, 10am) were entered in the rst column. Moreover, breaks were
made in the spreadsheet once a new site began and a colour was added to
visually separate sites. Within this grid all comments from the interviews were
entered. A NBin red was added to text cells that were deemed to be of extra
importance during the data inputting stage. Some of the answers can overlap
(or an interviewee may have suddenly come back to a previous heading), which
meant that, at times, some information in one cell would also relate to the
heading of another cell. When this happened, a small note was added in the
cell (using the heading code of the topic it related to). At the end of the data
inputting stage, a 56,000 word database had been constructed. As a result, for
any heading (e.g., Regulatory Bodies), it is possible to scroll down to see the
information entered for each interviewee (and by extension, each site). This
database was then used to construct the initial ndings summary emailed to
all participants and subsequently used in the comparative case studies of each
country, which constitute Part III of the thesis.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis consists of nine chapters in total. Chapter 2 outlines the discussion
on market e¢ ciency and reviews key corporate governance literature relating
to the scope of this thesis. In Chapter 3, we review some key literature on
IPO underpricing, both empirical and theoretical. Chapter 4 is the quantitative
chapter. Through an exploratory data analysis, it is determined that Russia,
India and China are outliers in the IPO data set. Chapter 5 uses econometric
modelling to estimate the impact of economic, demographic and institutional
factors on IPO underpricing. Part III of the thesis is a qualitative analysis that
builds on the quantitative analysis carried out in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 (Part
II). Part III consists of three case studies that are based around eldwork carried
out in Russia, India, China and United Kingdom. Lastly, Chapter 9 contains
the conclusions based on the preceding analysis.
Market e¢ ciency tells us that we should not be able to consistently earn
rate of return on investments above the risk premium. However, that would
seem to be exactly the outcome for investors buying IPO shares in the primary
markets in India and China, according to the Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist
(2008) data set. Moreover, it would seem that investors in Russia, a country
that is normally associated with a corporate governance risk premium (as we
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will discuss in Part III), see the lowest initial return on their IPO investments.
Chapter 2 discusses briey what pricing behaviour we should expect in e¢ cient
markets. The chapter also covers some key corporate governance literature, in
preparation for the corporate governance issues which will be discussed as part
of the eldwork analysis in Part III of the thesis.
As we use cross-country IPO underpricing as a barometer for corporate gov-
ernace failure, it is important to understand some of the factors that may drive
underpricing, both within a country and between countries. We will discuss
this in more detail in Chapter 3. In this chapter we will examine the US IPO
market, which is interesting for a number of reasons. It is the most researched
IPO market in the world and it should also be among the most e¢ cient markets
globally (arguably on par with London). And yet, the US IPO market expe-
rienced a signicant pricing bubble in 1999-2000. We will discuss some of the
factors that may have driven the IPO market during that period. We will also
look in some detail at the most popular IPO pricing mechanism - bookbuild-
ing. The actual process is not often discussed in the IPO literature, although
there is a fascinating dynamic in play during this process. We will conclude
Chapter 3 on a theoretical note, by examing some key IPO pricing models. In
doing so, we are presented with a stylised paradigm that may assist us in better
understanding some of the IPO market dynamics.
Having covered some key literature on both corporate governance and IPO
underpricing, we now move on to the quantitative analysis part of the thesis.
Chapter 4 is an exploratory data analysis, which allows us to assess the data
using a number of di¤erent analytical tools (for instance, scatter diagrams). In
this chapter we look more closely at international di¤erences in IPO underpric-
ing, while also drawing on the Dreher (2006) KOF Index of Globalization in an
endeavour to contextualise the analysis. We nd that IPO underpricing is sta-
tistically signicantly negatively correlated with globalisation; i.e., as a country
becomes more interconnected with the global community, it should expect to see
a decline in domestic IPO underpricing. We posit that increased globalisation
is connected with increased transparency, more accountability and improved
corporate governance standards. As such, it would make sense to expect this
relationship. As our analysis uses a multi method approach, we will explore this
connection in much more detail through analysis of the eldwork (Part III).
Chapter 5 is dedicated to econometric modelling. We establish that a range
of factors (economic, demographic and institutional) inuence cross-country
IPO underpricing. These are statistically signicant results and, as we run
a number of robustness tests (including testing for multicollinearity and trim-
ming the samples to see if the coe¢ cients are stable), it becomes clear that the
model is relatively stable.
Moving into Part III of the thesis, which consists of Chapters 6, 7 and 8,
we now have a number of key factors from our quantitative analysis, which
can be explored in more detail through the qualitative analysis. The eldwork,
divided over Russia, India, China and United Kingdom, and based on a semi-
structured interview schedule provides us with a great number of observations
and comments to compare and contrast. Indeed, the database constructed on
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the basis of the eld notes comes to 56,000 words and it is supplemented by
company material that was collected as part of the interview process.
Lastly, Chapter 9 draws together the analysis in its entirety and states the
conclusions about the main ndings.
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1.4.1 Terms, Acronyms and Abbreviations
A shares Traded in mainland China (not open to direct foreign participation)
ABC Agricultural Bank of China (One of the Big Fourstate-owned Chinese banks)
AI Asymmetric information models (endeavouring to account for the
underpricing of initial public o¤erings)
AIM Alternative Investment Market (Part of the London Stock Exchange catering
for smaller businesses)
Alfa Bank Biggest private bank in Russia
BC Business combination laws (Anti-takeover legislation)
BE Behavioural explanations models (endeavouring to account for the
underpricing of initial public o¤erings)
BOC Bank of China (One of the Big Fourstate-owned Chinese banks)
Bookbuilding Also known as rm commitment contracts
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China (Country grouping)
BSE Bombay Stock Exchange (in India)
CAG Comptroller and Auditor General of India
CAPM Capital asset pricing model
CBI Central Bureau of Investigation (in India)
CBRC China Bank Regulatory Commission (Regulator in China)
CCB China Construction Bank (One of the Big Fourstate owned Chinese banks)
CCTV China Central Television
CIRSC China Insurance Regulatory Commission (Regulator in China)
Clause 49 A corporate governance act that came into e¤ect in 2005 in India
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CSR Corporate social responsibility
CSRC China Securities Regulatory Commission (Regulator in China)
Deloitte Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (One of the Big Fourglobal accounting rms)
E&Y Ernst & Young (One of the Big Fourglobal accounting rms)
EDA Exploratory data analysis
EMH E¢ cient market hypothesis
FAS Federal Antimonopoly Service (in Russia)
FCPA US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FII Foreign institutional investor
Fixed priced o¤ers Also known as best e¤ort contracts
FreeAltCur Freedom to Use Alternative Currencies
FreqRep Timeliness of Financial Disclosures
FSA Financial Services Authority (Regulator in the United Kingdom)
FSDC Financial Stability and Development Council (in India)
FTT Financial Transaction Tax (Proposed by the European Union)
GloIndex KOF Index of Globalization
GNI Gross National Income
Great Firewall An information ltering mechanism that separate the Internet
of China in China from the outside world
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ICAI The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (Regulator in India)
ICBC Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (One of the Big Four
state-owned Chinese banks)
IE Institutional explanations models (endeavouring to account for
the underpricing of initial public o¤erings)
IPO Initial public o¤ering
IRDA Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (in India)
JV Joint venture (A partnership between two or more companies)
KPMG Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (One of the Big Four
global accounting rms)
Laddering When the underwriter articially inates the price of the initial
public o¤ering
M&A Mergers and acquisitions
MCG Stock Market capitalisation Growth
MCR Minimum Capital Requirement to start a business
as share of GNI per capita
MICEX Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange
MNCs Multi-national companies
Multi-brand Stores in India that sell several di¤erent brands under one roof
(e.g., supermarkets). Most often associated with the discussion
on whether India should allow foreign multi-brands to enter their
retail market
NASD National Association of Securities Dealers (in the US)
NPAs Non-performing assets
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NSCC National Securities Clearing Corporation (in India)
NSE National Stock Exchange (in India)
OAO Overallotment option
OC Ownership and control models (endeavouring to account for the
underpricing of initial public o¤erings)
PBC Peoples Bank of China (Regulator in China)
PCAOB Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (in the US)
PFRDA Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (in India)
PNs Participatory notes. Used by foreign institutional investors to invest
in the Indian nancial market, without having to register with the regulators
Pop Population
PSD Private Sector Development variable (Dened as domestic credit extended to
the private sector)
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers (One of the Big Fourglobal accounting rms)
QDII Qualied Domestic Institutional Investor (Domestic institutional investors
in China)
QFII Qualied Foreign Institutional Investor (Foreign institutional investors
in China)
QSSP The Quebec Stock Savings Plan
R&D Research and development
RBI Reserve Bank of India (Indias central bank)
Red herring The preliminary initial public o¤ering prospectus led with the
regulators in the US
RTS Russian Trading System Stock Exchange
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RWH Random walk hypothesis
SAFE State Administration of Foreign Exchange (Chinese government fund)
Sberbank One of the two market-leading, state-owned, retail banks in Russia (in
conjunction with VTB)
Sberbank Troika Russian investment bank
SBI State Bank of India (The largest bank, by far, in India)
SEBI Securities Exchange Board of India
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission (in the US)
SEO Seasoned equity o¤ering
Single-brand Stores in India that sell only one brand under their roof (e.g., a Nike
store)
SOE State-owned enterprise
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (in the US)
Spinning Where an underwriter or broker allocate an underpriced initial public
o¤ering to prospective future clients
The Bank The Bank of England
TSX The Toronto Stock Exchange
Underwriter An investment bank that act as the intermediate between the issuer
and the investors
Undpri Underpricing of initial public o¤erings
VPFs Voucher privatisation funds (in Russia)
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VTB One of the two market-leading, state-owned, retail banks in Russia
(in conjunction with Sberbank)
VTB Capital Russian investment bank
WOS Wholly owned subsidiary
WTO World Trade Organisation
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1.4.2 Interviewee Overview
Table 1.8A: IntervieweesCodes, Status, and Sector, United Kingdom
Interviewee Code Sector
Chief Economist AU Professional Association
Director BU International Investment Bank
Chief European Economist CU International Investment Bank
Global Chief Economist DU International Investment Bank
Equity Strategist EU Asset Management Firm
Global Head of Mergers & Acquisitions FU Big Four Accounting Firm
Operation Risk Manager GU UK Retail Bank
Managing Director HU Financial Services Company
Senior European Economist IU International Investment Bank
Analyst JU UK Investment Bank
Table 1.8B: IntervieweesCodes, Status, and Sector, Russia
Interviewee Code Sector
Senior Credit Analyst AR Russian Investment Bank
Advisor to the Chairman BR Russian Investment Bank
Strategic Analyst CR Russian Private Equity Firm
Head of Banking DR International Investment Bank
Managing Partner ER Big Four Accounting Firm
Emerging Markets Broker FR Russian Brokerage Firm
Senior Investment O¢ cer GR International Organisation
Head of Client Services HR Asset Management Company
Chief Economist IR International Investment Bank
Deputy Director, Research JR Russian Retail Bank
Chief Economist KR Russian Retail Bank
Finance Professor LR Moscow based University
Chief Economist MR International Investment Bank
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Table 1.8C: IntervieweesCodes, Status, and Sector, India
Interviewee Code Sector
Professor of Economics AI Mumbai based University
Director BI International Organisation
Managing Director CI International Investment Bank
Senior Economist DI International Investment Bank
Research Analyst EI Indian Investment Firm
Senior Vice President FI Large Indian Corporation
Director GI Private Equity Firm
Assistant Adviser HI Financial Regulator
Associate Vice President II International Retail Bank
Director & Chief Economist JI International Investment Bank
Chief Operating O¢ cer KI International Investment Bank
General Manager LI Indian Retail Bank
Professor of Finance MI Mumbai based University
Table 1.8D: IntervieweesCodes, Status, and Sectors, China
Interviewee Code Sector
Manager AC Big Four Accounting Firm
Client Executive BC International Retail Bank
Chief Operating O¢ cer (COO) CC International Firm
Senior Product Manager DC Asset Management Company
Senior Research Analyst EC Chinese Investment Bank
Shanghai Branch Manager FC International Retail Bank
Director GC Private Equity Firm
Equity Analyst HC Asset Management Company
Equity Analyst IC Fund Management Company
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Chapter 2
The E¢ cacy of Markets
and Corporate Governance
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines some key literature on market e¢ ciency and corporate
governance. We start by looking at what is meant by market e¢ ciency and
whether it applies to Russia, India and China. All three countries are rela-
tively newly marketised economies; with some socialist attributes still evident
in the three economies (for example, ve-year investment plans are still pop-
ular government policies). In seeking to adapt their institutions and markets
to more closely resemble the free market economic model, all three countries
have encountered numerous challenges. The conundrum of why Russia (4.2 per-
cent underpriced, 1999-2006), India (92.7 percent, 1990-2007) and China (164.5
percent, 1999-2005) di¤er greatly in the degree of underpricing of their IPOs,
is a peculiarity that has remained unexplored (we introduced this discrepancy
in Chapter 1 and it will be fully discussed in Chapter 4); yet, it is crucial for
potential investors to understand the market forces in these countries before
committing funds.
In Chapter 4, through an exploratory data analysis, we nd the KOF Glob-
alization Index (Dreher, 2006) and IPO underpricing (Loughran, Ritter & Ry-
dqvist, 2008)) to be negatively correlated to a statistically signicant degree.
This discovery will be further explored in Part III of the thesis, but for now we
will focus on what increased globalisation may mean for convergence of corporate
governance standards across the world. In Chapter 5 we build an econometric
model that consist of economic, demograpic and institutional variables. These
variables also serve as a foundation for further enquiry, in the eld,to analyse
corporate governance issues in Russia, India, China and the UK. As corporate
governance is at the core of this thesis, we will use the remainder of this chapter
to focus on di¤erent aspects of this area. Corporate social responsibility (CSR)
32
is, of course, a part of corporate governance, and we will review this area se-
peartey before examining corporate governance as a control mechanism (both
internal and external).
2.2 Market E¢ ciency
Persistent deviation from e¢ cient markets should not exist; as such anomalies
should be countered by arbitrage. The notion of market e¢ ciency is often
attributed to Adam Smith (1776). Smith posits in The Wealth of Nationsthat
unobstructed free markets result in a social optimum. This idea can also be
found in The Theory of Moral Sentiments(1759), where Smith rst mentions
the notion of the invisible handas a self-regulating force in the marketplace.
Looking specically at stock market e¢ ciency, a large body of research has been
dedicated to examining whether the notion of market e¢ ciency holds. At its
most general level, the theory of e¢ cient capital markets is just the theory of
competitive equilibrium applied to asset markets (LeRoy, 1989:1583). Louis
Bacheliers (1900) groundbreaking thesis was the rst paper to use Brownian
motion (Brown, 1828) to mathematically model stock price movement, that
is, to put forward the idea that stock price movements are patternless and
unpredictable. In doing so, Bachelier established and formulated the random
walk hypothesis (RWH).
However, his work proved to be ahead of its time and was overlooked (for-
gotten) until Leonard Savage, in 1955, rediscovered the work. In the mean time,
Kendall (1953), Working (1958) and Roberts (1959) also suggest that time series
stock prices may follow a random walk. Kendall (1953:13) famously remarked:
[t]he series looks like a wanderingone, almost as if once a week
the Demon of Chance drew a random number from a symmetrical
population of xed dispersion and added it to the current price to
determine the next weeks price. And this, we may recall, is not the
behaviour in some small backwater market. The data derive from
the Chicago wheat market over a period of fty years [...]
The e¢ cient market hypothesis (EMH) followed as the next development
in the literature.1 This theory was independently developed by both Fama
(1963, 1965a, 1965b and 1970) and Samuelson (1965). Fama (1970:383) states
that [a] market in which prices always fully reect available information is
called e¢ cient.Samuelson (1965) was the rst paper to link capital market
e¢ ciency with martingales.2
Fama (1970) treats the EMH as a fair game model (martingale) and assumes
that all publicly available information is priced into the share. In testing his
1See Sewell (2011) for a brief, yet comprehensive, narrative chronological overview of the
key contributions in the literature of the evolution of the EMH.
2A sequence (Xn)n1 of random variables is said to be a martingale if
E(Xn+1jX1; : : : ; Xn) = Xn for each n 2 N. See, for example, Los (2003).
See LeRoy (1989) for an in-depth consideration of the EMH and Martingales.
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model, Fama divided the empirical test into three segments: the weak-form
e¢ cient market hypothesis, the semi-strong-form e¢ cient market hypothesis
and the strong-form e¢ cient market hypothesis. The three forms are distinguish
by the level of information incorporated into the share prices. The weak-form
hypothesis reects historical prices and trading volumes. The semi-strong-form
hypothesis also includes public information, while the strong-from hypothesis
also includes condential price-sensitive information.
Subsequently there have been a number of seminal contributions to this
area. Notably, Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) on option-pricing
models. Black (1986) coins the terms noise traders(i.e., irrational traders) and
shows that liquid markets are dependent on this type of trader, while La¤ont
& Maskins (1990) work on imperfect competition and EMH suggests that the
EMH may fail in markets where insider trading occur.
In explaining market e¢ ciency, Malkiel (2003:60) states:
I will use as a denition of e¢ cient nancial markets that such
markets do not allow investors to earn above-average returns with-
out accepting above-average risks. A well-known story tells of a
nance professor and a student who come across a $100 bill lying on
the ground. As the student stops to pick it up, the professor says,
Dont bother - if it were really a $100 bill, it wouldnt be there.[...]
Markets can be e¢ cient in this sense even if they sometimes make
errors in valuation, as was certainly true during the 1999-early 2000
Internet bubble. [...] Above all, we believe that nancial markets
are e¢ cient because they dont allow investors to earn above-average
risk adjusted returns. In short, we believe that $100 bills are not ly-
ing around for the taking, either by the professional or the amateur
investor.
However, in a 2006 speech, Professor Malkiel notes that there are markets
that do not conform to the EMH.3 In particular, Malkiel states that the Chinese
nancial market is not e¢ cient. If we were to accept La¤ont & Maskins (1990)
paper on the inuence of insider trading on market e¢ ciency, it may be true,
according to evidence analysed in Part III of the thesis, that the Russian and
Indian nancial markets are also ine¢ cient.
2.3 Corporate Governance
Shleifer & Vishny (1997:737) state that [c]orporate governance deals with the
ways in which suppliers of nance to corporations assure themselves of get-
ting a return on their investment. Corporate governance is traditionally seen
as the framework within which the agency problem between owners (i.e., the
principals) and the managers (i.e., the agents) is controlled and managed. The
agency problem is an integral part of the contractual view of the rm formally
3Malkiel (2006) Investment Opportunities in China.
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developed by Coase (1937), Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Fama & Jensen
(1983a,b).4 However, the idea can be traced back to Adam Smith (1776). Denis
& McConnell (2004) note that the conicts of interest and the cost associated
with forming contracts and/or monitoring the controllers, will, ceteris paribus,
reduce rm value. These ideas form the basis for research into corporate gover-
nance.
The following survey of corporate governance literature will be conducted
within the framework of Globalisation, Corporate Governance, Institutional
Structure and Competitive Strategy. These four topic are used as the basis
for the eldwork analysis, which will be discussed and examined in Chapters 6,
7 and 8 (Part III) of the thesis.
2.3.1 Globalisation
We discuss and link the KOF globalization index (Dreher, 2006) to IPO under-
pricing in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Moreover, the globalisation index is discussed
in detail in Part III of the thesis, as it forms a cornerstone of the eldwork carried
out in Russia, India and China, and benchmarked against the UK.
The contributions of various countries to the development of modern cor-
porate governance can be divided into three stages. Jensen & Meckling (1976)
seminal paper marked the beginning of a ourishing of research into corporate
governance mainly in the US. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s this body of
US centric research continued to expand. However, by the early 1990s research
focus started to include other countiesparticularly Japan, Germany and the
UK. This development was followed in the early 2000s by the emergence of a
truly international body of research into corporate governance from countries
across the world.
Denis & McConnells (2004) international corporate governance survey nds
that the international papers (papers on corporate governance outside the US)
can be seen as two distinct generations of contributions. The rst generation
of international research papers on corporate governance is an extension of the
principals of the US research that came before these papers (focusing mainly on
board composition and equity ownership in individual countries). The second
generation of international research focus on the impact on corporate governance
of di¤erent legal systems across countries.
Globalization entails a lifting of barriers to the mobility of capi-
tal, products, and labor, leading to an intensication of competition
for these factors across borders by rms and countries. Just as U.S.
states competed for most of the twentieth century for franchise tax
revenues by o¤ering the best terms for incorporation (Easterbrook &
Fischel, 1991; Romano, 1993) [...], nations could compete for rms
and resources by creating the most e¢ cient corporate governance
environmentKhanna, Kogan & Palepu (2006:70).
4Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
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Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu (2004) note that cross-country competitive forces
may drive a race to the bottomscenario, as managers prefer counties with weak
corporate governance which will allow them to press their own interests over the
best interests of the shareholders. In this context they note that the US state
of Delaware was the clear winner within the intra-US race to attract corpora-
tions. Whether Delaware won the race to the bottom(Carey, 1974) or the race
to the top(Winter, 1977 and Romano, 1993) is open to debate. Both Win-
ter (1977) and Romano (1993) attribute Delawares success to its strong legal
framework and experienced judges. Crucially, however, the US competition dy-
namics were underpinned by both similar federal law requirements and national
stock exchange regulations (the two most important institutions of corporate
governance in the US, according to Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu). Nonetheless,
the US race may be indicative of the importance of the legal institutions when
a company seeks to relocate its business. Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu tenta-
tively conclude that cross-country corporate governance competition may lead
to a separating equilibrium in the future. If the world were not to converge
on a variation of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system, it may see a
two-tier system: One for multinational companies with access to the global -
nancial markets and the other for mainly family owned companies listing in
their respective countries with share ownership concentrated among the found-
ing family (these local entities may eventually gain access to the global capital
market through the acquisition of a multinational company). Khanna, Kogan
& Palepu (2006) state that the distinction between de jure and de facto conver-
gence is one aspect of the corporate governance convergence that has not been
su¢ ciently emphasised.5 Hansmann and Kraakmans (2001) paper, The End
of History for Corporate Law,nds that globalisation of the capital markets
has led to an increased focus on e¢ ciency gains and as a result promoted de
facto convergence of the shareholder-oriented model (through outperforming the
three other main corporate governance alternatives: the managerialist model,
the labor-oriented model, and the state-oriented model). Hansmann & Kraak-
man continue by noting that this convergence momentum will have spillover
e¤ects into policy making, which in turn will ensure that corporate governance
convergence will continue to happen both in law making and in practice. These
theses are based in various forms on the e¢ ciency convergence hypothesis and
assume that eventually a global homogenous best-practice corporate governance
system will emerge. However, this may not be the case.
The ensuing decade [2000s], bookended by major corporate scan-
dals and corresponding stock- and nancial-market collapse, has not
treated kindly the thesis that we have reached the end of history
for corporate law by solving its remaining critical issues. Indeed,
Hansmann and Kraakmans [2001] unfortunate choice of title bears
increasing resemblance to the ill-timed statement of the hapless o¢ -
cial who, late in the nineteenth century, called for closing the patent
5De Jure convergence refers to convergence of corporate governance laws across countires,
whereas de facto convergence refers to convergence of actual practices.
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o¢ ce on the ground that everything worthwhile to invent already
had been inventedGevurtz (2011:479).
There are proponents of corporate governance divergence who argue that the
Darwinian view of e¢ ciency driven corporate law convergence may not hold.
Mark J. Roe (among others) argue that the key to corporate governance and
ownership evolution is path dependence. Roe nds that this e¤ect is structure-
driven (i.e., linked to the initial corporate ownership structure of a country) and
rule driven (i.e., linked to current corporate structures & institutions and the
lobbying of interest groups).6 Notably, however, both Banner (1997) and Co¤ee
(2001) argue against the notion that the evolution of corporate law is policy
based. They posit that law changes are due to economic and nancial drivers.
Interestingly, it may be that the discussion regarding the de facto/de jure
convergence (race to the top/bottom) or divergence of corporate governance
is, in e¤ect, somewhat academic. Clarke (2011:99) states that [t]he foreign
business community has been telling China for years that it must improve its
corporate governance regime or face a loss of investment, but the threat has
proved empty. And foreign investment continues in Russia, despite corporate
governance practices described by Bernard Black and his co-authors [2000] with
terms such as kleptocracy,looting,and plunder.It would seem that pro-
jected monetary gains may, to some extent, take precedence over weak corporate
governance practises within a country when rms are looking to expand their
operations internationally.
2.3.2 Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is a vast area of research and there are many nuances to
explore within the topic. Returning to Shleifer & Vishny (1997) for a moment
(from Section 2.3), who note that corporate governance is concerned with how
the providers of nance to corporations can ensure a return on their invest-
ment, may help to explain the complexity of the topic. Ensuring a return on
investments is dependent on a countrys judicial system, the e¤ectiveness of its
institutions, the ow of information within the country, as well as corporate ac-
countability and transparency among other issues. In this thesis we will narrow
the discussion to corporate social responsibility, internal corporate governance
controls and external corporate governance controls. In doing so, we capture the
main aspects of the corporate governance issues explored within the framework
of the eldwork carried out and analysed in Part III of the thesis.
Before we continue to analyse these issues in more detail, Young, et al.
(2008:199) make an interesting and, on the basis of the eldwork carried out in
this thesis, correct observation:
In short, the corporate governance structures in emerging economies
often resemble those of developed economies in form but not in sub-
stance (Backman, 1999; Peng, 2004). As a result, concentrated own-
6See, among others, Roe (1994); Roe (1996) and Bebchuk & Roe (1999).
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ership and other informal mechanisms emerge to ll the corporate
governance vacuum. While these ad hoc mechanisms may solve some
problems, they create other, novel problems in the process. Each
emerging economy has a corporate governance system that reects
its institutional conditions. However, there are a number of similar-
ities among emerging economies as a group; conicts between two
categories of principals are a major issue.
2.3.3 Corporate Social Responsibility
The area of corporate social responsibility (CSR) encompasses a wide variety of
issues and interests and, as such, it has proven di¢ cult to settle on an agreed
denition of the term in the academic and corporate literature. This notwith-
standing, Wood (1991:695) notes that [t]he basic idea of corporate social re-
sponsibility is that business and society are interwoven rather than distinct
entities[...].McWilliams & Siegel (2001:117) emphasise the voluntary aspect of
CSR by stating that they dene CSR as actions that appear to further some
social good, beyond the interests of the rm and that which is required by law.
Dahlsruds (2008) paper, How Corporate Social Responsibility is Dened: an
Analysis of 37 Denitions,concludes that CSR denitions consistently refer to
ve dimensions: Environmental, Economic, Social, Stakeholder and Voluntari-
ness. However, Dahlsrud goes on to suggest that it may be more important for
companies to understand that CSR is socially constructed and is dependent on
the specic social context.
Taking one step back, it may be useful to consider the origin of CSR. Andrew
Carnegie (1889), with the essay Wealth, is often credited as being one of the
pioneers of CSR (see e.g., Kim, Nofsinger & Mohr (2010); Lantos (2001) and
Wulfson (2001)).7 However, Cochran (2007) notes that Andrew Carnegie pro-
moted private philanthropy but did not explicitly advocate charitable corporate
action in this area. Cochran states that the US court case Smith v. Barlowin
1953 marked the starting point of modern day corporate giving and opened the
door to considerable corporate philanthropy. Academically, Howard R. Bowens
(1953) book, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman,arguably ushered in
the modern approach to CSR, although, as pointed out by Carroll (1999), the
title of the book would suggest that there was either no businesswomen at the
time of writing or that they were not recognised in the formal literature.8
McWilliams, Siegel & Wright (2006) lament the fact that a clearly deed
and widely agreed upon denition of CSR has proven elusive and they note that
this has made it di¢ cult to fully understand the contribution of CSR. In this
context, Garriga & Mele (2004:51) nd that:
7Andrew Carnegie, the nineteenth century industrialist, had a strong connections to St
Andrews and the surrounding area. He was born in Dunfermline, Scotland, but emigrated
with his parents to America as a boy. He build most of his fortune through the American
steel industry.
8Carroll (1999) o¤ers an excellent US centric survey on the evolution of CSR from mainly
the 1950s up to the late 1990s.
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[...] this eld [CSR] has grown signicantly and today con-
tains a great proliferation of theories, approaches and terminolo-
gies. Society and business, social issues management, public policy
and business, stakeholder management, corporate accountability are
just some of the terms used to describe the phenomena related to
corporate responsibility in society. Recently, renewed interest for
corporate social responsibilities and new alternative concepts have
been proposed, including corporate citizenship and corporate sus-
tainability. Some scholars have compared these new concepts with
the classic notion of CSR (see van Marrewijk, 2003 for corporate sus-
tainability; and Matten et al., 2003 and Wood and Lodgson, 2002
for corporate citizenship).
Garriga & Mele introduce a classication system in an endeavour to map
out the contributions to CSR literature. They categories CSR theories into four
groupings:
1. Instrumental theories: CSR is used as a strategic tool for prot maximi-
sation (see Friedman, 1962).
2. Political theories: The two main lines of contributions are Corporate Cit-
izenship and Corporate Constitutionalism.
3. Integrative theories: Basically, CSR is used in response to evolving de-
mands by society.
4. Ethical theories: Based on the principle of the right thing to do and
seeking to improve society (including normative stakeholder theory).
Even within these sub-sections it may be di¢ cult to nd coherence. For ex-
ample, the meaning of corporate citizenshipmay vary between papers. Matten,
et al. (2003, cited by Garriga & Mele), notes that there are three views of cor-
porate citizenship: A limited view, a view equivalent to CSR and an extended
view. On this basis, it is understandable that it may be di¢ cult to compare
results between studies.
Lastly, on CSR, it should be emphasised that CSR is not a universally ac-
cepted pursuit. In the CSR literature the debate can be summarise as Friedman
(1962) v. Freeman (1984). Friedman (1962:133) famously states:
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations
of our free society as the acceptance by corporate o¢ cials of a social
responsibility other than to make as much money for their stock-
holders as possible
In direct contrast to the shareholder view held by Friedman, Freemans
(1984) seminal book stresses the importance of the rms stakeholders by analysing
the notion of management as a duciary relationship to stakeholders.
(Freeman, 1984:vi), with Freemans classic denition of a stakeholder as [...]
any group or individual who can a¤ect or is a¤ected by the achievement of the
organizations objectives. (Freeman, 1984:46).
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2.3.4 Internal Corporate Governance Controls
There are a number of internal corporate governance controls that can, or
should, be used to ensure that the company is run in the best interest of the
owner(s) (e.g., shareholders). These controls vary in e¤ectiveness between coun-
tries, as we will discover and discuss in detail in Part III. For now we will discuss
company boards, remuneration, monitoring and audits.
Company Boards and Performance Monitoring
Fama & Jensen (1983a) note that the board of directors is the apex of the rms
decision control system, while its members do not proportionally share the risk
of the wealth e¤ects stemming from their decisions. Anderson & Reeb (2004)
examine the role of family ownership inuence among US boards with founding-
family ownership. This phenomenon that is of particular importance in Russia,
India and China today, where families often retain the overall control of the
board of directors and independent directors are only independent in name, as
we will discuss further in Part III. Anderson & Reeb conclude, in line with
agency theory, that rms with balanced boards of independent directors (i.e.,
both consisting of family members and outsiders), were of the highest value. In
contrast, rms with boards that mainly consist of family-owner members and
few independent directors, performed worse. It was also found that families seek
to exclude independent directors from their rms, while outside stakeholders
endeavour to place independent directors in their rms. As such, independent
directors should ideally serve to mitigate conicts of interest on boards. That
is not to say that the board composition should not be endogenous. Demsetz &
Lehn (1985) were among the rst to suggest that a rms governance structure
develops endogenously, as agents respond to the challenges that face the rm.9
This ties in with Andres & Vallelados (2008) ndings. Andres & Vallelado
conclude that banks with larger and not excessively independent boards, might
prove more e¤ective in rm monitoring and in advising roles, and ultimately
create more value. This notwithstanding, Masulis & Mobbs (2011) note that al-
though the board of directors plays an essential part in the corporate governance
framework, it still remains somewhat unclear what makes boards e¤ective. Ma-
sulis & Mobbs suggest that until recently the corporate governance literature
has not distinguished between insider that simply follow the CEO lead, and as
such raise the rms agency costs, and well informed insiders that ensure bet-
ter decision making in the board room. According to Masulis & Mobbs, inside
directors with outside directorships are linked to better rm performance.
Board remuneration is also a topical issue, as we have seen a number of
reports in 2012 on shareholders blocking executive pay packages.10 As HU ,
a Managing Director at an international nancial services company in London,
remarked with concern: Board remuneration is still murky. How is it inuenced
9See Coles, Lemmon, & Meschke (2011) on the di¢ culty in measuring endogeneity in
corporate nance.
10Kollewe (2012), reporting for the Guarding Newspaper, lists a short timeline (mid-April
to early May) of shareholder protests on executive pay.
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and changed? Di¢ cult to understand the determination of remunerations!
Core, Holthausen & Larcker (1999:371) nd that the root of board compensation
is related to agency problems:
Overall, our results suggest that rms with weaker governance
structures have greater agency problems; that CEOs at rms with
greater agency problems receive greater compensation; and that
rms with greater agency problems perform worse.
Bebchuk & Fried (2003) also suggest that the motivation for executive com-
pensation is an agency problem. While Jensen & Murphy (1990), in their widely
cited paper, conclude that CEO compensation is not strongly performance re-
lated. However, Hartzell & Starks (2003) nd that there is a statistically sig-
nicant positive correlation between the sensitivity of performance compensa-
tion packages and concentration of institutional investor ownership. Moreover,
Hartzell & Starks suggest that there is a negative correlation between the level
of compensation and institutional ownership. On this basis, they conclude that
institutional investors mitigate agency problems between shareholders and man-
agers. However, Cornetta, Marcusb & Tehranian (2008) nd that earnings man-
agement increases when CEOs are tied to option compensation, although, again,
institutional investors are found to have a mitigating e¤ect on agency problems.
Audits
Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright (2010) observe that in recent years in the
US, there has been an increased focus in corporate governance on ensuring
truthful nancial reports and detecting fraud. However, they conclude that
audit committees in general are not e¤ective and that they lack the inuence to
ensure that they are an e¤ective part of overall corporate governance practises.
On the other hand, Agrawal & Chadha (2005), in examining the likelihood
of a company restating earnings, nd that audit committees that are headed
by an independent director with nancial expertise are less likely to issue an
earnings restatement. The opposite is found to be the case for companies with
a founding family CEO. However, Turley & Zaman (2004) warn that there
is no automatic correlation between the design of the audit committee (e.g.,
the independence of members) and rm performance. Turley & Zaman go on
to suggest that more research is needed in this area. When fraud has been
detected and the company is looking to restore its reputation, Farber (2005)
nds that corporate governance (e.g., audit) improvements have no inuence
on institutional holdings and the rate of analyst followings. However, there is a
marked increase in share prices when corporate governance standards are raised,
implying that investors appreciate higher corporate governance standards.
The US Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 has had a considerable e¤ect
on audit practises, not only in the US but also internationally where it has
served as inspiration for other lawmakers. For example, SOX inspired Clause
49 in India, which we will cover in more detail in Chapter 7, The Indian Tiger.
Although SOX has been widely implemented, it has not, on balance, been well
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received in academic circles. Romano (2005) note that the Act was rushed
through congress amid corporate accounting scandals (famously Enron) and
with a high degree of media attention. Deakin & Konzelmann (2004) augue
that the real lessons of the Enron case were not incorporated into SOX, as it
was mistakenly assumed that the Enron collapse was due to the failure of the
board in monitoring the company.11 However, Deakin & Konzelmann posit that
it was the wider, ruthless, company focus on maximinsing shareholder value that
led to a breakdown on internal governance controls and subsequently saw the
company implode. Chhaochharia & Grinstein (2007) conclude that companies
which are less compliant with the SOX Act earn positive abnormal returns in
comparison to companies that are more compliant. While, Zhang (2007) nd
that SOX imposes signicant costs on rms.
However, there are also proponents of the Act. Coates (2007) suggests that
the core ideas incorporated in SOX, had been developed over a number of years
prior to the rush to pass the act. Moreover, Coates recommends that critics of
the Act should focus their attention on the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board (PCAOB) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
encourage them to cut or reduce requirements and restrictions that are exces-
sively costly. Leuz (2007), in addition, suggest that some of the literature on
the SOX Act may have attributed rm costs to the Act that are actually part
of a wider market trend. Leuz acknowledges that the one-size-ts-all Act may
have imposed signicant costs on rms, but states that we do not currently have
enough evidence to condently attribute increased rm costs to the SOX Act.
Leuz concludes by also noting that more emphasis and focus should be placed
on the SEC and the PCAOB implementation of the Act.
2.3.5 External Corporate Governance Controls
External corporate governance controls are mechanisms that complement the in-
ternal corporate governance functions in a company. These are tools that allow
outside stakeholders (even society in general) to inuence corporate practises.
Media scrutiny, divulgence of nancial statements, shareholder activism and reg-
ulators are all elements that can directly inuence rm behaviour. Moreover,
well-functioning markets impose some dicipline on rms. Market competition
(contestable markets), the managerial labour markets and the mergers & ac-
quisitions market are all factors that are subject to market dynamics and can
inunce managers behaviour.
Media Scrutiny
Although media scrutiny is a potentially e¤etive corporate governance tool, it
is, of course, not one available in all countries.12 As we will discuss in more
11Deakin & Konzelmann (2004) also note that the UKs Higgs Review of Non-Executive
Directors (Higgs, 2003) similarily misunderstood Enrons collapse as being due to a failure of
monitoring.
12See Reporters without Borderss (2012) Press Freedom Index 2011/12, for example.
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detail in Part III of the thesis, out of Russia, India, China and the UK, both
Russia, and in particular China, currently censor and control their media. This
notwithstanding, media pressure may even have had an impact in Russia. Dyck,
Volchkova & Zingales (2008) nd in their 1999 to 2002 study, that the Hermitage
Fund in Russia, headed by William Browder, used the Anglo-American media
to pressure the Russian autorities and companies into improving corporate gov-
ernance standards in targeted companies with some e¤ect.13
Dyck and Zingales (2003) suggest that media and social control are linked
and that they serve an essential function in reducing agency risk in companies.
Berglöf & Claessens (2006) note that in some countries (notably not Russia,
India or China, on the basis of the information gather through the eldwork and
discussed in Part III), social norms act as the rst line of defence against poor
corporate governance practises, with formal regulations becoming a secondary
tool. However, for social preassure to be e¤ective in a corporate setting, access to
a relatively free media is essential. Baron (2006) observes that a free media can
conduct their own investigations but that it also provides pressure groups with
a cost e¤ective way of communicating with the general public. In Friedmans
(1999, Ch. 8, cited by Baron (2006)) study of activist driven ecological boycotts,
22 cases out of 24 were aimed at the news media. Coyne & Leeson (2004:40) posit
that a free media is one of the tools needed to generate economic development,
as a free media is critical for shifting games of conict to games of coordination.
Shareholder Activism
Becht, et al. (2010) dene shareholder activism as shareholder actions aimed
at inuencing rm boards and management behaviour. There are a range of
actions available to shareholders in their endeavour to promote rm changes,
as contained in this quote refering to the seminal work of Hirschmann (1970),
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:
Actions range from threatening the sale of shares (exit), letter
writing, meetings with management and board, to asking questions
at shareholder meetings and the use of corporate voting rights. Un-
der a common denition, an activist shareholder is a shareholder
who tries to change the status quo through voice,without a change
in control of the rm (Gillan and Starks, 1998). Becht, et al.
(2010:3094)
Moreover, it may be that di¤erent shareholder groups prefer di¤erent ac-
tivism strategies. Klein & Zur (2009) conclude that hedge funds tend to focus on
more protable companies than other private activists in the US. Additionally,
13Hermitage Capital Management: http://hermitagefund.com/#
Browder (2011), in the Wall Street Journal, notes that due to his campain to increase
transparency in the Russian corporate world, he was banned form entering Russia in 2005.
Moreover, he allege that $230 million was stolen from his company in Russia by o¢ cials and
his lawyer was later found dead in prison.
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hedge funds target cash ow agency costs, as oppose to other private activists,
who target changes in the companys investment strategies. Del Guercio, Wallis
& Woidtke (2008) exam 150 just vote no or withhold the vote campaigns
from 1990 to 2003 in the US. These are relatively new and low cost shareholder
activism strategies used to shame boards into aligning their actions more closely
with shareholder interests. Del Guercio, Wallis & Woidtke nd that evidence
would suggest that the strategy can be successful under some circumstances; the
strategy is found to be e¤ective in pressuring boards into either ring underper-
forming CEOs or taking other remedying action. However, activist campaigns
focused more on principles of corporate governance are not normally success-
ful. Del Guercio, Wallis & Woidtke also note that these campaigns may have
a positive spillover e¤ect on other companies in the portfolio of the activists,
when these companies observe the campaign and take corrective measures in
their own organisation.
Classic corporate governance theory would argue that a single large block-
holder will have the most inunce over rm strategies, as the single large block-
holder has an incentive to exersice their voice rather than exit (Edmans &
Manso (2011)). Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009:3941) similarily nd that block-
holders with a larger block size, board membership, direct management involve-
ment, or with a single decision maker are associated with larger e¤ects on cor-
porate policies and rm performance.And yet, as Edmans & Manso note, most
rms have a fragmented ownership structure, with multiple small blockholders.
This ownership fragmentation gives rise to free-rider issues and reduces the in-
centive to voiceconcerns. On the other hand, the fragmentation may discipline
managers through threat of exit. When shareholders express their dissatisfac-
tion through competitive trades, more information is priced into the equity.
Palmiter (2002:1437-38) suggests that larger sharesholders have been success-
ful in inuencing company strategies through the threat (actual or implied)
of selling their holdings and driving down the price of the targeted company.
Moreover, Aggarwal, et al. (2011:25) nd that institutional investors are able
to improve corporate governance practises in other countries when they invest
internationally, beyond the e¤ect of government regulations.
Yet, shareholder activism has not been uniformly seen as e¤ective in the
corporate governance literature. Black (1998:459) laments the perceived lack of
activist commiment by US institutional investors and notes:
A small number of American institutional investors, mostly pub-
lic pension plans, spend a trivial amount of money on overt activism
e¤orts. They dont conduct proxy ghts, and dont try to elect their
own candidates to the board of directors. Legal rules, agency costs
within the institutions, information costs, collective action problems,
and limited institutional competence are all plausible partial expla-
tions for this relative lack of activity. The currently available evi-
dence, taken as a whole, is consistent with the proposition that the
institutions achieve the e¤ects on rm performance that one might
expect from this level of e¤ort - - namely, not much.
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Regulatory Framework
Regulators, govermental bodies and self-regulating organisations, play an inte-
gral part in external corporate governance mechamism through monitoring and
controlling rm behaviour. Black Kraakman & Tarassova (2000), for example,
suggest that one reason why the Russian privatisation process of the 1990s re-
sulted in very poor corporate governance standards, was that the regulators
were simply too inexperince in overseeing and controlling the rms.
Becht, Bolton & Röell (2002) suggest that there are at least two reasons why
regulators are needed in the markets. Firstly, if it was left to the founder or
the shareholders to dictate the rules governing the company, conicts of inter-
est would arise and result in ine¢ cient rules. For example, as noted by Becht,
Bolton & Röell, antitakeover defenses would be one area of conict between
the di¤erent agents. The founder, or even shareholders, may want strong anti-
takeover defenses to maximise their benets from a takeover, which in turn may
excessively reduce hostile takeover activity. It may also be that shareholders
will look to increase their benets from a takeover, at the expense of employees
and other creditors. Secondly, even if a framework could be design to incentivise
rms to produce e¢ cient rules, managers or owners could easily alter or break
the rules ex post facto. A fragmented shareholder ownership will not have the
incentives to encur costly rm monitoring, that is, shareholders are faced with
a collective action problem, which would be alleviated by the presence of a reg-
ulator. However, Klapper & Love (2004) nd that companies in countries with
especially weak shareholder protection can, to some extent, improve shareholder
rights on a rm level. However, Klapper & Love continue to note that rms
cannot fully overcome the lack of strong enforcement and e¤ective legislation.
Regulators, of course, operate within a wider legal and judicial framework.
La Porta, et al. (2000:24) argue that a legal approach is key to improving
corporate governance:
Financial markets need some protection of outside investors,
whether by courts, government agencies, or market participants them-
selves. Improving such protection is a di¢ cult task. In part, the na-
ture of investor protection, and more generally of regulation of nan-
cial markets, is deeply rooted in the legal structure of each country
and in the origin of its laws. Marginal reform may not successfully
achieve the reformers goals. In part, the existing corporate gover-
nance arrangements benet both the politicians and the entrenched
economic interests, including the families that manage the largest
rms in most countries in the world. Corporate governance reform
must circumvent the opposition by these interests. [...] It can take
the form of opting into more protective legal regimes or introduc-
ing more radical changes in the legal structure. The integration of
world capital markets makes such reforms more likely today than
they have been in decades.
45
Contestable Markets
Baumols (1982) seminal paper on contestable markets posits that there are
markets which contain a small number of participants, and yet, display all the
characteristics of a perfectly competitive market (due to the threat of rm en-
try).14 To qualify as a contestable market three key requirements must be met:
 Market entry and exit is free
 No sunk costs
 All rms must have access to the same technology
Baumol notes that, in the same way as perfectly competitive markets, con-
testable markets do not exist in the real world, although there may be industries
that come close to displaying perfect competition chareteristics. [...] perfect
contestability, then, serves not primarily as a description of reality, but as a
benchmark for desirable industrial organization [...]Baumol (1982:2).
Allen & Gale (2000) nd that the threat of takeovers in the UK and the US is
often seen as an incentive for managers to act in the best interest of shareholders,
while in, for example, Germany and Japan, banks are seen as ensuring good
corporate governance practises. However, Allen & Gale suggest that a broader
view is needed to understand rm agency issues. Companies in compatitive
markets need good managers with initiative to compete and move the company
forward. In such a market, Allen & Gale argue that traditional agency is not
valid. Instead of corporate raiders looking to take over the company, the best
companies will be focused on taking over the market. Bertrand & Mullainathan
(2003) suggest that it may be interesting to investigate whether changes in the
takeover legislation would have a di¤erent impact on corporate governace in
more or less competitive industries. Giroud & Mueller (2010:312) may answer
that question using US data:
When we examine which agency problem competition mitigates,
we nd evidence in support of a quiet-lifehypothesis. While capi-
tal expenditures are una¤ected by the passage of the BC laws [busi-
ness combination (BC) laws that weaken corporate governance], in-
put costs, wages, and overhead costs all increase, and only so in
non-competitive industries. Similarly, when we conduct event stud-
ies around the dates of the rst newspaper reports about the BC
laws, we nd that while rms in non-competitive industries experi-
ence a signicant stock price decline, rms in competitive industries
experience a small and insignicant stock price impact.
14For a fuller treatment see Baumol, Panzar & Willigs (1982) book on contestable markets:
Contestable markets: an uprising in the theory of industry structure.
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The Disciplinary Takeover
Although much discussed in the academic literature, and a high-prole corporate
governance mechanism, Becht, Bolton & Röell (2002) note that disciplinary
takeovers are relatively rare (and very costly) occurances, even in the US and the
UK. This is not to say that they cannot act as a disciplinary force in the markets.
Jensens (1986) classic paper on takeovers, nd that the restructuring of both
Phillips and Unocal happened under the threat of takeover action, and resulted
in gains of around 20 to 35 percent in market value.15 Jensen suggests that two
types of companies in particular lend themselves to becoming takeover targets:
poorly performing rms with poor management and exceptionally successful
rms that have large free cash ows which refuse to pay out to shareholders.
Danielson & Karpo¤ (1998) examined 20 US corporate governance takeover
provisions, divided into four categories: external control provisions (e.g., poi-
son pills, also known as shareholders rights plans), internal control provisions
(for instance, supermajority vote requirement, where the company raises the
required level of approval of an action to above the mininum level required by
law), state takeover laws (e.g., freeze-out law, where the state bars the takeover
company from conducting business with the acquired company for a specied
period of time) and other miscellaneous provisions (e.g., condential voting,
where managers and shareholders are only informed of the vote totals).
Jarrell & Poulsen (1987) noteably nd that the announcement of takeover
defences results in a decline in the rms share price. However, Stráskaa &
Waller (2010) posit that low barganing power rms may nd it value-enhancing
to adopt more antitakeover provisions. Meanwhile, Deakin & Singh (2009:32)
argue that:
In summary, contrary to current conventional wisdom, an active
market for corporate control is not an essential ingredient of either
company law reform or nancial and economic development. The
economic and social costs associated with restructuring driven by
hostile takeover bids, which are increasingly seen as prohibitive in the
liberal market economies, would most likely harm the prospects for
growth in developing and transitional systems. Developing countries
simply cannot a¤ord the burden of the extremely expensive, and hit
and miss system of management change that takeovers represent.
Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) posit, in Section 2.3.1 on globalisation,
that corporate governance is converging globally. They posit that regulation
of takeovers will follow suit and the US (which is currently more pro-defence)
will either converge to the European model (inclined to limit takeover defence
options), or vice versa.
15Phillips: www.philips.com
Unocal merged with Chevron Corporation in 2005: www.Chevron.com
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2.4 Conclusion
As we noted in the beginning of the chapter, persistent deviation from e¢ cient
markets should not exist, as such anomalies should be countered by arbitrage. In
e¢ cient markets investors should not earn above-average risk adjusted returns.
However, as discussed, various practises, such as insider trading (which would
seem to be an issue in all three countries, based on the evidence gathered during
the eldtrips), can make markets ine¢ cient.
Although we can trace corporate governance and agency problems back to
Adam Smith (1776), it remains a topical issue. As the world becomes increas-
ingly globalised, new corporate governance issues will arise. For example, when
we consider convergence of corporate governance standards, it remains to be
seen whether it will be a race to the bottomor a race to the topfor countries.
Although SOX may be misguided in its approach to remedy agency problems,
it has become a template for corporate governance considerations around the
world. This may indicate that market forces are driving improvements in this
area. However, as discussed, corporate governance dynamics are complex issues
and some mechanisms may work better in some countries than in others. For
example, diciplinary takeovers may be a motivational force in the US and the
UK, but they are rarely (if ever) seen in Russia, India or China.
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Chapter 3
Market Ine¢ ciency
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 3, which is the rst chapter in Part II of the thesis, reviews some key
literature on IPO underpricing. This chapter will account for both empirical and
theoretical contributions to the IPO literature. It is a selective review, which
emphasises more the empirical, rather than the teoretical, contributions to the
literature. This balance reect the thesis as a whole. We start by dening IPO
underpricing and reviewing the phenomenon of underpricing in the context of
the US. In particular, we focus on the factors that may have contributed to the
technology pricing bubble in the late 1990s in the US (i.e., the dot-com IPO
bubble in 1999 and 2000) and how IPO pricing factors di¤er between the US
and Canada. Next, we briey discuss the di¢ culty in establishing common,
cross-country factors that may explain underpricing. Selling mechanisms, with
particular emphasis on the bookbuilding mechanism, is discussed next. We
include a step-by-step description of the bookbuilding process, which is not
often seen in the IPO literature. We conclude the chapter by focusing on some
of the key theoritical IPO models; this further helps us understand the dynamics
governing IPO underpricing.
We use IPO underpricing in this thesis as a barometer of market ine¢ ciency
and corporate governance failure on a national level and, as such, it is impor-
tant to cover the key issues within the IPO literature before moving onto the
quantitative analysis, which will complete Part II. Once we have concluded the
quantitative analysis in Part II, we will substantiate and extend our ndings
through eldwork, which will be documented and discussed in Part III of the
thesis. This research strategy is in accordance with the multi-method approach
that, as noted by Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009) in their book on mixed method
research, has become increasingly used in empirical studies, especially since the
early 1990s.
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3.2 Initial Public O¤erings
There are three main anomalies associated with initial public o¤erings (IPOs):
initial underpricing, long-run underperformance and cyclical issue activity. We
will focus on initial underpricing in this thesis. IPO underpricing (Undpri) is
normally measured as the percentage di¤erence between the price the issuing
company sells at (the o¤er price) and the following market price. Most studies
into the area use the rst-day closing prices when detecting and measuring
the underpricing, that is, Undpri = (Issue price = Closing price of first
day of trading)  100: Academics use rst-day returns, initial returns and
underpricing to denote the same phenomenon. This is not to say that all IPOs
are underpriced on the rst day of trading. Ritter & Welch (2002) report that
US IPO data indicates that between 1980 and 2001, 70 percent of IPOs were
underpriced. However, of the remaining 30 percent, 16 percent experienced zero
price movement after one day of trading.
3.3 US IPO Performance: 1980-2011
The US, and to some extent the UK, have traditionally been the main areas
of empirical enquiry when trying to establish why IPO underpricing occurs.1
Later, as the literature became more internationally orientated, it became clear
to analysts that underpricing was a global phenomenon.2 Although this thesis
focuses on cross-country underpricing of IPOs, it may be informative to use a
single country to illustrate some of the key issues associated with IPOs. In this
section, we will initially focus on the US as the basis for review of IPO activity,
and then we will compare it to its neighbour, Canada, in the following section
(3.4).
Average IPO underpricing by country uctuates signicantly from year to
year. Moreover, so does the IPO issuing activity level. As we will discuss in Part
III when it comes to recent events, Russia, India and China have all experienced
relatively slow IPO markets in 2011. Table 3.1 indicates that the US has also
experienced a relatively low level of IPO listings in 2011, compared to most of
the previous years from 1980 onwards.
1See Brennan & Franks (1997) on the UK and Loughran & Ritter (2004) on the US, as
classic papers on the topic of IPO underpricing.
2Engelena & van Essen (2010) provide a current international analysis on IPO underpricing.
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Table 3.1: Average First day Returns and Annual Number of IPOs,
1980 to 2011
Source: Constructed using Ritter (2012) data.
Table 3.1 illustrates IPO proceeds-weighted average underpricing data from
Amex, NYSE and NASDAQ in the year from 1980 to 2011 in the US (see
barchart).3 Additionally, Table 3.1 displays the total number of o¤erings per
year, in excess of 5 dollars per share, within the same time frame for the US (see
scatter diagram). Ritter (2012) divides the period from 1980 to 2011 into sub-
periods: 1980-1989: 6.1 percent average underpricing; 1990-1998: 13.0 percent
average underpricing; 1999-2000: 51.4 percent average underpricing and 2001-
2011: 11.5 percent average underpricing.4 As Table 3.1 shows, the modest initial
returns of the 1980s were followed by more pronounced underpricing during
the 1990s, with an explosion in the levels of both activity and underpricing
occurring during 1999 and 2000. The early 2000s saw a re-adjustment of the US
markets, with a correspondingly sharp drop in both activity levels and levels of
underpricing. From 2003 to 2011 the IPO market has uctuated at around 10
percent to 14 percent in underpricing, with the exception of 2008. Proceeds-
weighted average underpricing for 2008 is 24.8 percent with 21 o¤erings, while
equal-weighted average underpricing is only 6.4 percent, according to Ritter.
3As a matter of denition, proceeds-weighted means that when calculating the yearly
average returns, IPOs are weighted by size.
4Calculations are based on proceeds-weighted returns.
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The signicant di¤erence in the 2008 average is due, in part, to Visa Inc (the
worlds largest IPO at the time) skewing the result. Visa Inc was 28.4 percent
underpriced (oating at $44 per share, while trading at $56.5 at the close of
the rst day of trading). The implication of these observed variations in IPO
activity levels is to suggest that di¤erent models are required in order to explain
IPO initial returns over di¤erent periods, as institutional structures evolve and
market dynamics change.
3.3.1 The 1999-2000 US IPO bubble
The US 1999-2000 IPO bubble may serve to illustrate the complexity of some
of the forces governing underpricing.5 The clear spike around 1999 and 2000 in
Table 3.1 has been linked to the greater dot-com bubble phenomenon. There are
numerous explanations as to why the dot-com period experienced this increase
in underpricing and they may not be mutually exclusive.
Ljungqvist & Wilhelm (2003), in a seminal paper on the dot-com bubble,
attribute the underpricing spike to changes in the issuing companiescharacter-
istics (e.g., more technology-driven rms listed) and selling behaviour. CEOs,
venture capitalists (VCs) and investment banks all reduced their equity stakes
signicantly during the tech bubble, while insiders increased the magnitude and
frequency of sales in the secondary market. As the ownership structure became
more fragmented during the bubble period, this reduced monitoring incentives.
Moreover, directed share programs, which were present in 24.7 percent of all
US IPO deals in 1996, rose to 79.2 percent in 1999 and 92.6 percent in 2000.6
The combination of these factors may have reduced the incentive of the issuing
rmsmanagement to minimise underpricing.
Loughran & Ritter (2002) analyse US data from 1990 to 1998 and argue that
a number of factors lead to increased underpricing during hot issueperiods,
such as the period from 1999 to 2000. Combining considerations of prospect
theory and increased agency problems may give rise to increased underpricing.
Loughran & Ritter argue that company managers failed to get upset by signi-
cant underpricing, because they also saw their own net wealth increase (through
retained shares). This coupled with potential agency problems may have given
rise to increased underpricing. Benveniste & Spindt (1989) posit that underwrit-
ers work in the best interest of the issuing company, facilitating price discovery
and nding potential o¤er buyers. However, Loughran & Ritter suggest that
self-interested underwriters may underprice an issue to make it easier to sell (in
line with Baron & Holmstrom (1980)) and manipulate sales commission in order
5See Gri¢ n et al (2011) on the role of institutional investors role in driving up technology
sector equity prices during the 1997 to 2000 period. Speculative bubbles are of course not a
new phenomenon. See for example Goldgar (2007) on the Dutch tulip bubble (1634-37) and
Paul (2010) on the South Sea Company/bubble (1720). Garber (1990) o¤ers a perspective
on three famous bubbles: The Dutch tulip bubble, the Mississippi bubble (1719-20) and the
South Sea bubble.
6Directed share programs: Schemes where family members, friends, employees, suppliers,
VCs and others could buy shares at the IPO o¤er price, potentially increasing the issuers
incentive to underprice.
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to maximise their prots. Smith & Pulliam (2002) report that the National As-
sociation Of Securities Dealers (NASD) was investigating whether Wall Street
rms allocated desirable IPO allocations to favoured investors during the bubble
period in return for inated commissions on other share trades. This also ties in
with laddering, which is further explored by Bradley, et al. (2009).7 Bradley, et
al. examine laddering as a factor in underpricing during the period of 1993 to
2003. They conclude that laddering did play a role in underpricing throughout
this period and particularly during the dot-com bubble. Somewhat surprisingly,
they nd their laddering analysis to be robust for the 2001 to 2003 period a
perios after the SEC had increased IPO laddering oversight and litigation. On
this basis, Bradley, et al. conclude that laddering may be a contributing factor
to underpricing, but not the main source.
In 2001, investors sued dozens of high-prole investments banks and broker-
age rms alleging that they had inated IPO after-market prices in hundreds
of tech companies through laddering. It was only in April 2009 that the case
was settled and the investors awarded $586 million, without the defendants
admitting wrongdoing.8
If widespread laddering did exist during the dot-com bubble, it would have
increased underpricing. It may also help to partially explain why top-tier un-
derwriters went from issuing the least underpriced o¤ers (in the 1980s) to being
involved in the highest underpriced o¤ers during 1990s and the bubble period.
Carter & Manaster (1990) and Carter; Dark & Singh (1998) nd that in the
1980s the most prestigious underwriter were associated with less underpricing.
They reason that prestigious underwriters could identify the most suitable and
desirable rms to take public, that is, that the prestigious investment banks
would provide certication, thus reducing the need for underpricing and in-
creasing their fees in the process. However, both the Beatty & Welch (1996)
and the Cooney et al. (2001) papers subsequently nd this relationship to be
reversed at the beginning of the 1990s. This reversal is conrmed by Loughran
& Ritter (2004), who note that higher underpricing in the 1990s, and in partic-
ular, during the dot-com bubble was associated with the top-tier underwriters.
They attribute this reversal to issuers pursuing better analyst coverage (disre-
garding underpricing in order to attract banks with star analysts) and to rms
involvement in spinning (until it was prohibited).9
Bradley, et al. (2009) evaluate the claim that retail sentiment in the after-
market forces up prices to an unsustainable level, resulting in initial underpricing
and long-run underperformance; this behavioural explanation behind underpric-
ing is an hypothesis supported by Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) among
others. Bradley, et al. nd a strong positive correlation between the number
7Laddering is a process whereby the underwriter allocates IPO shares to a specic client
on the condition that the client buys additional shares in the secondary market at a higher
price.
8Jones (2009).
9 IPO spinning is where an underwriter (i.e., an investment bank) o¤ers an allocation of
underpriced shares to a prospective future IPO issuing client with a view to secure the rights
to oat their IPO.
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of small trades (retail investors) and the level of underpricing. However, in the
long run (up to three years) the shares are not found to be underperform. These
conicting ndings by Bradley, et al. would suggest that evidence for the retail
sentimentpersistence during the bubble period is weak, and that the period
was not primarily driven by retail investors over-optimistic behaviour. This
notwithstanding, Loughran & Ritter (2004) analyse the long-run performance
of the 19 IPOs with rst-day returns in excess of 300 percent during the bubble
period. The 19 o¤ers in question did underperform (compared to other dot-com
IPOs) if held until December 2002. In this example, retail sentiment would seem
to t the evidence. Again, this would suggest that investor sentiment did not
play a signicant role during the bubble period, but that it may have inated
prices in some extreme cases.
Lowry, O¢ cer & Schwert (2010, cited by Bradley, et al.) posit that infor-
mation asymmetry can manifest itself through aggregate demand uncertainty,
which is most likely only resolved in the after-market. Lowry, O¢ cer & Schw-
ert note that higher stock market volatility over time and rm characteristics
associated with higher asymmetric information risk (smaller rms and/or rms
with higher beta coe¢ cients) are factors that amplify underpricing. Bradley, et
al. conrm these ndings; however, they note that the beta coe¢ cient may not
serve as a proxy for aggregate demand uncertainty. Rather, the beta coe¢ cient
may reect other, undetectable, rm-specic variables.10
3.4 US - Canada IPO Market Comparison
When comparing the the US and Canadian IPO markets, one might be struck
by the di¤erence in initial returns between the two countries; the US averages
16.9 percent (1960 - 2007) and Canada averages 7.1 percent (1971 - 2006).11
Intuitively, one might expect Canada to be subject to higher underpricing than
the US, all things being equal. The US nancial markets are much deeper and
more liquid markets than are their Canadian counterparts. However, Professor
Suret of Laval University in Canada states that there are several reasons why
Canadian initial returns are signicantly lower than in the US.12
First of all, it is simply impossible to compare Canadian and US IPOs, notes
Professor Suret; they are not the same. Canada has a high proportion of penny
stocks IPOs and they are normally disregarded in academic work. The Toronto
Stock Exchange (TSX) is the de facto source for obtaining IPO data, leaving
other entities uncovered.13
10The beta coe¢ cient is a part of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and measures
systematic risk. Markowitz (1952) laid the foundation for the CAPM. However, it was more
formally developed independetly in a series of articles by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and
Mossin (1966). CAPM was famously criticised by Fama & French (1992).
11See chapter 4 (Table 4.1) for the full data set, which is obtain from Loughran, Ritter &
Rydqvist (2008).
12From personal communication with Prof Suret of Laval University on the 4th of April
2009.
13The Toronto Stock Exchange: www.tmx.com
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Suret goes on to observe that many large Canadian IPOs are often falseand
associated with very small initial returns; this further complicates comparisons
with other countries, as they are often included in cross-national studies. Since
these falseIPOs tend to be large, they inuence weighted average initial returns
severely. They arise due to changes in statue of large corporations, not as a prot
maximisation IPO exercise. These changes in status often result from a move
from a mutual to a public company, from privatisation and, most commonly,
from the transformation of traditional companies into income trusts.14
The Canadian underpricing gure quoted in Table 4.1, is derived from two
sources. Data from 1984 to 2002 was obtained from an article by Kryzanowski,
Lazrak & Rakita (2005). Their nal sample of 359 IPOs from the TSX is
well described, however, they exclude penny stocks, amongst others. However,
income trusts are not mentioned as being excluded from the sample. The average
year, in the sample time frame, saw approximately 19 new companies oating
on the TSX. The sample of 276 companies from 2003 to 2006 is from Dealogic,
obtained by Ritter. In this second sample the average number of IPOs has risen
to 69 per year - clearly a signicant increase. The composition of the second
sample is not explained further in the original source, however, it is possible
that the sample composition has changed considerably - potentially biasing the
overall ndings toward a lower average.
Suret also notes that Canada did not experience the dot-com IPO bubble,
which led to massive underpricing during 1999 and 2000 in the US.
Another reason for the di¤erences in IPO pricing between the US and Canada,
may be that in Canada, smaller and more risky companies (entrepreneurial ven-
tures) are restricted from using IPOs to raise funds; they utilise reverse mergers
instead. Carpentier & Suret (2009) nd that the security regulations in place
to prevent new ventures entering the stock market, and hence protect investors,
are justied. This is due to the fact that the reverse merger companies are
found to be of lower quality, without growth potential and, ultimately, that
they signicantly underperform as investment vehicles.
Lastly, on a regional note, the province of Quebec (two other provinces fol-
lowed later) implemented a tax credit, in 1979, in order to encourage retail
investors to provide more capital to the IPO market, notes Suret. The Quebec
Stock Savings Plan (QSSP) ran until 2003. It was later revised and replaced in
2005 by the SMB Growth Stock Plan. Bédard, Coulombe & Paquette (2005)
nd that there is a signicant negative correlation between the QSSP and the
degree of initial returns. Thus, the QSSP is found to reduce the cost of capital
for the companies eligible for QSSP support. However, the investors are the
agents reaping the largest tax advantage from the scheme. Carpentier & Suret
(2006) also nd that companies benet from the QSSP arrangement; again, can-
celling out underpricing. Cormier & Suret (1997) note that the QSSP scheme
is more e¤ective in reducing underpricing in small companies. However, smaller
companies that listed under the QSSP scheme performed very poorly in the
14See, for example, Anand & Iacobucci (2011) income trusts in Canada. Anand & Iacobucci
note that these publicly-traded trusts have become a popular as nancial instruments in recent
years.
56
after-market. Indeed, both investors and brokers were unable to correctly price
the shares oated under the QSSP, resulting in systematic overvaluations (cited
by Carpentier & Suret, 2006). Furthermore, evidence would suggest that dur-
ing the 1980s underpricing completely disappeared on the QSSP-backed shares.
In contrast, during the same period non-QSSP IPOs were found to still have
signicant underpricing15 . From 1982 to 2002 69.3 percent of the QSSP IPOs
were clustered around the period from 1985 to October 1987. Consequently,
the study could not be extended beyond 1992 due to signicant changes in the
issues over time.
3.5 Justied IPO Underpricing
Ritter & Welch (2002) look at US IPOs covering the period from 1980 to 2001,
noting average underpricing to be 18.8 percent for the entire period. However,
the daily market return averaged 0.05 percent, which is a signicantly smaller
return on investment. The contrast between the everyday average returns and
average underpricing raises the question: Why are IPOs expected to reward
investors more than the average market return?
To understand how widespread extraordinary underpricing is in the US and
internationally, we would need to know when the valid risk premium stops and
extraordinary prots starts. Loughran & Ritter (2004) see asymmetric infor-
mation as the underlying cause of underpricing. They note that if asymmetric
information is counteracted, underpricing will be no more than several percent
(Loughran & Ritter, 2004: 8). They go on to conclude that if underpricing
exceeds this level, then prot maximisation is not the main objective and un-
derwriters are not fully supporting the issuer.
3.6 International Di¤erence and Underlying Fac-
tors
All countries, as far as it is known, have exhibited IPO underpricing. Prot
maximisation is normally taken as the key motivation behind the IPO o¤er.16
However, when considering country di¤erences, it is helpful to keep in mind that
IPOs can, and do, serve other purposes (e.g., political objectives, inuencing and
corruption).17 As we will discuss further in Part III, the investment climates
and growth trajectories of Russia, India, China and the UK di¤er considerably.
Take, for example, the ow of information in the di¤erent countries. In the UK,
15Suret, Cormier & Lemay (1990) found Ontario IPOs from 1979 to 1985 to be underpriced
by an average of 12 percent. In addition, Bédard; Coulombe & Paquette (2005) state that non-
QSSP shares form Quebec averaged 17.8 percent in underpricing. Both cited by Carpentier
& Suret (2006).
16See Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) on the topic.
17For a comprehensive study on the economic and political objectives in privatisation IPOs
see Jones; Megginson; Nash & Netter (1999). Spinning (bribery) is one example of undue
inuencing that is covered by Liu & Ritter (2010) among others.
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where we have a mature and well developed nancial market, we also have a
long tradition of our free press actively seeking out and reporting on corporate
governance issues. On the other hand, press freedom is signicantly curtailed
in Russia, and the press is sophistically censored and controlled in China. In
India, the press became free in the early 1990s and it has proven instumental in
disseminating a number of corporate governance scandals.
The conundrum of US IPO underpricing is what most IPO literature has
focused on. A long and innovative list of (mainly US) models has been devel-
oped to explain why, on average, a signicant amount of money has been left on
the table by issuing companies. However, the driving forces behind US initial
returns may not be directly transferable to other countries; this further compli-
cates matters. This is something also noted by Jenkinson & Ljungqvist (2001),
as they comment that some factors behind US underpricing are noticeably ab-
sent in other countries; certain regulatory and institutional assumptions about
the stock market in US models, are country specic and do not lend them-
selves to explaining underpricing on a global scale. Tinics (1988) model on
legal liabilities, for example, may describe the US well. However, in many other
countries, issuing companies and their underwriters experience insignicant eco-
nomic risk of being sued, yet underpricing still occur (Ljungqvist, 2007). This
notwithstanding, some US observations may still aid us in better understanding
underpricing on an international scale.
There are not many papers dedicated to the issue of international di¤erences.
In one of the most inuential papers on the topic, Loughran, et al. (1994) suggest
that the international di¤erence in IPO underpricing could be explained through
a number of variables. Contractual mechanisms form the basis for their analysis
of this issue. They also suggest that there may be underlying factors inuencing
the IPO pricing process. IPOs can, for example, be seen as a political tool
in privatisations, prot maximisation, corruption or tax avoidance (Rydqvist
(1997) notes that untill 1990, IPOs were used as a tax avoidance tool in Sweden)
depending on country specic circumstances.18
In contrast, other research has taken a more regional approach in analysing
the underlying reasons for cross-country di¤erences; for example, Fung, et al.
(2004) stress that the subscription costs incurred by investors in Asia are a
contributing factor in international IPO underpricing discrepancies (as opposed
to US and European markets). In Asia, investors are required to deposit sub-
scription funds upfront when bidding for IPOs. These funds are inaccessible to
the investor leading up to the stock allocation and do not accure interest rate,
thus inicting both nancial and opportunity costs. These drawbacks are accen-
tuated by the fact that oversubscribed IPOs will return funds to unsuccessful
bidders, with a time delay of between one and three weeks without interest
payments on the capital.
18See Jones, et al. (1999) for an extensive analysis of IPO privatisation issues.
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3.7 Selling Mechanisms
One important issue in the pricing of IPOs is the actual mechanism used to
establish the IPOs market value. Jagannathan & Sherman (2006), among oth-
ers, note the di¤erent pricing e¤ects stemming from the three selling/pricing
mechanisms: xed price, auctions and bookbuilding. Today, as noted by Ja-
gannathan & Sherman, the bookbuilding mechanism is the most popular tool
to price IPOs across the world. The four countries under particular considera-
tion in this thesis, Russia, India, China and the UK, all use bookbuilding. We
will now briey discuss two of the most popular pricing mechanims, xed price
and auctions, before focusing in more detail on bookbuilding. The bookbuild-
ing process, where the investment bank (underwriter) undertakes activities to
establish the market value of the issuing rm, is a fascinating procedure. The
actual stages of the process are not often documented or discussed in the IPO
literature, however we list the seven stages here and briey discuss some of the
key issues.
Fixed priced o¤ers (also known as best e¤ort contracts) were the traditional
way to take a company public (apart from in the US and Canada, where book-
building has always been the prefered modus operandi). The price is set before
the demand curve has been established for the o¤er and marketing activities
are limited; in general, road shows are not used to promote these o¤erings.19
As a result, this method is normally associated with the greatest degree of un-
derpricing among the three methods. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) observe
that if there is considerable uncertainty regarding the value of the company,
this method could ensure a successful IPO; underwriters may not be willing
to take the subscription risk or their fees would be prohibiting. By setting a
su¢ ciently low o¤er price and shouldering the subscription risk themselves, the
issuing company increases their chances of a successful otation. Hence it is
a more self-reliant method. Jagannathan & Sherman suggest that the xed
price mechanism also works better in smaller issues (less underwriter fees and
fewer investors required) and that xed price o¤erings may be the most e¤ective
method in developing countries as it is less vulnerable to agency problems.
Although auctions were rst introduced in most countries during the 1980s,
with more taking up auctions in the 1990s, they ultimately lost out (for the
most part within years) to the xed price method and bookbuilding.20 Of the
three possible pricing mechanisms, auctions are associated with the least de-
gree of underpricing; there may be a simple explanation for this. Jenkinson
and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that auctions are inherently disadvantaged in dis-
covering price sensitive market information when compared to bookbuilding.
This may mean that issuing companies that are easier to value will choose auc-
tions and that the companies with more valuation uncertainty will choose the
bookbuilding process.
19The road show is predominantly used by underwriters to gauge investor demand. Since the
o¤er price, in a xed price mechanism, is set from the outset a road show becomes somewhat
redundant.
20Jagannathan & Sherman (2006).
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Regardless, auctions have fallen out of favour in most countries. It is dif-
cult to say why this has happened. One line of argument, put forward by
Degeorge, Derrien & Womack (2007) suggests that the more expensive book-
building method o¤ers quid pro quo benets for the issuing company, mainly in
the form of increased positive research coverage by the lead underwriter. They
linked this argument to a popular paper by Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001),
which nds that the primary factor behind switching underwriter for US com-
panies issuing a Seasoned Equity O¤ering (SEO) was to obtain more research
coverage, not to reduce underpricing. This line of argument would suggest that
issuing rms and underwriters are in collusion, manipulating the market to their
own benet.
Another explanation, more concerned with the inherent aws of auctions,
has been advocated by Jagannathan & Sherman (2006). They note that all
three types of pricing mechanisms have deciencies and are open to the risk of
undersubscription. They argue, however, that the xed price method should
replace auctions as it is more stable and can better control for risk. More-
over, in more developed countries, the bookbuilding process should replace the
xed price method as it facilitates better price discovery and o¤er discriminate
investor allocation.
3.7.1 Bookbuilding
Bookbuilding (also known as rm commitment contracts) has now become the
standard method of oating IPOs in most countries, including Russia, India
and China. Although in the case of China, the IPO process is greatly inu-
enced by the government, as we will discuss in more detail in Part III of the
thesis. Indeed, as of 2006, it is the dominant pricing mechanism in 34 out of 46
countries surveyed by Jagannathan & Sherman (2006). Bookbuilding has the
potential to increase market e¢ ciency if implemented correctly and honestly.
Benveniste & Spindt (1989) famously demonstrate that underwriters can facil-
itate the information/price discovery process and thereby reduce the need for
underpricing. This is in contrast to Baron & Holmstrom (1980) who assume
underpricing to be a by-product of agency problems; self-interested underwrit-
ers increase underpricing to minimise their sales costs/e¤orts. Both models
may hold in di¤erent circumstances. Jagannathan & Sherman (2006) note that
underwriters are gatekeepers in the bookbuilding process. In countries with
little banking oversight or competition, banks may face a moral hazard problem.
Bookbuilding lends itself more to well regulated countries where banks have suf-
cient discretion to work independently, and yet, are held accountable for their
actions. A surprising amount of nancial misconduct has come to light in resent
years in the US IPO market, highlighting the fact that agency problems may
still be present in even the best-regulated countries.
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The BookbuildingProcess
To better understand some of the dynamics that drive the IPO pricing process,
it may be helpful to briey examing the bookbuilding process. The process can
be broken down into seven distinct stages for the U.S.21 Every stage presents its
own unique issues and is open to potential conict between the market agents.
It has proven a very successful way of taking rms public, but the process is
vulnerable to abuse, which may in turn give rise to market ine¢ ciencies.
The IPO process starts with a bake-o¤or beauty contestbetween di¤erent
investment banks. The lead underwriters reputation, expertise, analyst cover-
age, fees and company valuation are essential elements in this selection process,
note Ellis, Michaely & OHara (2000). However, Blodgets (2012) fascinating
behind-the-scenes article on the competition between Morgan Stanley and Gold-
man Sachs to become the lead underwriter on the 2012 Facebook IPO otation,
suggests that the selection process in fundamentally relationship driven. Blod-
get posits that Morgan Stanleys success in the tech IPO sector started with
their successful bid for the LinkedIn oatation, where Morgan Stanley outma-
noeuvred Goldman Sachs.
In sucking up to LinkedIn before the IPO, Stanford [Managing
Director, Goldman Sachs] and Goldman [Sachs] also made three key
mistakes.
First, they entrusted the LinkedIn relationship to a relative peon:
Stanford was merely the head of Goldmans Global Internet group,
whereas Grimes [Managing Director, Morgan Stanley] was the head
of Morgans whole technology group. Theres nothing that tells you
[more] about a rms commitment to your company than the rank
of the banker assigned to you.
Second, Stanford sucked up to the wrong guy: He schmoozed
LinkedIns founder and board member Reid Ho¤man instead of the
companys CEO Je¤Weiner and CFO Steve Sordello, both of whom
played a big role in the decision.
Third, Goldman got there too late.
For more than a year leading up to LinkedIns IPO, Michael
Grimes and Morgan had been doing favors for LinkedIns executives
analyzing parts of their business, showing them deals, helping them
with their nance operations all the while building a relationship.
Goldman, meanwhile, showed up right before the IPO and said,
basically, Hi, were Goldman hire us.(Blodget, 2012:3)
Underwriters have been observed to initially set one valuation, only to adjust
the o¤er price downwards at a later stage; this is known as bait & switch.
Underwriter fees have been subject to some scrutiny and discussion in resent
years. If the underwriter market were competitive, fees would be expected to
21The bookbuilding process may vary somewhat in timing and stages between di¤erent
countries, depending on their regulatory framework. This bookbuilding framework is based
on Ellis, Michaely & OHara (2000), modied and extended using other sources.
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converge to a low denominator. However, fees have been remarkably similar,
and high, among underwriters, something documented by Chen & Ritter (2000).
They nd that, in the US, fees (i.e., gross spreads) would often be precisely seven
percent. Hansen (2001) notes that the Chen & Ritter paper, The Seven Percent
Solution, resulted in both in a class action lawsuit against 27 banks for not
competing on price and a Department of Justice investigation into underwriter
collusion. Interestingly, as mentioned ealier, Krigman, Shaw & Womack (2001)
nd that of the companies that change underwriters for their seasoned equity
o¤ering (SEO), higher underwriter reputation and more analyst coverage are
cited as the main reason for switching, not, maybe surprisingly, underpricing.
After choosing the lead investment bank, a letter of intent is produced. It
outlines the agreement between the parties, including terms and conditions;
specing the fees (as mentioned, usually seven percent) and setting the lock-up
period for company insiders (usually 180 days). The letter of intent provides
the underwriter with an insurance policy in case the issuing company decides
to withdraw. However, it may also be that the underwriter looses faith in the
issuer during the process and wants to terminate the IPO process if, for example,
the issuers nancial position deteriorates or other new negative information
comes to light. This, again, is something that can be covered in the letter.
Typically, the letter also allows for an extra 15 percent of stocks to be issued
by the underwriter. Known as an overallotment option (OAO), it has to be
exercised within 30 days of the otation. The OAO is a clever addition to the
o¤er. If the issue increases in value in the after-market, the investment bank
can issue another 15 percent of shares to cover their short position. The banks
collect another fee for their services and the issuing company raises additional
funds. If the issue performs poorly in the after-market and is treading below the
o¤er price, the investment bank covers its short position on the open market 
again, making a prot. The letter of intent remains valid until the Underwriting
Agreement is implemented at the pricing stage.
The Registration Process is the next stage of the process. The company is
legally required to register with the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in order to ensure transparency. The underwriter has to investigate
the companys nancial position and verify the information provided by the
company to the public, that is, perform due diligence. After the registration
process is completed with the SEC, the document is turned into the preliminary
prospectus or Red Herring for the marketing process. The prospectus will
normally include a ling range (the expected o¤er price range), which is the
rst public signal of the anticipated o¤er price. Benveniste & Spindt (1989) are
the rst to emphasise the importance of the price range in obtaining truthful
pricing information from potential investors. Lowry & Schwert (2004) analyse
the impact of public information on the IPO price range and conclude that the
underwriters do also price all public information into the nal o¤er price (as
one would expect in an e¢ cient market). Further highlighting the international
di¤erences in IPO pricing, Jenkinson, Morrison & Wilhelm (2006) note that the
signicance of the ling range di¤ers between the US and Europe. In European
IPOs, the initial price band is seldom revised and IPOs are normally priced
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within that range. Jenkinson, Morrison & Wilhelm nd that the European
IPO pricing ranges are established at a later stage than in the US, allowing
underwriters to price more information into the range.
The next stage is the Road Show. The prospectus is distributed to sales
people and potential clients, (inter)nationally through the road show. Over a
period of two to three weeks, the road show pitches the company to, predomi-
nantly, institutional investors. Normally, two teams are sent out to meet these
potential investors; each team is headed by either the Chief Financial O¢ cer
(CFO) or the Chief Executive O¢ cer (CEO). The teams representing the issuer
are prohibited from disclosing any new information that has not already been
published in the prospectus. Any new information that were to be mentioned,
should subsequently also be divulged to the regulators and the market as a
whole. Hence, the road show is less about selling and more an opportunity for
the investment bank to gauge the level of interest, with a view to establishing
a nal price before selling allocations at a later date.
After the road show, the underwriter will consider the nal price and alloca-
tion of shares. The day before, or even the same morning of, the IPO oating,
the underwriter and the issuer meet to establish the o¤er price. The order books
that have been lled in during the road show (hence the term bookbuilding)
are of particular importance in striking a fair price. Jagannathan & Sherman
(2006) note that it is crucial to the bookbuilding process that the underwriters
have allocation discretion over the o¤er. Underwriters can underprice an issue
to give investors an incentive to truthfully disclose pricing information, with
underwriters only partly incorporating the new information into the price and
with the understanding that the investor will be allocated some of the IPO for
their information. Hence, allocation control is essential to the process.
Once the IPO has oated, the underwriter takes on a new potential respon-
sibility: price stabilisation. Price stabilisation is a key activity undertaken by
the lead underwriter after the issue, if required (see Chowdhry & Nanda (1996)
Section 1.8.1, on a theoretical argument for the price stabilisation function).
Market interference through using the overallotment option is only allowed at
or below the o¤er price; and only during the rst 30 days. This option, as
described in the paragraph on the letter of intent, is an essential tool in sup-
porting the o¤er price. In addition, underwriters are also know to take naked
short positions in the market, suggested to be around ve percent.22 However,
banks are as perfectly entitled to buy up shares as any other investor, at any
time, in the market to shore up support for any particular share. At this stage,
the investment bank can also impose penalty bids on brokers, to reduce ipping
activity.23
The next stage is research coverage, which is a highly valued commodity in
the nancial market. Liu & Ritter (2011) posit that analyst lustmay partly
drive underpricing in the US. This servicetakes e¤ect 25 calendar days after
22See Chen & Ritter (2000) and Jenkinson & Jones (2007) for seminal papers on this
intriguing topic.
23Flipping: When an investor sells its shares soon after trading has commenced, in order to
make a quick prot.
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the IPO often boosting the share price. Underwriters typically issue a buy
or strong buy recommendation. As discussed in Part III, analysts (even in
London) are pressured not to issue sell recommendations as their bank would
fear the loss of future business from the a¤ected company. In Russia (see chapter
6), one broker mentioned that companies would put strong direct pressure on
analysts that downgrade their investment grade. Bradley, et al. (2003) nd that
from 1996 to 2000, on average, there was a three percent rise in share prices
when the quiet period expires. This is something that Ritter & Welch (2002)
note is di¢ cult to reconcile with an e¢ cient market.
Lastly, the lockup period expries, generally 180 days after the oatation.
Pre-IPO shareholders will now be able to sell their shares on the open market.
Venture capitalists, for example, often see an IPO as a protable exit strategy.
Ofek & Richardson (2000) nd that there is a permanent 1 to 3 percent drop
in the share price and a 40 percent increase in trading volume, as the lockup
period expires. The permanent share price decline is surprising, as an e¢ cient
market should price this expected event into the initial price.
3.8 Key IPO Models
Over the past 30 years a wide range of theories and models have been con-
structed to explain why IPO underpricing occurs. Today, IPO underpricing
theories, endeavouring to capture the impact of potential inuencing factors,
can be grouped into four overarching categories: asymmetric information (AI),
institutional explanations (IE), ownership and control (OC) and, nally, behav-
ioural explanations (BE). As we covered in the section on the US IPO bubble
(3.3.1) and in the pricing comparison between the US and Canada (Section 3.4),
the complexity of the forces driving IPO pricing is substantial. It may be that
we need all four models to more fully capture the IPO pricing dynamics in the
US and internationlly. In Chapter 4, we establish that there is a negative corre-
lation between IPO underpricing and globalisation. In other words, as a country
becomes more integrated into the world community, it should see a decline in
IPO underpricing. We take globalisation as a proxy for transparency, account-
ability and increased information ows. As such, it may not be surprising that
globalisation counteracts underpricing (although, as far as we know, we are the
rst to formally make this connection). This relationship is in accordance with
the AI models that we list below in Table 3.2 and discussed from a theoretical
point of view in Section 3.8.1. As we will discover in more detail in Part III,
pricing factors may vary between countries. For example, in China, the state
controls rmsaccess to the IPO market (adjusting supply as it sees t) and
it has the nal say in approving the o¤er price. In such an environment, it
may be that institutional factors are among the primary pricing determinants.
By contrast, in Russia, the state does not seem to directly interfer in the IPO
process. However, the Russian corporate market is notoriously opaque and AI
models must be among the primary factors in such an environment.
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Table 3.2: Four Models Endeavouring to Explain IPO Underpric-
ing
Asymmetric Information
Rock (1986) The Winner’s Curse: Price discount to keep uninformed investors in the market
Booth & Smith (1986) Underwriter Certification: Prestigious underwriters certify the IPO to reduce
asymmetric information and thereby reduce underpricing
Benveniste & Spindt (1989) Information Revelation: During the bookbuilding process underwriters pay, through
underpricing, investors to truthfully reveal price sensitive information they may possess
Baron & Holmstrom (1980) Principle-Agent Models: Self-interested underwriters underprice an issue to make
it easier to sell
Lowry, Officer & Schwert (2010) Pricing Uncertainty: Underwriters simply misprice issues during bookbuilding process
Jenkinson & Jones (2009) Quid pro quo Deals: Relationship transactions. Bookbuilding may not be informative
Ljungqvist & Wilhelm (2003) Misappropriation: Benefit family, friends, employees, suppliers and in some cases even VCs
Welch (1989) Signalling: High-quality firms underprice their IPO to “leave a good taste in investors’mouths”
(Ibbotson, 1975: 264) for later issues; a signal low-quality firms cannot afford to replicate
Institutional Explanations
Tinic (1988) Lawsuit Avoidance: Underwriters see underpricing as a form of lawsuit avoidance i.e. they
underprice in order to protect themselves from dissatisfied investors
Rydqvist (1997) Taxation, Swedish data: Employee IPOs used as a tax avoidance tool in Sweden until 1990
Taranto (2003) Taxation, US data: Underpricing benefit employees with share options
Ownership and Control
Brennan & Franks (1997) Control & Influence: Managers underprice shares to ensure widely held share ownership
to increase investors’relative monitoring costs and reduce threat of hostile takeovers
through dispersed shares
Stoughton & Zechner (1998) Reduce Agency Costs: Opposite view to Brennan & Franks (1997). Underpricing is used to
encourage monitoring by large investment holders, reducing agency costs. Monitoring costs
will be reflected in the IPO price, making it beneficial to management to facilitate monitoring
Behavioural Explanations
Loughran & Ritter (2002) Prospect Theory: Directors look at the overall net capital gain and do not focus on
the underpricing
Ljungqvist, Nanda & Singh (2006) Investor Sentiment: Overenthusiastic retail investors bid up the price in the initial after market
Liu & Ritter (2011) Analyst Lust: Firms seek to secure all-star analyst coverage when selecting underwriter
Table 3.2 represent the four key categories of IPO models. The asymmetric
information (AI) area, the largest section in Table 3.2, is the most developed.
One of the earliest theories was formed by Rock (1986) and is underpinned by the
assumption that uninformed investors are subjected to adverse selection when
bidding for IPOs. This winners curse, as it has become known, is counter-
balanced by underpricing to keep uninformed investors in the market. Booth &
Smith (1986) focus on underwriter certication. This line of argument is linked
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to the winners curse phenomenon. It was initially suggested that prestigious
underwriters could certify the IPO, so reducing asymmetric information and
thereby cutting underpricing. This seemed to be the case in the 1980s, however
during the 1990s this trend was reversed, according to Beatty & Welch (1996)
and Cooney, et al. (2001). Loughran & Ritter (2004) posit that the Dot-com
bubble distilling the e¤ect seen in the 1990s even further. Benveniste & Spindt
(1989), on the other hand, suggest that underpricing may help to facilitate
information revelation during the bookbuilding process. Through underpricing,
underwriters pay investors to truthfully reveal price sensitive information they
may possess. That is, the underwriter works in the best interest of the issuer
to optimise the issue price. This line of argument has been further extended by
Benveniste & Wilhelm (1990) and Sherman & Titman (2002), amongst others.
On the other hand, in a now classic paper, Baron & Holmstrom (1980) use a
principle-agent model to suggest that self-interested underwriters deliberately
underpriced IPOs to reduce their selling costs. Underwriters are assumed to
have superior knowledge of the IPO mechanism and Baron & Holmstrom posit
that self-interested underwriters may underprice an issue to make it easier to sell.
On a similar note concerning the principle-agent model, it has been suggested
that allocations have been mis-used to benet underwriters or company insiders.
It may have been more of a contributing factor in the 1990s in the US, but the
years 2000 and 2003 saw a tightening of the regulations, which signicantly
reduced the problem, according to Loughran & Ritter (2004). Signalling of rm
quality, with a view to issue a successful SEO, is another type of AI model that
has been promoted by Welch (1989) and Grinblatt & Hwang (1989). However,
Jegadeesh, Weinstein & Welch (1993) found no strong evidence to support this
line of reasoning.
Table 3.2 also lists a number of institutional models that seek to explain
underpricing. Tinic (1988) (supported later by, for example, Hughes & Thakor
(1992) and Hensler (1995)) suggest that underwriters see underpricing as a form
of lawsuit avoidance, i.e., they underprice the issue in order to protect themselves
from dissatised investors looking to be compensated in the courts. Drake &
Vetsuypens (1993) and Lowry & Shu (2002) debate the validity of this model. It
may be said that US enthusiasm for suing is not universal; however, on average,
underpricing is seen across the world. Taxation issues may be another variable
within the institutional models. Taranto (2003) notes that it may not drive
underpricing, but may account for some of its variation.
The ownership and control (OC) models in Table 3.2 are dened by two
opposite models - Brennan & Franks (1997) and Stoughton & Zechner (1998).
Brennan & Franks posit that managers look to retain their control and inuence
over the company by deliberately underpricing the shares. Underpriced shares
will be distributed in small amounts to outsiders. By spreading the ownership
of the shares, managers achieve two benets, namely, reduced monitoring, as it
is relatively more costly to monitor a company if you only hold a small num-
ber of shares and a reduction in the threat of hostile takeovers due to a more
dispersed ownership circle. While Stoughton & Zechner, on the other hand,
suggest that underpricing is used to encourage monitoring by large investment
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holders, reducing agency costs. Monitoring costs will be reected in the IPO
price, making it benecial to management to facilitate monitoring. However,
Hill (2006), using UK data, suggest that underpricing is not driven by ownership
considerations.
Lastly, Figure 3.2 lists some behavioural models which seek to at least partly
explain IPO underpricing. Loughran & Ritter (2002) seek to account, through
Prospect theory, for why managers tend to not get upset about signicant IPO
underpricing. When shares increase in value immediately after the IPO, com-
pany directors also see their holdings increase in price. Here there is a relative
loss in wealth and also a perceived gain in wealth. The rms directors add the
loss and the gain together through mental accounting. They see the net benet
and, consequently, do not worry as much about the missed revenue opportu-
nity. Ljungqvist, Nanda & Singh (2006) suggest that investor sentiment may
explain IPO underpricing. Investor sentiment is manifested in overenthusiasm
about future cash ows and investment risk. Retail investors, irrationally, bid
up the price in the initial after market, which also results in long-run under-
performance. Finally, Liu & Ritter (2011) posit that if issuing companies care
about other matters than just price (for example, research coverage or industry
expertise), the underwriting sector then becomes a series of oligopolies. More-
over, Liu & Ritter extend their reasoning to the underpricing of VC backed
IPOs and conclude that analyst lustmay drive the IPO underpricing of such
rms.24
3.8.1 Asymmetric Information models
Of the four categories listed in Table 3.2, asymmetric information (AI) models
are the most developed in the IPO literature and as such, we will use this frame-
work to further our understanding of the market dynamics. The asymmetric
information models are generally made up of three key players: the issuing com-
pany, the underwriter and the investors (who can again, at times, be divided
into informed and uninformed groups). The AI models assume that one of the
agents knows more than the others and exploits this fact. It became evident
from visiting Russia, India and China, that in these three countries there is a
prominent fourth participant, namely, the state. We will discuss and analyse
government involvement in the nancial markets in more detail in Part III.
In Russia, the government inuence extends greatly into the business world,
through non-transparent companies often owned by government o¢ cials. In In-
dia, the markets are still fairly heavily inuenced by the regulators. Moreover,
for China, the regulators (i.e., the state) control the listings process in some
detail. For instance, the state decides what companies can list and at what
time they can oat on the stock exchange. At the last stage of the IPO process,
the state also has the nal say in approving the listing price.
24See, for example, Black & Gilson (1998) on the role of venture capital (VC) in the US
stock market. Moreover, Reid & Smith (2008), through using a combined method (nance,
economics and accounting), explore VC risk in UK high technology ventures.
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Adverse Selection Models A Brief Comparison
This thesis will solely focus on three adverse selection models within the AI
framework (Rock (1986), Beatty & Ritter (1986) and Chowdhry & Nanda
(1996)), in order to allow for a somewhat detailed examination and explana-
tion of the IPO market seen through these models.
Rock (1986): The Winners Curse Model One of the early pivotal the-
ories in IPO underpricing was famously developed by Rock (1986). This theory
is now known as the winners cursemodel and it is based within the AI frame-
work.25 The winners curse model theorises that some investors have superior
information to that of other investors and the rm itself. In addition, the un-
derwriter plays a neutral role, as an intermediary, in the IPO, since the issue
company is assumed to set the price and shoulder the under-subscription risk. In
assuming that the issuing company takes the under-subscription risk, Rock is in
fact modelling a xed priced o¤er (best e¤ort contracts), as in bookbuilding the
underwriter takes responsibility for undersubscribtion (indeed, the underwriter
directly buys all the IPO shares from the company just before the otation and
adds its fee to the public o¤er price). One function that the underwriter does
perform is certication, that is, through its reputation it signals that the IPO
price is a true reection of the future prospects of the company. However, as
documented by Beatty & Welch (1996) and Cooney, et al. (2001) by the 1990s,
tier one underwriters were no longer o¤ering certication value to their clients
in pricing IPOs.
If an IPO is issued at a price below its true value (so it is underpriced),
the informed investors will rush into the market, crowding out the uninformed
investors. On the contrary, if the IPO is unattractively priced, only uninformed
investors will buy it, which results in uninformed investors being subject to
adverse selection. As we will discover in Chapter 8, The Chinese Dragon, this
is very much the case in China today. The end result would be that uninformed
investors drop out of the market altogether, resulting in undersubscribed IPOs.
To prevent such an occurrence, the solution is to give a nite discount on all
IPOs, to ensure uninformed investors are compensated for the biasedallocation
that exists in the market.
To underline the dynamics within the model, Rock states ve simple as-
sumptions:
1. Informed investors have perfect information regarding the actual value at
which the share will be trading in the after-market, e.
2. Informed investors are not able to sell private information in the market
and also, due to regulatory constraints, borrowing of shares or short selling
is not possible.
3. Informed demand, I, does not exceed the IPOs mean value, e Z.
25The term winners cursewas attached to Rocks model by a subsequent paper by Beatty
& Ritter (1986).
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4. Uninformed investors have uniform expectations regarding the distribu-
tion of e.
5. All investors possess the same utility and level of wealth (here taken to be
1).
The uninformed investors (total number denoted as Nu) are not able to predi-
cate the size of their order after the realisation of e, unlike their informed coun-
terparts. Upholding assumptions (4) and (5), the uninformed investor would
look to invest the same fraction of his wealth (denoted by T and equal to 1), in
a new issue. Since the model explicitly states that short selling and borrowing
is not possible, each investor bids the positive share T  = max(0; T ).
The total dollar investor, Ttot, is then given, where p is the o¤er price, by:
Ttot :=

NuT
 + I; if p < ~v;
NuT
; if p > ~v.
The case where there is no over- or under-pricing expected by informed
investors (that is, p = e) is not explicitly covered by Rock. Presumably this is
because the IPO would be priced on the money,with no great risk of alienating
investors. Indeed, no winners curse would exist in this case.
As discussed, the key to the uctuating demand is whether e is above or be-
low p. Accordingly, the issuer will experience either an under- or over-subscribed
issue. In case e > p, let us denote the probability that an order is lled by b
and in case, if e < p, let us denote the probability by b0 . Further, denote by ~Nu
the number of uninformed orders lled and ~Ni the number of informed orders
lled.
Then, rationing occurs, the issue value is given by
~NuT
 + ~Ni = pZ if b < 1:
Taking expectations, we obtain that either,
bNT  + bI = pZ if b < 1;
or,
b = min(pZ=NuT  + I; 1): (3.1)
Likewise,
b0 = min(pZ=NuT ; 1): (3.2)
When b < b
0
, the probability of receiving an underpriced allocation, e > p,
is at most equal to the probability of receiving an overpriced allocation, e <
p. This phenomenon causes the uninformed investor to adjust downwards the
valuation of a new IPO. As a result, to keep uninformed investors interested
in the IPO, the issuer must factor a price discount into the o¤er price, thus
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compensating uninformed investors for receiving a disproportionate number of
overpriced shares.
The investors are assumed to have rational expectations regarding their po-
tential allocation of under- or over-priced o¤ers. Their allocation beliefs must
equal the actual share distribution, stemming from the allocation mechanism.
By equating investorsbeliefs into the allocation mechanism seen in equations
(3:1) and (3:2), the equilibrium is achieved when
b = min[pZ=NT (b=b0; p) + I; 1] (3.3)
and
b0 = min[pZ=NT (b=b0; p); 1] (3.4)
As the IPO price declines, the probability of receiving an allocation will also
decline, due to the crowding-out e¤ect of informed investors being able to buy up
a larger proportion of the o¤er. Let T (b; p) denote total uninformed investment.
Suppose that b satises equation (3:3), and keep T (b; p) xed while decreasing
the o¤er price. The denominator, which determines b, will not change while
the numerator declines. Hence, probability of lling an individual order when
demand is high decreases. The uninformed investor may be enticed by lower
prices, but will also feel increasingly concerned about not being able to secure
desirable shares.
However, we know that there must be more to the demand function of un-
informed investors, otherwise they would drop out of the IPO market. It must
be shown that uninformed investors increase their investment as the price is
reduced.
Bias rationing is key to understanding the investors bid decisions. Take
the initial market price to be set at the mean value of the shares, e, with
the informed investors not numerous enough to buy up all the shares, even
if they wanted to do so. Moreover, uninformed investors will be reluctant to
submit bids, as they stand to earn the risk-free rate on a small, but risky, asset.
As the IPO price is reduced, more uninformed investors will start to submit
bids. Supply and demand will match up in this scenario and there will be not
rationing. When the IPO is exactly fully subscribed, consisting of uninformed
and informed investors, demand will equal the dollar value of the o¤ering.26
Further price reductions will increase uninformed investor demand, resulting
in competition between informed and uninformed investors, in the good state
of the world. Consequently, in this situation, rationing must be present.
Similarly, price reductions will also entice uninformed investors into the IPO
market, in a bad state of the world where informed investors are not looking
to invest. There will be a point where a su¢ cient price reduction will enable the
underwriter to sell the entire o¤er to uninformed investors. The full subscription
pricewill ensure the sale of all shares irrespectively of the state of the world.
26 Informed investors know it is protable to buy in this state of the world.
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When prices drop below the full subscription price, uninformed demand will
cause rationing in both states. However, importantly, rationing in the good state
relative to the bad state, declines as uninformed investors begin to dominate
the market in both states, the rationing changes will converge. It is now clear
that receiving an allocation as an uninformed investor does not indicate that
informed investors have withdrawn from the bidding.
Since uninformed investors only care about the rationing bias, the closer
the chances are of being allocated shares in the good and bad states of the
world, the stronger the uninformed demand will be. This fact creates a self-
fullling prophecy; as larger demand decreases the bias, which again will increase
demand etc, resulting in a demand explosion when the price falls below the full
subscription price.
Rock (1986) argues that the full subscription price will always exist and he
denes it to be
pfZ = NuT (b(pf ; Nu); pf)
This equation can be substituted into the quantity b(p;N) in (3:3), giving
us:
b(pf ; Nu) = pfZ=(pfZ + I)
The allocation probability, b(p;Nu), in larger markets, is close to the zero
demand probability, b0(p). Hence, the full subscription price must be somewhat
similar to the solution of the equation
b0(p) = pZ=(pZ + I)
which, according to Rock (1986:198), can always be shown to exist.
Beatty & Ritter (1986): Adverse Selection Model Rock (1986) pro-
duced a paper that has shaped research into the IPO underpricing until the
present day. This work is still relevant in forming a foundation for further ad-
verse selection models. Beatty & Ritters (1986) paper di¤ers in two signicant
ways from Rocks contribution. Firstly, it extends the Rock (1986) model by
linking ex ante uncertainty to the level of underpricing, as seen in their Propo-
sition 1:
The greater is the ex ante uncertainty about the value of an is-
sue, the greater is the expected underpricing. (Beatty & Ritter,
1986:216)
Secondly, it integrates another variable into the model, in this case the role of
the underwriting investment bank in ensuring that the underpricing discount
is enforced.
They (citing Rocks original 1982 thesis, chapter II) note that the equilibrium
converges into two states, namely, with (i) zero expected prots for informed
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investors and (ii) zero expected prots for uninformed investors.27 By assigning
the pricing decision to the underwriter, Beatty & Ritter undoubtedly brings
the model more in line with reality. As we discussed in Section 3.7.1, under
bookbuilding, the underwriter is managing the process of determining the IPO
demand and (o¢ cially) pricing the issue accordingly.
The underlying equations behind cases (i) and (ii) suggest, between them,
that all underpricing prots will go to informed investors, due to the winners
curse problem. In reality this is not the case, as uninformed investors are re-
warded, to a certain extend, for free riding. To become informed, aggregate
costs will equal the amount of money left on the table by issuers:
M  c =
1Z
0
Z(e   p)f(e)d = Z[E(e)  p]
Here, M is the number of informed investors, c is the cost per investor to
become informed, n is the number of shares, p is the o¤er price and E(e) is the
expected realised share price.
Hence, the investor who chooses to become informed determines the required
degree of underpricing, E(e)  p. It could be said that the investment in infor-
mation is similar to buying a call option, proting if e > p. The greater the
dispersion of e in the IPO, with everything else being equal, the greater the
potential prot. In other words, the greater the ex ante uncertainty, the greater
the underpricing. Since the cost, c, of becoming informed is xed, the more
ex ante uncertainty the greater incentive investors have to choose to become
informed about the IPO. Hence, there exits a positive correlation between ex
ante uncertainty and IPO underpricing.
The individual company issuing an IPO could be tempted to free-ride and not
set the underpricing at a level where uninformed investors would be induced to
stay in the market. Beatty and Ritter note that underwriters, as repeat players,
have an incentive to ensure that companies consistently underprice su¢ ciently.
A natural equilibrium exists in this relationship. If an underwriter doesnt un-
derprice enough, they will lose potential investors. However, if they underprice
too extensively they will stand to lose future issue business. In short, if they
get the level of underpricing wrong, their reputation will su¤er.
Chowdhry & Nanda (1996): Price Stabilisation Chowdhry & Nanda
(1996) acknowledge the Rock (1986) framework, but they see uninformed in-
vestors being compensated in the after-market, through price stabilisation ac-
tivities as the dominant strategy.28
Underpricing is a blunt and expensive instrument, as informed investors also
prot. By using ex post compensation, it is predominantly uninformed investors
who reap the benets. Beatty & Ritter (1986) likened an investors decision to
27Rocks original 1982 thesis is not publicly available.
28They argue that Rocks model does not incorporate the bookbuilding process; rather
Rocks model is seen as capturing the xed price method.
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become informed to buying a call option.29 Whereas Chowdhry & Nanda see
price stabilisation as a put option, compensating mainly uninformed investors.30
In order to keep them in the market , it is essential for uninformed investors
to know they will not lose in bidding for IPOs. In line with this reasoning,
Chowdhry & Nanda have developed an illustrative incentive compatibility con-
ditionfor inducing uninformed investors to bid:
Z 1
p
a(e   P )f(e)de h(1  s)Z 1
p (S=;K)
a(e)(p  e)f(e)de
+
Z p (S=;K)
0
a(e)(P   e   (S=Z))f(e)dei = 0 (3.5)
In this formula, e is the true value of the share; p is the o¤er price; f(e) is
the density function; s is the fraction of shares that underwriters buys back
to support the share price; Z is the number of shares for sale and S is the total
amount of funds available to stabilise the share price.
Price stabilisation (represented by ) holds a key position in (3:5). However,
in the rst term of the equation (3:5) there is no need for price support, as this
signies expected prots in an underpriced issue.
The overall next term, between the square brackets, signies the expected
total loss to investors if the issue is overpriced, after investors have received the
benets associated with price stabilisation activity. The rst term in the square
brackets stands for the expected loss when the after-market price can be raised
to the o¤er price again, through price support. This scenario relies on the after-
market price not being too low, that is, e > (p   (S=sZ). Here a fraction 
of the shares are bought up in the market and investors are left with amount 1
   of shares. The second term in the square brackets stands for the expected
loss in a situation with greater overpricing. Indeed, in this case underwriters
are unable to bring up the after-market price to the o¤er price again, i.e., ife < (p   (S=sZ). They will spend S amount in the e¤ort, resulting in S=Z
price support per share.
One of the most interesting features is that by setting s to zero (that is,
eliminating price stabilisation), we essentially have Rocks (1986) framework
again. However, Chowdhry and Nanda note that this scenario is not revenue
maximising for the issuing company.31 Indeed, they state in Proposition 1:
The revenue raised by the rm R is increasing in the fraction of
shares  the underwriting syndicate promises to buy back at the issue
price p. (Chowdhry & Nanda, 1996:30)
The simple intuition behind Proposition 1 is that by reducing ex ante ad-
verse selection costs by price stabilisation, less underpricing is required to entice
29Call option: right to buy shares if e > P .
30A put option, or price oor, is more valuable to uninformed participants, as informed
individuals are expected to bid only when the shares are underpriced.
31See Chowdhry & Nanda (1996) for a comprehensive proof.
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investors. Hence greater revenue for the issuing company, with reduced expected
prots for informed investors.
3.9 Conclusion
The US IPO market has experienced signicant uctuations in IPO underpricing
levels since 1980. However, rarely has it experienced average underpricing in
excess of 20 percent, which, as we will discover and discuss in the next chapter,
places the US among the more modestly underpriced countries. It may in fact
be that the US, with its deep, mature and robust markets, provides us with an
international benchmark, against which we can judge whether other countries
are experincing abnormal IPO pricing. However, one notable exception to this
observation was the 1999-2000 US stock market tech bubble. On reection, the
tech IPO bubble may have been the perfect storm: Investment banks becoming
increasingly careless in their rent seeking; overenthusiastic investors looking for
a short-term prot and managers in issuing companies being blinded by the
sudden rise in their wealth (through retained shares).
By examining some of the factors that may partly drive underpricing in this
chapter, it becomes apparent that the pricing of IPOs is a complex process
where underwriters, issuers and investors all have their own agenda. More-
over, the bookbuilding process, widely and successfully used across the world
(including Russia, India and China), is open to abuse by market agents if it
is not correctly regulated and monitored. It is a multifaceted process that is
certainly based on good corporate governance standards to ensure transparency
and accountability. In the Western European and the North America nancial
markets, we may assume that transparency and accountability is a basic re-
quirement for investing in the markets (although there are notable exceptions,
for instance Enron). However, as we will discuss in Part III, this is not the
case in Russia, India and China. Other variables may, in a sense, substitute
for transparency. For example, as the markets are in essence non-transparent
and most investors are not familiar with nancial products in these countries,
the role of intermediate agents (e.g., independent nancial advisors, brokers and
even other family members) is magnied. Investors seem to follow their advise
somewhat blindly. There is also a sense among local investors in these markets
that investing is a game, a lottery. You place your bet and hope for the best.
Which takes us to the theoretical asymmetric information models (Rock (1986),
Beatty & Ritter (1986) and Chowdhry & Nanda (1996)) that we covered in
this chapter. They highlight in a stylised setting the vital role information ows
play in ensuring e¢ cient markets and they account for some of the consideration
made by market participants. Financial markets and emperical models are by
their very nature noisy. The theoretical models covered in this chapter give us
a better idea of what ideal market dynamics may look like, and make it easier
to identify behaviour that goes against this ideal setting when we discuss IPO
dynamics in the quantitative analysis (Chapters 4 and 5) and the qualitative
analysis (Chapters 6, 7 and 8).
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Chapter 4
Exploratory Data Analysis
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 marks the beginning of the quantitative analysis that will be com-
plemented by the qualitative analysis carried out in Part III of this thesis, in
accordance with the multi-method approach where quantitative and qualitative
tools are used to achieve synergy.1 Following the IPO underpricing discussion in
Chapter 3, this chapter carries out an exploratory data analysis (prominent con-
tributions by Hoaglin, Mosteller & Tukey (1983), Martinez, Martinez & Solka
(2010) and Tukey (1977)) on IPO underpricing data and relates IPO perfor-
mance to a number of variables and factors, most notably Drehers (2006) KOF
Index of Globalization. In e¤ect, it serves to develop a vehicle, of a baromet-
rictype, which suggests further investigation on the groundin Russia, India,
China and the UK in Part III of the thesis.
4.2 Data Sources and Summary Statistics
The US, and to some extent the UK, have traditionally been the main areas
of interest when trying to establish why IPO underpricing occurs.2 There are
two key reasons why some slight underpricing may be justied: asymmetric
information and risk bearing. When potential investors are looking to buy
an IPO, they are considering a new, untested product in the markets. They
are taking a liquidity risk; the company managers will often not be known to
equity analysts and the companys nancial records may not be substantial.
Investors will need to become informed about the company, which will require
research expenses that should be covered by the IPO to make it attractive
1See e.g. Bryman (2004) and Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009) on the theory behind the multi-
method approach. Moreover, Buchanan, Chai & Deakin (2012), Chapter 2 and Janssen,
Bousquet, Ostrom (2011) are recent examples of the approach used in the eld.
2See Brennan & Franks (1997) on the UK and Loughran & Ritter (2004) on the US, as
classic papers on the topic of IPO underpricing.
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for informed investors to enter the market. Later, as the literature became
more internationally orientated, it became clear that underpricing is a global
phenomenon.3 However, as we will discover in the following section (4.2.1),
while all major markets are united in displaying average IPO underpricing, the
severity of underpricing varies considerably between countries.
4.2.1 Initial Public O¤ering (IPO) Data
The Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2008) data, which is the key foundation
for the quantitative analysis, and by extension, the eldwork, is graphically
illustrated by the barchart in Figure 4.1. The gure provides a striking image
of the extent of variation in international underpricing. The gure is comprised
of a sequenced listing of countries, with the country with the lowest average
underpricing found at the beginning of the gure, followed by ever-increasing
levels of underpricing. The data illustrated in Figure 4.1 (and subsequently
listed in Table 4.1) is equally weighted, that is, a similar weight is allocated
to each company and each year when calculating the average returns listed
in Figure 4.1 (and Table 4.1). It should be noted that the Loughran, Ritter
& Rydqvist country data vary is sample sizes and sampling periods. We will
discuss this further below Table 4.1.
3Engelena & van Essen (2010) provide a current international perspective on IPO under-
pricing.
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Source: Constructed on Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2008) data. 
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Although there are signicant di¤erences in the sample sizes and the periods
covered, Figure 4.1 makes for interesting reading. At one end of the scale (see
short red bar), with the lowest level of underpricing, we see countries such as
Russia (4.2 percent), Argentina (4.4 percent) and Austria (6.5). At the other
end of the scale (see the long red bars), we have Malaysia (69.6 percent), India
(92.7 percent) and China (164.5 percent) with the most pronounced levels of
underpricing. Not surprisingly, each end of the bar chart requires a di¤erent
explanation. The underpricing levels seen in, for example, India and China, ar-
guably reect di¤erent ine¢ ciencies in resource allocation than those in Russia.
As we will explore in Chapter 6 (Part III), The Russia Bear, Russia saw little
IPO activity during the 1999 to 2006 issue window. The Russian nancial mar-
kets are still shallow and somewhat illiquid. Strong Russian companies tend to
seek listings abroad, to protect their ownership structure from government in-
tervention and to access more liquid markets. In contrast, as we will discover in
Chapters 7 and 8, The India Tiger and The Chinese Dragon respectively, these
markets are considerably more dynamic. All three countries (Russia, India and
China) are faced with corporate governance challenges. However, India and
China have been able to accommodate relatively many large listings on their
domestic markets, a fact that is also reected in the sample sizes in Table 4.1:
Russia (40), compared to India (2,811) and China (1,394). Furthermore, un-
derpricing may not necessarily reect an ine¢ cient market either, as some mild
degree of underpricing may indeed be e¢ cient. IPO shares are by their very
nature unknown entities; the management of the company may not be known
to investors and may not have been previously followed by analysts. There is
an inherent liquidity risk associated with new issues. Moreover, as we will dis-
cover and discuss in Part III of the thesis, in a market such as the Russian one,
with poor company transparency and little minority share holder protection,
the risk of investing in a new issue is magnied. Loughran & Ritter (2004:8)
argue that if asymmetric information is attenuated, or even resolved, underpric-
ing may still exist but they would expect that it would be no more than several
percent. Indeed, a possible international benchmark for e¢ cientunderpricing
may possibly be found through the US (where it stands at 16.9 percent) and
the UK (where it stands at 16.8 percent), clustered together in the middle of
the barchart (see the medium lenght green bars in Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1 is visually e¤ective in illustrating cross-country di¤erences in IPO
underpricing. However, it does not tell the full story. Table 4.1. (below)
provides the reader with the sample sizes and the sampling time periods for
each country.4 Moreover, Table 4.1 lists the specic country IPO underpricing
(or average initial returns) gures.
4Underpricing is calculated as Undpri = (Issue price = Closing price of first day of
trading)  100 Each IPO is equally weighted in the data set.
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Table 4.1: Equally Weighted Cross-country Variations in Under-
pricing
Country Sample Time Avg Initial Country Sample Time Avg Initial
Size Period Returns Size Period Returns
Russia 40 1999-2006 4.2% Indonesia 321 1989-2007 21.1%
Argentina 20 1991-1994 4.4% Philippines 123 1987-2006 21.2%
Austria 96 1971-2006 6.5% Iran 279 1991-2004 22.4%
Canada 635 1971-2006 7.1% Poland 224 1991-2006 22.9%
Denmark 145 1984-2006 8.1% Cyprus 51 1999-2002 23.7%
Chile 65 1982-2006 8.4% Ireland 31 1999-2006 23.7%
Norway 153 1984-2006 9.6% Greece 363 1976-2005 25.1%
Netherlands 181 1982-2006 10.2% Germany 652 1978-2006 26.9%
France 686 1983-2006 10.7% Sweden 406 1980-2006 27.3%
Turkey 252 1990-2004 10.8% Singapore 441 1973-2006 28.3%
Spain 128 1986-2006 10.9% Switzerland 147 1983-2006 29.3%
Portugal 28 1992-2006 11.6% South Africa 118 1980-1991 32.7%
Nigeria 114 1989-2006 12.7% Bulgaria 9 2004-2007 36.5%
Belgium 114 1984-2006 13.5% Thailand 459 1987-2007 36.6%
Isreal 348 1990-2006 13.8% Taiwan 1312 1980-2006 37.2%
Hong Kong 1,008 1980-2006 15.9% Japan 2,579 1970-2007 40.5%
Mexico 88 1987-1994 15.9% Brazil 180 1979-2006 48.7%
United Kingdom 3,986 1959-2006 16.8% Sri Lanka 115 1987-2007 48.9%
United States 12,007 1960-2007 16.9% Korea 1417 1980-2007 57.4%
Finland 162 1971-2006 17.2% Malaysia 350 1980-2006 69.6%
Italy 233 1985-2006 18.2% India 2,811 1990-2007 92.7%
Australia 1,103 1979-2006 19.8% China 1,394 1990-2005 164.5%
New Zealand 214 1979-2006 20.3%
Source: Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2008)
It is clear from Table 4.1 that sample sizes and samplig time periods vary
signicantly between countries, partly reecting their individual activity levels.
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For example, the Russian sample size of 40 (1999-2006), is modest in comparison
to, for example, the Chinese sample of 1,394 (1990-2005) listed companies. On
a similar note, the US, the UK and Japan have large sample sizes and long
sampling periods. The amount of publicly available data for these three markets
is testament to their prominent positions within the nancial world.
Looking at Table 4.1 in more detail, there are some interesting potential
anomalies to be observed. Firstly, and key to this thesis, Russia, India and
China stand out clearly as a cardinal group of interest. Russia (4.2 percent
for 1999-2006), India (92.7 percent for 1990-2007) and China (164.5 percent
for 1990-2005) are all fast growing, developing countries with strong socialist
backgrounds but very di¤erent IPO performances. Russia has the lowest mea-
sured IPO underpricing of all the countries in the table, in contrast to India and
China, which both display overwhelming underpricing. As far as we are aware,
there has not been any academic study into why Russia, India and China di¤er
considerably in their primary markets, and by extension, how their corporate
governance proles are evolving. It is the objective of this thesis to shed light on
the market dynamics and corporate governance issues that govern these three
markets, and to benchmark them against the mature UK markets. The analy-
sis carried out in this chapter, and continued in Chapter 5, is instrumental in
enabling the qualitative eldwork which follows in Part III of this thesis.
Another interesting consideration, outside the scope of this thesis, would be
to add Brazil to the grouping of Russia, India and China, and thus consider the
BRIC group.5 We note that Brazil, with average initial returns of 48.7 percent,
is only three countries removed from India in Table 4.1.
Austria (6.5 percent for 1971-2006) and Switzerland (29.3 percent for 1983-
2006) also stand out in Table 4.1. They both share a land border and are in
many ways integrated, both in terms of trade and nancial services. Yet, with
6.5 percent and 29.3 percent underpricing respectively, they di¤er signicantly
in primary market pricing.
Norway (9.6 percent for 1984-2006) and Sweden (27.3 percent for 1980-2006)
also clearly di¤er, despite the fact that they are similar in many aspects. This
variation may be due to di¤erences in the two countriestax systems. Up until
1990, the prots made by individuals from underpriced IPOs were not subject
to capital gains tax in Sweden. As a result, companies would reward employees
with underpriced IPOs, as a tax-free benet. Rydqvist (1997) note that in 1990,
the Swedish tax authorities made underpricing-related gains subject to income
tax, thereby removing the incentive to allocate underpriced stock to employees.
Underpricing subsequently fell from an average of 41 percent in 1980-1989 to 8
percent in 1990-1994, according to Rydqvist. The previous practise of exempting
IPO capital gains from income tax in Sweden would seem to be a unique (or at
least uncommon) tax arrangement that is not widely reported, that is, it may
not be a factor in other counties experiencing signicant underpricing.
Table 4.1 also encapsulates the complexity of comparing countries. Take,
5The acronym BRIC, which represents Brazil, Russia, India and China, was coined by Jim
ONeill of Goldman Sachs in a seminal 2001 report titled Building Better Global Economic
BRICs.
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for example, the US and Canada. One might be struck by the di¤erence in
initial returns between these two countries, with the US at an average 16.9
percent (1960 - 2007) and Canada at 7.1 percent (1971 - 2006). Intuitively,
one might expect Canada to be subject to higher underpricing than the US,
all things being equal. The US is a much deeper and more liquid market than
its Canadian counterpart. However, as discussed in Chapter 3 with the added
insight of Professor Suret, Laval University, Canada, there are a number of
reasons that may explain the pricing variations between the US and Canada.
4.2.2 Globalisation Data
The KOF Index of Globalization 2004, found in the updated tables of 2010 and
made publicly available by Dreher (2006), is another important variable in this
thesis. It should be noted that the scores represent the overall globalisation
score for each country. The overall globalisation score is a composite of eco-
nomic (37 percent weight), social (39 percent weight) and political (25 percent
weight) globalisation.6 Please refer to Tables 1.1 (Economic), 1.2 (Social) and
1.3 (Political) in Chapter 1, for a breakdown of the specic sub-variables and
their respective weight allocations.7 Table 4.2 contains the globalisation scores
for the same countries listed in Table 4.1. Moreover, as we will be comparing
globalisation and IPO underpricing in more detail in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, the
IPO underpricing gures from Table 4.1 have been reproduce in Table 4.2 to
facilitate a brief overview of these two data sets.
6The reader may note that the sum of the weights for economic, social and political glob-
alisation comes to 101 in total. In private correspondence with Professor Dreher (June 25,
2012), he noted that it is due to the gures being rounded.
7These variables, with slight adjustments, serve as the foundation for the semi-structured
eldwork interview agenda on globalisation. The three other key areas in the eld work are
corporate governance, institutional structure and competitive strategy.
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Table 4.2: Cross-country Variations in the 2004 Globalisation In-
dex and Underpricing
Country Glo Avg Initial Country Glo Avg Initial
Index Returns Index Returns
Russia 67.7609 4.2% Indonesia 55.4415 21.1%
Argentina 62.784 4.4% Philippines 59.2485 21.2%
Austria 91.519 6.5% Iran 36.1661 22.4%
Canada 88.2234 7.1% Poland 80.1585 22.9%
Denmark 85.1532 8.1% Cyprus 77.1051 23.7%
Chile 72.2729 8.4% Ireland 85.8295 23.7%
Norway 83.0363 9.6% Greece 79.9707 25.1%
Netherlands 90.6375 10.2% Germany 80.5798 26.9%
France 84.8179 10.7% Sweden 89.8007 27.3%
Turkey 64.1083 10.8% Singapore 88.1856 28.3%
Spain 85.2434 10.9% Switzerland 90.0058 29.3%
Portugal 86.6914 11.6% South Africa 62.4266 32.7%
Nigeria 49.7332 12.7% Bulgaria 70.8657 36.5%
Belgium 92.7453 13.5% Thailand 61.782 36.6%
Isreal 75.0512 13.8% Taiwan 60.8889 37.2%
Hong Kong 88.1856 15.9% Japan 62.3963 40.5%
Mexico 59.6226 15.9% Brazil 60.3482 48.7%
United Kingdom 80.2023 16.8% Sri Lanka 49.618 48.9%
United States 77.6931 16.9% Korea 63.7532 57.4%
Finland 86.3704 17.2% Malaysia 77.9456 69.6%
Italy 80.3793 18.2% India 46.9542 92.7%
Australia 82.929 19.8% China 60.8889 164.5%
New Zealand 78.4947 20.3%
Source: The KOF Index of Globalization 2004, Dreher (2006).
As is evident from Table 4.2, countries vary signicantly in their degree of
globalisation. Examining Table 4.2 further, we nd four countries with a total
globalisation score of less than 50. Iran is, by far, the lowest entry with 36.17. As
we know, United Nations(UN) sanctions against Iran took e¤ect in 2006, due
to Irans insistence on developing their nuclear programme. However, Katzman
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(2009) notes that the US implemented sanctions against the country as early
as 1995 (the Iran Sanction Act (ISA)), in an e¤ort to isolate the country and
slow down its nuclear programme. As a result, it is probably not surprising that
Iran is the least globalised country in this sample.8 India is the second lowest
entry. However, with a 46.95 score, it is around 10 points higher than Iran. It
will become clear from the reported eldwork in Chapter 7, The Indian Tiger,
that the country has been quite reluctant in opening up its markets to foreign
participants and has instead embraced a gradualist approach to liberalisation.
Furthermore, until 1991 the country was in essence an autarky.9 Sri Lanka is
next on the globalisation list, with a score of 49.61. Fearon & Lainin (2010)
note that the Sri Lankan Civil War (1983 to 2009) has been one of the longest
and most ferocious civil conicts over the past 30 years. Although there was
a ceasere, brokered by Norway, between 2002 and 2006, our data may reect
the di¢ cult period that Sri Lanka underwent. Nigeria, with a score of 49.73,
follows closely after Sri Lanka. However, due to Nigerias oil wealth, it may be
expected that the country will accelerate its integration into the wider global
community in the coming years.10
At the other end of the globalisation scale in the sample reported in Table
4.2, we nd four (small and homogeneous) countries above the 90 mark. They
are Belgium (92.74), Austria (91.52), The Netherlands (90.64) and Switzerland
(90.01). Interestingly, the UK (80.20) and the US (77.69) are not ranked at the
top of Table 4.2 in terms of globalisation. During the eldwork carried out in
London, several interviewees (e.g., CU , a Chief European Economist, and HU , a
Managing Director in banking), commented that the international atmosphere
found in London is not indicative of the country as a whole. The same might
be said for New York, the US nancial centre. Two more countries are of
particular interest to this thesis, China (60.89) and Russia (67.76), as together
with India and the UK (London), they constitute the eldwork destinations.
Chapter 8, The Chinese Dragon, documents and analyses Chinas attempt to
build a uniquely Chinese market form (a socialist market economy with Chinese
characteristics, as it is known).11 While, as discussed in Chapter 6, The Russian
Bear, Russia has a complex relationship with its neighbours and the West.
Trenin (2006:87) suggests that Kremlins foreign policy under President Putin,
is based on the assumption that Russia is essentially friendless.
8Escribà-Folch & Wright (2010) nd that economic sanctions may work against
individualist-driven regimes, however they are ine¤ective against single-party and military
regimes. Pape (1997), amongst others, suggests that economic sanctions are in general in-
e¤ective. See Askari (2002) for an analysis on the e¤ect of economic sanctions on business
interests, from a US/Iran perspective.
9See e.g. Nayar (2001) on the liberalisation process that started in the early 1990s and
moved India away from an autarky model.
10See, for example, Iwayemi & Fowowe (2011) on the macroeconomic impact of oil price
shocks in Nigeria.
11See, for example, Coase & Wang (2012) on the Chinese liberalisation process which began
in the mid to late 1970s.
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4.2.3 Summary Statistics
Finally, in concluding the discussion on data sources, a summary of statistics is
a useful tool to gain a brief overview of the two key data sets.
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Undpri 45 .2712667 .2738393 .042 1.645
GloIndex 45 73.64476 14.08003 36.1661 92.74529
In Table 4.3 we note that the IPO underpricing (Undpri), Undpri = (Issue
price = Closing price of first day of trading)  100, sample mean is approx-
imately 27.4 percent. This is around ten percentage points above the UK (16.8
percent) and the US (16.9 percent). The 4.2 percent recorded as the minimum
is representative of Russia, while the maximum of 164.5 percent is China. With
a globalisation index (GloIndex ) mean of 73.64, the UK (80.20) and the US
(77.69) are among the most globalised countries in the sample. The minimum
value of 36.17 is Iran and the maximum is Belgium.
4.3 Scatter Plots
Scatter plots are a useful way to suggest correlation between two variables and to
identify outliers. Right now, matters of potential causality will not be discussed,
but rather deferred to Section 4.4 on a simple regression model. For the moment
we will focus on what the data itself can tell us.One aspect of this will be whether
any specic data points belongto the population under consideration. In this
section we plot IPO underpricing (Undpri) against the 2004 KOF Index of
Globalization using the data in Table 4.2. Scatter plots often play a central
role in exploratory data analysis (EDA). Early, seminal contributions to the
literature are Cleveland & McGill (1988) and Stuetzle (1987). These are followed
by Anselin, Syabri & Kho (2006) and Martinez, Martinez and Solka (2010), for
example.
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Figure 4.2: Log Linear Scatter Diagram of IPO Underpricing
(Undpri) against Globalisation Index (GloIndex), with Fitted Line
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Scatter Plot of Log(GloIndex) and Log(Undpri) Regression Line
In Figure 4.2, the raw data points would suggest that the two variables,
IPO Underpricing (Undpri) and Globalisation Index (GloIndex ), are negatively
correlated. Indeed, a straight line (in logs), which is superimposed on the data,
might be regarded as adequate for summarising the data, if not for statistical in-
ference. The downward-sloping, tted line indicates more precisely the negative
relation between the two variables: as the GloIndex increases in value, the Und-
pri variable decreases. An important feature of Figure 4.2 is that it indicates
that Iran (at the bottom of the diagram) should be treated as an outlier (see
section 4.2.2 on Iran). Globalisation is used in this thesis as a proxy for country
openness, transparency, accountability and compliance with international stan-
dards. As such, it should not be surprising that underpricing and globalisation
are negatively correlated. And yet, to our knowledge, no other publications
have explored the connection between the KOF Index of Globalization and IPO
underpricing.
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Figure 4.3: Log Linear Scatter Diagram of IPO Underpricing
(Undpri) against Globalisation Index (GloIndex), with Fitted Line
and 95 percent Condence Interval
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Scatter Plot of Log(GloIndex) and  Log(Undpri)
To reinforce the observations made from Figure 4.2, an inferential element
can be added, as in Figure 4.3. It is similar in design to Figure 4.2, but with
the addition of a 95 percent condence interval (CI) to the tted line. The
95 percent condence band is a graphical representation of the observations
which, with 95 percent probability, fall within this distance from the tted
line. Figure 4.3 provides an inferential basis for comrming the fact that Iran
is a signicant outlier. Therefore, Iran is dropped from the further statistical
analysis carried out in section 4.4. As discussed in section 4.2.2, Iran has found
itself increasingly isolated on the world stage, due to its continuing development
of its nuclear programme. Mehrabanpoor, Bahador & Jandaghi (2011), quoting
the Economist (2007), nd that despite the Tehran Stock Exchange reporting
considerable returns in recent of years, there is little foreign participation in the
Iranian stock market due to transparency issues and liquidity concerns. This
would suggest that the country is not only isolated politically and economically,
but that its nancial markets are also missing out on foreign engagement.
4.4 Simple Regression Model
In Section 4.3 we established that there is probably a correlation between the
Undpri and GloIndex variables. However, we did not consider causality or the
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strenght of this corrlation. To progress with the analysis, we now change focus
from description to inference. We argue that causality is from globalisation to
underpricing. Therefore, we move Undpri to the y-axis and GloIndex to the
x-axis as, in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Globalisation Index and IPO Underpricing data in
Levels, with Fitted Log Linear Line
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Scatter Plot of Undpri against GloIndex Regression Line
In Figure 4.4 we note that a convex curve is now superimposed on the data,
with variables expressed in levels. The specic functional form used is:
Undpri = b1  exp(b2 GloIndex) + a (4.1)
Equation 4.1 was estimated in Stata, giving a positive value for b1 and a
negative value for b2. Thus, the slope of the tted line is negative, and the
second derivative is positive, implying convexity:
Undpri = 2:335368  exp( :0291156 GloIndex) + ( :0148254)
The tted line again suggests that IPO underpricing drops as a country
becomes more globalised, and now also that the causality is from globalisation
to underpricing. Figure 4.4 suggests that, in general, we should expect to nd
pronounced underpricing in countries with a low globalisation score and, as
we move up the globalisation ranking, IPO underpricing should drop, but at a
decreasing rate.
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Whilst many functional forms can be used as alternatives to (4.1), simplicity
is an important consideration, on the basis of Occams Razor.12 Therefore, to
start the continued inferential work in Chapter 5 on the simplest possible basis,
we begin by running a bivariable linear regression on the 45 country sample. IPO
underpricing (Undpri) is the dependent variable and the globalisation index
(GloIndex ) is the independent variable, and both variables are untransformed.
The IPO underpricing (Undpri) and globalisation (GloIndex ) variables dis-
cussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 produce this specic equation (4.1), which can be
econometrically estimated:
Undpri = 0 + 1GloIndex+  (4.2)
An estimation of equation (4.1) by least squares, using Stata software and
the command <reg>, is provided in Table 4.4A and Table 4.4B, where Iran is
dropped in the latter.
Table 4.4A: Bivariable Linear Regression
Number of obs F (1; 43) Prob > F R2 AdjR2 Root MSE
45 6:77 0:0127 0:1360 0:1159 :25748
Undpri Coef: Std:Err: t P > jtj Elast13
GloIndex  :0071728 :0027568  2:60 0:013  1:271248
_cons 0:7995027 :2066229 3:87 0:000 3:828835
Note: **Signicant at 5% level
Table 4.4A reports results estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) for
N = 45 observations. Goodness-of-t, R2, is reasonable for a cross-section at
0:13, coupled with a low p-value. We note that the explanatory variable is sta-
tistically signicant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, an elasticity of -1.2712
was calibrated for the globalisation index (GloIndex ), which would suggest a
10 percent increase in a countrys globalisation index should reduce the coun-
trys average IPO underpricing by 12.7 percent. However, as exemplied in the
scatter plot analysis, Iran is an outlier and may unduly inuence the results.
12See for example Domingos (1997) on Occams Razor role in facilitating knowledge discov-
ery.
13The elasticities used here, and elsewhere in this chapter where magnitudes of elasticities
are mentioned, were obtained as the coe¢ cients of the corresponding variables in a log linear
form of Equation (4.1). This is done to obviate the arbitrariness of having to choose a point
(e.g., the point of means) at which to calculate the elasticity. Our procedure is adopted for
calibration purposes only. Our preferred estimator procedure is applied to the model of (4.1),
for which all other results are reported in the rest of Table 5.1.
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Table 4.4B: Bivariable Linear Regression, Iran Dropped
Number of obs F (1; 42) Prob > F R2 AdjR2 Root MSE
44 8:76 0:0051 0:1725 0:1528 :25487
Undpri Coef: Std:Err: t P > jtj Elast
GloIndex  :0088356 :0029859  2:96 0:005  1:63258
_cons :9305623 :2257321 4:12 0:000 5:397939
Note: ***Signicant at 1% level
Table 4.4B repeats the same estimation, but with Iran dropped from the
sample. As a result, R2 increases from 0.13 to 0.17, while the estimation also
increases in statistical signicance (now statistically signicant at the 1 per-
cent level). Moreover, the calibrated elasticity increases by approximately 3.5
percentage points.
4.5 Kernel Density Estimations
We now move from discussing IPO underpricing in relation to the KOF Index of
Globalization to focusing on IPO underpricing and variations between regions.
Non-parametric kernel density estimates work well as an exploratory tool; they
provide an initial visualisation of the data. Being a non-parametric estimator,
the kernel does not impose any xed functional form on the density and relies
on the data points to create an estimate.
The kernel density estimates are related to well-known histograms. However,
they provide a number of advantages over a simple histogram. For example,
kernel estimators set a kernel function at each data point, hence eliminating the
dependence of the end points of the bins. Moreover, using an appropriate kernel
function as the underlying assumption will result in a smooth density estimate.
On the other hand, the quality of kernel density estimates relies on estab-
lishing the correct bandwidth (h) for the kernel estimate. If h is set too low, the
resulting estimate would be considerable spiky as there would be insu¢ cient
smoothing. Contrastingly, h values that are too large lead to oversmoothing
and a loss of detail. Within the kernel density estimation literature there is a
considerable debate as how best to establish the optimal bandwidth. The main
dispute is whether the integrated squared error (ISE) or the mean integrated
squared error (MISE) should be used in determining the optimal bandwidth,
notes Turlach (1993). This notwithstanding, this thesis is minimising theMISE
in the endeavour to obtain the optimal bandwidth, which we note is in line with
the Cameron & Trivedi (2005) approach.
The kernel density estimate is the sum of the weighted values, calculated
using the kernel function K and the bandwidth h:
f^K =
1
qh
nX
i=1
wiK(
x Xi
h
) (4.3)
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where q =
P
i wi if the weights are analytic weights or frequency weights and
analytical weights are rescaled to
P
i wi = n: Otherwise, if they are importance
weights we set q := 1: When weights are not used, wi = 1; for i = 1; :::; n:We
denote by h the bandwidth (or window width), x represents the range of the
kernel estimate, n is the number of observations and Xi is the observation that
the kernel is centred on. For the kernel function K in the formula there is a
choice of eight di¤erent kernel functions to choose from, as shown in the following
table.
Table 4.5: Kernel Function, Commonly Used Examples14
Kernel Kernel Function K(z) Parameter 
Uniform (or box or rectangular) 12  1(jzj < 1) 1.3510
Triangular (or triangle) (1  jzj)  1(jzj < 1) -
Epanechnikov (or quadratic) 34 (1  z2)  1(jzj < 1) 1.7188
Quartic (or biweight) 1516 (1  z2)2  1(jzj < 1) 2.0362
Triweight 3532 (1  z2)3  1(jzj < 1) 2.3122
Tricubic 7081 (1  jzj3)3  1(jzj < 1) -
Gaussian (or normal) (2) 
1
2 exp( z2=2) 0.7764
Fourth-order Gaussian 12 (3  z)2(2) 
1
2 exp( z2=2) -
Fourth-order quartic 1532 (3  10z2 + 7z4)  1(jzj < 1) -
Silvermans seminal paper form 1986 on kernel density estimation evalu-
ated many of the kernel functions in terms of their e¢ ciency in minimising the
MISE. Although it was concluded that there is little di¤erence between the
potential kernels e¢ ciency, the Epanechnikov function was found to be the most
e¢ cient. As a result, this thesis is using the Epanechnikov function to obtain
the optimal bandwidth.
The optimal bandwidth that minimises the MISE can calculated through
di¤erentiatingMISE with respect to h and setting the derivative equal to zero:
h = 
Z
f 00(x0)2dx0)
 0:2
N 0:2: (4.4)
Here, the constant , which is also used in Table 4.5, is dened to be
 =
 R
K(z)2dzR
z2K(z)dz2
0:2
; (4.5)
where h is the optimal bandwidth,  is a constant, f(x0) is a density esti-
mate, N is the sample population and K is the kernel function.
Applying the above theoretical framework to the Loughran, Ritter & Ry-
dqvist (2008) data set presented in Table 4.1, potentially informative kernel
estimations can be constructed.
The countries will be grouped according to their geographical region:
14Cameron & Trivedi, 2005.
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Europe: Russia, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, France, Turkey,
Spain, Portugal, Belgium, United Kingdom, United States, Finland, Italy, Poland,
Cyprus, Ireland, Greece, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Bulgaria. Asia:
Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, Sri Lanka, Hong
Kong, Korea, Malaysia, India and China. North America: The USA and
Canada. South America: Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Brazil. Oceania: Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. Middle East : Israel and Iran. Africa: Nigeria and
South Africa.
Countries di¤er in many respects within these regions, however it would
still be interesting to analyse whether any conclusion can be extended to any
particular area.
Figure 4.5: Kernel Density Estimation: Asia, Europe and all
Countries
Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of Asian underpricing (with a fat tail)
to be considerably di¤erent from the categories of all countriesand Europe.
Europe is also shown to display somewhat di¤erent properties from the group
as a whole, with a distinct peak parallel to all countries. Also, Europes tail is
attens out sooner than the other countries in the estimate.
91
Figure 4.6: Kernel Density Estimation: South America, North
America and all Countries
Figure 4.6 shows the North America IPO underpricing distribution to be
concentrated at the lower end of the scale, with an early spike and a sudden
drop. However, since it only applies to two countries, it may be di¢ cult to
assign signicance to this distribution. Moreover, as mentioned in Section 4.2,
the US and Canada di¤er considerably in their IPO markets. South America,
on the other hand, is shown to mirror the general sample distribution, albeit
somewhat negatively skewed. South America also attens out sooner than all
countries; there are no extremely high values in this sub-sample.
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Figure 4.7: Kernel Density Estimation: Asia, Oceania and all
Countries
Figure 4.7 illustrates the kernel density estimate for the Oceania set in con-
trast to its neighbour Asia and all countries. Oceania displays somewhat sim-
ilar characteristics to those of North America in Figure 4.6. They are both re-
gions represented by only two countries and this may make it di¢ cult to analyse
their performance in this framework. This notwithstanding, it is interesting to
note the clear di¤erence in performance between Oceania and Asia.
Figure 4.8: Kernel Density Estimation: Africa, Middle East and
all Countries
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For Figure 4.8, it should be noted that, again, that the samples for both
Africa and the Middle East consist of only two countries apiece, making more
general observation in regard to these regions di¢ cult. Africa is seen to mirror
all countries, however with a slightly reduced peak which is slightly negatively
skewed.
Further complicating comparisons is the fact that the two African exchanges
are very di¤erent. The South African stock exchange is older, considerably larger
and more active than its Nigerian counterpart.15 Moreover, the South African
market may also be more e¢ cient, as Nigeria limits its stock prices to a daily
change of 5 percent in either direction.16
Figure 4.8 also represents the kernel density estimate for the Middle East.
The Middle East is illustrated by a sharp early rise, with a high peak, and a
subsequent drop in the estimate. Again, it is di¢ cult to draw conclusions from
this group, as it consists of only two, and very di¤erent, countries: Iran and
Israel. Israel has been the centre of a considerable amount of IPO studies, due
to its extensive use of IPO auctions. The Iranian IPO market, in contrast, is
not widely referred to in the IPO literature.
4.6 Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
Having discussed observed di¤erences in the underpricing distribution between
regions in Section 4.5, we can now test to see whether regional di¤erences are
signicant. By using a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test it is possible to
determine whether there are statistically signicant di¤erences in the under-
pricing distribution between the di¤erent regions. Table 4.6 shows the results
from contrasting Asia, Europe, North America, South America and Oceania
respectively with all countries:
15This is based on contrasting market capilisation, total turnover value and average daily
turnover between the two markets (World Federation of Exchanges, 2007 and Okereke-
Onyiuke, 2009).
16From personal communication with Professor Ikoku of Lagos Business School, Pan-African
University on the 5th of April 2009.
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Table 4.6: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions
Asia Europe
Smaller group D P-value Exact Smaller group D P-value Exact
0: 0.6979 0.000 0: 0.0000 1.000
1: 0.0000 1.000 1: ?0.3750 0.043
Combined K-S: 0.6979 0.001 0.0000 Combined K-S: 0.3750 0.0896 0.060
North America South America
Smaller group D P-value Exact Smaller group D P-value Exact
0: 0.1163 0.950 0: 0.5061 0.155
1: ?0.6512 0.198 1: ?0.1951 0.758
Combined K-S: 0.6512 0.392 0.275 Combined K-S: 0.5061 0.308 0.223
Oceania Middle East
Smaller group D P-value Exact Smaller group D P-value Exact
0: 0.2093 0.846 0: 0.3256 0.667
1: ?0.7209 0.137 1: ?0.4419 0.474
Combined K-S: 0.7209 0.274 0.184 Combined K-S: 0.4419 0.850 0.741
Africa
Smaller group D P-value Exact
0: 0.2791 0.743
1: ?0.2326 0.813
Combined K-S: 0.2791 0.998 0.994
Generally speaking, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, is used as a tool to deter-
mine whether there are any di¤erences in the distribution of a variable between
two groups. In other words, the null hypothesis states that there is equality of
distributions. With this in mind, the rst line tests the hypothesis that the data
set for Group 0 contains smaller values than for Group 1. The D-value shows
the largest di¤erence between the distribution functions, with a corresponding
p-value to indicate whether the observed D-value is signicant. In contrast,
the second line tests whether Group 0 contains larger values than for Group 1,
again with corresponding D and p-values. The third and nal line, states the
approximate p-value for the combined test.
Interestingly, the p-values for the standard test, which are based on the as-
ymptotic distribution derived by Smirnov (1939), are not suitable for smaller
samples (n < 50). As a result, when working with small samples, the p-values
are reported too conservatively (i.e., the real p-value is considerably lower than
reported). This phenomenon can be corrected for by analysing the nondirec-
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tional hypothesis based on an empirical continuity correction. Here, this is
represented as the exact value in the third line.
By applying these principles to the data set it is possible to analyse the
underlying fundamentals. The variable under consideration is underpricing.
Specically, we are interested in the distribution of underpricing between specic
regions as compared to the sample in general.
For Asia, the rst line tests whether the remaining sample contains smaller
values of underpricing than the Asian grouping, which is clearly found to be
the case. The second lines run a similar test but testing whether the remaining
sample contains larger values than the Asian grouping, which is not the case.
The exact p-value of 0.000 would strongly suggest that the null hypothesis can be
rejected and that Asia displays a signicantly di¤erent underpricing distribution
to that of the sample in general.
The same principle can be applied to Europe (exact value: 0.060 - signif-
icant), North American (0.275 - not signicant), South America (0.223 - not
signicant), Oceania (0.184 - not signicant), Middle East (0.741 - not signif-
icant) and Africa (0.994 - not signicant). From these results, it is clear that
Europe also di¤ers in its underpricing distribution in relation to the rest of the
world, as the European distribution displays a lower degree of underpricing than
the remaining sample as a whole.
4.7 Conclusion
The analysis carried out in this chapter, through scatter plots and a simple re-
gression model, would suggest that there is a statistically signicant, negative
correlation between IPO underpricing and globalisation. As a country becomes
more open and integrated into the world community, it should experience less
IPO underpricing. This is not surprising, as globalisation may be a proxy for
greater transparency, higher accountability and higher compliance with inter-
national standards in nancial markets and in corporate governance. We learn
in Part III of the thesis that the market participants in Russia, India and China
are keen on moving towards international standards in their nancial markets
(although India has wholeheartedly adopted a gradualist approachto their lib-
eralisation process). As we see these countries integrate further into the wider
global community, we can, according to this analysis, expect IPO prices that
more accurately reect the company fundamentals. This is the rst study, as far
as we know, that links the KOF Globalization Index to IPO underpricing. How-
ever, it should be noted that, as we developed a more general model in Chapter
5, involving a range of variables and embracing economic, demographic and in-
stitutional factors, the globalisation variable was swamped by those dominant
variables and nally fell out of statistical signicance. This inuence of domi-
nating variables (including, archetypally the demographic variable) in regression
analysis is well known, and should not suggest that globalisation is unimpor-
tant. In a larger sample, it would be likely to remain important and signicant.
Fortunately, we are using the mixed method, which allows us to keep global-
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isation in our qualitative analysis, even though it falls out of our most general
quantitative analysis in Chapter 5. Thus, globalisation forms a key part of
the semi-structured interview agenda covering the eldwork conducted in Rus-
sia (Moscow), India (Mumbai) and China (Shanghai) and benchmarked against
the UK (London) and which is further analysed in Part III of this thesis.
The kernel density estimates for Asia and Europe would suggest that they
are considerably di¤erent to the general group of countries as a whole. The
Asian underpricing distribution would seem to be located at the higher end of
the scale. In contrast, the European underpricing distribution would seem to
display the opposite properties. For the other regions, it becomes more di¢ cult
to draw conclusions. The kernel density estimates for North America, Oceania
and the Middle East all seem to at peak around the same point in the sample,
possibly suggesting that they display similar characteristics. However, their
small sample sizes make comparisons di¢ cult. The Middle East and South
America also display somewhat similar density estimates to both each other
and all countries, but they are distinctly di¤erent markets.
Our two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test strongly suggests that both Asia
and Europe display a signicantly di¤erent underpricing distribution to that of
the sample in general. Europe, with generally mature and developed nancial
markets, display uniquely low average underpricing. Asia, on the other hand,
with generally with immature and developing markets, is found at the higher
end of the IPO underpricing scale.
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Chapter 5
Econometric Modelling
5.1 Introduction
Following the IPO underpricing discussion in Chapter 3 and the explorative
data analysis carried out in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 is dedicated to econometric
modelling of the IPO data and, thus, completes Part II and provides the foun-
dation for the eldwork which is analysed in Part III. The exploratory data
analysis (Chapter 4) highlighted the unique attributes of the Russian, Indian
and Chinese nancial markets in terms of IPO underpricing. Before travelling
to Russia, India and China in an endeavour to better understand these impor-
tant markets, it is imperative to more fully comprehend the dynamics that may
drive these IPO markets. Once the signicance and impact of key variables
have been established through econometric analysis, it is possible to build on
this knowledge and to further illuminate its interpretive content by activities in
the eld. This eldwork will be covered in Part III of the thesis, with coun-
try specic chapters analysing Russia, India and China (which are themselves
benchmarked against the UK).
As previously discussed, underpricing occurs when the IPO price is below
the subsequent market value (normally taken as the closing price after the rst
day of trading). Individual IPOs can be either underpriced, on the money, or
overpriced. However, when annualised, which is a kind of averaging or smooth-
ing of data, all countries display IPO underpricing.1 We know from Chapter 4
that there is a wide range of average underpricing accross the globe, with Rus-
sia, India and China being of particular interest due to their contrasting pricing
behaviour. This is to say that the three countries are at the extremes of low
(Russia) and high underpricing (India and China). However, to further analyse
these anomalies in the eld, it is imperative that we analyse and discuss some of
the signicant factors that may drive di¤erence in underpricing between coun-
tries in an inferential framework. To advance this endeavour, we make use of six
1Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2011) provide a table with 49 countries represented. The
IPO time periods vary between the countries, however they all display underpricing.
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key independent variables that are grouped under economic, demographic and
institutional headings. The dependent variable in this simple model represents
IPO underpricing.
5.2 Model Specication
In order to further the understanding of the factors that may drive cross-country
di¤erences in underpricing, it is advantageous to construct an econometric model
that may capture some of the key IPO pricing factors. In Chapter 4, the ex-
ploratory data analysis chapter, we discussed and analysed the role of globalisa-
tion in pricing IPOs. Now, in Chapter 5, we have the opportunity to focus our
analysis on exploring some variables in more detail. Chapter 4 would suggests
that there is a link between globalisation and the level of countrys underpricing.
It may be reasonable to posit that transparency, accountability, openness of the
economy, education levels, the e¤ectiveness of regulators, business ethics, the
e¢ ciency of stock markets and the fairness/e¤ectiveness of the judicial system
are all factors that are inuenced by the globalisation process and, by extension,
may inuence IPO underpricing. In short, economic, demograpic and institu-
tional factors may partly explain underpricing.
As is often the case in data analysis, the data avaiable is somehow compro-
mised, incomplete or missing all together, which necessitates the use of proxies.
This specic analysis, looking at variables across 39 countries in total, is no
exception.
Quantitative easing and the role of monetary policies to stimulate growth
have been at the forefront of policy discussions in recent years in both the US and
the UK amongst other countries, due to the 2008 nancial crisis. Blinder (2010)
notes that it also played a signicant role in the Japanese economy between 2001
and 2006, before entering into the US debate in 2008.2 Mishkin (1999) notes that
an expansionary monetary policy will generate growth and reduce unemplyment
in the short-run, but will result in higher ination in the long-run. To capture
the e¤ect of cross-country liberalisation of money on IPO underpricing, this
model includes a variable that represents domestic credit extended to the private
sector (PSD).
An interesting avenue of exploration would be to analyse the impact of the
market microstructure on IPO underpricing. For example, Brennan & Subrah-
manyams (1996) seminal paper nds that informed investors are instumental
in creating considerable illiquidity costs for uninformed investors. As a result,
required rates of return on relatively illiquid shares should be higher, according
to Brennan & Subrahmanyam. Additionally, Andersen, Bollerslevy & Meddahiz
(2011) conclude that market microstructure noise reduces share price forcasting
accuracy. It would also be interesting to analyse cross-country market e¢ ciency
against IPO underpricing. Fama (1965, 1970 and 1998) and Samuelson (1965)
were pioneers in this eld and they established the e¢ cient market hypothesis
(EMH) which is still being analysed and extended today. Lo (2005) states that
2See Benford, et al. (2009) on the UK and quantitative easing.
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behavioral nance can be reconciled with the e¢ cient market hypothesis and
proposes a new framework: the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis. It is not possible
to account for these issues in this model, but, as a proxy for increased market
liquidity and maturity, we use stock market capitalisation growth (MCG).
It would also be interesting to consider demographic variables in this context.
For example, Hong, Kubik & Stein (2004) posit that there is a link between social
interaction and stock market participation in the US, while Kumar (2009) nds
that individualspropensity to gamble and their investment decisions are corre-
lated in the US. Financial literacy and stockmarket participation (van Rooija,
Lusardic & Alessie, 2011) would also be of great interest when evaluating fac-
tors that drive underpricing. It is not possible to capture nancial literacy in
this econometric model. However, as this thesis makes use of a mixed-method
approach, we will explore this in more detail in the eldwork (i.e., the quali-
tative analysis in Chapters 6, 7 and 8). In this econometric model, we make
use of population (Pop) to represent the demographic dimension, which will be
explored in much greater detail in the eld research carried out in Russia, India,
China and the UK (Part III of the thesis).
Earnings quality is a crucial factor in reducing asymmetric information in
nancial markets, which in turn should reduce IPO underpricing. The institu-
tional framework governing this area is becoming more complex, and increas-
ingly international as we see the rise of multi-national companies (MNCs) and
globalisation. For example, the US SarbanesOxley Act (SOX) may have forced
lower quality auditors to exit the market in the US (DeFond & Lennox, 2011),
while it also served as the inspiration for the framework that underpin the -
nancial standards required for listed Indian companies (i.e., Clause 49), note
Chakrabarti, Megginson & Yadav (2008).3 However, it may be di¢ cult to as-
sess whether international standards are truely met in audits. Luchs, Stuebs
& Sun (2009) examing the relationship between earnings quality and company
reputation. They nd that in the US, higher reputation companies display bet-
ter earnings quality. This econometirc model will use timeliness of disclosures
(FreqRep), which is a combination of the frequency of nancial reporting and the
number of items included in reports, as a proxy for audit quality and reliability
in this cross-country analysis. However, once again, the following eldwork in
Part III of the thesis will be a useful tool to better understand audit dynamics
on a country-specic level.
Market contestability and barriers to market entry may also be a partial
explanation of IPO underpricing.4 A perfectly contestable market needs to
meet three requirements: agents can freely enter and exit the market at no costs,
there are no sunk costs and all rms have access to the same level of technology.
Such a market would ensure e¢ ciency among the incumbent rms, due to the
3 It should be noted that SOX was rushed through by US politicians amid corporate scandals
(prominently Enron), volatile nancial markets and signicant media focus. It has been
widely noted in the academic literature that the Act should not have implemented corporate
governance mandates. See for example Romanos (2005) widely cited paper for a review of
the SOX Act and corporate governance.
4See Baumols (1982) seminal paper on market contestability.
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threat of rival companies entering the market. From the perspective of country
development, de Soto (1989) posits that barriers to entry are detrimental to
increasing income levels in Peru, as it is di¢ cult for small businesses to enter
the formal economy. Moreover, Herrendorf & Teixeira (2011) conclude that if
all barriers to entry in developing countries were removed, they would be lifted
out of poperty. Barriers to entry may encourage corruption and the formation
of cartels, both of which would adversely a¤ect IPO underpricing. This analysis
makes use of minimum capital requirement to start a business (MCR) as a proxy
for barriers to entry and also as a gauge of the level of bureaucracy and legal
requirements that contries level on businesses.
The viability of the connection between nancial openness and economic
growth has been discussed for a number of years. However, according to Bekaert,
Harvey & Lundblad (2011), three studies, Gupta & Yuan (2009), Mitton (2006)
and Quinn & Toyoda (2008), have rmly established that nancial openess and
economic growth are linked. And yet, Claessens et al. (2010) warn that with
the increased level of globalisation and interconnectedness of nancial markets,
countries face increased systemic risk and vulnerability to global crises.5 Free-
dom to use alternative currencies (FreeAltCur) serves as a proxy for country
openess in this econometric study.
The general model may be expressed as follows:
Underpricing = f(economic variables; demographic variables; (5.1)
institutional variables) + error:
IPO underpricing (Undpri) is, as discussed and outlined in Chapter 4 (see
table 4.1), a global phenomenon. It is measured as the di¤erence between the
issue price and the market value. The market value is assumed to be evident
after one day of trading on most stock exchanges, hence underpricing is calcu-
lated as Undpri = (Issue price = Closing price of first day of trading) 
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Before moving on to the regression model, the indepedent variables will be
listed in greater detail, with denitions, sources and a note on their relevance
to this model.
Economic variables
Private Sector Development (PSD), dened as domestic credit extended to
the private sector, is obtained from the World Development Indicators (World
Bank, 2003) and represent 2001 gures. The World Bank notes that a well-
developed private sector is indicative of a wider, sound, macro climate. Private
sector development is dependent on policies that promote openness in the econ-
omy and ensure a legal/regulatory framework which supports a healthy busi-
5Schwarc (2010) notes that the increasing complexity of nancial markets and the threat
of systemic failure pose a signicant challenge to regulators. Frank & Hesse (2009) examine
the nancial spillovers into developing markets, during the 2008 global nancial crisis. In-
terestingly, Gai, Jenkinson & Kapadia (2007) nd that systemic risk in developed countries
is now less likely to occur due to nancial innovations and greater marcoeconomic stability.
However, potentially, systemic risk may have become a more severe factor.
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ness environment (e.g., protects private property rights and promotes access to
credit).6
Stock Market Capitalisation Growth (MCG) is calculated as the change
between the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP in 1990 and the ratio of
market capitalisation to GDP in 2001. These gures are obtained from the
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003). It is often the case that
countries with large stock market capitalisation to GDP ratios are associated
with lower risk ratings in relation to their investment climate.7
Demographic variables
The Population variable (Pop) is, of course, a reection of the size of a
countrys population.8 However, in this analysis population may reect more
nuanced issues. Countries with larger populations may be less transparent and,
as such, experience less corporate and institutional accountability. Extrapolat-
ing on the demographic variable, it may also be that other considerations within
this heading may inuence market dynamics, for example, income levels, educa-
tion, family sizes and age. For instance, we know that China is facing an aging
population, with all of the challenges that are associated with such shifts in the
population make up. Moreover, as nancial products are becoming increasingly
complex and international in nature, it may also be that education is a factor
in creating market anomalies. To more fully understand such issues and gain
insight beyond what the gures can tell us, it is important to visit the countries
in question. Moving from the quantitative analysis in Part II to the qualitative
analysis in Part III, will allow this thesis to provide a more substantial and
considered conclusion on how economic, demographic and institutional variable
inuence market anomalies.
Institutional variables
The Timeliness of Disclosures variable (FreqRep) measures the [f]requency
of reporting, consolidation of interim reports, # of disclosed items(Bushman,
Piotroski & Smith, 2004:211). Bushman, Piotroski & Smith note that higher
frequency of and more comprehensive disclosure in nancial reports yield higher
scores in their study.
The data on the Minimum Capital Requirement to start a business as a share
of GNI per capita in 2002 (MCR) was obtained in the World Development In-
dicators (World Bank, 2003). This variable relates to the business environment
within a country. When a new company seeks to establish a new business in a
country, it is faced with some degree of bureaucracy and certain legal require-
ments. In some countries the process is quite straightforward, while in others,
it can represent a signicant barrier that drives businesses into the informal
economy. The World Bank (2003) nds that as of January 2002, the minimum
capital requirement to start a business as a share of GNI per capita varied con-
siderably between Russia, India, China, the UK and the US. For Russia it was
6World Bank, 2003.
7World Bank, 2003.
8UN Stats (2006) for 2003 world population, except for Ireland and Taiwan. For Ireland,
Department of Health (2003), population gures for 2002. For Taiwan, 2002 gures from
Yearbook of the Republic of China (2004).
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38 percent, while there was no minimum requirement in India. Indias openness
to capital requirements notwithstanding, the country is, of course, well know
for its substantial informal economy. Harris-White & Sinha (2007) conclude,
through the use of both eldwork and modelling, that the informal sector of the
economy is expending at a rapid pace in developing countries. China is another
country with a large, informal economy, however, China required a staggering
4338 percent of GNI per capita to start a business (which may partly reect the
low GNI for the country) in 2002. In 2002, neither the US nor the UK had any
minimum requirements in terms of capital to start a business.
Freedom to Use Alternative Currencies (FreeAltCur) is a composite of two
factors: the Freedom of Citizens to Own Foreign Currency Bank Accounts Do-
mestically and Abroadand the Di¤erence between the O¢ cial Exchange Rate
and the Black Market Ratein 2001 (Gwartney et al., 2001:6). Both variables
are weighted equally to produce the Freedom to Use Alternative Currencies vari-
able. In other words, it measures the freedom of a countrys citizens to access
foreign currency.
5.3 Regression Model
We now turn to expressing the general model of (5.1) in a specic form, set out
in Equation 5.2 below. As a reminder, Table 5.1 briey reviews the denitions
of all relevant variables described in the previous section, in the context of three
crucial factors: economic, demographic and institutional.
Table 5.1: Brief Denitions of Explanatory Variables
Variable Acronym Factor
IPO Underpricing Undpri
Private Sector Development PSD Economic
Market Capitalisation Growth MCG Economic
Population Pop Demographic
Frequency of Financial Reporting FreqRep Institutional
Minimum Capital Requirements to start a business MCR Institutional
Freedom to use Alternative Currencies FreeAltCur Institutional
The variables in Table 5.1, when entered into the above model (5.1), produce
this specic equation (5.2) which can be econometrically estimated:
Undpri = 0+1PSD+2MCG+3Pop+4FreqRep+5MCR+6FreeAltCur+
(5.2)
An estimation of equation (5.2) by least squares, using Stata software and
the command <reg> is provided in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Estimated Regression Model Explaning IPO Underpric-
ing
Number of obs F (6; 32) Prob > F R2 AdjR2 Root MSE
39 33:74 0:0000 0:8635 0:8379 :1161
Undpri Coef: Std:Err: t P > jtj Elast9
PSD :0010137 :00045194 2:24 0:032 :252
MCG  :0022484 :000867433  2:59 0:014  :076
Pop 4:94e  07 :0109869 4:37 0:000 :109
FreqRep  :0021069 :00089032  2:36 0:024  :184
MCR :0002546 :000059126 4:28 0:000 :293
FreeAltCur  :039901 :0109508  3:64 0:001  :172
_cons 0:6255221 :1156258 5:41 0:000  3:825
Note: ***Signicant at 1% level, **Signicant at 5% level
Table 5.2 displays the results estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
for N = 39 observations, with some observations being lost from the Ritter
(2008) sampling frame of N = 45, due to missing data for a few variables from
a few countries.10 Regarding goodness-of-t, R2, a satisfactory value of 0:86
is obtained. Moreover, the F statistic (33:74) for the model is highly statisti-
cally signicant with p = 0:0000: Finally, each single parameter is statistically
signicant as indicated by the t-test being above the 5% critical value.
The independent variables represent di¤erent aspects of the makeup of a
country: economic, demographic and institutional. The sample of 39 observa-
tions, represents countries from North American, South America, Europe, the
Middle East, Africa, Asia and Australia. See Table 4.1 (Chapter 4) for a full
country list.
Private Sector Development (PSD), here measured as domestic credit ex-
tended to the private sector, is noted as having a positive coe¢ cient, which is
to be expected, and it is statistically signicant at the 5% level (p-value of
0:032).11 This is, in e¤ect, liberalisation of money, which would cause economic
growth, stimulate the nancial markets and, as a result, also impacts on the
expected returns from the IPO market. This model supports this assumption.
The elasticity of underpricing with respect to PSD has a magnitude of +0:253,
implying that it has one of the largest impacts on underpricing among the ex-
ploratory variables analysed.12 PSD growth is dependent on the openness of
9The elasticities used here, and elsewhere in this chapter where magnitudes of elasticities
are mentioned, were obtained as the coe¢ cients of the corresponding variables in a log linear
form of Equation (5.2). This is done to obviate the arbitrariness of having to choose a point
(e.g., the point of means) at which to calculate the elasticity. Our procedure is adopted for
calibration purposes only. Our preferred estimator procedure is applied to the model of (5.2),
for which all other results are reported in the rest of Table 5.2.
10The countries not included in the 39 country sample are: Belgium, Bulgaria, France,
Netherlands, Nigeria and Portugal.
11The World Bank, 2003.
12The elasticities used in this analyis are obtained from the coe¢ cients of the variables in
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the economy and on institutional e¤ectiveness. As it links di¤erent aspect of
the economy, it is interesting to note that it has a signicant impact on IPO
underpricing.
Market Capitalisation Growth or market value growth (MCG) is here dened
to be the ratio of nominal market value in 2001 to the market value in 1991.13 It
is found to have a negative coe¢ cient and to be statistically signicant at the 5%
level (p-value of 0:015). The model suggests that stronger market growth over
this period is associated with lower returns. Generally speaking, one may expect
high growth markets to display higher IPO underpricing. This has certainly
been the case for developing countries like Brazil, Sir Lanka, Korea, Malaysia
and India in recent years. It was also evident during the US dot-com bubble
of 1999  2000, where excessive IPO returns became the norm. The highly
signicant negative coe¢ cient may be explained by the nature of the markets
that saw growth in the 1990s. European and North American markets and their
satellites all performed well during this period. They recorded signicant, stable
growth and at the same time managed to avoid, on average, disproportionate
IPO mispricing. The elasticity of  0:0764 calibrated for Market Capitalisation
Growth is the smallest of the elasticities in this model, which would suggest that
for policy implementation purposes this area has the least potential for policy
inuence on underpricing.
The coe¢ cient on Population (Pop) is positive and highly statistically signif-
icant at the 1% level (p-value of 0:000).14 China and India are prime examples
of this relationship at the higher end of the scale. Russia is one of the exceptions
to this rule. With around 143 million citizens it is one of the more populous
countries, and yet, it displays negligible underpricing. This only adds to the
previous discussion regarding the opacity of Russian market dynamics and il-
lustrates why it is paramount to travel to the country to more fully understand
the economic and social trajectory of the country. In contrast, countries such
as Austria, Canada, Denmark, Chile, Norway, Israel and Hong Kong are all at
the lower end of the scale in terms of both underpricing and population size.
It may be that these smaller countries (in terms of population) o¤er a higher
degree of accountability in their markets, that is, their markets may be more
transparent. Although the population variable is highly statistically signicant
at the 1% level, its +0:109 elasticity suggests that it is not one of the most
important factors in inuencing underpricing performance.
The frequency of interim corporate reports (FreqRep) also encapsulates num-
ber of items disclosed and consolidation of interim reports.15 FreqRep is
signicant at the 5% level (p-value of 0:024) and has a negative coe¢ cient.
The negative coe¢ cient supports the notion that a higher degree of trans-
parency/accountability reduces underpricing. Moreover, with a relatively high
elasticity in absolute terms of  0:184, compared to the other independent vari-
log linear form. This is done to overcome the issue of choosing at which point to calculate the
elasticity.
13The World Bank, 2003.
14The United Nations data covering 2003 (2006).
15Bushman, et al. (2004).
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ables, FreqRep has the potential for greater policy impact on underpricing (Und-
pri).
Minimum Capital Requirement to start a business as a percentage of GNI
per capita (MCR) is, in e¤ect, a measure of barriers to entry.16 Highly sta-
tistically signicant at the 1% level (p-value of 0:000), it is noted as having a
positive coe¢ cient. This would suggest that countries with greater minimum
capital requirements will also experience greater underpricing. If it is more di¢ -
cult to set up a new business in a country, some insiders might be more inclined
to manipulate the share price to maximise their returns, as start up companies
may be less frequent. Higher barriers to entry may lead to more collusion be-
tween incumbent agents. Minimum Capital Requirements display an elasticity
of +0:293, which is the highest absolute value of any elasticity in the model.
Freedom to Use Alternative Currencies (FreeAltCur) reects the availability
of money in the economy.17 However, it may also be a proxy for the openness and
e¢ ciency of a countrys nancial markets. FreeAltCur has a negative coe¢ cient
and is statistically signicant at the 1% level (p-value of 0:001). Moreover, with
an elasticity of  0:172 it is among the key variables in the model in regard to
impact on IPO underpricing. It is not surprising to see a negative coe¢ cient.
As economies open up their markets they become more accountable to external
stakeholders and they have the opportunity to adopt more e¢ cient controls,
both on a market and a corporate governance level. It is interesting to consider
the availability of foreign exchange in China. As we will discover and discuss in
Chapter 7, The Chinese Dragon, China has a well developed, informal economy
that can move currency around, even internationally. Some of these facilities
may not be widely appreciated in the international literature, which tends to
focus more on corporate transactions. Indeed, it has become clear through the
eldwork that even some Chinese citizens do not know about these facilities,
which again emphasises the need to couple quantitative analysis with a more
in-depth qualitative investigation on the ground.
5.4 Robustness Testing
To determine the strenght of the ndings discussed in the previous section, it is
paramount to run a series of robustness tests. In this thesis we will report on
three investigatory techniques. The rst, multicollinearity, looks at problems
which may arise if regressors are highly correlated (see Section 5.4.1). The
second, kernel density trimming, tests the robustness of the coe¢ cients, as a
predetermined percentile of values (10 percent in this analysis) are trimmed
away on each variable individually (see Section 5.4.2 on trimming). The third,
trimmed least squares (TLS), is an extension of, and complement to, the kernel
density trimming. TLS trims the variables simultaniously (at 5, 10, 15 and 20
16World Bank (2003).
17Gwartney, et al. (2001).
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percent levels), which again allows us to asses the robustness of the coe¢ cients.18
5.4.1 Multicollinearity
Having discussed the merits of the coe¢ cients in relation to not only being sta-
tistically signicant but also economically signicant, it is advisable to test for
multicollinearity. As we know, multicollinearity becomes a problem when two
or more independent variables are highly correlated in a multiple regression.
When this occurs in a regression, the coe¢ cient estimates may become unreli-
able. Farrar & Glauber (1967), amongst others in the 1960s and 70s especially,
discuss the implications of multicollinearity and how best to detect this issue
in regressions. It is a classic consideration and should be accounted for in this
type of work. Multicollinearity often exists amongst regressors but may not be
crucial, depending on its degree of severity.
There are two ways of testing for this condition. Method 1 would be simply
to analyse the bivariate correlation coe¢ cients as given in Table 5.3.19
Table 5.3: Bivariate Correlation Coe¢ cients
Undpri PSD MCG Pop FreqRep MCR FreeAltCur
Undpri 1.0000
PSD 0.1458 1.0000
MCG 0.5540 -0.0835 1.0000
Pop 0.8195 -0.0489 0.6219 1.0000
FreqRep -0.2187 0.1105 0.0426 -0.0784 1.0000
MCR 0.7908 0.1482 0.8083 0.7277 -0.0516 1.0000
FreeAltCur -0.4506 0.3537 -0.4259 -0.4221 -0.0061 -0.2740 1.0000
Any gure above 0.8 would be considered high. It is evident, from Table 5.3,
that with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.8083, correlation between Minimum Cap-
ital Requirement to start a business (MCR) and Market Capitalisation Growth
(MCG) is a borderline result.
The second, and more comprehensive, method of testing multicollinearity is
to test for Variance Ination Factors (VIFs). The dependent variable in this
simple model represents IPO underpricing (Undpri).
The general model:
Underpricing = f(economic variables; demographic variables; (5.3)
institutional variables+ error);
18We ran extensive tests of endogeneity (viz. Hausman (1978) and Wu (1973, 1974)). That
is, we attempted to refute exogeneity in the indepedent variables. In general, we failed to
refute exogeneity. However, in one case, for MCG, the variable with the lowest elasticity,
there was a slight suggestion of endogeneity at somewhat over the 5 percent signicance level.
19Table 5.3 is produced using the Stata command <correlate> on the dependent and inde-
pendent variables.
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can be stated specically as:
Undpri = 0+1PSD+2MCG+3Pop+4Time+5MCR+6FreeAltCur+:
(5.4)
The VIF test can be broken down into three stages:
Suppose that equation 5.4 is represented by a general model that has K
regressors and is indexed by i:
Yi = 0 + 1X1;i + 2X2;i + :::+ KXK;i + i (5.5)
Now each independent variable can be tested as a dependent variable to
determine multicollinearity by running auxiliary regressions of the form:
Xk = 0 + 1X1;i + :::+ k 1Xk 1;i + k+1Xk+1;i + :::+ KXK;i + i (5.6)
For each auxiliary regression an unadjusted goodness of t (R2k) can now be
obtained. This reects the proportion of variation in Xk that can be explained
by variation in the other independent variables X1; X2;:::Xk 1;Xk+1; :::XK :
Let us now turn to the Variance Ination Factor (V IF ) for Xk, which is
dened to be
V IF (^k) =
1
(1 R2k)
: (5.7)
The higher the VIF for a given variable, the higher the estimated coe¢ cient
of that variable. Any V IF (^k) in excess of 5 might be a cause of concern in
terms of multicollinearity, to the extent that variables rejected under t-tests as
insignicant may need to be re-evaluated.
Table 5.4: Variance Ination Factor (VIF) Estimates
Variable VIF 1/VIF
PSD 1.37 0.730780
MCG 3.65 0.274009
Pop 2.44 0.409182
FreqRep 1.06 0.941492
MCR 4.81 0.207840
FreeAltCur 1.52 0.658784
MeanV IF 2.48
Fortunately, as Table 5.4 indicates, all VIF factors are below the critical value
of 5.20 Whilst the Minimum Capital Requirement to start a business (MCR) is
found to be the variable with the strongest potential for multicollinearity, it has
a VIF factor which is still below the critical value of 5. Overall, one therefore
concludes that no signicant problems of multicollinearity arise for estimates of
the key equation (5.1).
20Table 5.4 was produced using Stata. First the regression command <reg> was run,
followed by the command <estat vif>.
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5.4.2 Sample Trimming
By running tests that trim the data and remove outliers it is possible to further
assess the robustness of the specied model.
Kernel Density Trimming
Kernel density estimates were used in Chapter 4 and we can now bring the
method full-circle by using it to trim one indepedent variable at a time. We
will exemplify the process by reporting the full results of the two independet
variables in the model (5.2) with the highest elasticities in terms of absolute
values: PSD and MCR, as these are potentially the most important in policy
contexts. Table 5.5 and Table 5.7 illustrate the percentile trimming levels. For
example, a 10 percent trim will remove the observations below the 5th percentile
and above the 95th percentile. Moreover, Table 5.6 and Table 5.8 represent the
modied results, on the basis of a ten percent trim of respectively PSD and
MCR.
Table 5.5: Distribusion of PSD
Percentiles Smallest
1% 11:5 11:5
5% 15:4 15:4
10% 20:6 20:5 Obs 39
25% 34:7 20:6 Sum of Wgt. 39
50% 86:2 Mean 86:22051
Largest Std. Dev. 48:66319
75% 127:2 149:2
90% 149:2 155:9 Variance 2368:106
95% 158:5 158:5 Skewness :0675956
99% 186:7 186:7 Kurtosis 1:893018
Table 5.6: 10 percent Trim of PSD
Number of obs F (6; 30) Prob > F R2 AdjR2 Root MSE
37 31:91 0:0000 0:8645 0:8375 :11887
Undpri Coef: Std:Err: t P > jtj [95% Conf: Interval]
PSD :0009443 :0005022 1:88 0:070  :0000812 :0019698
MCG  :0024034 :0009159  2:62 0:014  :004274  :0005328
Pop 4:90e  07 1:16e  07 4:23 0:000 2:53e  07 7:27e  07
FreqRep  :0019793 :0009303  2:13 0:042  :0038792  :0000794
MCR :0002641 :0000624 4:24 0:000 :0001368 :0003915
FreeAltCur  :0402035 :0112202  3:58 0:001  :0631182  :0172887
_cons :6289949 :1193539 5:27 0:000 :3852418 :8727481
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Table 5.7: Distribusion of MCR
Percentiles Smallest
1% 0 0
5% 0 0
10% 0 0 Obs 39
25% 0 0 Sum of Wgt. 39
50% 24 Mean 183:5692
Largest Std. Dev. 694:4789
75% 109 326
90% 326 429 Variance 782301
95% 544 544 Skewness 5:701038
99% 4338 4338 Kurtosis 34:5919
Table 5.8: 10 percent Trim of MCR
Number of obs F (6; 31) Prob > F R2 AdjR2 Root MSE
38 10:2 0:0000 0:6637 0:5986 :11745
Undpri Coef: Std:Err: t P > jtj [95%Conf:Interval]
PSD :0009997 :0004588 2:18 0:037  :000064 :0019354
MCG  :0024538 :000964  2:55 0:016  :0044199  :0004877
Pop 4:75e  07 1:20e  07 3:97 0:000 2:31e  07 7:20e  07
FreqRep  :0022308 :0009331  2:39 0:023  :0041339  :0003277
MCR :000178 :0001594 1:12 0:273  :0001471 :0005032
FreeAltCur  :0411324 :0113297  3:63 0:001  :0642395  :0180254
_cons :6551501 :1301763 5:03 0:000 :3896538 :9206465
The kernel density trimming procedure slightly improves the models R2
when the PSD variable is tested (from 0.8635 to 0.8645), while R2 for the MCR
variable drops from 0.8625 to 0.6637 in the 10 percent trim sample. Moreover,
it is evident that the coe¢ cients are stable under a 10 percent sample trim; the
coe¢ cients display similar (positive/negative) signs as in Table (5.2), while their
magnitudes are also stable in comparison to Table (5.2). The results displayed
for PSD and MCR, are indicative of all six independent variables. As such, it
is possible to conclude that the model is relatively stable under trimming and
that the model is relatively robust.
Trimmed Least Squares
Alternatively, the Least Trimmed Squares (LTS), devised by Rousseeuw (1984),
allows for trimming at specied levels accross all variables simultaniously. This
analysis is carried out in Stata, using the robreg lts function.21 Atkinson &
21Robreg lts was devised by Jann in 2010 and is an independent addition to Stata.
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Cheng (1999) account for the process of computing LTS estimates. The co-
e¢ cients are also relatively stable under the LTS trimming, which is another
encouraging sign that the model is relatively robust.22
5.5 Conclusion
It is clear from the econometric analysis that economic, demographic and in-
stitutional variables are statistically and economically signicant in inuencing
cross-country variation in levels of IPO underpricing. For example, we nd that
Minimum Capital Requirement to start a business as a percentage of GNI per
capita (MCR), a proxy for barriers to entry, is statistically signicant, with
a positive coe¢ cient. Countries with greater minimum capital requirements
are associated with higher IPO underpricing. As we will discuss in detail in
Part III, India and China are both economies where licence requirements are
ubiquitous and barries to entry are considerable. Moreover, Private Sector De-
velopment (PSD), measured as domestic credit extended to the private sector,
is also positively correlated with IPO underpricing. As credit is increased to the
private sector, stimulating growth, underpricing becomes more pronounced in
the nancial markets. This may partly reect the dynamics observed in India
and China. Both countries have archieved impressive growth rates in recent
years, and they also display signicant IPO underpricing. The variable with
the third highest coe¢ cient in the model is Freedom to Use Alternative Cur-
rencies (FreeAltCur). This variable is a measure of the availability of money
in the economy. However, it can also be used as a proxy for the openness and
e¢ ciency of a countrys nancial markets. FreeAltCur is found to be negatively
correlated with IPO underpricing. As nancial markets become more open and
interconnected with the wider global community, we should expect to see im-
provements in company oversight and higher corporate governance standards.
This nding also ties in with the globalisation index analysis, which was carried
out in Chapter 4 of the thesis.
To more fully understand the impact and inuence of these key factors and
variables on Russia, India and China, it is necessary to conduct eldwork in their
nancial centres: Moscow, Mumbai and Shanghai. As discussed in Chapter 1,
this is consistent with the mixed method approach. The quantitative analysis
(Part II) has highlighted some key areas that warrant further investigation,
which will be covered in the qualitative analysis (Part III).
22For example, for 15% trimming, using least trimmed squares under Stata, we obtain
values for PSD (:0005982), MCG ( :0019027), Pop (3:03e  07), FreqRep ( :0056663), MCR
(:0002816) and FreeAltCur ( :9998363).
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Chapter 6
The Russian Bear
6.1 Introduction
Following on from the outline of the eldwork instrumentation in Chapter 1 and
the quantitative analysis in Part II of the thesis, Chapter 6 marks the start of
Part III of the thesis. Part III, which is a qualitative analysis, builds on and
expands the quantitative analysis carried out in Part II (Chapters 3, 4 and 5)
of the thesis. As such, Part III brings the mixed method approach, discussed
in Chapter 1, full-circle. In particular, we detected market anomalies in the
pricing of equity in Russia, India and China in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, when
benchmarked against the UK (London). The econometric model constructed in
Chapter 4, proved a good t on the overall country data set. The analysis and
discussion in Chapter 5 presented some key variables that inuence global IPO
pricing. It is clear that economic, institutional and demographic variables are
signicant in explaining global IPO pricing. However, the quantitative analysis
does not provide a complete picture on a country level. To understand the
underlying dynamics governing IPO pricing in Russia, India and China, it is
necessary to conduct eld work in each country. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are based
on this eld research and endeavour to explain the market anomalies found
through the statistical and econometric analysis, using London as a benchmark
for a mature and e¢ cient market. To summarise, the quantitative analysis
(Part II) identied a number of interesting pricing anomalies and the qualitative
analysis (Part III) seeks to explain this pricing behaviour on a country level.
Russia rst saw attempts to reform its economy during Mikhail Gorbachevs
perestroika programme in the late 1980s. The Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics (USSR) was experiencing economic di¢ culties and perestroika reforms
were introduced to stimulate growth and improve living standards. These ten-
tative economic reforms, which included leasing of land to farmers and allowing
small-scale private ownership of some businesses, still left the state planning
rmly in control and by 1991 it was clear that perestroika had failed. The USSR
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was o¢ cially dissolved in December that year.1 It was clear that signicant eco-
nomic reforms were required and Russias journey towards a market economy
began in 1991 with the election of Boris Yeltsin as the President of Russia,
who implemented Russias rst economic reforms in January 1992 (Brainerd,
1998). Initially, President Yeltsins attempt to implement ambitious and much
needed economic reforms to stimulate growth were met with approval by both
domestic and foreign experts alike (Gerber & Hout, 1998). However, the shock
therapyreforms proved catastrophic to the general population. Gavrilova, et
al. (2000) observe that the abolition of price controls in 1992, within a still
heavily monopolised economy, resulted in signicant ination, which in turn
reduced real wages and wiped out almost all private savings. At the same
time, between 1992 and 1994, the life expectancy for Russian females and males
dropped from 73.8 to 71.2 years and from 62.0 to 57.6 years, respectively. Desai
(2005) nds that the 1990s were characterised by the shock therapy economic
reforms, signicant contraction of the economy, hyperination and privatisation
as the country moved from a planned economy towards capitalism. Megginson
& Netter (2001:33) comment on the severe economic challenges that Russia was
facing in the 1990s, moving towards a capitalistic market model:
It is very di¢ cult to reach a simple conclusion regarding privati-
zations impact in the former Soviet Union in general, and Russia in
particular [...] the transition from socialism to capitalism was much
more di¢ cult and painful in the former Soviet Union republics than
anywhere else in the world, both because these republics were under
communist rule the longest and because the transition to capitalism
also coincided with dissolution of the Soviet Union. Breaking up
any continental scale nation was likely to prove traumatic; break-
ing up a country that was also an economic system proved doubly
so. [...] the contraction in output that occurred in the former So-
viet Union after 1991 was far greater than anywhere elseand there
is as yet no upturnmaking it very di¢ cult to document any kind
of relative performance improvement, or to assign causality to any
improvement that is found. [...] it seems clear that the former So-
viet Union republics especially Russia took a decided turn for the
worse economically after 1997 [...]
However, by the year 2000 Russia had reversed the downward trend in GDP
per capita after the 1997 crisis and by 2003 it had reached 1997 levels again
at a modest $2,976 GDP per capita. The decade, with the exception of 2009,2
continued to see steady GDP growth, according to the World Bank.3
Given the relatively recent date of the economic reforms, the Russian -
nancial markets and institutions are still inmature and in their development
1Desai (2005).
2The signicant drop in GDP in 2009 was a result of the nancial crisis and its repercus-
sions, which occurred 2008.
3World Bank (2012a), Data Indicators, GDP per capita (current US$).
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phase. The Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) was opened in
1992, followed by the Russian Trading System (RTS) in 1995. These two ex-
changes constituted the main equity markets in Russia and in December 2011
they merged in an endeavour to create a credible Russian alternative to the
London Stock Exchange (LSE). This is the current centre of Russian initial
public o¤erings (IPOs).4 As noted in Chapter 1 (and explored in Chapter 4),
the surprisingly modest IPO underpricing of equity in Russia (4.2 percent un-
derpriced, 1999-2006), coupled with a small sample size of 40 companies, gave
rise to inquisitiveness. This was amplied when comparing the Russian IPO
prole with India and China, which both displayed considerable underpricing
and large sample sizes. The reason behind this pricing behaviour is explored in
this chapter (with India and China to follow in Chapters 8 and 9). We know
from Chapter 5 that Economic, Institutional and Demographic variables inu-
ence global IPO underpricing. However, eldwork is required to more fully grasp
the issues at hand and to understand the nuances within the market framework.
Scope of Fieldwork
The eldwork which forms the basis for this Russia case study was con-
ducted between Friday August 5 and Saturday August 20, 2011, in Moscow.
The rst formal interview took place on the rst Monday morning (August 8);
this was followed by an additional 12 formal interviews over the following nine
working days. The interviewees were accomplished nance professionals and
opinion formers in Moscow. Interviewees had initially agreed to meet for one
hour to cover the interview agenda (the minimum time period required to cover
all sub-headings), however, as the conversations developed almost all the inter-
views lasted around two hours.
Table 6.1: IntervieweesCodes, Status, and Sector
Interviewee Code Sector
Senior Credit Analyst AR Russian Investment Bank
Advisor to the Chairman BR Russian Investment Bank
Strategic Analyst CR Russian Private Equity Firm
Head of Banking DR International Investment Bank
Managing Partner ER Big Four Accounting Firm
Emerging Markets Broker FR Russian Brokerage Firm
Senior Investment O¢ cer GR International Organisation
Head of Client Services HR Asset Management Company
Chief Economist IR International Investment Bank
Deputy Director, Research JR Russian Retail Bank
Chief Economist KR Russian Retail Bank
Finance Professor LR Moscow based University
Chief Economist MR International Investment Bank
4Weaver (2011).
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The interviewees, listed in Table 6.1, were explicitly guaranteed anonymity
and they all signed a University of St Andrews Participant Consent Form,
Anonymous Data, that explained the nature of the research and list their rights
as interviewees (see Appendix E). They were, for example, informed that they
could terminate the interview at any stage and that they were free to refuse
to answer any specic questions. Moreover, there were four additional formal
meetings which served to build a more full picture of the country and its culture.
After returning to the UK, two more extensive conversations were conducted by
telephone with experts on Russia who at the time were not in Moscow.
In this chapter, the analysis carried out and the evidence presented, as in the
India and China case studies, is predominantly based on these primary sources
and augmented by additional secondary sources.
Chapter Structure
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 6:2 exam-
ines Russia in the context of globalisation, both from an economic and a so-
cial/political perspective. This section makes it clear that, for better or worse,
the Russian economy has become increasingly dependent on hydrocarbon ex-
ports. Moreover, information ows are actively stied by the state although the
internet remains uncensored in Russia. Section 6:3 looks at corporate gover-
nance and its nature and implementation today in Russia. Although corporate
governance practises have improved signicantly since the 1990s, it was evident
that accountability and transparency were still far from Western European stan-
dards. Section 6:4 discusses the institutional structure within the country, which
was seen to be improving to some extend. For example, the two main stock ex-
changes in Moscow were only a few months away from merging, which was seen
as a positive development. However, as long as the self-interested government
interferes in the market processes and directly inuences the regulators, it is
di¢ cult to see how the institutional structure can develop and mature into a
market stabilising force. Section 6:5 evaluates competitive strategy within the
Russian nancial sectors. With thousands of small opaque private banks in
Russia there is talk of future consolidation within the retail banking sector.
Notwithstanding this, the Russian Sberbank and VTB are rmly in control of
the Russian retail market. Russian banks and rms are strongly represented
in both the banking and brokerage sectors, whereas auditing is almost entire
dominated by the Big Four international auditing rms.5 Russia is still heav-
ily dominated by the state and any company entering Russia will have to take
this into account when planning its entry strategy. Finally, conclusions will be
drawn on the basis of the evidence presented on Russia in Section 6:6.
5The Big Four accounting rms consists of: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (Deloitte), Ernst
& Young (E&Y), Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG) and PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC).
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6.2 Globalisation
This section examines Russias interaction with the international community
from a number of di¤erent angles. We will examine the relative importance of ac-
tual economic ows and restrictions, the relative importance of personal contact,
information ows and cultural proximity, and political e¤ects on market func-
tions. The globalisation sub-headings and the questions in the semi-structured
interviews that form the foundation for this chapter are derived from the KOF
Index of Globalization which also forms a part of the explorative analysis carried
out in Chapter 4 (Dreher, 2003).
6.2.1 Economic E¤ects on Market Functions
The 2008 nancial crisis was mentioned throughout most interviews as a wa-
tershed moment. Capital ight was signicant, property prices dropped consid-
erably, many lost their jobs in the nancial services in Moscow, foreign retail
chains either slowed down their expansion in Russia or withdrew from the mar-
ket. By 2012, activity in the nancial markets have still not fully recovered.
Gaddy & Ickes (2010) echo this sentiment, as they state that Russia, from
mid-2008 to early 2009, saw a sharper contraction of the economy (in measures
including output and stock market values) than almost any other major coun-
try. Frankel & Saravelos (2012) note that, measured as GDP change during
the period Q2 2008 to Q2 2009 for a 64 country sample, only Macao, Estonia,
Ukraine, Latvia and Lithuania performed worse than Russia. All six countries
experienced negative growth. In contrast, India and China were at the very top
of the best performing countries during this period, with respectively around
approximately 5.5 percent and 7.0 percent GDP growth. Gaddy & Ickes at-
tribute the severity of the crisis to Russias dependence on oil exports: Russia
grew thanks to oil; Russia fell because of oil [...] These recent shocks, positive
and negative, are by no means the rst and will not be the last.Gaddy & Ickes
(2010:307).
Figure 6.1: RTS Stock Exchange Index performance vs. London
Stock Exchange FTSE 100 between 2007 Q3 and 2010 Q1
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Source: Financial Times, 2010.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the considerable drop in share prices on the RTS Stock
Exchange around June 2008, here in the thicker red colour. The London Stock
Exchange FTSE 100 (indicated as the thinner grey line) also displays negative
growth but with less volatility and less drop in value.
The Relative Importance of Economic Flows
The relative importance of economic ows for Russia is quite straightfor-
ward when examining trade ows. Exports of oil and gas constitute around
two-thirds of the value of total Russian exports in 2011 and minerals make up
another ten percent, according to IR, the Chief Economist of a large interna-
tional investment bank. The US Census Bureau (2012) reports that Russia
produced 9,674,000 barrels of crude oil per day in 2012 out of a total daily
production of 74,043,000 barrels, making Russia the worlds largest producer
of crude oil in 2010. So, despite its legendary standing as a highly intellectual
probity, based on these statistics, Russia is a natural resource based economy.
Russias oil rich deposits have given rise to a number of publications questioning
whether Russia is moving towards becoming a rentier economy.6 Beblawi (1987:
51) notes that [a] rentier economy is thus an economy where the creation of
wealth is centered around a small fraction of the society; the rest of the society
is only engaged in the distribution and the utilisation of this wealth. Estrada
& Arilla (2005) concluded that by the mid-2000s the Russia economy was not
drifting towards a rentier system. Desai, Freinkman, & Goldberg (2005) and
Freinkman & Plekhanov (2009), on the other hand, suggest that there are signs
on a regional level which indicate that local Russian governments have taken on
rentier characteristics. During the eldwork stay in Moscow, FR, an Emerging
Markets Broker, shared a Citigroup agship publication that is not disseminated
to the wider public (see Appendix N for the full document). In the Citigroups
(2011:4) The Russian Hunter, their inaugural strategy publication, they build
their equity investment strategy around the notion that Russia has become a
borderline rentier economy:
[...] Russia is not yet a pure rentier economy, but [...] it is in
danger of becoming one, with some of the less appealing aspects
of rentier economies. Commodity taxation makes up over half of
the federal revenue, rents to the level of over a quarter of GDP are
generated by the commodity sector, the economy is highly vulnerable
to external price shocks, as we saw in 2008, rent is transferred from
the government to the people, and so on.Appendix N.
Citigroup dene rent rate as the di¤erence between world market prices
and extraction costs and continue to note that rent is extracted from three key
providers: oil, gas and metals. They conclude, according to their estimates that
6See Reid (1989) for a theoretical overview of the concept of rentier economies. Herb (2005)
o¤ers a general discussion on the concept of rentier economies.
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total Russian rent is $500bn. This gure is based on the estimate of $650bn is
natural resources, with extraction costs estimated at $150bn.
On the other hand, Russia imports mainly manufactured goods as its manu-
facturing industry su¤ers from chronic underinvestment and is not competitive
on an international scale. Erixon & Dreyer (2010:8) observe that underinvest-
ment in the industrial sector and the heavy dependence on commodity export
revenues has been displayed with brutal force during the [2008 nancial] crisis.
Foreign direct investments (FDI) have proven elusive in Russia. MR, a Chief
Economist, noted that FDI is a chronic problem, below 1 percent of GDP, even
during the so-called golden years. They continued to state that the lion
share; around 80 to 85 percent, of FDI reported is not transparent. In contrast,
in Central and Eastern Europe FDI constitutes 3 to 4 percent of GDP and it is
even higher for Kazakhstan at around 8 percent.
The large state-owned investment bank, VTB Capital (2011) has commu-
nication material which states that FDI and capital ight o¢ cial estimates for
Russia are skewed for a number of reasons. The fundamental issue is that,
[t]hroughout Russia, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, private sector companies
are very often owned from the outside (e.g., Russians control Russian compa-
nies not from Russia itself, but through a chain of intermediate o¤shore holding
vehicles). Even state-owned companies occasionally have an o¤shore component
in their corporate structure(VTB, 2011:2).
VTB continues to list a number of reasons for the resources of Russian
companies to be held o¤shore:
 It provides the companies with the opportunity to make use of foreign
courts for protection of ownership rights, contractual agreements and cap-
ital structure exibility
 It allows for companies to be less transparent and can lower visibility of
the real benecial interests(VTB, 2011:2)
 Thirdly, and most trivially, certain o¤shore jurisdictions provide a better
tax climate versus onshore regimes(VTB: 2011:2)
As a result, funds that are o¢ cially marked as FDI or capital ight, may
often in reality be capital that is moved between di¤erent legal entities that
ultimately come under a Russian based company (although ownership is regis-
tered through an o¤shore account).7 In this context, most of the interviewees
( AR, BR, CR, DR, ER, HR, KR and LR) mentioned that Cyprus has become
particularly popular with Russian companies as an o¤shore base. One of the
main beneciaries of bona de FDI in Russia is the automobile industry, ac-
cording to the Chief Economist, KR. Krkoska & Spencer (2008) conclude in an
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) report that FDI
7As an aside, the third bullet point mentions the term: most trivially. This is of course an
interesting choice of words, which would suggest that Russian companies already extensively
exercise tax evasion/avoidance in Russia.
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has created enough momentum and know-how in the Russian car manufacturing
sector to ensure that more capital intensive processes will be attracted to the
country over the coming years, provided that announced investments projects
are carried out. There have also been some improvements in terms of ownership
transparency and the Central Bank is moving in the right direction, according
to one Senior Investment O¢ cer, GR. Banks are now required to publish the
names of their beneciaries on their website - not all comply and there are no
consequences for this noncompliance - but the big Russian banks do follow this
requirement. In general, the banking sector is much better regulated than other
sectors.
Russia is one of the four BRIC countries,8 which should facilitate its attract-
ing investments from abroad. However, BR, Senior Advisor to the Chairman of
a large Russia investment bank, notes that Russia is a less prominent member
of the BRIC grouping. Portfolio investments in Russia are often driven by oil
prices, according to another local economist. This observation ties in with those
of London interviewees when expressing their views on Russian investment op-
portunities. As JU , a London Investment Analyst who has lived and worked in
Moscow in the past, noted [the] smart money goes to China and India, before
adding that the appetite to invest in Europe is currently quite limited.
The Relative Importance of Economic Restrictions
Economic restrictions is an area that should be liberalised with the accession
into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2011. Currently, Russia
make use of tari¤s to protect domestic industries and there are informal barriers
to entry, such as bureaucracy and ad hoc customs rules. There is no one-stop-
shopfor those keen to export into Russia and most nd the process needlessly
opaque. CR, a Strategic Analyst in private equity, noted that there are also
uno¢ cial restrictions in, especially, the mining sector. Small Canadian and
UK companies have encountered problems in the past that seem to have been
designed to push out small foreign companies. They are often listed but small
in size. These episodes often get reported in annual reports. For example,
small rms nd that they cannot get their licenses renewed and they are forced
to sell to big Russian companies. These problems are often encountered in
infrastructure projects and exploration and typically revolve around licences
renewals. Chebankova (2010), for example, details the politicisation and conict
of interest that is present in the issuing and management of natural resource
licences in Russia.
Moreover, in 2008 Putin imposed strict foreign ownership restrictions on
Russias strategic companies.9 According to GR, a Senior Investment O¢ cer,
this may be the biggest restriction to inows in Russia and the biggest obstacle
to growth. The Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) enforces these restrictions
8The acronym BRIC, which represents Brazil, Russia, India and Chia, was coined by Jim
ONeill of Goldman Sachs in a seminal 2001 report titled Building Better Global Economic
BRICs.
9Gati (2008) provides a comprehensive legal overview of the strategic law, which covers 42
types of activity included within 15 broad sectors or industries.
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rigorously.10 For example, banks are classied as strategic due to their use of
the SWIFT transfer system (although everyone realises that it was a mistake
to classify them as such), since this system is cryptographic and, as such, it
is sensitive high-tech equipment. The list of restrictions is extensive and cov-
ers banks, natural resources, media and defence companies, amongst others.
This is of course in sharp contrast to the UK approach. There, most of the
UK interviewees commented upon the openness of the UK. DU , Global Chief
Economist for an international investment bank, encapsulated the sentiment by
stating that the UK is famous for selling o¤ its crown jewels to foreigners. On
the other hand, 2010 marked somewhat of a reversal in UK openness to foreign
takeovers. Patrone (2011:2) analysed the $19 billion hostile-turned-friendly
2010 Kraft and Cadbury takeover and nds that it illustrated sound execution
of the United Kingdoms board neutrality regime but tested a nations resolve
of its underlying policies.Patrone (2011:2). However, within months of taking
over Cadbury, Kraft announced the closure of a UK plant to the dismay of UK
regulators and stakeholders. As a result, which was also noted by AU , a Chief
Economist in London, the Takeover Panel Code Committee published a report
in 2010 that gave non-equity stakeholders a greater say in potential takeovers
(Patrone, 2011).11
6.2.2 Social E¤ects on Market Functions
Personal contact between Russia and the international community has increased
in recent years. In particular, Turkey (chiey because of no visa requirements)
and Egypt are popular for package holidays. London is the destination of choice
for wealthy Russians. As AR, a Senior Credit Analyst, noted, one third of
Moscow, one third of St Petersburg and one fth of other big Russian cities are
plugged-in, meaning fully economically, socially and politically engaged. This
has been the case for centuries. It should also be noted that personal contacts are
essential in conducting business in Russia. Interestingly, both CU , Chief Euro-
pean Economist, and FU , Global head of Mergers & Acquisitions, observed that
the (international) culture found in London is very di¤erent to the rest of the
country. Moreover, HU , Managing Director, observed that sitting in London
you feel connected to many countries. However, London is not representative of
the country as a whole. London may be more like the Netherlands.
Information is censored in Russia, especially any medium that reaches the
wider population. As a result, TV news programmes are seen as listing the
policy objectives of the Kremlin and not transmitting actual news. However,
the two main business papers (Vedomosti and Kommersant) are seen as quite
independent and objective. There are also some minor intellectual news sources
that have remained independent of government inuence. The Internet is also
not censored and is used by mainly one activist (Alexei Navalny) to publicly
10See http://en.fas.gov.ru/ for the English version of the FSAs o¢ cial website.
11The report is The Takeover Panel Code Committee Review of Certain Aspects of the
Regulation of Takeover Bids by The Takeover Panel, Code Committee, October 21, 2010.
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/2010-221.pdf
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highlight shortcomings of corporate governance practises.
During an informal conversation with a US educated Human Resource (HR)
Audit Manager from one of the Big Four accounting rms in Moscow, they
mentioned that their rm sells salary data to other companies. However, they
noted that pricing this information is not done in, for example, the UK and
US since these countries are considerably more transparent about salaries. As
in China and, to a lesser extent, India, information comes at a premium in
Russia. Unimpeded information is paramount for nancial markets to function
e¢ ciently and pricing information out of the market is detrimental to e¢ ciency.
In contrast, the UK benets from a free ow of information and a free press.
Cultural proximity may be gauged by the countrys openness to Western
European brands in retailing. Russia saw an upward trend in foreign retail-
ers entering the large Russian cities up until the 2008 crisis. Today, there are
some prominent foreign retailers present. According to HR, a Head of Client
Services in asset management, McDonalds may be the biggest success story in
this context. There were six-hour queues when McDonalds rst opened their
doors in Moscow in 1991. They have a joint venture with the state and have
secured excellent locations and buildings for their restaurants. On the other
hand, Ikea was mentioned by the majority of observers as having had a more
problematic entry into Russia. Ikea was from the outset extorted by local elec-
tricity providers. However, Ikea hired diesel generators to avoid paying bribes
to local o¢ cials. This became Ikeas modus operandi as it moved to open more
stores in Russia. However, it transpired that the manager that was tasked with
hiring the generators allegedly was taking kickbacks from the rental company.
The estimated fraud came to $196 million over two years. Ikea sought redress
in a local Russian court but the rental company was instead awarded e5 mil-
lion euros for breach of contract12 . This incident is somewhat reminiscent of a
Russian joke that HR mentioned, with the caveat that this may be happening
quite frequently:
You are tasked with building a big house in Russia. First you
go and ask a Turkish contractor for a quote; he wants $100 million.
Then you ask a German contractor and he quotes $200 million for
the same project. Finally you ask the Russian contractor and he
also quotes $200 million. You then ask the Russian: Why would I
want to hire you when I can get the German contractor for the same
amount of money and he has great skills and technology available?
The Russian replies: Because I will hire the Turkish guy, and we
split the remaining $100 million between us, 50/50.
12Kramer (September 12, 2009) reporting for the New York Times. The Economist Intel-
ligence Unit (January 18, 2011) adds that Ikea had encountered further bribey issues and
had dismissed two more managers in relation to giving bribes to local energy o¢ cials. The
Economist Intelligence Unit suggests that Ikea is doing well nancially in Russia but that
underlining corruption issues need to be continually addressed by the company.
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6.2.3 Political E¤ects on Market Functions
Russia uses its natural resources as leverage on the international stage. It would
like to be seen as a superpower again and is historically suspicious of the motives
of the West. DR, Head of Banking in an investment bank, stated that Russia
wants to be among the global elite and thinks that this is a clubof less than ten
countries. Moreover, Russia understands that the only reason it was accepted
into the G8 was due to its nuclear power status. It does not like to be part of the
G20, as it is considered to be less exclusive. Russia often sides with China, India
and some other peripheral countries in international disputes, despite the fact
that economically its signicant trade partners are Western Europe countries.
The UK itself may be able to identify with this dilemma of allegiance. Most
of the UK interviewees mentioned that there is a danger of the UK losing in-
uence on the world stage, as it seems conicted between working closely with
the US or seeking more integration with the European Union. For example,
IU , a Senior European Economist, expressed surprise that the UK does not join
forces more often with the the rest of the EU, for inuence.
6.3 Corporate Governance
This section examines the position of stakeholders in Russia, corporate social
responsibility, business ethics, enforcement and control, corporate governance
and rm performance. Moreover, it also covers mergers and acquisitions and
initial public o¤erings. Good corporate governance practises are essential in
establishing fair IPO valuations and, by extension, ensuring e¢ cient alloca-
tion of resources in economies. Issues such as transparency, earnings quality,
business ethics and management skills will be important to both investors and
stakeholders in the wider community. Chapter 5 established through econo-
metric modelling that the frequency and the level of detail required of interim
corporate reports inuences IPO underpricing. More stringent reporting re-
quirements were found to reduce underpricing. By including core corporate
governance topics in the eldwork study, it is possible to go behind the gures
and build a fuller picture of the underlying causes of market failure. It is for
example possible to evaluate earnings quality in Russia, India, China and the
UK through the eldwork.
6.3.1 Stakeholders
Internal Stakeholders
Employees are not normally involved in daily decision making in an average local
company and their job prospects are quite static. Russia has what are known
as monotowns scattered around the country, often is isolated areas. These are
towns with essentially only one (large) industrial employer and they are a legacy
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from the planned economy of the former USSR.13 In these towns and cities
where, say, 95 percent are dependent on this one entity, it is di¢ cult to move
and it is di¢ cult to obtain a mortgage. Employees cannot a¤ord to lose their
jobs, that is, they are in a weak negotiating position. However, the factory
needs to keep certain employment levels, otherwise authorities will go after the
company. The labour code, which is also a product of the former USSR, is
quite good in theory. Manager accountability has improved although it is still a
weak area. There is often a very hierarchical ownership structure, with a strong
hands-on individual as the owner.
CU observed that [t]he notion that the company is being run in the interest
of the owner, not the employees, is important for the UK. That shareholders,
not the management or the company founder, are the dominant force behind
listed companies is a fundamental di¤erence between the UK and Russia. Deakin
(2005) questions the primacy of shareholder value in the UK and the US and
notes that shareholder primacy originates from norms and culture in these two
countries, not from corporate law. He continues to state that:
What we are witnessing is a shift in the content of the share-
holder value norm, so that it comes to represent the idea that share-
holders exercise their powers not as the representatives of the market,
but as agents of society as a whole. The corporate governance of the
future will be centrally concerned with how this idea is worked out
in practice.Deakin (2005:16)
More recently, Stout (2011) predicts that the classic notion of shareholder
primacy in the US will soon give way to more sophisticated considerations on
corporate governance and its objectives. In contrast to these nuanced consider-
ations and mature markets with well developed and tested corporate governance
principles, it was the very substantial 1992-1994 privatisation period in Russia
that laid the foundation for its structure of corporate ownership and gover-
nance, according to Vasilyev (2000). Black, Kraakman & Tarassovas widely
cited paper from 2000 Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What
Went Wrong? supports this conclusion. Black, Kraakman & Tarassova found
that the privatisation process of Russian SOEs was rushed through without
the necessary well-developed institutional framework to support the process. It
formed part of the general shock therapy method to move rapidly away from
the old USSR model, however, it left vast country resources open to corruption,
manipulation and asset stripping.
External Stakeholders
The lack of legal protection is a concern raised by all the interviewees in Russia.
There is a consumer protection agency, which is somewhat e¤ective in the large
13One such monotown is Togliatti. Its population is 720,000 people, with 66,000 workers
employed at the AvtoVAZ plant, producing lada cars. Between 2009 and 2012, the AvtoVAZ
plant workforce has been reduced from 104,000 to 66,000 employees (Kelly, 2012).
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cities.14 For suppliers and lenders the lack of legal protection, places an extra
emphasis on them to carefully select their counterparties. This also extends to
bank lending. Russian banks are reluctant to force bankruptcies and to take
lenders to court, as often assets will simply be transferred o¤shore.
In contrast, the UK o¤ers a strong legal framework. Its mature and trans-
parent legal system is widely respected internationally. ER, a Managing Partner
from a Big Four accounting rm, pointed out that, in practise, if people invest
into Russia, sale and purchase agreements are almost invariably written under
English law structure, they use London courts. Similarly, although from a dif-
ferent perspective, CU , a Chief European Economist in London, noted that, the
UK legal system is expensive but e¤ective: English law is great for solving busi-
ness disputes. For example, we currently see two Russian business men ghting
it out in the English courts, over stolen funds from Russia.... The interview
took place on November 30, 2011 and at that time Boris Berezovsky and Roman
Abramovich were locked in a High Court battle over a £ 2bn Russian business
dispute.15
Unions have little inuence in Russia and o¢ cial unions are closely associ-
ated with the state. Some workers are trying to organise independent unions,
including teachers and also coal and other mining unions in some places. Unions
are often stronger in foreign companies, for example Fords car assembly plant
has experienced strikes.
When asked about government inuence as an external stakeholder, GR
replied that on a scale from 1 to 10, it would probably be 9.5/10, in a wide
sense of the word, taking a¢ liated people into account. They also added that the
inuence of the government is growing. There is a long-term plan by President
Medvedev to privatise a substantial part of the state companies. However,
several interviewees (for example, FR, an Emerging Markets Broker) predicted
that if President Medvedev does not remain in power after the March 2012
election, the implications would be negative for the privatisation plan. As of
May 7, 2012, Mr Putin is once again the President of Russia. Whether this
will be detrimental to the tentative reform programme instigated by President
Medvedev remains to be seen.
6.3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility
As discussed in Chapter 2, Andrew Carnegie (the nineteenth century industrial-
ist with strong connections to St Andrews and the surrounding area) was one of
the pioneers of what we today know as corporate social responsibility (CSR). By
the mid-1950s in the US, the modern perception of CSR had been established
in both industry and academia.16
14The consumer agency is called the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights
Protection and Human Welfareand can be found at http://rospotrebnadzor.ru/en/web/en/
15See e.g. Croft & Binham (2011) reporting for the Financial Times on the outline of the
case, on October 2.
16See e.g., Cochran (2007) on the inception of CSR in industry and Carroll (1999) on the
rst academic contribution.
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CSR is starting to become a factor in Russia. Most interviewees noted that
there is a long way to go but that international companies coming into Russia
have had a positive inuence in this area. Although international companies
are leading the way in promoting CSR in Russia, CSR commitments are still
maturing in the UK. FU found that CSR is an increasingly prominent topic in
the UK business environment. [It is] [m]ore important to talk about CSR than
to act upon it. Although talking is leading to more action.They suggest that
brand considerations, image and political acceptability are the driving forces
behind CSR in the UK. It has become a social norm. They also noted that
in terms of action and activities that companies can be just as cynical as
individuals.
Several Russian interviewees (e.g., CR, DR, FR and LR) alleged that CSR
is also used as a front for asset stripping and bribery in some companies. Large
sums of money is allegedly donated to non-transparent charities and opaque
associations. DR, a Head of Banking, stated that however its common knowl-
edge that its [CSR] very untransparent and an asset stripping activity. They
further mentioned that a big state owned oil company pays $100s of millions
to unknown charities and then the money disappears. Also, private companies
pay into charities linked to local government o¢ cials.
6.3.3 Business Ethics
Corporate and government scandals are publicised and discussed in Russia when
they enter the public domain. In some cases black PRmay be used to achieve
an ulterior objective.17 Dyck, Volchkova & Zingales (2008) document that dur-
ing the period 1999-2002, Hermitage Capital Management lobbied for Anglo-
American media coverage in an attempt to address corporate governance issues
they uncovered through their investments in Russia.18 Dyck, Volchkova & Zin-
gales posit that the Anglo-American press coverage was instrumental in revers-
ing some corporate governance infringement cases and also in spurring Russian
regulators into action. AR, a Senior Credit Analyst, noted that any unethical
means used today is basically the old US model: what Russia is seeing is just
like the second half of the twentieth century in the USA, i.e., its a normal stage
in development. However, more of an issue in the 1990s. . . . GR added that
hear-saywould suggest that all big deals have issues today. They continued to
observe that the presidential election is imminent and that: People think they
need to build their fortunes nowand that there is a no tomorrow approach.
President Medvedev is seen as saying all the right words, but the consensus is
that the state is not proactive in reducing unethical behaviour.
The agrant abuse of power and corruption in Russia today, is in stark con-
trast to the UK and the US. CU stated that, Business Ethics has become a
17Black PRis a Russian phenomenon where journalists are paid to discredit adversaries and
competitors in the press. See Ledeneva (2006), Chapters 2 and 3, for an extensive explanation
and analysis of this phenomenon.
18The below discussion under Institutional Investorsdiscusses Hermitage Capital Manage-
ment dramatic exit from the Russian market.
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brand after the crisis in the UK. Moreover, HU , a Managing Director, added
that the UK Bribery Act demonstrates that ethical behaviour is expected glob-
ally that it is not just lip service in the UK. ER, a Managing Partner with
one of the Big Four accounting rms in Russia, explained that if they uncover
corruption during due diligence for an US or UK investment/acquisition they
will have to terminate the process. They add that underdeveloped corporate
governance practises can be overcomed but not corruption, due to the US For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, which applies globally to US businesses. The UK
has been falling into line with the US on this issue.
6.3.4 Enforcement and Control
There is no real will to implement enforcement and controls in Russian compa-
nies, according to ER, a Managing Partner with one of the Big Four international
auditor rms. As a result, their company is very careful about who they take
on as clients in an e¤ort to stay out of the corrupt environment. LR, a Finance
Professor based in Moscow, commented that it is very di¢ cult to be an honest
auditor in a very corrupt environment, especially with big state owned com-
panies. DR noted that audits are well organised, especially in companies that
are traded in the West. The Big Four are used for publicly traded entities and
although there is an understanding that they can be pushed around to a certain
degree by big corporations, they try to be independent. KR, a Chief Economist
at a Russian retail bank, added that markets do not pay much attention to audit
information, as they feel that audits do not go into depth. They see audits more
as a cursory process that does not necessarily provide a certication value.
Notwithstanding this, most interviewees noted a marked improvement in
the quality of nancial statements. This was especially for companies with
international exposure or seeking international nance.
Lack of enforcement is a concern among all the interviewees. AR observed
that if a company is listed internationally then corporate governance standards
are followed and there is enforcement of the rules. However, for domestic com-
panies there is either no enforcement or it can easily be overcome.
GU , an Operational Risk Manager in London, found that internal audits are
quite reliable in the UK, which is in line with other interviewees. GU added
that the credit crisis and the European regulation on nancial services have
increased the pressure for good internal corporate governance controls in the
UK. Moreover, the UK media is found to have a positive e¤ect on companies
as an external corporate governance control mechanism.
6.3.5 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
Board composition and dynamics are changing in Russia. Traditionally, SOE
boards have not been involved in guiding their company strategically or had any
other real inuence over their company. The role of supervision and strategic
steering that is normally ascribed to boards in the UK has not been applied
to the Russia SOEs. According to one analyst, AR, the Federal Agency for
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State Property Management issue directives that are then read out loudby
board members. Board positions are often awarded to long serving and loyal
government members who are not o¢ cially paid for their services. These jobs
have been highly sought after and AR stated that state o¢ cial board members
would nd ways to monetisetheir inuence on the board. In 2011 the govern-
ment began to replace o¢ cials on boards with external independent directors,
however they may be independent in name only according to interviewees in
Russia. Clover & Buckley (2011) wrote in the Financial Times that, On March
31 he [President Medvedev] issued a decree that cabinet ministers had to va-
cate board seats they occupied at state companies, eliminating untold privileges
and conicts of interest. Chris Weafer, Chief Strategist at UralSib Financial
Corporation was reported on June 20 2011, as stating that, Already, there is
disappointment that Medvedevs initiative earlier this year to get rid of eight
top government o¢ cials on state company boards isnt producing the promised
results because they are being replaced by allies.19
For non-state controlled listed companies there is more openness and they
increasingly have international board members in an endeavour to promote good
corporate governance.
Corporate boards should act as crucial links between stakeholders and man-
agement, mitigating conict of interest issues. A board provides (or at least
should ideally provide) separation of ownership and control (John & Senbet,
1998). It is evident that Russian boards do not in general fulll this role. They
are rather an extension of the founders reach or the state. As a result, stake-
holder representation on a strategic level is greatly lacking in Russia, which does
not inspire condence in potential investors. In contrast, the UK is entering a
new mature phase of its board composition considerations. CU found that there
has been a stronger focus over the past ve years on diversity and independence
of directors. London has a competitive advantage in this area, as there is a
great pool of expertise to be found in the City London. Women are currently
lagging behind in representation on boards. However, according to HU , this is
now changing. They mentioned the 30 Percent Clubas a topical example: the
goal is to achieve 30 percent women on the boards of FTSE 100 companies.
Notwithstanding this, the UK can draw on some of the most experienced and
accomplished nance professionals in the world in the board rooms.
6.3.6 Mergers & Acquisitions
The mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market is quite active. The banking sector
consolidation started around 18 to 24 months ago, but the lack of transparency
prevents some M&A activity. BR, an Advisor to the Chairman of an investment
bank, stated that the market is driven by expansion of international players,
especially in the beverage sector. For example, Nestle, Pepsi and Heineken are
expanding in Russia. A Russian Chief Economist, MR, noted that, in the dairy
industry for example, Pepsi bought Wim-Bill-Done which has got a 15 to 20
19Cited by Pronina & Meyer (2011).
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percent Russian market share. Wim-Bill-Done is an excellent start-up company
that had its IPO in 2000. Allegedly the owner realised that his company had
reached a critical size and that he would have to deal more closely with the
government if the company were to continue to grow. He sold the company to
Pepsi as he was not comfortable to work with the state alone.
In contrast to the Russian M&A market, London is not hampered by trans-
parency issues or undue state intervention. On the contrary, the well developed
reporting standards and the free ow of information in the UK markets have
proven fruitful to the UK nancial industry. Speaking in regard to the UK,
FU , a Global Head of Mergers & Acquisitions, noted that London is one of the
most active M&A markets in the world. The motivation behind M&As may
vary, namely, it may be cheaper to buy than to build, synergies, growth of mar-
kets, new products, expansion of prots, increase in executive compensation and
more fun than just running a company - executives get bored!20
In Russia, the state acts as the primary takeover defence, according to AR.
In the UK, on the other hand, there are almost no takeover defences. The UK
relies mostly on market forces to regulate M&A activity. Potentially markets can
encourage increased company e¢ ciency by the threat of disciplinary takeovers
(see Jensen, 1993). FU suggested that the two most e¤ective (and rather simple
methods of) takeover defences in the UK are management not allowing due
diligence (as the buyer would need due diligence to obtain nance from the
banks) and, secondly, anti-trust issues i.e., management of the targeted company
may alert the authorities who may eventually block the deal.
6.3.7 Initial Public O¤erings
The primary reason why Russia became a country of interest in Chapter 4 was
its abnormal level of average underpricing. Russia, with 4.2 percent average
underpricing between 1999 to 2006, was the country out of a sample of 45 coun-
tries that registered the lowest initial returns on the rst day of trading. This is
of course in stark contrast to India (92.7 percent, 1990-2007) and China (164.5
percent, 1999-2005), not to mention the international benchmark of the deepest
and most mature markets of the UK (16.8 percent, 1959-2006) and US (16.9
percent, 1960-2007). Once on the ground in Moscow, it became apparent that
the primary IPO market had not developed into a credible entity by 2006. FR
commented that the domestic Russian IPO market only started to see activity
in earnest by 2007.
Moreover, the econometric model developed and explained in Chapter 5, lend
itself well to further observations made during the eld trip to Moscow. Inter-
estingly, the private sector development (PSD) variable suggests that economies
which are experiencing higher growth, will also see higher underpricing of their
IPOs. However, although the Russian economy did experience signicant growth
during this period (1999 to 2006), its nancial markets did not match this growth
rate. Since Russia has a natural resource based driven economy, the nancial
20Keynes (1936) rst mentioned the animal spiritsthat interfer with rational behaviour.
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markets have not been prioritied in the past as growth areas. We know from
the econometric model that the otherwise highly statistically signicant popu-
lation variable (Pop) does not t Russias prole. We would expect to see, from
the model, that countries with large populations would experience higher levels
of underpricing, in general. However, it may be that the Russian economys
unique reliance on hydrocarbons, with less interest in its somewhat dormant
and underdeveloped nancial markets during the 1999 to 2006 period, may ex-
plain the discrepancy between the Pop variables t on Russia, as opposed to the
economies of India and China. FreqRep, a variable representing transparency
and good reporting standards, would suggest that transparency would reduce
underpricing. Russia is a notoriously non-transparent country and the fact that
it registered such low underpricing must again refer back to its uniquely under-
developed and dormant nancial markets.
The Russian IPO market has been somewhat dormant in the past few years.
Good quality companies have been lacking. Although Russian companies have
only been allowed to list a maximum of 25 percent abroad, many companies
have been listed fully abroad through o¤shore holdings. In particular, London
and New York have been popular destinations for Russian IPOs. The Russian
government has removed the IPO cap on listing abroad from 2012.
In Russia it is seen as paramount that the owner stays in control of the
company after it has listed. AR, for example, observed that it (the issuer)
cant be an orphan company.
FU ; an expert in this area, observed that London is still a world centre for
IPOs. The dormant Russian IPO market is in contrast to the busy and highly
liquid London IPO market, to the extent that Russian companies are seeking
out the London Stock Exchange (LES) to go public. There are very few nancial
centres that can o¤er the liquidity and depth of markets that can be found in
London, according to FU . Moreover, FU nds that the traditional reason for
going public, prestige, is now less important. It used to be quite important to
tell your friends that you run a listed company, but this is no longer such an
incentive.
6.4 Institutional Structure
This section examines the role of the state, the regulators and the stock ex-
changes in the nancial markets. As discussed in Chapter 5, the econometric
modelling established that counties with higher minimum capital requirements
to start a business (MCG), that is, countries with higher barriers to market en-
try, would display, on average, higher degrees of underpricing. This institutional
variable was the inspiration to expand the qualitative cross-site investigation
into institutional factors as well.
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6.4.1 Market Inuence by the State
Market regulation continues to be a topical political issue in Russia. Some
market participants see the equity market as being proactively regulated, for
example, through the merger of the Moscow stock exchanges. Some also stress
what they nd to be proactive e¤orts of the Central Bank. On the other hand,
some participants see the nancial regulations as being more reactive.
6.4.2 Regulatory bodies
The Central Bank, which regulates the banking sector, was granted indepen-
dence in 1995. Although it is not seen at all as independent, it may nevertheless
be the most independent and best regarded of the regulators in Russia. They
operate by law and can take information to the police if they seek a prose-
cution. The regulators are seen as a neutral- to-positive force by the market
participants. Although the UK nancial regulations are much more developed
and mature, most of the UK interview participants also see regulations as being
reactive in the UK. EU , an Equity Strategist, stated that the UK is reactive
in regulating the markets, as there is an understanding that the market should
operate freely, but if something goes wrong the regulators step in. However, IU ,
a Senior European Economist, warned that regulators are currently reacting to
the causes of the 2008 crisis, which may carry a risk of over-regulating the UK
markets.
6.4.3 Stock Exchange
It is seen as a positive signal to list in Russia and it brings a degree of trans-
parency. The stock exchanges are quite open to entry, on par with the Alterna-
tive Investment Market (AIM) at the London Stock Exchange. CR noted that
it is not di¢ cult to list but getting trading volume is di¢ cult.
KR, a Chief Economist, stated that the stock exchanges do, up to a point,
share information, but they do not pressure companies to share information.
The stock exchanges do release information but the quality is low. KR stated
that the stock exchanges have a very proscribed approach, dictated by the law;
the law does not mention anything about the quality of the information - so the
exchange does not care.
All interviewees in Moscow saw the upcoming merger between the two Moscow
stock exchanges, RTS and MICEX, as a positive development, on balance.21
They were concerned that it creates another monopoly but they felt it would
be outweighed by the added benets of a simplied nancial infrastructure in
Moscow.
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) is held in high esteem in London and
throughout the world. International companies are keen to list, with the stock
exchange o¤ering liquidity (it is possible to enter and exit e¢ ciently), market
volume and a strong infrastructure. JU added that the exchange has benetted
21The merger o¢ cially happen on December 19, 2011.
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in recent years over the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) due to less red tape.
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) has also been very successful in terms
of attracting Russian companies, as it has less listing requirements than in the
States.
6.4.4 Market Maturity
One Russian Chief Economist, IR, stated that the Russian equity market is
still nascent but moving in the right direction, although insider trading is men-
tioned as still being a problem. CR commented that its an insider market.
The Moscow exchanges are hampered by a one-sided market. AR remarked that
it is a one way market: Oil. This refers to the fact that the Russian equity
market is three quarter hydrocarbon related and oil is priced e¢ ciently. They
continued by noting that for Russia, tax reforms [in relation to oil] are more
important factor than oil prices, in terms of stock prices. There are around 15
to 20 liquidly traded companies connected with the oil, gas, metals and miner-
als industries. Since Moscow is not particularly liquid, London (predominantly)
and New York are required for listings to raise large amount of funds. London,
on the other hand, is a market maker for many products and is unparalleled
in Europe. Globally, it is only matched by the US. Publicly traded equity re-
sponds quite well to information on the LSE. However, there are periods where
the price is driven away from the fundamental underlying price, according to
AU and other interviewees. In e¤ect, the London markets are active, deep, liq-
uid, transparent, have sophisticated monitoring systems scanning for abnormal
trading trends (potential insider trading), with free movement of information
and companies seeking to list from across the world. The Russian nancial mar-
kets are undoubtedly maturing, but they are still in most respects the opposite
paradigm to London.
6.5 Competitive Strategy
This section is inspired by three books on competition by Porter. Porter (1980,
1985) examined rm competition and the framework was extended to countries
in Porters (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations. This section seeks
to examine the rivalry within the di¤erent nancial sectors, to understand the
driving motivation behind the primary clients and look at the barriers to entry.
Market barriers to entry is a key variable in the econometric model constructed
in Chapter 5. This examination complements and extends the analysis carried
out under the Institutional Structure heading (6.4).
6.5.1 Rivalry
Banking Sectors
The investment bank sector is highly competitive in Russia. Almost all inter-
national Houses are in Russia and they are heavily subsidised from other prot
132
centres abroad, which undercuts and hurts future prot, according to one se-
nior investment banker. The two dominant local players are VTB Capital, with
around 1000 people on sta¤ and Sberbank Troika, with around 1200 people. In
contrast, Deutsche Bank have only around 150 people in Moscow. International
investment banks tend to open representative o¢ ces in Russia with well con-
nected sta¤. Mostly the work carried out in London, New York and Frankfurt,
but as in many other countries, sta¤ y in as required.
It is quite common to see teams or individual employees switch employer
over the weekend in Moscow within the investment bank sector. For example,
Renaissance Capital had sta¤move to Otkritie. Its sales team had three or four
waves of people leaving in 2011.
The retail bank sector is dominated by the two state banks: Sberbank (for-
mer savings bank) and VTB (former trade bank). Sberbank has 40 to 50 per-
cent market share (with 50 percent of retail deposits market) and approximately
20,000 outlets/branches. VTB has a 10 percent market share. Alfa Bank (the
biggest private bank) has approximately 500 outlets/branches and has around 3
to 4 percent of the retail market share. According to KR, a Chief Economist for
a Russian retail bank, in terms of market share Russia is the country with the
widest gap between its two largest retail players and their other competitors.
Some foreign retail banks have also managed to establish a strong foothold in
Russia. Rai¤eisen may be the most successful. It has been in Russia for the
longest among the foreign banks and it may be the biggest one in Russia today.
Citi and Societe Generale can also be seen to be doing well. However, other are
struggling, with HSBC and Barclays now pulling out of Russia.
Further bank consolidations are expected in the future and there are thou-
sands of small non-transparent banks in the country.
Sell side recommendations were mentioned as a conict of interest issue in
Russia. However, interviewees noted that this is a global problem. It was
mentioned that there is, in reality, no Chinese Wallbetween the sell & buy
side.22 FR, an equity broker, also noted that a sell recommendation has a
much bigger impact in Russia. Companies call analysts (sometimes daily) who
are personally targeted by the company if they recommend sell. Companies
may also try to buy recommendations.
CU noted that the investment bank industry is a very peculiar sector in
the UK. Although it behaves aggressively, there is little actual competition on
prices. It is based on relationships. IU , a Senior European Economist, added
that competition is extremely high within the group, some may say that it is
one big collusion. Prices/fees are quite similar, with very high entry costs
into the sector. In short, IU , concluded, it is an oligopoly.
In terms of the retail bank sector, IU continues to observed that, again,
there is collusion among them and also there is incredibly high entry costs.
HSBC and Santander are currently the stronger banks (in the sense of stronger
balance sheets) that are pushing the others, though with little price di¤erence.
22See, Cohen, Frazzini & Malloy (2010) on an innovative analysis of sell side recommenda-
tions and school ties.
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AU added that there is a very low propensity for households to move bank. It
can be seen, from a local perspective, as a natural monopoly.
Auditor Sector
Competition is high between the Big Four auditing companies. They are used
widely by listed companies in Russia and by Russian companies that are seeking
international nance, to the extent that companies will often report three to six
months late, due to the lack of auditors (generally, but in particular for the Big
Four), and consequently long waiting times. Auditors are now as common as
pocket thieves in the London Metro, according to AR. The quality of the actual
auditors may have su¤ered - as they are in high demand and with high turnover
- as good auditors are headhunted by their client companies and switch side. An
audit manager from one of the Big Four, in an informal setting, also complained
that their team was su¤ering from a lack of international level talent.
Generally speaking the auditors are seen as independent to the audited com-
pany. However, as previously stated, they are operating in a di¢ cult and chal-
lenging environment where it is believed that the state and large corporations
can inuence their reports.
Most of the interviewees refered to the much publicised Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (PwC) and Yukos incident where PwC in 2007 withdrew its Yukos
audit reports for the period 1995 to 2004, as an example that the government
hold sway over auditors. DR, a Head of Banking in Moscow, stated that PwC
changed position due to severe pressure by the government. PwC were under
the threat of having the government close all PwC o¢ ces in Russia. The Yukos
case marked a watershed in Russias corporate governance practises, according
to KR.23 The Yukos court case made it apparent in Russia that the government
control the judicial system and that the system can be used to extort money
from companies operating in Russia. There may be little doubt that Mikhail
Khodorkovski, who controlled Yukos, acquired Russian natural resources at a
criminally low price and behaved in an unethical manner but it was the states
response that greatly concerned interviewees in Russia.24
Competition is high between the Big Four auditing companies. CU , a Chief
European Economist, states that auditors cover very complex issues and that a
big house is needed to manage big clients. As such, the Big Four are dominant
in the UK. DU , a Global Chief Economist, added that it is a relationship-based
business arrangement. That is, banks tend to stay with the same auditors, even
if they charge more, since the relationship is more important than the fees. This
observation is echoed by the outcome of three Freedom of Information Requests
submitted to the Bank of England (see Appendix O). From the replies it is
23Most companies are still comfortable with using PwC as they look at prices. However, for
individual taxation, some people feel they will not be protected su¢ ciently by PwC, according
to one Head of Banking, Moscow.
24See, for example, Black, Kreekman & Tarassova (2000) on some of Mikhail Khodorkovski
business pratises. See chapter eight in Milhaupt & Pistor (2008) on the renationalisation of
Yukos.
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evident that the Bank employed the same auditor rm/entity for in excess
of 85 years continuously.25 It would seem that between 1919 and 2006 the
only reason that the Bank changed auditors was due to mergers and demergers
on the part of the auditors, not due to the Bank seeking to ensure auditor
independence:
The Bank of England (the Bank) rst employed an external
auditor in 1919, Deloitte, which became Deloitte Haskins & Sells in
1952. In 1990 the Bank was audited by Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte
following a merger between Deloitte Haskins and Sells (UK) and
Coopers and Lybrand. In 1993 Coopers & Lybrand were the Banks
auditors, after Deloitte was dropped from the rms name, and in
1998 Coopers & Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse to become
PricewaterhouseCoopers, who were then the Banks auditors from
1999 onwards. In 2006, as you are aware, KPMG Audit plc was
appointed as the Banks external auditors.Munro, Bank of England
(2012:1), Appendix O.
As evident from the above quote, KPMG won the tender in 2006. It was
awarded a contract up to ve years in length (which can potentially be extended
to a second term).26 This would suggest that relationships have historically been
valued in this type of client and agent agreement, even with the Bank of England
acting as a best practise example.
In seeking legal counsel, the Bank would seem to have been more proactive
in ensuring outside advice:
[...] it was the Banks practice in 1850 and for many years there-
after to appoint an individual lawyer rather than a law rm as such
as the Banks attorney and solicitor. Based on some research we
have conducted in the Bank in response to your request, the fol-
lowing individuals held that o¢ ce from 1850, in some cases the of-
ce was held on a joint basis: J Fresheld (1840-57); C Fresheld
(1840-70); H Fresheld (1857-77); W D Fresheld (1869-1903); E
Fresheld (1869-1918); E H Fresheld (1892-1921); Sir WH Leese
(1916-1937?). Following the death of Sir William Leese, no succes-
sors were formally appointed as the Banks Attorney and Solicitor.
The Bank maintained a close connection with the rm of Freshelds
after the Second World War, but worked increasingly with an ever-
widening range of law rms and barristers, as and when necessary.
Since 1992 the Bank has had its own in-house legal department and
much of the Banks legal work has been handled in-house. During
the last 20 years or so the Bank has worked with a vast number
of di¤erent law rms and external counsel in the UK and overseas
in relation to individual transactions, projects or matters. Munro,
Bank of England (2012:1), Appendix O.
25See Appendix O to consult all three documents.
26See Freedom of Information Request, appendix O.
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It is interesting to note that the Bank chose to employ one specic lawyer
from 1850 to approximately 1937. During that period the British Empire was
a vast and complex entity and the Bank was an integral part of this system.
In Davutyan & Parkes (1995) review of the Bank of England between 1890
and 1908, they note that a number of the countries that constitued the British
Empire held accounts at the Bank.27
Brokerage Sector
Competitiveness is very high with the brokerage sector, to the extent that it
is almost a zero margin business. VTB Capital (owned by VTB) and Troika
Dialog (owned by Sberbank) are the two biggest players in Russia. Other signif-
icant participants are Otkritie, Aton, BCS, Finam, Citi Bank, Meryl Lynch and
Goldman Sachs. Renaissance Capital also used to be a major player in Russia
but they were badly a¤ected by the 2008 nancial crisis (however, they are now
strong in Africa).
In the UK, competitiveness in this sector is also very high, with independent
agents unable to benet from cross-selling products to retail clients. Barriers to
entry and to stay in business are quite considerable. HU , a Managing Director
in banking, noted that it is becoming an arms race in terms of technologyand
that they expect competition to decrease as technology becomes a factor, i.e.,
the leading companies will cement their position through proprietary trading
systems.
However, FU , a Global Head of Mergers and Acquisitions in the audit sector,
suggested that on a corporate brokerage level there may be a strong conict of
interest between some investment institutions and their clients. The institutions
have repeat customers that enter into an arrangement of cross-selling, in other
words, they move shares around between the group. It is very simple and very
protable. Suppose that a client is looking to sell shares. The broker allocate
these shares to its regular buyers. The broker does not make much money on
this transaction. However, the regular buyers who have been given shares at a
signicantly discounted price (as opposed to the market price), will move shares
around between themselves and use the same broker. This is where the real
prot is obtained by the broker. If this happens in the UK, one of the most
mature and sophisticatedly- monitored markets in the world, we may reasonably
infer that such manipulation may be even more pronounced in Russia, India and
China.
6.5.2 Customers
Institutional Investors
There is one single government pension fund that is pay-as-you-go operating in
the market. Domestic banks mostly trade in bonds and they are not allowed
27See, for example, Sayers (1976) classic book on the Bank of England from between 1891
to 1944, for an in-depth analysis of the Bank during that period.
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to trade in private equity. In terms of ranking the market participants by size,
KR observed that foreign institutional investors (for instance, Delta Capital and
TPG Capital)28 make up the largest segment, at least by volume. KR and MR
both noted that these funds are usually characterised by short-term thinking
and create volatility in the market. There is a BRIC element (as Russia forms
part of the BRIC portfolio) but most of the investments go to the other three
countries, according to BR. Pre-deposits in the clearing house are now required,
which should eliminate counter-party risk. This used to be a problem in the
Russian market, due to low transaction transparency.
Institutional investors tend to keep a low prole in Russia, with little share-
holder activism. Hermitage Capital Management, funded by William Browder,
is one of the only examples.29 The idea behind its approach was simple: Buy
shares, obtain minority stake in a company, get board membership, drive up
e¢ ciency and, as a result, drive up the share price.30 The fund transformed
$25 million into $4 billion by investing in underperforming Russian companies
between 1996 and 2005.31 However, the company and its founder got into dif-
culties with the Russian government. HR, head of client services for an asset
management company, stated that Mr Browder made a lot of noiseto bring
companies to the attention of the media, in an endeavour to force the targeted
companies to become more transparent. He also took on the very large state-
controlled Gazprom company but was then refused a visa to re-enter Russia.32
Hermitage was then raided. One of his lawyers, Sergei Magnitsky, investigated
the raid and allegedly uncovered a $200 million tax refund scheme fraud by
Government o¢ cials, they were looking to claim back Hermitages funds for
themselves.33 The lawyer was arrested and sent to prison where he died before
going on trial.
Institutional investors are well represented on the London Stock Exchange
(LSE), however, they tend to keep a somewhat low prole. Pension funds and
insurance companies dominate and move the market. In contrast to London,
pension funds are not dominant in Russia, India or China. In Russia and China
they are allowed but they remain small in size, whereas in India they are not
allowed to invest in equity. In contrast to the previous high prole of Hermitage
in activism, on the LSE, institutional investors have taken a more low key
approach to inuence companies, according to, JU , a London equity Analyst.
28Delta Capital also jump-started the mortgage industry in Russia.
29See Dyck, Volchkova & Zingales (2008) for an interesting account of the Hermitage Capital
Managements (inital) success story in shareholder activism. See Gillana & Starks (2000) on
the general role of institutional investors in shareholder activism. See Kim, Nofsinger & Mohr
(2010) for general considerations on corporate governance and shareholder activism.
30Gillan & Starks (2000) note that the primary motivation behind shareholder activism
has been to presure management into improving rm performance and, as a result, enhace
shareholder value.
31Levy (2008).
32Gazprom: http://www.gazprom.com/
33See, for example, Firestone (2008) on how raids are used in Russia. Firestone suggest
that raids in Russia are a sophisticated type of organised crime.
137
Retail Investors
Retail investors go through brokers and retail banks to invest in the equity mar-
ket. However, only around 2 percent of the population buy shares and among
that group, 10 to 20 percent of their wealth is invested in the nancial markets.
Russia has a pronounced spending culture, where people like to buy homes, cars
and other physical assets, according to interviewees. LR, a Finance Professor,
noted that there may be several reasons why people are mistrustful of the nan-
cial markets. Only around 3 percent of the population is active in the market.
For example, VTB (in other words, the state) heavily promoted Rosnefts IPO
and used VTB branches to sell these shares.34 President Putin also promoted
this IPO. However, many people lost money on this initiative. Moreover, during
the voucher privatisationof 1993 by President Yeltsin, people had their funds
stolen. This was archived through wages arrays. For example, after wages were
not paid for months, CEOs would come and o¤er a low price to buy their sta¤s
vouchers. In the words of Megginson & Netter (2001:23):
Although most countriesactual experience with vouchers has
been poor, none has been quite as dismal as Russias. Although a
variety of factors have played a role, Roman Frydman, Katharina
Pistor, and Andrzej Rapaczynski (1996) show that insider control of
privatized rms has been by far the most important impediment to
e¤ective reform. Initially, the Russian government had high hopes
that the voucher privatization funds (VPFs) formed during the
initial voucher distributions might be able to overcome the collective
action problem inherent in mass privatization programs. Such funds
might use their concentrated ownership in privatized rms to force
managers to restructure. Though most funds attempted to exercise
their voicein corporate boardrooms, insider dominance completely
blocked their e¤orts. The VPFs turned instead to their exitoption
and sold shares on the secondary market.
Black, Kraakman & Tarassova (2000:1802) also lament the organisation and
implementation of the 1992 to 1994 privatisation process and conclude that:
[a] central lesson from the past decade is that mass privatization
o¤ers no escape from that general lesson. A weak government cant
build the institutions that are needed to control self-dealing and
support a complex market economy. Yet without that infrastructure,
rapid large-rm privatization wont help the economy much if at all.
Initial conditions, especially the quality of institutions, matter more,
and privatization matters less, than we thought in the early 1990s.
This statement ties in with the statistical and econometric analysis in Chap-
ters 4 and 5 of this thesis. It is evident that a well-developed institutional
34Rosneft: http://www.rosneft.com/
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framework is needed in order to promote and support economic growth and
market e¢ ciency.
Russian retail investors were also negatively impacted in the 1960s, when the
state forced bonds on the population, according to LR. Due to these extreme
nancial events and crises, retail investors in Russia are generally sceptical of
the nancial markets. As a result, nancial sophistication is still low in Russia
and most of the Russian investors that do venture into nancial investments are
speculators.
Alexei Navalny was mentioned as the only current example of either indi-
vidual or institutional shareholder activism in Russia. He publishes his ongoing
disputes online and has a fund that people can contribute to if they would like
to support his work.35 JR and LR, for example, mentioned his activities as an
example of activism, while for example FR and MR concluded that there was
no shareholder activism in Russia at the time of the interviews (2011, August).
Becht, et al. (2009) conclude on the basis of a number of studies that US
institutional investors engage infrequently in activism, and, when they do, there
is little or no link with rm performance. In contrast, the Hermes UK Focus
Fund (HUKFF) which is somewhat similar in its approach to activism as some
US hedge funds, is found to have a real impact on returns. Kahan & Rock (2007,
cited by Becht, et al. (2009)) state that there are three reasons why hedge funds
have great activism potential: fewer regulatory barriers, less political constraints
and reduced conicts of interest. If this is the level of commitment required to
make a di¤erence in a company through activism, it may not be surprising that
few (if any) successful activists have emerged in recent years in Russia, India or
China.
Although nancial knowledge is signicantly on average higher in the UK
than in Russia, India or China, opinion is divided over whether the average UK
investor is actually well informed. Financial sophistication may be very high
in the UK, according to IU . People speculate a lot on interest rates on their
mortgages. Most common is the two year xed interest rate (the maximum xed
term interest rate available is ten years). It is a signal that they believe that
they know where the interest rates are going. However, on the other hand, there
is also spread bettingwhere bets are place on nancial developments.36 This
is basically a future. Nine out of ten investors/speculators lose money on this,
according to IU . You are playing with re as there is potential for unlimited
losses, added IU . Retail activism is limited. Most retail investors do not even
go to the AGMs anymore to make their voices heard, noted MU . EU suggested
that retail investors are too small to be taken seriously by management and that
it is therefore di¢ cult to have an impact.
35Alexei Navalny online blog: http://navalny-en.livejournal.com/
36See for example the website www.capitalspreads.com (one of the websites that specialises
in o¤ering spread betting on nancial products) for the denition of spread betting.
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6.5.3 Suppliers
New companies entering the stock market are mostly owned by the original
founder. Free ow is very limited (20 to 25 percent) and the owner keeps most
of the outstanding shares to ensure full control of the company. Formally, the
issuing companies have everything in place to comply with rules and regulations,
but the information released by the companies may be unreliable. One way or
another, these companies are usually driven by individuals. Consistently with
Russias economic and nancial prole, the companies seeking to list around the
2007 market activity peak were predominantly from the oil and gas sector.
Transparency is getting better. However, when a company is controlled by
one person only, as often is the case, transparency is limited to what they want
to share.
As a greater number of foreign entities are seeking to list in London it is
becoming increasingly common to see foreign companies that are controlled by
a single majority shareholder in the UK. However, suppliers (that is, issuing
companies) are waiting in the wings at the moment. IPOs both need a great
story and need a good macro climate, according to AU , a Chief Economist.
When companies do enter the market in the UK, they are quite transparent
(as required by the LSE and the FSA). However, transparency is not enough
in itself to satisfy investors. New companies to the market come often come
with an inherent uncertainty, there is less historical information, analysts have
not followed management for years (they do not know them) and the market
will wonder what the motivation is for selling out. The company may also only
have two or three years of nancial statements. Interestingly, new companies
may have underinvested in the past - so exiting owners could drain capital -
however the e¤ects may not be easy to see at the point of sale, only becoming
apparent at a later stage. Since the IPO process is associated with a high degree
of uncertainty and asymmetric information, it corresponds with the econometric
model in Chapter 5 that suggests a higher degree of transparency/accountability
of the issuer (denoted FreqRep in the model) will reduce IPO underpricing.
6.5.4 Potential entrants
Barriers to entry may be the highest in retail banking as opposed to the invest-
ment bank sector. Foreign banks have moved into retail banking to a certain
extent, but with mixed success. Some found that the state owned banks were
too dominant and exited the market again, e.g., Swedbank and Barclays pulled
out. Investment banking is more open and competitive: Citi Bank is strong and
Societe Generale is also quite active. BSGV bought Rosbank and OTP Bank is
also in the market. There are no legal barriers to entry but, as FR noted, the
pie is already divided.
For issuing companies it is an international environment, that is, money
raised internationally rather than locally. Life is becoming more like in the
West but there is still a long way to go. Russian banks have dominated lending
and have started to learn to be more sophisticated and careful. However, they
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do still occasionally get a phone call from the government to requestthe rescue
of a company. Of course, these requests are in fact orders to take action.
For individual retail investors the market is quite open and the same rules
apply to everyone. Private international investors would normally have to invest
through a broker, which should be very simple.
UK investors are quite open to foreign entities, with IU noting that home
biascan be overcome at the right price; the LSE is full of foreign companies.
This is in contrast to Russia, India and China. In Russia, foreign companies
could list, but local nance professionals questioned why any foreign company
would seek a listing in Russia. In India, direct foreign listings are not allowed but
a multinational company could list a subsidiary (e.g., Unilever listed Hindustan
Unilever Limited (HUL)).37 In China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange is in the
process of launching an International Sectorindex. In short, the LSE (London)
is open to foreign companies if they are somewhat transparent and meet its
minimum requirements. Companies seek out the LSE for its deep and liquid
markets, with only the NYSE being able to match London in prestige.
The market is very open to individual retail investors in London. It o¤ers
international standards on disclosure, corporate governance and nancial state-
ments, it has good liquidity, well-developed and deep markets. Moreover it is
safeguarded by sound institutions and investorsfunds are kept separate from
company accounts. In the words of JU , the UK is the paragon of the free
market and free trade, even historically.
6.6 Conclusion
Evidence would suggest that Russia is still facing signicant corporate gover-
nance and transparency issues. Russia was severely a¤ected by capital ight at
the outset of the global nancial crisis in 2008 and its nancial services industry
is still in the recovery phase. One of the key issues raised by interviewees in
Moscow is the lack of rule of law in the country, as the courts are not perceived
to be e¤ective or fair. The Yukos court case, where Mikhail Khodorkovsky was
prosecuted for fraud, was signicantly and directly inuenced by the state. As
a result, it became evident that state o¢ cials could use the courts to obtain
private benets. This business climate places an emphasis on the companies
operating in Russia to choose their business partners with great care.
There are sign of improvements, including the fact that more independent
directors (in name, at least) are gaining seats on boards; CSR is also improving
and politicians are promising action. However, as long as Russia can balance
its budget through the sale of oil and gas, there may be no real incentive to
implement substantial reforms to its institutional framework, be regulatory or
judicial.
37Unilever: www.unilever.com
Hindustan Unilever Limited: www.hul.co.in
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Chapter 7
The Indian Tiger
7.1 Introduction
Following on from the outline of the eldwork instrumentation in Chapter 1
and the quantitative analysis carried out in Part II of the thesis, Chapter 7
is dedicated to exploring and analysing India in light of the information ac-
quired during the eld trip to Mumbai and the preseding quantitative analysis.
Moreover, the eldwork carried out in London serves as an e¢ cient market
benchmark. Chapter 7 is the second of the country case studies in Part III of
the thesis.1 Part III, which is a qualitative analysis, complements and furthers
the quantitative analysis carried out in Part II (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) of the
thesis. This is consistent with the mixed method approach that is discussed in
Chapter 1. The China case study follows in Chapter 8, with overall conclusions
drawn in Chapter 9.
When India gained independence from British colonial rule in 1947, it was
faced with the challenge of establishing an institutional framework that would
move India forward economically and socially.2 In this respect, India inher-
ited some key characteristics from Britain. Some, for example, Weiner (1952),
suggest that the British colonial system proved a good training ground for the
domestic political classes.3 However, Adeney & Wyatt (2010) posit that Britain
did not seek to actively promote democracy during its rule; to the extent that it
would oppress opposition politicians. Nevertheless, it did form the basis of the
structure of the Indian parliamentary system and civil service. Furthermore,
according to Adeney & Wyatt, it also inspired a preference for weak federal
institutions in India. The British colonial practise of divide and rule, most
notably applied in the creation of divisions between religious groups, has had
a lasting legacy. Tensions between Muslims and Hindus, for instance, are still
very much in evidence in India today.
1 It should be noted that the case studies are in a sense independent from each other and
they can be read in any other.
2British colonial rule: 1757-1947.
3Adeney & Wyatt (2010).
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Another dimension to India is the caste system. As Hardgrave & Kochanek
(1999:43) state:
And yet, even in a more open stratication system, caste remains
a potent political factor in Indian political life. It functions often
as a surrogate for class in a society in which class identity is weak.4
Caste conict cuts deeply in Indias fragmented society.
This conclusion correspond with the observation of DI , a Senior Economist
in Mumbai, who suggested that the caste system today is a political tool that is
widely applied in Indian politics. It would seem this very Indian phenomenon
is another legacy of the British e¤orts to divide and rule India in the mid-
nineteenth century:
After suppressing a widespread civil revolt in northern India dur-
ing 1857 and 1858, the British established their dominance o¢ cially
by making Queen Victoria monarch of India. The nineteenth cen-
tury saw a massive state project undertaken by a small group of
British o¢ cials to enumerate, classify, and thereby control a quar-
ter of a billion Indians. In this project categories like caste, religious
community, and race were variously applied, but two elements are of
particular importance: the collection of endogamous groups - castes
- ranked in a hierarchical order. This classication was derived from
classical Hindu texts, but the census operation succeeded in making
it a contemporary reality.5 They established an o¢ cial discourse of
caste that enabled o¢ cials to rule Indian society but that also had a
deep impact on the way Indians came to perceive their relations with
one another on an all-India basis. Some have argued that the British
invented caste, but this seems an exaggeration.6 Caste society did
exist before the colonial period, but the census operations did much
to make caste divisions more rigid and to encourage the application
of all-India categories. This resulted in the enhanced importance of
caste in dealings with the state and led to the emergence of caste
associations (sabhas). (Van Der Veer, 1994:19)
Another legacy from the colonial period is of course the English language.
Today India has both Hindi and English as o¢ cial languages. English serves
as a uniting language within this large and diverse country, with 20 o¢ cial
language groups, 50,000 castes and 500,000 villages, according to Cohen, (2001).
Moreover, it has provided India with a competitive advantage in the services
industry, be it developing IT software or o¤ering back-o¢ ce support for global
companies.
4Harold A. Gould, in The Hindu Caste System, Vol. 3: Politics and Caste (Dehli:
Chanakya Publications, 1990) explores the dynamics of caste and class in Faizabad District,
Uttar Pradesh.
5V.S. Naipaul, India: A Wounded Civilization, 18.
6Ibid., 21.
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When India became independent it adopted a socialist planned economy to
promote future economic growth and social inclusion. It nationalised key indus-
tries, built up large (non-e¢ cient) state owned enterprises (SOEs), established
protectionism and introduced ve-year plans from 1951 and onwards. This ap-
proach is not dissimilar to that taken in Russia and China, although private
property rights remained in India.7
In 1990/91 India experienced an extreme balance of payment (BOP) crisis
that in 1991 forced a fundamental paradigm shift of the Indian economic system
and introduced a wave of liberalisation that is still evolving today. There were
a number of direct factors behind the BOP crisis in the early 1990s but the
underlying weakness of the economy was exacerbated during the 1980s. The
1980s saw growth fulled by higher government scal decits, increased current
account decits and more external debt. In addition, Indias exchange rate was
inexible and its currency overvalued. These factors combined were su¢ cient
to bring the Indian economy to a tipping point. In 1990, external and inter-
nal factors conspired to induce the BOP crisis. Externally, the collapse of the
Soviet Union, one of Indias main trading partners, was detrimental to its ex-
ports. Moreover, around the same time the Iraq-Kuwait war drove up oil prices
signicantly. Internally, this was coupled with increased political uncertainty in
India, where political inghting had taken priority over the management of the
economy and, as a result, market participantscondence in the economy was
gradually eroded.8 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to bail out
India in 1991 on the condition that India agreed to substantial nancial reforms
and liberalisation.9 However, Rodrik & Subramanian (2004) argue in their im-
portent paper on the Indian economy that the early 1980s was the inception
of the growth transition that become more pronounced after the reforms in the
1990s. Although India opened the door to, for example, some foreign technol-
ogy input and some FDI (Suzuki was a prime example of early FDI) around
1985, Rodrik & Subramanian suggest that these initiatives did not qualify as
liberalisation, but rather as specic business friendly initiatives. Notwithstand-
ing this, Rodrik & Subramanian posit that the tentative reforms in the 1980s
provided India with the strength in the real sector of the economy to overcome
the macroeconomic crisis in the early 1990s. Kambhampati & Kattuman (2009)
nd that the period can be divided into three sub-periods in terms of business
growth. Until 1985 larger rms were growing faster, this trend was reversed in
the period after 1985 where smaller rms saw higher growth (potentially due
to their better positioning in terms of adjusting to the new business climate).
However, this relationship was reversed again in the early 1990s, as the major
liberalisation agenda was introduced in India. Kambhampati & Kattuman sug-
gest that larger rms may have been in a stronger position to compete in the
more volatile environment of the 1990s.
7See Bhagwatis (1993) considerations on the evolution of Indias economic reforms.
8Virmani, 2001.
9The International Monetary Fund (IMF): www.imf.org
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Scope of Fieldwork
The eldwork which forms the basis for this India case study was carried
out between Sunday October 30 to Saturday November 12, 2011 in Mumbai.
The rst formal interview took place on the rst Monday afternoon (October
31), which was followed by an additional 12 formal interviews over the following
nine working days. The interviewees were accomplished nance professionals
and opinion formers in Mumbai. Interviewees had initially agreed to meet for
one hour to cover the interview agenda (the minimum time period required to
cover all sub-headings), however, as the conversations developed, almost all the
interviews lasted around two hours.
Table 7.1: IntervieweesCodes, Status, and Sector
Interviewee Code Sector
Professor of Economics AI Mumbai based University
Director BI International Organisation
Managing Director CI International Investment Bank
Senior Economist DI International Investment Bank
Research Analyst EI Indian Investment Firm
Senior Vice President FI Large Indian Corporation
Director GI Private Equity Firm
Assistant Adviser HI Financial Regulator
Associate Vice President II International Retail Bank
Director & Chief Economist JI International Investment Bank
Chief Operating O¢ cer KI International Investment Bank
General Manager LI Indian Retail Bank
Professor of Finance MI Mumbai based University
The interviewees, listed in Table 7.1, were explicitly guaranteed anonymity
and they all signed a University of St Andrews Participant Consent Form,
Anonymous Data, that explained the nature of the research and listed their
rights as interviewees (see Appendix E). They were, for example, told that they
could terminate the interview at any stage and that they were free to refuse to
answer any specic questions.
There were four additional formal meetings which served to build a more
full picture of the country and its culture. Two afternoons were spent reading
Indian banking publications in the corporate library of a large Indian bank,
which had kindly o¤ered its hospitality. Lastly, I was also fortunate enough
to be given a guided tour of Mumbai, by the brother of a Indian contact, and
fellow student, from the University of St Andrews.
In this chapter, the analysis carried out and the evidence presented, as in
the China and Russia case studies, is predominantly based on these primary
sources and augmented by additional secondary sources.
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Chapter Structure
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 7:2 exam-
ines India in the context of globalisation, both from an economic and a so-
cial/political perspective. India is still emerging from its past reliance on au-
tarky, both economically and politically. India has undergone a rapid transition
since the early 1990s and yet it is clear that the country still favours a protection-
istic approach while seeking to promote growth. Section 7:3 examines corporate
governance and its nature and implementation today in India. Although Indias
corporate governance practises have been evolving and improving, there is still
some way to go before they are on a par with Western European standards. De-
spite this, they may be the most developed of Russia, China and India. Section
7:4 discusses the institutional structure within the country, which is still sig-
nicantly inuenced by the state. For example, banks and markets are heavily
regulated. There are encouraging signs of improvements in this area. For exam-
ple, the regulators are held in high regard by most market participants and the
rise of the National Stock Exchange (NSE) is seen as improving transparency
and accountability in the nancial markets. Section 7:5 evaluates competitive
strategy within the Indian nancial sectors. Retail banking is dominated by
domestic players with extensive branch networks. State Bank of India stands
out as the most dominant force in the Indian retail banking sector. While the
nancial sectors in both Russia and China (and most certainly in the UK), to
some extent is managed by foreign talent, this is not the case in India. However,
many nance professionals are trained in the US and the UK. Finally, conclu-
sions will be drawn on the basis of the evidence presented on India in Section
7:6.
7.2 Globalisation
This section examines Indias interaction with the international community from
a number of di¤erent angles. It looks at the relative importance of economic
ows and restrictions; the relative importance of personal contact, information
ows and cultural proximity; and political e¤ects on market functions. The
globalisation sub-headings and the questions in the semi-structured interview
that form the foundation for this chapter, are derived from the KOF Index of
Globalization which also form a part of the explorative analysis carried out in
Chapter 4 (Dreher, 2003).
7.2.1 Economic E¤ects on Market Functions
In response to the IMFs demands for economic liberalisation in India in return
for bailing out the country during the BOP crisis, India chose a decisively gradu-
alist approach to its economic reforms and liberalisation which is evident today.
Ahluwalia (2003) warned that although India had made signicant progress in
reforming its economic policies, it was too early to conclude whether the changes
were enough to secure the future growth target of 8 percent. Ahluwalia high-
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lighted that Indian scal reforms were especially needed. Today, it is clear that
India is struggling to cement its high growth trajectory. Indias growth rate
dropped to 5.3 percent in Q1 2012, down from 9.2 percent in Q1 2011. Since
the current government (the Congress Party) was elected to a second term in
o¢ ce in 2009, it has been unable to pass any new substantial policy reforms,
due to a series of public corruption scandals and a fragile government coalition.
To secure medium-term growth, an HSBC research note nds that substantial
Indian supply-side reforms are required.10
The Relative Importance of Economic Flows
Indian economic ows have increased signicantly since the early 1990s. In-
deed, the prior four decades had been characterised by autarky and interven-
tionism.11
Even though India today can still be considered a heavily pro-
tected economy on many accounts, progressive liberalization has pro-
duced remarkable results. The countrys openness to international
trade has more than trebled since the late 1980s and its economy
has been expanding at an astounding pace, second only to Chinas,
who embarked on reforms earlier and more incisively so.12
India experienced a 31 percent drop in inwards FDI ow in 2010 from the
pervious year. Still, the 2010 FDI inow still represent a 6.5 fold increased over
the annual average amount of FDI inows between 1996 and 2004.13 The recent
drop in FDI was attributed to a deterioration of the macroeconomic climate,
with concerns over a high current account decit and ination, in addition to
the fact that the approvals of large FDI projects, including the governments
scheme to invest $1.5 trillion in infrastructure from 2007 to 2017, were being de-
layed.14 According to the Assistant Advisor with the India nancial regulators,
HI , India has historically been running current account decits. India is also a
considerable net importer of crude oil, which is partly reected in the current
account decits.
The Relative Importance of Economic Restrictions
Economic and nancial restrictions are still a major factor in many aspects of
the India economy, despite the ongoing concerted e¤ort to liberalise Indias rules
and regulations. For example, AI , a Professor of Economics, noted that tari¤s
and taxes are still used in the manufacturing sector. Licences and quotas are
renewed every 24 months for capital goods and every 18 months for raw materials
and consumer goods, for import and export, by the Directorate General of
10Chalmers, 2012.
11Desai, 1999.
12Alessandrini et al (2011:8) citing World Bank (2008).
13United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2011a.
14United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2011b.
147
Foreign Trade.15 Moreover, infant industries policies are still in place to shield
emerging industries from international competition.
A Senior Economist with an international investment bank, DI , observed
that foreigners cannot invest directly in Indian equity. However, from 2011
Indian mutual funds have been allowed to sell their products abroad. Moreover,
there are no restrictions on foreign institutional investor (FII) portfolio ows.
But there are sectorial caps on foreign participation. In particular, there is a 74
percent foreign ownership cap in banking and individuals can hold a maximum of
5 percent. Share holding rights di¤er between international and local investors,
with restricted foreign holder rights.16 A Director with a private equity rm, GI ,
added that there are 26 percent sectorial foreign ownership caps in the media
and airline sectors, which are consider strategic.17 The insurance industry is
also capped at 26 percent foreign ownership participation, which Warren Bu¤ett
stated as a decisive factor in not investing in the industry.18
In late 2011 and early 2012 Indias very large retail market was somewhat
liberalised with a view to attract more international players. Research analyst,
EI , stated that although international capital and expertise is needed in the
Indian retail sector, allowing foreign competition is a sensitive political issue.
Reforms that allow multi-brands (e.g. Tesco and Walmart) to establish
stores in India were passed with a number of conditions:19
 The foreign entity is required to have a local (minority) JV partner.
 The foreign entity is required to invest in infrastructure.
 The foreign entity is allowed only to establish stores in cities with excess
of one million inhabitants.
Global supermarket chains expressed an interests in this development but
they are aware that many obstacles are facing them in India, including political
opposition. Consequently, they may choose to expand through their already
existing partnerships with local companies.20
Single-brand stores (e.g., Marks & Spencer and Ikea) are now allowed to be
fully foreign owned in India, with the requirement that the company source 30
percent of its products locally.21
As it stands, according to an associate vice president, II , more branded
goods are sold to Indians abroad than in India.
The protectionistic nature of Indias trade framework is in clear contrast to
the UKs openness in both trade and in services, notably nancial products and
15Directorate General of Foreign Trade: www.dgft.gov.in
16See Ghosh, Harding & Phani (2008) on the liberlisation of foreign investment limits in
the Indian banking sector.
17See Panagariya (2008) for a review of the evolution of the Indian strategic industries.
18Bloomberg, 2011.
19Multibrandsare stores that sell several di¤erent brands under their roof.
A classic example would be a supermarket e.g., Tesco. Singlebrandsare stores
that are dedicated to only sell a single brand, such as, a Nike store or Ikea.
20The Economist, 2011.
21The Financial Times, 2012.
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expertise. DU , a Global Chief Economist, stated that the UK governments
policy on QinetiQ (the British defence technology company) illustrates how
open the UK is to foreign businesses. In early 2003 the UK goverment sold 33.8
percent of QinetiQ to the Carlyle Group, a US private equity rm.22
7.2.2 Social E¤ects on Market Functions
Interviewees note that since the early 2000s India has become especially outward-
looking in terms of tourism. However, as Managing Director, CI , highlighted,
India still represents a somewhat untapped potential for international tourism.
It needs to invest a lot in tourist infrastructure to capitalise on its potential
and attract tourists. There is great scope for growth, as India has abundant
scenic beauty, beaches, important historical and religious sites. Moreover, health
tourism (medical procedures and yoga) is another strand of tourism that could
entice many more international travellers to visit India.23
The foreign population in India is still negligible according to a director
with an international governmental organisation, BI . When an international
company seeks to establish a presence in India for trade purposes, it sends out
one or two people from the parent company to India. They in turn hire locals
and handover the responsibility to them when the business is up and running.
This is also reected in the nancial sector, where all the interviewees and
contracts during the eldwork visit were Indian. In contrast, JU , an Analyst
with a large international investment bank in London, noted that almost all
their colleagues were European and Americans.
Print media is still strong in India. The Internet is popular with the younger
urban generations, but 70 percent of the population is based in rural areas, where
radio is a strong source of news and entertainment. The ow of information in
India has increased dramatically since the early 1990s. A General Manager with
an Indian retail bank, reminisced that around 1991 he would have to wait up to
three hours to place a phone call to another local state. Moreover, the media
was government controlled at the time. It become liberalised in the early 1990s
and by the late 1990s it had attracted signicant private involvement. One
Senior Economist, DI , observed that today there is very high competition in all
20 local languages. Bloomberg, CNBC, STAR TV (Murdoch owned) and local
channels all compete in the market place.
As the media is now much less restricted in India, there are currently a
signicant number of political and corporate corruption scandals being widely
published (including, but not limited to the 2G Telecoms licences, the cash
for votesscandal, Commonwealth Games nancial irregularities, illegal mining
involving politicians and nally P.J. Thomas, the anti-corruption watchdog, was
forced to resign in 2010 as he himself faced corruption allegations). As several
interviewees noted, it is a healthy sign that these issues are coming to the
22See James, Cox & Rigby (2005) for a case study analysis on the national defence impli-
cations of the UK governments part-privitation of QinetiQ.
23See Chinai & Goswami (2007), a World Health Organization note, on the challenges of
channelling Indias benets of health tourism into the care for local people.
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surface and being dealt with publicly. The Right to Information Act of 2005,
where public authorities are required to release information requested by the
public within 30 days, has been widely praised for improving accountability and
transparency in India. The proposed Lokpal Bill (anti-corruption law) is also
seen as signicant tool to mitigate corruption and it has been widely discussed
in the media.
However, the government is still involved in controlling and managing the
ow of news and information in India. According to Reporters Without Borders
(RwB), Press Freedom Index 2011-2012, India is ranked number 131st (Russia
is number 142th and China is ranked 174th). RwBs major concerns were that
[...] journalists were exposed to violence stemming from the
persistent conicts in the states of Chhattisgarh and Jammu and
Kashmir. The threat from maa groups operating in the main cities
of the country also contributed to self-censorship. However, the au-
thorities were no better. In May, they unveiled the Information
Technology Rules 2011,which have dangerous implications for on-
line freedom of expression. Foreign reporters saw their visa requests
turned down or were pressured to provide positive coverage.24
In contrast, the UK is placed 28th in the world ranking, reecting its open
approach to the media. The US is ranked 47th in the 2011-2012 index. This
is 27 places down from its 2010-2011 ranking. The reason for the USs steep
decline in the rankings was explained to be due to the arrests of journalists
covering the Occupy Wall Street protests.
Citing terrorism concerns, the Indian government (Department of Telecom-
munications) is looking to monitor communication from Nokia phones25 and
the BlackBerry Messenger system.26 In February 2012, The Economic Times
reported that BlackBerry has agreed to place its servers in Mumbai follow-
ing intense pressure from the government to provide a mechanism for lawful
interception of its messenger servicesand Nokia has been requested to follow
BlackBerrys example.27
Information general ows freely in the UK. AU has observed a proliferation
of blogs and sites in recent years and believes that the brandhas become vital
in todays market place. The brand is used to indicate that you can trust the
information being transmitted. For the UK, the BBC is that brand.28 Chief
European Economist, CU , for an international investment bank, continued to
add that the BBC o¤ers both localisation (evening news about cats stuck
in trees) and globalisation (News 24). They also note that the UK has ve
good international newspapers and the US has two or three good international
newspapers. Television is still dominant across the board, but the Internet is
playing an increasingly important role in disseminating information in the UK
24Reporters without Borders, 2012:2.
25Economic Times, 2011.
26Wall Street Journal, 2011.
27Economic Times, the (2012a).
28BBC: British Broadcasting Company.
150
as a whole. IU suggested that today there is no monopoly on forming opinions
in the UK.
Cultural proximity is here measured as the countrys openness to Western
European brands in retailing. Western brands are not seen widely in the Indian
urban areas, as the retail sector is still quite restrictive of international entrance.
The Indian retail sector is uniquely Indian and dominated by small independent
shops. Notwithstanding this, McDonalds is very popular in urban areas. It has
adapted an Indian approach and does not serve beef. Starbucks and some other
food chains are also starting to emerge on the Indian scene. However, the
infrastructure is a big challenge in India and there is high degree of variance
in standards of living between rural and urban centres.29 Interestingly, as an
Indian Finance Professor, MI , notes, sports may be the key to cultural proximity
for India. Cricket is incredibly popular in India.
7.2.3 Political E¤ects on Market Functions
Director and Chief Economist, JI , noted that India was part of the Soviet group
until the early 1990s. Although India was not communistic, India was clearly left
of centre. It is still at the centre or left of centre today, but is much more open
to the West. JI continued to state that Indias mistrusted neighbour, Pakistan,
is today basically a dictatorship. However, the West may prefer to deal with
Pakistan politically as it is only one person versus the noisy democracy of
India.
India has arrived in the global arena, according to DI . It wants to be
a global power and has with rising aspirations. It is still a young domestic
demand driven economy, with stable growth. Militarily, India is strong, due
to the hostile environment, and it was the largest defence importer in the
world in 2011. In contrast to the tension around the 1997 nuclear tests, it now
has a nuclear treaty with the US.30 Moreover, it is a G20 member, with keen
aspirations to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Cooper &
Fues (2008:298) note that India is playing catch up with China on the world
stage:
Whereas China has enjoyed the comfortable status as a UN in-
sider India has remained an aspirant and frustrated outsider. Given
this uncomfortable standing the prime focus of Indias foreign policy
elites has turned toward gaining a permanent seat in the Security
Council. For it is only by this measure of success that the ascen-
dancy of India can be judged. In other words, The big prize in
Indias quest for a larger role in global governance is a permanent
seat on the UN Security Council(Scha¤er & Mitra, 2005, p. 14).
29Patel & Bhattacharya (2010) chart the (lack of) developments of the Indian infrastructure
over recent years and conclude the political will to promote the infrastructure sector is lacking.
Davis et al (2008), on a microlevel, nd that low-income households in India are open to invest
in improved water supplies and sanitation services if they are given access to microlending.
30See Bajpai & Mattoo (2007) and Kux (1992) for indepth analysis of India-US relations.
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India is today a net lender to the IMF. Indeed, it controls the 9th largest for-
eign reserves in the world, with $294,846.00 million in foreign reserves. Russia,
number four in the world ranking, holds $524,370.07 million in foreign reserves,
due to its natural resource exports. However, by far the largest reserves are held
by China, with $3,236,000.00 in total due to its successful objective of stimulat-
ing domestic growth through exporting manufactured goods. The UK holds a
total of $130,163.00 in foreign reserves, placing it as number 19th on the world
ranking.31 Despite Indias large foreign currency reserves, the Indian economy
is still somewhat closed to foreign interaction, which is in contrast to the UK
model. The UK is keen to convey that it is open for business, according to
several interviewees, to the extent that the Foreign O¢ ce is diverting resources
to promote the UK on the international business scene.
7.3 Corporate Governance
This section examines the position of stakeholders in India, corporate social
responsibility, business ethics, enforcement and control, corporate governance
and rm performance. Moreover, it also covers mergers and acquisitions and
initial public o¤erings. Good corporate governance practises are essential in es-
tablishing fair IPO valuations, and by extension, ensuring e¢ cient allocation of
resources in economies. Issues such as transparency, earnings quality, business
ethics and management skills will be important to both investors and stake-
holders in the wider community. Chapter 5 established through econometric
modelling that the frequency and the level of detail required of interim corpo-
rate reports inuence IPO underpricing. More stringent reporting requirements
were found to reduce underpricing. By including core corporate governance
topics in the eldwork study, it is possible to go behind the gures and build
a more full picture of the underlying causes of market failure. It is, for exam-
ple, possible to evaluate earnings quality in Russia, India, China and the UK
through the eldwork carried out in this thesis.
7.3.1 Stakeholders
Director & Chief Economist, JI , noted that India used to worry about Western
corporate governance practises entering India when it rst started to open up in
the 1990s. The practises were seen as capitalistic and Western, as JI said, India
is India. However, they realised that many corporate governance standards
had already been implemented, although there are still challenges in dealing
with corruption and extortion. Chakrabarti, Megginson & Yadav (2008), in an
Indian corporate governance analysis, nd that Clause 49 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act
inspired)32 , which was introduced in 2001 by the Securities Exchange Board
31Data sources: IMF (2012) on India, Russia and the UK. The World Fact Book (2012) on
China.
32See Romano (2005), among others, for a critical review of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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of India (SEBI),33 signicantly raised the standards expected and required of
Indian companies:
The key mandatory features of Clause 49 regulations deal with
the following: (1) composition of the board of directors; (2) the
composition and functioning of the audit commit-tee; (3) governance
and disclosures regarding subsidiary companies; (4) disclosures by
the company; (4) CEO/CFO certication of nancial results; and
(5) reporting on corporate governance as part of the annual report.
The composition and proper functioning of the board of direc-
tors was one of the key areas of focus. Clause 49 stipulates that
non-executive members should comprise at least half of a board of
directors. It denes an independent director and requires that
independent directors comprise at least half of a board of directors
if the chairperson is an executive director and at least a third if
the chairperson is a non-executive director. It also lays down rules
regarding compensation of board members, sets caps on committee
memberships and chairmanships, species the minimum number and
frequency of board meetings, and mandates certain disclosures for
board members.
Clause 49 also pays special attention to the composition and
functioning of the audit committee, requiring at least three mem-
bers on it, with an independent chair and made up two-thirds of
independent directors, including at least one nancially literate
person. The Clause also spells out the role and powers of the audit
committee and species the minimum number and frequency of the
committee meetings.
With regard to material non-listed subsidiary companies,13
Clause 49 requires that at least one independent director of the
holding company serve on the board of the subsidiary. The audit
committee of the holding company should review the subsidiarys
nancial statements, particularly its investment plans. The minutes
of the subsidiarys board meetings should be presented at the board
meeting of the holding company, and the board members of the lat-
ter should be made aware of all signicant transactions those
likely to exceed in value 10% of the total revenues or assets of the
subsidiary entered into by the subsidiary.Chakrabarti, Megginson
& Yadav (2008:64,65)
These requirements are undoubtedly a step in the right direction. When
meeting with GI , a private equity Director, they also pointed out that one third
of board members in listed companies are required to be independent. However,
GI continued by noting that they may in fact be independent in name only.
Employees are generally not involved in daily decisions. However, with the
right skills there are good career prospects in the private sector in particular.
33Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI): www.sebi.gov.in
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The private sector also tends to pay higher salaries. The public sector is seen
as potentially o¤ering great opportunities with the same institution. It rotates
people and jobs are for life, noted HI .
The public sector has widely implemented a government policy that discrim-
inate positively in relation to the caste system.34 Certain castes are recruited
into the government system in order to promote equality.35 The public sector
has entry and mid-level quotas for minorities and castes. This initiative was
praised by HI , who saw it as being quite e¤ective in promoting equality. How-
ever, the private sector was very much against this initiative when it was rst
discussed and it only applies to the public sector. As noted by Chief Operating
O¢ cer, KI , the private sector believes in equal opportunities, although from
a Western perspective, this choice of words may be counter intuitive.
Management accountability seems to be increasing, both in the private and
public sectors. According to II , an Associate Vice President in banking, the
public sector has improved greatly, with a corresponding increase in the level
of service provided. However, nepotism, bribery and loopholes are still major
issues.
Space between ownership and management has been reduced in some com-
panies. However, for some listed family companies, promoters act as owners,
although it is now the shareholders that own the company.36
The Indian judiciary system is overstretched but it might be improving.
There is a considerable backlog of cases and the process is slow (a large number
of frivolous cases may have contributed to the current inertia). It has also been
suggested that corruption is a problem within the system. JI observed that
there is a signicant salary gulf between being a lawyer and a judge in India. A
judge is paid approximately $24,000 to $48,000 annually, whereas the average
successful lawyer is paid around $500,000 per year. Once a lawyer accepts a
position as a judge, they are not allowed to return to practise law later. JI
continued that the UK system compensate judges in other ways, for instance
the award of knighthoods. This is not the case in India.
Unions are mostly active in manufacturing, in particular in the automobile
sector, where the Maruti Suzuki joint venture (JV) production has been hit by
strikes and unrest.37 Unions are also active in public sector banks. Similarly, in
the UK, union activity is centred within certain industries, although they have
steadily lost inuence over the past 40 years. As a collective force in the private
sector it is extinct, according to CU , a Chief European Economist. Unions are
still in present in the public sector and former privatised companies, where they
are rent seeking. AU , a Chief Economist, noted that they have seen evidence
that some companies will not buy, or invest in, companies that are unionised
34See e.g. Dumonts (1980) seminal work on the Indian caste system and, more recently,
Dirks (2001) among many publications dedicated to this evocative topic.
35See Bassett-Jones (2005) and Li¤ (1999) on discussions on diversity and equal opportu-
nities in the workplace.
36Promotersis the Indian terms for founders. See Fama (1980), Fama & Jensen (1983a)
and Jensen & Meeklin (1976) on agency considerations.
37See Becker-Ritterspach & Becker-Ritterspach (2009) on Maruti-Suzukis entry into India
and its market position.
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i.e., they divert funds away from those entities. Nevertheless, according to
IU , a Senior European Economist, although unions are still somewhat strong
in transport (airlines/ports/tube/rail) there has been a muted response to the
severe austerity measures.
CI , a Managing Director, mentions that the government should leave much
more to private initiative, but stresses that it is nothing like China in terms of
government inuence.
7.3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility
The Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises has made it mandatory
for public sector industries to donate 5 percent of their prots to CSR.38 The
private sector is also encouraged to follow suit.39 This proactive approach is not
entirely unlike the UKs CSR environment. As FU , a Global Head of Mergers
& Acquisitions for a Big Four accounting rm, observed, there is both political
and social pressure in the UK on companies to implement CSR initiatives.
CRS is rising in importance in India; parallel to greater integration with
the world, standards have improved. Family owned businesses are looking to
establish a better corporate prole through CSR and they focus more on the
environment and employee satisfaction. Some interviewees also note that CSR
has become a PR tool (e.g., CI and FI), whereas GI , a Director in private equity,
stated that for many people it is still hand-to-mouth living, [they] dont care
about trees. . . 
7.3.3 Business Ethics
Both corporate and government scandals are discussed publicly in India, as is the
case in the UK. The 2007 International Business Ethics Index (Tsalikis, Seaton,
Li, 2008) nd that India is ranked below China in ethical business conduct.
India faces signicant challenges in reducing the corruption that seem to have
been ingrained into the fabric of Indian society, according to Chakraborty (1997,
1529):
Since the 1950s however, with the launching of the era of state-
planned and controlled economic development, things seem to have
been going from bad to worse though usually below the surface.
This cumulative ethical depression began to break loose as an eth-
ical cyclone with economic liberalization adopted by India in 1991.
This storm has been exposing the supportive role of the politics-
bureaucracyalliance in fostering and feeding upon economic terror-
ism of various kinds. The neutrality of bureaucracy has been tam-
pered rather heavily since the mid-seventies by the political masters.
38The Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises: www.dhi.nic.in
39Carroll (1999) and Garriga & Mele (2004) both provide the reader with a good overview
of some of the core areas within CSR.
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The highest prole issue in recent memory is the ongoing second-generation
spectrum licences scandal, where 2G mobile licences were sold at a signicantly
discounted price in an non-transparent process, Lamont (2011).There are sig-
nicant issues of corruption and bribery in India. However, the government
and the judiciary is seen as being proactive in reducing this behaviour. The
Indian government announced in May 2012 that as of January 31 2012, the
number of Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) corruption cases pending trial
was 7,172.40 As a result, 70 government sponsored special courts have been
set up across the country, with 62 already functioning.41 The Financial Times
highlight Mr Vinod Rai, Indias Comptroller and Auditor-General since January
2008, as one of the leading gures in Indias ght against poor business ethics.42
7.3.4 Enforcement and Control
Audits are generally seen as reliable in India, with improving standards. Checks
and balances are in place, but with some window dressing going on, according
to DI , a Senior Economist. However, analysts are aware that this is happening
and can see past the window dressing. The Big Four have a good reputation in
India but there are also other local rms there are well regarded. The Institute
of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) is the regulatory body for nancial
audits and accountancy in India.43 Moreover, the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India (CAG) has the power to institute special audit but only if
there has been a complaint or if there is a reasonable suspicion that there may
be accounting irregularities.44 Rules and regulations are seen as being quite
strong and as businesses move up in scale this is strengthened.
There has been one large accounting scandal in India, where Satyam Com-
puter Services Ltd in 2009 was accused of accounting fraud (also known as
Indias Enron scandal, according to Bloomberg (2009)).45 PwC was the auditor
for this company, a fact that was mentioned by of most the interviewees. In
contrast, the UK has not seen a US Enron-esque scandal, which DU , a Global
Chief Economist, suggests may indicate that the audit functions are quite well
implemented in the UK (although they add that it may be a question of luck
that the UK has avoided such a scandal until now).
The quality of Indian nancial statements are improving, especially for the
larger companies, but there may still be grounds to be sceptical about the
quality, according to GI , Director in private equity. Media scrutiny is somewhat
e¤ective in this regard and the Income Tax Department is seen as very active.
Enforcement is happening but resolution of issues can take a long time,
especially through the legal system. The Securities and Exchange Board of
40Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI): www.cbi.nic.in
41Press Information Bureau, 2012.
42 Ibid.
43The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI): www.icai.org
44Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG): www.cag.gov.in
45See Atesci et al (2010) for a case study analysis of the Satyam Computer Services scandal.
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India (SEBI) is seen as a strong regulator that side with investors. It also
provides investor forums and training classes. Moreover, the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI) is also perceived as a competent regulator.46
7.3.5 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
Indian companies are becoming proactive in improving this area as more for-
eign investors are starting to focus on India. Moreover, Clause 49, discussed
under Stakeholders (Subsection 7.3.1), has placed more impetus on companies
to promote transparency and good corporate practises. Companies are keen
to have prominent people on their boards for credibility. However, now non-
executive directors are also arrested when fraud is detected and, as a result,
they are careful about lending their names to companies. In contrast, AU , a
Chief Economist, observed that many people sits on boards in the UK due to
the fact that they are motivated by the compensation package. However, for
private equity, senior members will have their own money invested and there is
a real commitment. Others will not have this dedication, there is no incentive
to exercise due/proper oversight.
7.3.6 Mergers & Acquisitions
There were more M&As in 2008 than 2010, as the industry did not think that
it would be such a severe/long-lasting downturn in India. They are now often
announced in India, but many fall through due to the current market sentiment.
Mergers are happening in the banking industry for example, as RBI is seeking
to consolidate the market. Size has become important in India, as they seek to
compete with very large Chinese companies and factories. Takeover defences
are not common, deals are mostly made in agreement. Moreover, the banks
and the government do not like hostile takeovers, which in turn inuences the
market.
Acquisitions are still quite popular. They are mostly cross-border activities
that began in earnest around 2005. According to the United Nations (see Ta-
ble 1), some of the largest cross-border M&As between South-East Asia and
developed countries have been Indian in recent years.
46Reserve Bank of India (RBI): www.rbi.org.in
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Table 7.2: Selected M&As undertaken by rms from South, East
and South-East Asia in developed countries, 2007 - 2011
Acquiring Company Target Company Industry Value ($ million) Year
Tata Steel (India) Corus Group (United Kingdom) Steel 11,791 2007
Hindalco Industries (India) Novelis Inc (United States) Aluminium 5,789 2007
Doosan (Republic of Korea) Ingersoll-Rand Co (United States) Construction equipment 4,900 2007
Flextronics (Singapore) Solectron Corp (United States) Electronics 3,675 2007
Tata Motors (India) Jaguar Cars Ltd (United Kingdom) Motor vehicles 2,300 2008
China National Agrochemical (China) Elkem (Norway) Aluminium 2,179 2011
Wanhua Polyurethanes (China) BorsodChem (Hungary) Chemical products 1,701 2011
Essar Steel Holdings (India) Algoma Steel (Canada) Steel 1,603 2007
United Spirits (India) Whyte & MacKay (United Kingdom) Food and beverages 1,176 2007
Geely Holding Group (China) Volvo (Sweden) Motor vehicles 1,500 2010
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2011b:51.
In Table 7.2, it can be seen that 50 percent of the acquiring companies are
Indian and they are targeting resource and manufacturing sectors in developed
countries. This ties in with Indias overall strategy of securing international
natural resources. India is also increasing their presence in Africa to acquire
more resources. China is another Asian country that is actively seeking out
international resource based investments, which is also evident from Table 7.2.
Paladini & George (2011) document and discuss the geopolitical implications of
China and India competing for global oil resources. They nd that China has
outpaced India in securing very large oil contracts and put forward that it may
be that Indias democratic government framework makes it slower than Chinas
in negotiating the market place, which may be the reason why India is unable
to compete with China in closing very large oil deals.
When considering the expansionary M&A activity of Indian companies, it
may be interesting to note that according to CU , the UK takeover code used
to favour the overtaker, where Kraft vs. Cadbury is the classic example of a
lax takeover code. However, the takeover code was changed in 2011 due to the
Kraft/Cadbury case in a quasi-protectionistic move that has dampened M&A
activity, according to AU , a Chief Economist. Notwithstanding this, FU , a
Global Head of Mergers & Acquisitions, noted that London is one of the most
active M&A markets in the world.
7.3.7 Initial Public O¤erings
The IPO market is current almost dormant or, as noted by GI , who is a private
equity Director, virtually dead. It was quite active until 2008. There is often
a cultural pressure to list in India where it is promoter driven, as they seek
prestige. In private equity investments, many smaller clients are keen on IPOs
but they are told that it is not realistic. This ties in with comments by FU
on the motivation of UK IPOs. They mentioned that prestigeused to be the
primary motivation to list a company, but that this factor is now less important.
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Apart from prestige, another motivation for Indian IPOs may be to raise capital
for R&D and to expand their business. It also raises the companys prole and
facilitates transparency, which in turn helps to attract more better qualied
sta¤.
7.4 Institutional Structure
This section examines the role of the state, the regulators and the stock ex-
changes in the nancial markets. As discussed in Chapter 5, the econometric
modelling established that counties with higher minimum capital requirements
to start a business (MCG), that is, countries with higher barriers to market en-
try, would display, on average, higher degrees of underpricing. This institutional
variable was the inspiration to expand the qualitative cross-site investigation
into institutional factors as well.
7.4.1 Market Inuence by the State
Market inuence by the state is still somewhat extensive and controlling in some
areas. Market regulation is a topical political issue, but it is almost entirely left
to the regulators to adjust the rules and regulations according to their aims and
objectives. The regulators have a strong direct inuence on market participants
and the nancial markets are still quite closely regulated. For example, at least
40 percent of bank lending is required to go to priority sectors, for instance
agriculture. To be specic, for public banks:
[A]ll banks in India are required to lend at least 40 percent of
their net credit to the priority sector, which includes small scale
industry (SSI), at an interest rate that is required to be no more
than 4 percentage points above their prime lending rate. If banks
do not satisfy the priority sector target, they are required to lend
money to specic government agencies at low rates of interest. In
January, 1998, the limit on total investment in plants and machinery
for a rm to be eligible for inclusion in the small scale industry
category was raised from Rs. 6.5 million to Rs. 30 million [$162,500
to $750,000 using January 15, 1998, exchange rate of 1USD = 40
INR47 ]Banerjee, Cole & Duo (2004: 8)
For foreign banks entering the Indian market, the priority sector lending
requirements are 32 percent. Although lower than the 40 percent required by
domestic banks, it is a signicant commitment.48 Foreign banks may soon be
required to match the 40 percent priority sector lending undertaken by the
public sector banks:
47Historical exchange rates source: XE Currency Tables:
http://www.xe.com/currencytables/?from=INR&date=1998-01-15
48Economic Times (2012b).
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As indicated in the SQR of October 2011, the Reserve Bank had
constituted a Committee (Chairman: Shri M. V. Nair) to re-examine
the existing classication and suggest revised guidelines with regard
to priority sector lending classication and related issues. The Com-
mittee submitted its report in February 2012. It made the follow-
ing major recommendations: (i) the existing target of the domestic
scheduled commercial banks for lending to the priority sector be
retained; [...] (v) the priority sector target for foreign banks be
increased to 40 per cent of adjusted net bank credit (ANBC) or
credit equivalent of o¤-balance sheet exposure (CEOBE), whichever
is higher with sub-targets of 15 per cent for exports and 15 per cent
for the MSE sector; [...]Reserve Bank of India, 2012
The agricultural sector has traditionally always played an important role
in the Indian economy and it still accounts for 53 percent of the economy,
according to LI (down from 70 percent in the past). Cole (2009) posits that
evidence would suggest that agricultural loans may be tied to winning political
elections. However, no matter the motivation, it is a signicant intervention by
the state.
KI noted that state intervention is not only about regulations but also about
development of the markets.49 Several interviewees (e.g., LI , a General Man-
ager in retail banking) found that the protectionistic and restrictive nancial
regulations somewhat prevented the 2008 crisis from reaching India. However,
according to Arora, Rathinam & Khan (2010) the nancial crisis did hit India,
through capital ight from its nancial markets, exchange rate depreciation and
tightening of external borrowing for the Indian corporate and banking sectors.
Notwithstanding this, market participants seem generally happy with the
level of regulations and their implementation. One exception to the overall
positive view, is MI , a Finance Professor, who noted that SEBI is criticised
for preventing competition and favouring the government. This general con-
tentment with the regulators and their restrictions on the industry, is in sharp
contrast to the prevailing perception in London where interviewees complain
about the burden of compliance costs.
7.4.2 Regulatory bodies
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is currently the main regulator, which comes
under the Ministry of Finance. The RBI is complemented by the Securities and
Exchange Board of India (SEBI), Insurance Regulatory and Development Au-
thority (IRDA) and the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority
(PFRDA).50 RBI is an independent and autonomous body, which operate by
law. In particular, under the RBI Act and Banking Regulation Act. It does
49See e.g. Milner (1988) on protectionism and international trade.
50 Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA): www.irda.gov.in
Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA): www.pfrda.org.in
160
not have powers to prosecute. It investigates internally and then hands over
investigations to the police to seek prosecutions. The Indian government will be
setting up a super-regulator, the Financial Stability and Development Council
(FSDC), which will be mainly tasked with co-ordinating the di¤erent regulatory
bodies.
In the UK, the FSA may not be seen as a positive force by the market
participants. Some interviewees complained about overbearing, burdensome
and costly regulations, conducted by people with too few skills and with a
political dimension, according to HU , a Managing Director. Conversely, others
note that the extensive regulation is needed, that it keeps clients happy and
that it may even provide the UK with a competitive advantage by building a
reputation for sound corporate governance practises.
7.4.3 Stock Exchange
The two dominant stock exchanges in India are the Bombay Stock Exchange
(BSE) and the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE).51 The BSE can trace
its history back to the 1830s but it has really developed over the past 15 to 20
years. Irregularities (fraud) have been uncovered periodically at the BSE and
the NSE has now overtaken the BSE in terms of importance. Chakrabarti, Meg-
ginson & Yadav (2008) note that the NSE was one of the four new institutions
created by the economic reforms in the early 1990s, in conjunction with the
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the National Securities Clear-
ing Corporation (NSCC) and the National Securities Depository. Although the
NSE was only established in 1994, by 2008 in accounted for approximately two-
thirds of stock trading in India, in addition to almost all derivative trading.
Interviewees noted that the NSE is making use of high-tech trading solutions
and has a robust settlement system. The Regional stock exchanges have almost
disappeared and are now mostly agents for the NSE. Retail equity participa-
tion has great potential for expansion. Today only around 4 percent of retail
investors participate in mutual funds or equity, compared with around 20 per-
cent in the early 1990s. Repeated crises and high market volatility due to the
inux of institutional investors around the opening the Indian stock market to
international participation drove retail investors away from equity.
Although the NSE in particular has made great strides towards international
standards and is spoken of with pride in India (for example by CI and DI),
it is clearly not comparable to the LSE. It would not be a fair comparison,
as the UK market is signicantly larger, more liquid, more transparent, more
developed and deeper, with less equity price volatility. The Indian nancial
markets are still severely restricted to foreign participation, which will need to
be addressed to develop their exchanges further. Daniels & Bobe (1992) argue
that the liberalisation of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) was one of the
main drivers for cementing Londons position as a world leader in the footloose
51Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE): www.bseindia.com
National Stock Exchange of India (NSE): www.nseindia.com
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nancial services industry.52
7.4.4 Market Maturity
The nancial markets are still maturing but the pace has increased in recent
years. Derivatives, which are still quite small in volume, were launched in
2002/03 and there are around 100 companies that are actively traded. As stated
previously, equity markets have a long history in India and around a total of
5000 companies are listed between the BSE and the NSE. The UK and Indian
markets are at di¤erent development stages. Whereas the LSE is an interna-
tional investment environment, the Indian market is still domestically focused,
with little outside inuence.
7.5 Competitive Strategy
This section is inspired by three books on competition by Porter. Porter (1980,
1985) examined rm competition and the framework was extended to countries
in Porters (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations. This section seeks
to examine the rivalry within the di¤erent nancial sectors, to understand the
driving motivation behind the primary clients and look at the barriers to entry.
Market barriers to entry is a key variable in the econometric model constructed
in Chapter 5. This examination complements and extends the analysis carried
out under the Institutional Structure heading (7.4).
7.5.1 Rivalry
Banking Sectors
The investment bank sector is characterised by high competition. Domestic
banks have better access to local companies, while international players can
provide better salaries which gives them a competitive advantage in the recruit-
ment market. The sector is regulated primarily, like the retail sector, by RBI,
although SEBI, as the capital market regulator, is also involved in overseeing
the investment banking.
Retail banking, which opened up to competition through the 1992-93 bank-
ing reforms (Bhaumik & Dimova, 2004), is also competitive. Yet, the state
and the regulators play an active role in determining the market dynamics.
An example of this is that RBI only freed lending rates in April 2010 and
deposit rates followed in late October 2011. According to LI , a general man-
ager with an Indian retail bank, there is very signicant competition in the
retail sector. However, there are still some rural areas of India with no access
to banks. There are a number of di¤erent bank segments: state co-operative
banks, national co-operative banks, commercial banks (private, public (nation-
alised) and foreign), regional rural banks (come from public banks), premium
52See Daniels & Bobe (1992) for an interesting and contextual account on the development
of Canary Wharf as a second nancial centre in London, from a city planning perspective.
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state co-operative banks and district co-operative banks. However, the normal
classication for India is simply public sector banks, private sector banks and
foreign banks. Table 7.3 provides an overview of the evolution of the banking
industry in India, starting at the outset of the liberalisation period until the end
of March 2004.
Table 7.3: Summary of the Banking industry: 1990-91 to 2003-04
(in Rs. billion)
Year/Bank group 1990-91 1996-97 2003-04
Pub Pvt Forgn Pub Pvt Forgn Pub Pvt Forgn
No. of banks 28 25 23 27 34 42 27 30 33
Total assets 2929 119 154 5563 606 561 14714 3673 1363
Total deposits 2087 94 85 4493 498 373 12268 2685 798
Total credit 1306 50 51 2202 281 265 6327 1709 605
Credit-deposit ratio 0.63 0.52 0.60 0.49 0.56 0.71 0.52 0.64 0.76
Share (%)
Total assets 92 4 4 83 9 8 75 19 6
Total deposits 92 4 4 84 9 7 74 16 10
Total credit 93 4 3 80 10 10 73 20 7
Total income 246 11 15 536 74 76 1376 332 130
of which: interest income 239 9.3 12.7 465 64 62 1095 255.4 90
Total expenditure 241 10.7 13 540 61 56 1211 297 108
Net profit 5 0.3 2 71 13 20 165 35 22
Source: Ghosh, 2006:180.
Table 7.3 shows that there has been a signicant change in the banking
segment since the liberalisation process began in the early 1990s. Public sector
banks have seen a contraction of their market share, with private sector banks
expanding considerably between 1990 and 2004. The foreign banks have also
expanded their market share, but they remain niche players, according to Table
7.3. The State Bank of India (SBI), a public sector bank, dominates the market.
In the nancial year 2009-10 it held 21.78 percent of Indian bank deposits, which
rises to 30.01 percent if its a¢ liated banks are included.53 Moreover, according
to one informed observer of the bank that I met for a formal lunch in Mumbai,
25 percent of the economy goes through the SBI annually. Indian private banks
are also doing well. They are attracting clients by o¤ering new services. In
particular, HDFC Bank and ICICI Bank stand out as being the two biggest
private banks and they are both expanding.54
53 Indias BanksAssociation, 2010.
54HDFC Bank is o¢ cially known as the Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited:
www.hdfcbank.com
ICICI Bank is o¢ cially known as the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India:
www.icicibank.com
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Some foreign banks have been driven out of business, according to BI , a
Director. The licences to operate may not allow for enough branches and there
can also be a cultural divide, e.g., deposit requirements to open an account may
be higher with foreign banks. However, some are clearly successful and several
interviewees (e.g., BI) noted that for Standard Chartered Bank, India is the
biggest prot contributor globally. In contrast, the UK market, according to
interviewees in London, requires considerable capital and strong balance sheets
to penetrate. For example, CU , an European Chief Economist, noted that
the investment bank sector is somewhat peculiar in the UK. It may behave
aggressively but there is little competition as such. The sector is relationship
based. Moreover, the retail market is satuated and it is di¢ cult to get a foothold
as an outside bank. AU , a Chief Economist, added that the UK retail banking
sector is in e¤ect a natural monopoly, due to a very low propensity for households
to move bank. However, licences and cultural divides were not raised as cause
for concern among the UK interviewees.
Kamath (2007) analyses Value Added Intellectual Coe¢ cient (VAIC) to de-
termine the value-based performance between four categories of Indian banks
(State Bank of India and Associates, nationalised banks, foreign banks and pri-
vate sector domestic banks) between 2000 and 2004.55 Kamath concludes that
the foreign banks were most e¢ cient in value creation, whereas the public sector
banks were found to have lower rations due to excess sta¤ levels. On the other
hand, Bhaumik & Dimova (2004) examining the 1995-01 period, found that
private and foreign banks held an e¢ ciency advantage over public banks until
1998-99. From 1999-2000 and onwards, driven by competition forces, public
banks eliminated the e¢ ciency gap they had expericed in the earlier period of
the study.
7.5.2 Auditor Sector
Competition is high among the Big Four auditing companies. They are well
regarded and used primarily by internationally exposed and listed companies.
Smaller Indian auditors have tied up with the Big Four in recent years to con-
solidate the market. In particular, KPMG, PwC and E&Y are mentioned by
market participants as being active in India, less so for Deloitte. Grant Thorn-
ton (GT) is also becoming popular. At the second tier, there are around 2000
or so auditors. They are regulated by the Institute of Chartered Accountants
India (ICAI), which is seen as doing a reasonably good job, according to GI .
The UK on the other hand is more consolidated. The Big Four have a solid
grip on the UK audit market. CU , a Chief European Economist, stated that
auditors cover very complex issues and that a big house is needed to manage
big clients. DU , a Global Chief Economist, added that it is a relationship-based
business arrangement in that banks tend to stay with the same auditors, even if
55See Ståhle, Ståhle & Aho (2011) for an overview of the Value Added Intellectual Coe¢ cient
(VAIC) analysis. They conclude that it is not an invalid tool to determine the e¢ ciency of
labour and capital investment in a company. However, on the other hand, Zeghal & Maaloul
(2010) nd that the VAIC is a valid analysis.
164
they charge more, the relationship is more important than the fees. A 2006 UK
Government report summed up the key gures around the UK auditing sector:
The Big Four audit rms [...] audit all but one of the FTSE 100 companies,
and represent 99% of audit fees in the FTSE 350. The high degree of concentra-
tion in the market became more marked after the Price Waterhouse/Coopers
& Lybrand merger in 1998 (six-to-ve) and the dissolution of Arthur Ander-
sen in 2002 (ve-to-four). In addition, switching rates are low (around 4% on
average for all listed companies, 2% on average for FTSE 100 companies), and
competitive tendering does not occur frequently.56
Based on a Freedom of Information Requests submitted to the Bank of
England it is evident that the Bankemployed the same auditor rm/entity
for in excess of 85 years continuously.57 Deloitte was hired in 1919 as the rst
external auditor of the Bank and the lineage continued until 2006 where the rst
competitive tender was introduced. KPMG won the tender and was awarded a
contract up to ve years in length (which can potentially be extended to a second
term). This would suggest that relationships have historically been valued in
this type of client and agent agreement, with the Bank of England acting as a
best practise example.
7.5.3 Brokerage Sector
The brokerage sector is very competitive, according to EI , an Equity Research
Analyst. There are now low fees, as over the past six or seven years there have
has a 60 to 70 percent drop in fees. Most (if not all) banks have brokerage
businesses. Various independent brokers are struggling, with limited services.
This may be somewhat similar to the UK brokerage market, where, according
to CU , independent brokers cannot generate prots from cross-selling.
7.5.4 Customers
Institutional Investors
Institutional investors are increasingly considering India as a viable investment
option. Locally, Unit Trust India Mutual Fund (UTI) and Life Insurance Cor-
poration of India (LIC) are both signicant participants and they domestically
trade only.58 There are also mutual funds, both overseas and local entities.
Today, foreign institutional investors (FIIs) account for 70 percent of volume
traded and they own 15 percent (market capitalisation) of the market, accord-
ing to CI . However, retail banks and pension funds are not allowed to invest
in equity, which is in contrast to the UK market where such entities are often
large players, especially pension funds.
56DTI, 2006:3.
57See Appendix O.
58Unit Trust India Mutual Fund (UTI): www.utimf.com
Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC): www.licindia.in
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Institutional investors are not known to engage in shareholder activism.
However, if they own a signicant part of a company they will be represented
on the board, which would grant them some inuence over the running of the
company.
Retail Investors
Retail investors will buy products through independent nancial advisor (IFAs),
banks, regional/national distributors or directly o¤-line/on-line. The typical in-
vestor does not understand the nancial markets and, as a result, invests in
either mutual funds or gold.59 It is clear from the interviews that for Russia,
India and China, the majority of retail investors are not making informed in-
vestment decisions; they are speculating. As mentioned in Chapter 6, IU argued
that there is evidence to suggest that UK retail investors are making informed
investment decisions, as well as other behaviour which suggests that they are
not aware of the nancial risk they are undertaking.
Only around 4 percent of clients participate in mutual funds on the stock
market in India. In the UK, on the other hand, most retail participants invest
through mutual funds. II , a retail banker, noted that in India 50 percent of
turnover of mutual funds are from Mumbai. JI , from an international invest-
ment bank, added that the retail investment dynamics is largely a function of
the caste system. It used to be that only the business caste would be involved
in investments and the stock exchanges. Western Indians have traditionally
been investing in the stock market (including Mumbai). Eastern Indians, on
the other hand, have traditionally not been interested in the stock market or
investments, although Calcutta is an exception.
7.5.5 Suppliers
There would seem to be a good sector mixture of companies seeking to list, al-
though currently the IPO market is slow and there may be a bias towards mostly
family owned companies. SEBI facilitates transparency and the standardised
preliminary (red herring) prospectus is publicly available on their website.60
Once listed, companies must publish gures at regular intervals. However, less
information may be available at that stage, it still a challenge to get extra in-
formation. If you call up as an investor, they do not have the department or
resources to deal with this, according to GI . There are detailed listing require-
ments, including on transparency, and if they are followed it may not be di¢ cult
to secure a listing. However, even in the UK when the listing rules are followed,
it can be di¢ cult to form a complete picture of the issuing company. Southern
Cross Healthcare may be a case in point, suggested AU . In 2006 the company
59Gold is traditionally very popular in India. Gold is used for marriage, ornaments and
investment vehicles.
60See Baron & Holmström (1980) and Ljungqvist & Wilhelm (2002) on the IPO process,
among others. See Bhabra & Pettway (2003) more specically on the link between IPO
prospectus information and subsequent company performance.
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issued an IPO prospectus was at least 70 pages long, when it was seeking to list
on the LSE. In the prospectus it did state that its business model was reliant on
state funds so state cuts would hurt the business.61 However, investors seemed
not to specically notice this fact as it was listed along side other information.
It may be di¢ cult to manage this stream of information and companies may
not be clear enough about what matters. They list so many risk factors that
any overview is lost, according to AU .
7.5.6 Potential entrants
India still has highly regulated markets with signicant regulatory barriers to
entry, which is of course the opposite to the UK. It is notoriously di¢ cult to
get a banking licence in India. The last banking licences issued to a foreign
bank was in 2008 to UBS. Prior to UBS securing a licence, Antwerp Diamond
Bank obtained a licence in 2002.62 However, it may be that four or ve bank
licences will be granted in 2012, according to LJ , a General Manager with an
Indian retail bank. However, JI noted that foreign banks are only allowed to
open 12 branches per year in India. Regulators rst choice is SBI and ICICI
as they are seen as the home team, said JI , a Director & Chief Economist
with an international investment bank. However, foreign banks may be better
at innovations and introducing need new products, which are protected by the
state for quite some time. Domestic banks nd it di¢ cult to attract talent,
with signicantly lower entry salaries. There is also a clear di¤erence in tax rates
between domestic and foreign banks, as they respectively pay 32.445 percent and
42.024 percent tax, that is, foreign banks pay a ca. 10 percent tax premium.63
Local banks can raise funds locally, whereas foreign banks have to raise capital
abroad. Local banks have, currently, higher priority sector lending targets (see
7.4.1 Market Inuence by the State).64 As a result, foreign banks could have
relative better non-performing assets (NPAs). In addition foreign banks may
have the advantage of less government interference and being able to operate
more selectively, observered KI , a Chief Operating O¢ cer for an international
bank. However, foreign owned law rms are not allowed in India. The 2010
domestic credit to GDP ratio is 71.1 percent for India (38.4 percent for Russia),
in contrast to 146.4 percent for China and 222.6 for the UK, i.e., the market is
still seen as under-banked.65
61Wearden (2011), writing for The Guardian newspaper, outlines [t]he rise and fall of
Southern Cross.
62Economic Times, 2008.
63See Ernst & Young (2011). The rm discusss the tax implications of operating as a bank
brance vis-a-vis a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) in India.
64China also impose strict lending requirements on domestic banks to lend SOE and support
the states growth strategy (see e.g Haggard & Huang, 2008).
65World Bank (2012b) gures.
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7.6 Conclusion
The Indian government is su¤ering from signicant inertia. A number of high-
prole public corruption scandals, coupled with a fragile government coalition,
has proven devastating to both local and national govermental decision making.
At a time when the country is experincing a slowdown in growth and further re-
forms are needed, this governmental policy freeze is unfortunate. Nevertheless,
India has changed signicantly since the early 1990s. For example, today the
country has a relatively free press that monitors and reports on both corporate
and govermental ethical issues. Moreover, quite unexpectedly according to the
interviewees in this study, the state opened up its retail market to more foreign
participation around early 2012. Interviewees did not expect this to happen for
some time, when they were asked in November 2011, due to the political sensi-
tivity of allowing foreign chains to compete against local businesses. Moreover,
the Indian nancial sector has clearly developed signicantly over the past two
decades but there is still considerable scope for further liberalisation. India is
still left-of-centre in terms of its approach to governing the markets. It imposes
signicant requirements on the market participants that are not found in the
Western European free-market approach, for instance, quotas and licences on
nancial products. It has a well regarded regulatory framework in place already,
which will be increasingly tested as the markets become more sophisticated and
developed.
168
Chapter 8
The Chinese Dragon
8.1 Introduction
Following on from the outline of the eldwork instrumentation in Chapter 1 and
the quantitative analysis in Part II of the thesis, Chapter 8 is the nal case study
in Part III. Part III, which is a qualitative analysis, builds on and expands the
quantitative analysis carried out in Part II (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) of the thesis.
As such, Part III of the thesis brings the mixed method approach, discussed
in Chapter 1, full-circle. In particular, we detected market anomalies in the
pricing of equity in Russia, India and China, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, when
benchmarked against the UK (London). The econometric model constructed in
Chapter 5, proved a good overall t on the country data set. The analysis and
discussion in Chapter 5 presented some key variables that inuence global IPO
pricing. It is clear that economic, institutional and demographic variables are
signicant in explaining global IPO underpricing. However, the quantitative
analysis does not provide a complete picture at the level of individual coun-
tires. To understand the underlying dynamics governing IPO pricing in Russia,
India and China, it is necessary to conduct eld work in each country. Chap-
ters 6, 7 and 8 are based on this eld research and endeavour to explain the
market anomalies found through the statistical and econometric analysis, using
London as a benchmark for a mature and e¢ cient market. In short, the quan-
titative analysis (Part II) identied a number of interesting pricing anomalies
and the qualitative analysis (Part III) seeks to explain this pricing behaviour on
a national level, which brings the mixed method approach full-circle. Finally,
Chapter 9 will draw conclusion based on the preceding exploration and analysis.
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping, as the de facto leader of China, was instrumental
in introducing economic and social reforms that are still evolving today.1 The
economic modernization that China launched at the end of the 1970s ranks as
one of the most dramatic episodes of social and economic transformation in
1See, for example, Vogel (2011) for a recent analysis of Deng Xiaopings rise to the top of
Chinese politics and his subsequent reforms.
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history, according to Pei (2006:1). China has, during this process, moved from
a command economy to a more market-orientated economy or, as it is o¢ cially
denoted: socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics, where the
state still holds a pivotal and controlling position in the economy parallel to
free market practices becoming more widespread.2 However,
with the emphasis on economic growth has come a change in
the basis of the regimes legitimacy. Although the Party still claims
legitimacy on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and this claim has im-
portant consequences for the political system, everyone is aware that
performance legitimacy has become far more important than ideol-
ogy in justifying the governments continued rule. This was true
during the 1980s but has become even more important [...] Few-
smith (2008:5)
The transition of the Chinese economy has been remarkable. Between 1978
and 2011 the Chinese economy has grown on average at 9.7 percent per year,
while averaging 11 percent between 2003 to 2007. During the 2008 global -
nancial crisis, China managed to maintain healthy economic growth due to con-
siderable stimulus and strong domestic growth drivers, according to the World
Bank (2012c). In early 2011, China overtook Japan to become the second largest
economy in the world. This was a position that Japan had held, second only to
the large US economy, for the past four decades (Dickie, 2011).
Scope of Fieldwork
The eldwork which forms the basis for the China case study, was carried
out between Saturday, September 17 and Monday October 3, 2011, in Shanghai.
The rst formal interview took place on the rst Monday in the early evening
(September 19), which was followed by an additional ve formal interviews over
the following nine working days. Moreover, during the stay in Shanghai, I
secured an additional three complete interview agendas by email. The three
participants (GC , HC and IC) were not able to meet during my stay in China,
but the information they provided helped make more complete the information
I obtained in face-to-face interviews. All the interviewees were accomplished
nance professionals and opinion formers in Shanghai. Interviewees had ini-
tially agreed to meet for one hour to cover the interview agenda (the minimum
time period required to cover all sub-headings), however, as the conversations
developed almost all the interviews lasted around two hours, with one interview
taking three hours.
2See, e.g., Coase & Wang (2012) for a general overview of the reform process from 1976
up until 2010, including the inception of the socialist market economy with Chinese charac-
teristics.
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Table 8.1: IntervieweesCodes, Status, and Sectors
Interviewee Code Sector
Manager AC Big Four Accounting Firm
Client Executive BC International Retail Bank
Chief Operating O¢ cer (COO) CC International Firm
Senior Product Manager DC Asset Management Company
Senior Research Analyst EC Chinese Investment Bank
Shanghai Branch Manager FC International Retail Bank
Director GC Private Equity Firm
Equity Analyst HC Asset Management Company
Equity Analyst IC Fund Management Company
The interviewees, listed in Table 8.1, were explicitly guaranteed anonymity
and they all signed a University of St Andrews Participant Consent Form,
Anonymous Data, that explained the nature of the research and listed their
rights as interviewees (see Appendix E). Moreover, there were four additional
formal meetings in Shanghai, which served to build a more fully developed
picture of the country and its culture. Before travelling to China, I had also
had telephone conversations with two international experts on China and its
economy, in addition to one extensive telephone conversation with a Chinese
entrepreneur based in Beijing. On my return from Shanghai I interviewed an
additional four nance professionals in regard to China by telephone. Between
interviews and appointments in Shanghai, I enjoyed the local atmosphere and
walked extensively around the city to form an impression of Shanghai and to
see the transformation of the city. I was also fortunate to spend one day with a
Chinese University of St Andrews alumnus who took me around the city by car
and shared their impressions of the city and country with me.
In this chapter, the analysis carried out and the evidence presented, as in
the case studies of India and Russia, is predominantly based on these primary
sources and augmented by additional secondary sources.
Chapter Structure
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 8:2 exam-
ines China in the context of globalisation, both from an economic and a so-
cial/political perspective. China is currently shifting its emphasis somewhat
away from the export and infrastructure investment driven growth model, to
more reliance on domestic consumption in stimulating growth. Although there
has been a marked market liberalisation in China since the 1980s, the Chi-
nese government still extensively controls information ows. India, on the other
hand, chose to move away from controlling the media during its (ongoing) lib-
eralisation process. Section 8:3 looks at corporate governance and its nature
and implementation in China today. As China has become increasingly interna-
tional and open with regard to its nancial markets, Chinese corporate gover-
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nance practises have not evolved accordingly. Signicantly more transparency
is required in Chinese society to bring it into line with international standards.
Section 8:4 discusses the institutional structure within the country, which is still
dominated by the state. Section 8:5 evaluates competitive strategy within the
Chinese nancial sectors. The retail and investment banking sectors are still
heavily inuenced by local banks. Interestingly, brokerage is closed to foreign
banks and rms. According to one interviewee, China is unique in generating
the largest prots from domestic brokerage (and not from investment banking,
as in Western countries). Finally, conclusions will be drawn on the basis of the
evidence presented on China in Section 8:6.
8.2 Globalisation
This section examines Chinas interaction with the international community
from a number of di¤erent angles. It looks at the relative importance of economic
ows and restrictions; the relative importance of personal contact, information
ows and cultural proximity; and political e¤ects on market functions. The
globalisation sub-headings and the questions in the semi-structured interview
that form the foundation for this chapter, are derived from the KOF Index of
Globalization which also forms a part of the exploratory analysis carried out in
Chapter 4 (Dreher, 2003).
8.2.1 Economic E¤ects on Market Functions
Notwithstanding an unparalleled market transformation and the long period of
enviable growth gures in China, there is now talk of an eminent slowdown in
the Chinese Economy. Whether this decline in GDP growth will amount to a
hard or soft landing, is currently being debated. An article in Time Magazine
(2012, April 6) states:
Patrick Chovanec, a professor at Tsinghua Universitys School
of Economics and Management, sees China heading for a bumpy
landing,with ups and downs in the next few years. The countrys
leaders, preoccupied with the upcoming shift to a new generation
of Communist o¢ cials and distracted by the global nancial crisis,
have put o¤ several tough but crucial structural reforms, he notes.
These include liberalizing exchange rates and interest rates, improv-
ing the distribution of wealth, carrying out tax reforms and shifting
away from the increasing dominance of state-owned industries. [...]
Chovanec notes. China needs corrections in the property market
and broader economy to refocus growth on activities that earn gen-
uine returns. The longer you put them o¤, the more painful it will
be.
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The Relative Importance of Economic Flows
China is currently shifting its policy emphasis from a focus on promoting
exports and investments to domestic consumption as the primary driver for
growth. CC , a Chief Operating O¢ cer, noted that state transparency may
often be cited as a problem when doing business in China. However, they go
on to state that at least in terms of investment strategies and growth stimulus,
the Chinese government is open about its overall plans and goals. Chinas 11th
Five-Year Plan (2006 to 2010) was centred around signicant infrastructure
investments.3 The focus on infrastructure was to such an extent that domestic
banks were forced to lend out capital to infrastructure related projects and
businesses and, as a result, are now left with considerable bad loans on their
balance sheets, according to, for example, BC , an international retail bank Client
Executive. Chinas 12th Five-Year Plan (2011 to 2015) will (crucially) focus on
domestic consumption and on inclusive growth.4 This notwithstanding, the
exports sector is still an essential cornerstone of the Chinese economy:
However, now that China is the worlds largest exporter (and the
leading manufacturer with 19.8 percent of global output in 2010 as
against 19.4 percent for the U.S.), a slowing of export growth and the
concomitant restructuring of production and demand will increase
the salience of domestic consumption on growth and on innovation
[...] (World Bank, 2012d:185)
China is now the largest automobile market in the world, both in terms
of production and consumption.5 EC , a Senior Macroeconomic Researcher,
noted that China imposes high tari¤s on car imports, which is a part of their
agreement to protect their domestic car production.6 The car market is growing
rapidly in China. However, this signicant automobile sector growth was not
expected by foreign car producers and, as such, international car manufactures
are now trying to further open up the market, according to DC , a Senior Product
Manager, in an asset management company. Car makers have got around the
steep import tari¤s by setting up factories in China, which have provided a
positive spill-over e¤ect for China, noted CC .
It is not only in car production that China has overtaken its Western coun-
terparts. Today, China is also dominant in steel, cotton, tobacco, beer and coal
production. Moreover, it is strong in high-technology exports. These are all sec-
tors where the US used to be the market leader.7 However, it should be noted
that Apple, Inc. products are famously included under Chinas high-technology
3Chinas o¢ cial 11th Five-Year Plan: htwww.gov.cn/english/special/115y_index.htm.
Fan (2006) analyses the Plans approach to addressing inequality in Chinas society.
4An uno¢ cial translation of 12th Five-Year Plan (2011 to 2015) is available online:
http://cbi.typepad.com/china_direct/2011/05/chinas-twelfth-ve-new-plan-the-full-
english-version.html
KPMG (2011) among others o¤er sector specic reports on the implications of the Chinese
12th Five-Year Plan.
5Financial Times, 2012.
6See Thun (2006) on Chinas development of its automobile industry into a global force.
7Stockdale & McIntyre, 2012.
173
exports although the technical and design expertise are US-based. Xing (2011)
nds that Chinese manufactures produced only 3.6 percent in added value to
Chinese iPhone exports in 2009. However, according to one successful entre-
preneur based in Beijing with a number of companies under their control, very
large Chinese companies may emerge on a global scale with innovative products,
in a fashion akin to Apples success, within the next ten years.
The Relative Importance of Economic Restrictions
Restrictions may di¤er by district, according to BC , a Client Executive. For
example, there are economic free zones, where high-technology and entrepre-
neurship is encouraged.8 CC , a Chief Operating O¢ cer, added that these zones
may o¤er, say, 5 percent corporate tax for 5 years, as oppose to the usual 30
percent. Interestingly, the e¤ectiveness and fairness of the judicial system also
varies across the country, added CC . One multinational company that partook
in the eldwork stated that they choose Shanghai in which to base their China
o¢ ce over Beijing mainly due to the more business-friendly and fairer court
system in Shanghai. This notwithstanding, corruption is still a general problem
within the Chinese judicial system across the country. Bureaucracy is also a sig-
nicant factor in China. One Media Director stated that there are four worlds
of bureaucracy in China: In Beijing nine departments regulate his business, in
Shanghai one department regulates his business, in the (15 to 20) second-tier
cities it varies. For the rest, it is driven by one person, one person runs the
show.
Joint ventures (JV) are also required in many sectors and industries for for-
eign companies to enter China.9 However, over the past three or four years,
this requirement has been relaxed and today wholly foreign-owned companies
are allowed to operate in some sectors, according to DC . However, JVs are still
required in the nancial services industry and foreign entities are not allowed to
take part in the very lucrative, Chinese, brokerage sector, noted FC , an interna-
tional retail bank Branch Manager. Updated guidelines on foreign investments
came into e¤ect on January 30, 2012. The update of the Industry Catalogue for
Foreign Investment, as it is o¢ cially known, reects the emphasis of the 12th
ve-year plan. Cli¤ord Chance (2012:1), the international law rm, concludes
that:
In recent years, China has gradually shifted its focus on enhanc-
ing the quantity to quality of foreign investment. Hence, the
Chinese government is now more receptive to foreign investment in
emerging industries such as hi-tech and innovative technology, en-
vironmental protection, renewable resources, new energy, modern
agriculture, manufacturing and services.
8See e.g. Park (1997) on the management and development of economic free zones across
China. See Wong & Tang (2005) for a case study on the Guangzhou Development District.
See Buck, Liu & Ott (2010) on JV strategies in China.
9See, for example, Killing (1983) and Harrigan (1988) on joint venture strategy considera-
tions. See Pingyao (2009) for an analysis on the role JV and FDI in China.
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However, by only moving nancial leasing companies onto the permitted
investment list for foreign companies, the updated FDI strategy has had little
impact on the nancial sector.10 China has clearly benetted greatly from the
JV arrangements. It has transferred foreign skills, know-how and technology
into local Chinese companies. CC noted that Chinese companies have success-
fully built on the initial know-how they acquired through JVs in, for example,
the aeronautical sector and the Chinese space programme. AU , a Chief Econo-
mist, lamented that it is easier to move capital (e.g., VC) into China than to
UK export services. They would like to see an improvement in Chinas service
import framework.
8.2.2 Social E¤ects on Market Functions
China is becoming more outwards looking. The travel industry is booming in
China, but obtaining a permit to leave China can still be a challenge, according
to BC and CC . For the 2010 China World Expo, 95 percent of visitors to
the event in Shanghai were locals from all over China, according to CC . The
wealthy and middle classes travel outside China. Hong Kong is very popular,
as are, London, Paris, New York, Singapore and Malaysia, noted CC . Li et al.
(2009) considers the immense growth potential of outbound Chinese tourism.
They note that the estimate for 2010 outward travel is 50 million tourist from
China, with this gure projected to increase to 100 million by 2020. CC , on the
subject of outbound travel, commented that although it is not widely known,
Arab countries have a substantial number of Chinese professionals based in
their region in relation to energy industry projects (oil and gas initiatives by
the Chinese government).
Learning English has now become a priority for a large part of the urban
population, with extracurricular English tutorials for children rising in popular-
ity, according to DC . This sentiment was echoed in India, where MI , a Finance
Professor, observed that even poor parents would seek out private education to
ensure that their children learn English.
In China all types of media are controlled and censored by the state. In
late 2011 users of the Internet passed the half a billion milestone in China,
although Internet penetration as a whole is still low in comparison to Japan
and South Korea. Internet penetration increased by 3.4 percentage points over
2011, taking the total to 37.7 percent for China, whereas Japan and South
Korea have around 70 percent penetration.11 While the Internet is widely used
by the urban younger generations, it is also subject to considerable censorship.
In China, Internet censorship is two fold: content (deletion of text) and access
(the Great Firewall of China).
Bamman, Oconnar & Smith (2012) analyses the type of content that is
politically sensitive and more likely to be removed from the Chinese microblog
10Cli¤ord Chance, 2012.
11Reuters, 2012, January 11.
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site Sina Weibo.12 Moreover, Bamman, Oconnar & Smith nd that certain
of the Western China provinces have much higher deletion rates (in particular
Tibet and Qinghai). King, Pan, & Roberts (2012) examine the governments
motivation for Internet censorship in China. They conclude that censorship is
used to reduce collective activities and expression in China.
The Great Firewall of China can be circumvented by a simple software
program, which is either free of charge or sold for around $5 uno¢ cally, noted
DC . Nevertheless, the states management of information ows on the Internet
is quite sophisticated, to the extent that it signicantly reduces the download
speed of certain international websites. One Director of a China-based media
company explained that the Chinese government on purpose makes it di¢ cult
to access some foreign run websites, for instance, Google and Gmail. The gov-
ernment ensures that the connections to these sites are slow, unreliable and
that they will often fail. This is done by the state to divert business away
from foreign sites and onto domestically run websites. Western internet compa-
nies are mirrored by very successful Chinese providers. These include Google
(Baidu), eBay (Taobao), Twitter (Sina Weibo), Facebook (Renren Network),
YouTube (Tudou), amongst others. The government waits for a separation of
the sub-set of domestic providers of a service and then backs them. In Septem-
ber 2011 Groupon13 was struggling in China and a number of other companies
were trying to position themselves as the market leader. Once this leader has
been identied, the media director predicts that the government will step in
and further back the dominant Chinese entity. Although this account of state
intervention may sound extraordinary, it is in line with testimony to the US
Congressional-Executive Commission on China:14
When most people think of the Great Firewall of China, they
think of government censors black holing the comments of political
dissidents or conversations related to the long list of topics the gov-
erning Communist Party nds disruptive to political harmony. But
in testimony before Congress, the head of a U.S.-based technology
industry group said that the censorship is also taking an economic
toll on Western Internet rms, as China steers Chinese consumers
away from Western Web based services including Facebook, Google,
Twitter, Yahoo and Foursquare and toward domestic competitors.
Ed Black, President and CEO of the Computer and Communica-
tions Industry Association (CCIA) told the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China that the Chinese government censors, blocks
and discriminates against foreign-based Web services and content.
The net result of the ltering, he said is to directly or indirectly
advantage domestic rms.(Roberts, 2011:1)
12Sina Weibo: www.weibo.com (Chinese website). This website is somewhat similar to
Twitter (The US microblog site).
13Named Gaopeng in China, as another company had already trademarked the name
Grouponin the country.
14Congressional-Executive Commission on China: www.cecc.gov
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However, the Internet is increasingly becoming a forum for discussing cor-
ruption and poor business ethics. When scandals are widely disseminated on
the Internet, the state normally takes action against the alleged o¤enders, notes
DC . Foreign companies can also access blocked sites from their o¢ ces (using
proxy servers) and mobile phones can also access restricted material, nds BC .
Despite the restrictions, China has become more open in terms of the ow of
information, both domestically and to the international audience, according to
AC and FC (amongst others).
Magazines have also become increasingly popular and they are targeted pre-
dominantly towards the wealthy. There also exists censorship of this media.
CC , for example, was awaiting the arrival of the Economistmagazine in the
post, as they had already heard about an interesting article on the Chinese gov-
ernment in that specic issue of the magazine. The issue was delayed and when
it arrived the pages containing the article on the Chinese government had been
physically ripped out of the publication.
In China, television is the main medium of entertainment. China Central
Television (CCTV) is based in Beijing and promotes government propaganda.15
It broadcasts shows about loyalty, family values and such-like themes. On the
other hand, China has got Talentwas a huge hit for Shanghai TV, Which has
a more entrepreneurial feel.16
Chinas concerted e¤ort to suppress the ow of information and manipulate
opinions in the population is in stark contrast to the quite free ows of informa-
tion in the UK. AU ; a Chief Economist, has observed a proliferation of blogs and
sites in recent years and believes that the brandhas become vital in todays
market place. The brand is used to indicate that you can trust the information
being transmitted. For the UK, the BBC is that brand.17 It is personalised
by radio and TV hosts, in a sense you feel a connection with the journalists
as they appear on TV or radio. Basically, the ltering mechanism is essential
today and it is the brand. CU , a Chief European Economist at an international
investment bank noted that the UK has ve good international newspapers and
the US has two or three good international newspapers. They summed up their
observations by noting that the news resources in the UK are great. TV is still
dominant across the board but the Internet is playing an increasingly impor-
tant role in disseminating information, whereas the print media is in decline.
IU , a Senior European Economist, suggested that today there is no monopoly
on forming opinions.
Cultural proximity is here measured as the countrys openness to Western
European brands in retailing. Western brands are ubiquitous and extremely
popular in Chinese cities. Chinese idolise Western items, noted BC . Yum!
Brands (parent company of KFC, Taco Bell and Pizza Hut), plan to open 5000
more stores in China by 2020.18 However, there are some challenges for foreign
companies to overcome. Copycats are a problem in China, with its weak judicial
15China Central Television (CCTV): http://english.cntv.cn/01/index.shtml
16See Zhao (1998) and Lynch (1999) on state propaganda in the Chinese media.
17BBC: British Broadcasting Company.
18 Inside Retail Asia (2012).
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system, so protecting their goods and brands can be problematic, according to
CC .
Despite the fact that China has experienced a tremendous internationalisa-
tion of its tier-one cities, most noticeably Shanghai, it is still a uniquely Chinese
environment. At the same time, personal contact between the UK and the global
community has continued to increase. CU observed that there is a divide in the
internationalisation of the UK, with London (a very international, multicultural
place, with a favourable business climate) versus the country(di¤erent type
of multiculturalism). This was echoed by HU who suggested that London is not
representative of the country as a whole, London may be more like the Nether-
lands. HU continued to comment that it is almost like barriers do not exist
between countries now, Dont really think about whether its an international
call now when you pick up the phone.
The One Child Policy, introduced in 1979, has meant that children have
become a precious commodity in China and businesses are increasingly targeting
this segment of the population.19 There are 150 million children below the age
of ten in China. You often see one child with six adults (two parents and
four grandparents) hovering over it on the street, according to CC . It is now
becoming more common to have two and three children but the parents are
subject to a one o¤ ne of around $4000 - $5000.
Chan, et al. (2002), are concerned about the imbalance in the Chinese
gender ratio as a result of the one-child policy and conclude that by 2029 there
may be up 30 million more males than females in China. Hesketh, Lu, & Xing
(2005:1174) express their concern about Chinas capacity to care for the larger
proportion of elderly people:
In China, the percentage of the population over the age of 65
years was 5 percent in 1982 and now stands at 7.5 percent but is
expected to rise to more than 15 percent by 2025. [...] Although
these gures are lower than those in most industrialized countries
(especially Japan, where the proportion of people over the age of 65
years is 20 percent), a lack of adequate pension coverage in China
means that nancial dependence on o¤spring is still necessary for
approximately 70 percent of elderly people. [...] Pension coverage is
available only to those employed in the government sector and large
companies. In China, this problem has been named the 4:2:1
phenomenon, meaning that increasing numbers of couples will be
solely responsible for the care of one child and four parents.Hesketh,
Lu, & Xing (2005:1174)
19See Hesketh, Lu, & Xing (2005) analyse the implications of the one-child policy after 25
years, in terms of population growth and discuss whether it is time to relax this rule. See
Fong (2006) on the one-child policy results on family dynamics.
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8.2.3 Political E¤ects on Market Functions
China would like recognition on the international stage as a world power. It
would like to be seen as organised and open to business, to the extent that
China spend $10 million in 2011 to promote China on Times Square in New
York, according to DC .20 DC continued by observing that although China is
becoming more proactive in managing its foreign relations, it is not on the
best of terms with Russia. China is happy to have more inuence than Russia
internationally, as they feel like they are competing with their old ally, adds BC :
Kotkin (2009) nds that despite Russias large oil reserves, China is rmly in
control over the Sino-Russia dynamics:21
[W]hatever opportunity does exist in the relationship, China
is in a better position to exploit it. China extracts considerable
practical benets in oil and weapons from Russia. In return, Beijing
atters Moscow with rhetoric about their strategic partnership
and coddles it by promoting the illusion of a multipolar world. In
many ways, the Chinese-Russian relationship today resembles that
which rst emerged in the seventeenth century: a rivalry for inuence
in Central Asia alongside attempts to expand bilateral commercial
ties, with China in the catbird seat.Kotkin (2009:132)
Despite Chinas endeavours to promote itself internationally and claim recog-
nition, including the Beijing 2008 Olympics and the 2010 World Expo in Shang-
hai, they still have a lot to learn in terms of managing their international rela-
tions. For example, when the Nobel Prize was awarded to the Chinese human
rights activist, Liu Xiaobo, government o¢ cials made some crude comments,
noted BC . Or as one Chinese nancial analyst, IC , noted Compared to the
U.S. and the EU, our overseas propaganda was not enough, sometimes too rigid.
Westerners do not like those scripted publicity [...].
The UK is also aware of the importance of promoting its business credentials
internationally and as a result it dedicates Foreign O¢ ce resources to sell the
UK overseas.
8.3 Corporate Governance
This section examines the position of stakeholders in China, corporate social
responsibility, business ethics, enforcement and control, corporate governance
and rm performance. Moreover, it also covers mergers and acquisitions and
initial public o¤erings. Good corporate governance practises are essential in es-
tablishing fair IPO valuations and, by extension, ensuring e¢ cient allocation of
resources in economies. Issues such as transparency, earnings quality, business
20Xinhua, a news agency operated by the Chinese government, leased the giant sign, known
as a spectacularon Times Square.
21See for instance Lo (2008) for an extensive analysis of Russian and Chinese relations.
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ethics and management skills will be important to both investors and stake-
holders in the wider community. Chapter 5 established through econometric
modelling that the frequency and the level of detail required of interim corpo-
rate reports inuence IPO underpricing. More stringent reporting requirements
were found to reduce underpricing. By including core corporate governance
topics in the eldwork study, it is possible to go beyond the gures and build a
fuller picture of the underlying courses of market failure.
8.3.1 Stakeholders
Employees are not involved in the daily decision-making process. As CC noted,
it is a top-down organisational framework in China. It starts in their top down
schools from a young age. As a result, CC suggested that it is very hard to
nd proactive and self-motivated sta¤ in China. If you tell them to do 10 tasks
every day, they will do them very well. But if something changes or goes wrong,
they are not able to adjust. Their company does have some bright sparks as
well who can work independently.At the same time, creativity may be lacking
among the talent intake in their company. However, it can be a good mix with
foreign talent, concluded CC .
There are job advancement opportunities if you work hard in China, espe-
cially in foreign companies. Graduates tend to frequently move between compa-
nies to improve their career. Although it should be noted that nepotism is quite
widespread in China. It not only extends to allocating jobs to well-connected
candidates but also placing them on a considerably higher salary level as op-
posed to their peer group. For state-owned enterprises (SOEs), relationships
with senior management are seen as being the most important factor in your
career progression, according to AC and DC . These are not new phenomena,
with Child (1996) and Yang (1994), among others, discussing the Chinese ap-
proach to management and social relationships.
Managers are seen as being accountable in large private companies, but not
in SOEs. China, Russia and India are all three economies with signicant SOE
components. Boardman & Vinings (1989) paper nds that private enterprises
outperform both mixed-owned and state-owned enterprises in terms of sales
per employee and prots. Crucially, SOEs enjoy a privileged market position
through state protection in all three countries. This is in contrast to the UK,
where during the 1980s, many state-owned companies were either privatised or,
if unprotable, simply closed down. This is far from the case in Russia, India
and China, where these companies also serve a social function. They provide
employment, social security and help to bring stability to parts of the countries
where there may be no alternative forms of employment in the medium term.
Salary ination is very high in China due to a talent shortage in some sectors.
Interesting, CC was of the opinion that non-nationals may be cheaper to hire
at middle-management level and above. This is due to the fact that 30 to 60
percent of the salaries paid to Chinese nationals is required to be paid towards
statutory benets (e.g., insurance and welfare benets) and is added to the basic
salary.
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External stakeholders are not well protected in China in terms of judicial
redress. The e¤ectiveness and fairness of the judicial system varies across the
country. Corruption is still a general problem within the Chinese judicial system,
as it is in all aspects of Chinese society. It is the norm and it is generally
accepted. DC noted that you can sue if you have a problem. However, oil, gas,
telecom, electricity and utilities are state-owned industries. You cannot protest
against the state, therefore you cannot sue these companies. The courts are also
part of the government. To maintain control of the legal system, the goverment
issued a new directive in March 2012 that stipulates that all new lawyers and
lawyers renewing their licence, must swear an oath to the government:
I swear to faithfully fulll the sacred mission of legal workers
in socialism with Chinese characteristics. I swear my loyalty to the
motherland, to the people, to uphold the leadership of the Com-
munist Party of China and the socialist system, and to protect the
dignity of the Constitution and laws.Wong (2012:1)
In business, personal contacts with o¢ cials are paramount, as everything is
open to interpretation. The ambiguity of rules and regulations in China gives
state o¢ cials inordinate inuence in all aspects of society. As GC noted, the in-
terpretation of the law is always very murky. Everything is grey.For Industries
and sectors that are especially dependent on government goodwill, headquarters
are located in Beijing, while others who prefer to keep some distance and seek
less government interference are based in Shanghai. For example, construction
and utilities companies are often based in Beijing, whereas the nancial services
sector is based in Shanghai, added BC .
Unions are not normally encouraged in the Western sense.22 In China,
unions are part of the company; you may even have a manager as the head of
the union in some companies, according to DC . They generally function more
like a body that provides assistance and welfare, not as a collective bargaining
entity. However, there are exceptions in, for example, manufacturing and for
some foreign companies. Unions have been quite e¤ective in some cases, e.g.,
Foxconn Technology Group, the very large manufacturing company.23 There
is a skills shortage in manufacturing, which may place workers in a stronger
position. The Beijing area now requires any company with more than 300 or
400 employees to have a union, according to CC .
Although unions have steadily lost their inuence over the past 40 years in
the UK, they can legally, and without fearing state repercussions (as oppose to
Russia and China), organise their members if they wish to do so. As a collec-
tive force in the private sector, unions are extinct in the UK. Unions are still
in present in the public sector and former privatised companies, for example,
BA where they are rent seeking. AU notes that they have seen evidence that
some companies will not buy, or invest in, companies that are unionised, that is,
they divert funds away from those entities. And yet, according to IU , a Senior
22See Olsen (1965) on collective bargaining.
23Foxconn Technology Group: www.foxconn.com
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European Economist, although unions are still somewhat strong in transport
(airlines/ports/tube/rail) there has been a muted response to the severe auster-
ity measures: More a silent acceptance, which is a considerable change from
the 1970s. This muted response continues even two years into the government
austerity package. It is a more an individualistic society now, noted IU .
8.3.2 Corporate Social Responsibility
Western-style CSR is not widely seen in China.24 There are some innovative
and interesting projects in China, but it is not high on the agenda of most
companies or consumers.25 However, CSR is used as a government response to
Chinese natural disasters. Companies are encouraged to donate money and the
amounts are widely publicised on television; companies are, in e¤ect, named
and shamed. As with India (mandatory contributions) and the UK (political
pressure on companies to implement CSR schemes), the Chinese government
considers CSR as a part of its social foundation.
8.3.3 Business Ethics
Corporate scandals are discussed publicly and many government scandals en-
ter the public domain. However, some feel that scandals are still government
managed to some extend. If it is not in the governments interest to have some-
thing come out, and if the papers still go ahead, the government will close or
take control of the paper(s). This is the same sentiment encountered in Russia,
where the mass-media is controlled indirectly by the state. Unethical business
practises are often used in China. However, as BC and others noted, business
is conducted from the perspective of the average Chinese person and they may
not see the practises as unethical at all; their social norms di¤er from to the
Western paradigm. This is in line with Crane & Matten (2007) who posit that
as globalisation advances across the world, corporations will have to consider
that local customs may not have changed accordingly:
As business becomes less xed territorially, so corporations in-
creasingly engage in overseas markets, suddenly nding themselves
confronted with new and diverse, sometimes even contradicting eth-
ical demands. Moral values, which were taken for granted in the
home market, may get questioned as soon as corporations enter for-
eign markets (Donaldson, 1996). For example, attitudes to racial
and gender diversity in Europe may di¤er signicantly to those in
Middle Eastern countries. Similarly, Chinese people might regard it
24See, e.g., Vogel (2005) amongst others for an overview of the CSR area.
25For example, some companies give out school bags with reective strips of material to
make children more safe in tra¢ c and ll the bags with study material. One company builds
libraries for schools. It o¤ers an Ikea approach to these sets and takes $15,000 and upwards
for sponsorships.
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as more unethical to sack employees in times of economic downturns
than would be typical in Europe.26 [...]
The reason why there is a potential for such problems is that
whilst globalization results in the deterritorialization of some processes
and activities, in many cases there is still a close connection be-
tween the local culture, including moral values, and a certain geo-
graphical area. [...] This is one of the contradictions of globaliza-
tion: on the one hand globalization makes regional di¤erence less
important since it brings together and encourages a more uniform
global culture. One the other hand, in eroding the divisions of ge-
ographical distances, globalisation reveals economic, political, and
cultural di¤erences and confronts people with them.Crane & Mat-
ten (2007:18,19)
Government o¢ cials are hanged publicly in China for taking bribes to send
a strong signal that corruption is not accepted, according to CC . CC went on to
lament that although the government is trying to reduce corruption, it is part
of the culture in China. It is a huge problem in China, a very, very serious
problem in China.Even on a grassroots level it is seen as normal. If you park
your car the parking attendant will ask you if you want a receipt. If so, it will
cost you $1.50 to park. If not, it will cost you $0.5 to park your car.
On May 1, 2011, the Chinese government made it a criminal o¤ence to of-
fer, receive, or ask for bribes. This new statute applies to everyone. This is a
milestone and great progress according to CC and it should level the playing
eld, as international companies were already subjected to the US Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the UK Bribery Act. The US Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act was introduced in 1977, however opinions are still divided over
whether this unilateral Act places US companies at an economic disadvantage
in the international market place. Some argue that the US should actively en-
sure that other countries across the world follow suit, for example, Salbu (1997).
The UK Bribery Act followed in 2010 and brings the UK in line with the US
posit in this area. Hatchard (2011) examines the potential impact of the UK
legislation. More recently, as mentioned, China enacted its anti-bribery law in
2011 (see Mark & Bullock (2011) for a short commentary).
8.3.4 Enforcement & Control
International companies in China have good accountancy standards but local
companies are often seen as having issues with their audited gures. Hence,
nancial statements are generally not regarded as reliable, noted DC . FC stated
that listed companies in China have got corporate governance systems that,
on the surface, look similar to Western countries but they still have family
26Dr Jim Jin, University of St Andrews, suggests that the attitute to terminating employ-
ment contracts in China during nancial di¢ culties changed in the early 1990s. It may, in
fact, be that rings in China are now more ruthless then in the West.
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ownership issues and are relationship based. The equity market has developed
at a quick pace over the last ten years and corporate governance has improved.
Accounting and corporate governance risks related to non-transparent Chi-
nese companies were documented further in 2011, with the added dimension of
cross-border auditing problems. Between March and July, 20 Chinese US-listed
companies were delisted and auditors resigned from a total of 30 companies.27
On July 11, 2011, Moodys issued a widely cited red agreport highlighting
potential risks in 61,28 mainly smaller and Hong Kong listed, Chinese com-
panies. The ve categories covered were: weak corporate governance, risky
business models, fast-growth strategies, poor earnings quality and audit con-
cerns.29 Six days after the red agreport, Fitch Ratings acknowledged this
issue as well and published a report that states, that its ratings for Chinese
corporates already include an inherent discount for weak corporate governance
relative to international capital market standards, as well as for issues such as
an under-developed legal system and quality of information standards.30 DU ,
Global Chief Economist, noted that for the US in the 1970s, 15 percent of earn-
ings in S&P 500 was foreign (i.e., 85 percent US exposure). It is now 30 percent
(i.e., 70 percent US exposure). Correspondingly, for the UK, the FTSE 100 of-
fers only 50 percent exposure to the UK now. This is something retail investors
may not realise and consider when investing in US or UK equity indices.
Despite the challenging environment, the Big Four accounting rms, have a
good reputation in China. However, there are signs that the Big Four may nd
themselves in an uncomfortable position between the US and China. On May
10, 2012, the Chinese goverment instructed the Big Four auditor rm to localise
their operations in China:
Although the rms have hired thousands of Chinese accountants
in recent years, many of their senior sta¤ers have come from outside
China. The rms were originally allowed to operate largely with
foreign partners because qualied local sta¤ were scarce.
The edict comes amid rising tensions between regulators in the
U.S. and China over the sharing of audit information of mainland
China-based companies whose shares are traded on U.S. exchanges.
On Wednesday, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
charged a Chinese unit of Deloitte with violating the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act by refusing to hand over documents related to a Chinese rm
[Longtop Financial Technologies] thats under investigation for de-
frauding investors. Deloitte has said doing so would violate Chinese
state secrecy laws.
Under the new rules, the Big Four will have to show by the end
of this year that no more than 40% of their Chinese partners have
gained their certied public accountant certication overseas. By
27BBC, 2011, July 11.
28OKee¤e, 2011.
29Kwok & Subhedar, 2011.
30Fitch Ratings, 2011.
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2017, that cap will drop to 20%, and a Chinese citizen must be
picked to head each of the Big Fours operations in China.Pierson
(2012:1)
The media is far from free to report on issues in China leaving a gap in
the external corporate governance controls. Moreover, although there can be
very severe consequences at times and the government has taken some steps to
try to reduce corruption. It is clear that enforcement is lacking in China. The
Russian media is also restricted in reporting freely on corporate governance
issues and is under the control of the state. And yet, it may not be surprising
to learn that there are restrictions on media reporting in Russia, when even the
nancial regulators are not allowed to intervene in some suspected fraud cases,
according to, for example, GR, a Senior Investment O¢ cer in Moscow. Both
in the UK and in India, on the other hand, the media exerts a strong inuence
over companies, as they are often afraid of media headlines, according to, IU ,
a Senior European Economist in the London, and DI , a Senior Economist in
Mumbai, for example.
8.3.5 Corporate Governance & Firm Performance
Board composition does not seem to be a topical issue in China.31 It is nor-
mally a mix of well-connected people. SOEs typically have government o¢ cials,
or members with prior government backgrounds, on their boards. Listed SOEs
also tend to have outside members as well, with some independent directors.
Remuneration seems not to be discussed in the public domain and the intervie-
wees did not have any comments to make in this regard. Although remuneration
is becoming more frequently discussed in the UK, HU , remarked that UK board
compensation is still murky.
8.3.6 Mergers & Acquisitions
There is a high frequency of M&As in China. Jensen (1993) suggests that
the M&As can impose some discipline on markets, especially when takeover
defences are somewhat low. Xin (2003) analyses the period 1993 to 2002 in
the Chinese equity market and suggests on the basis of the evidence that the
targeted companies benetted from the deal in terms of improved share price,
however the purchasing companies (and the merger as a whole) do not see a
statistically signicant net improvement as a result of the M&A activity.32
The domestic M&A market is not as large as the cross-border deals. The
cross-border deals tend to be large and are very important to China. A lot of
e¤ort is being invested in this area by China now. They look for strategic acqui-
sitionsin the Energy and Resource Sectors. Also, there is a trend of nancial
31See Baysinger & Butler (1985) and Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) on board composition and
rm performance. See Uzun, Szewczyk & Varma (2004) on US fraud and board composition.
32The body of research on M&As is vast, but see, e.g., DeYoung, Evano¤ & Molyneux
(2009) for a post-2000 survey on the M&As of nancial institutions.
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institutions going abroad, for example, buying Hong Kong-based banks. The
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) acquired an Africa bank.33
Ping An (Chinas second largest insurance company) also bought an interna-
tional company but got into trouble due to the crisis and made a huge lose.34
DU , a Global Chief Economist, stated that although China is resource focused
it is very slow to do deals. They are consistently missing out on deals in Africa
at the moment and they are very cautious. DU went on to note that China
is aware that other countries have a historical presence and expertise in Africa
(e.g., the United Kingdom) that China lacks. M&A takeover defences are specif-
ically not used in China. As the government acts as the lter, M&A falls under
the government control side. This approach is in contrast to the UK, where the
government is not involved in such decisions (unless there are anti-trust issues
or it is a matter of national security).
8.3.7 Initial Public O¤erings
IPOs are still quite frequent in the Chinese markets, according to e.g., AC , BC ,
DC and FC . The Shanghai Stock Exchange is mainly for blue chip companies
like utilities and banks, whereas the Shenzhen Stock Exchange list many smaller
companies in, for example, in the food and retail sectors.35 As of September
2011, there had been around 300 listings that year in China. Almost all of
these were small companies, with around 50 percent losing money on the rst
day of trading, stated DC . FC added that for the past three years, investors
have always made money on the rst day of trading. However, investors are
quite often losing money now on the rst day in 2011. This is due to a lack of
investor condence and weak market sentiments, tied to poor showings overseas.
When the market gets better many companies will want to list. A long list of
companies are queuing just now. It will be huge. Since 2007 the IPO market
has been in a developing mode. There was an explosion of IPO deals and the
market was attractive. Everyone was happy and making money.
FC explained that to buy IPOs in China you need to submit an online
request. Interested parties submit money rst, apply apply and a ration is
worked out if the issue is oversubscribed, say, 1:100. That means that one out
of one hundred applicants will receive one allocation of shares. Before 2009, the
ratio was 1:1,000 or even 1:10,000. However, 2009 marked a turning point in the
IPO market when the crisis took hold and there were regulatory problems. Now
rations of 1:3 or 1:4 appear, and the less attractive the IPO, the more likely that
the applicant will be given an allocation. In other words, uninformed investors
are being subject to adverse selection.36
33 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC): www.icbc.com.cn/ICBC/sy/
34Ping An: http://about.pingan.com/en/index.shtml
35The Shanghai Stock Exchange: www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en/home/home.shtml
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange: www.szse.cn/main/en/
36Seminal papers by Rock (1986) and Beatty & Ritter (1986) explore the winners curse
model, which is based within the asymmetric information (AI) framework, as discussed in
Chapter 3 of the thesis.
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FC noted that the assigned investment bank produces a company-specic
report that is used to justify the share price that the bank decides to recommend
to the CSRC.37 The investment bank uses a coding system, online, to take bids
from institutional and retail investors, in order to determine the level of demand.
Once a price has been determined, it is taken to the CSRC where it is subject
to nal approval. In other words, the state has the nal word in the price
setting process. In IPO theory, three agents are normally considered: the issuer,
the underwriter and the investors. In China, the government acts as a fourth
agent in the IPO dynamics, further complicating an agent-principal relationship
already fraught with uncertainty and conict of interests.
In short, the ow of companies to Chinas IPO market is controlled by the
goverment. As it stands, foreign companies cannot list in China and, even when
a Chinese company gains access to the IPO market, the government will have
the nal word in approving the IPO pricing. Moreover, the individual investor
is faced with a winners curse when applying for an IPO allocation. The hotter
the IPO, the less likely an investor is to secure stocks in the company, and vice
versa. The institutional and legal framework is weak, which means that an
IPO o¤ering may be more likely to be awed, however, it is di¢ cult and costly
to seek redress in court. In contrast, the LSE is an open, market-driven entity
with minimum government interference. These two countries are at the extreme
ends of the scale of market e¢ ciency, which may explain a great deal about the
di¤erence in IPO underpricing over time.
8.4 Institutional Structure
This section examines the role of the state, the regulators and the stock ex-
changes in the nancial markets. As discussed in Chapter 5, the econometric
modelling established that counties with higher minimum capital requirements
to start a business (MCG), that is, countries with higher barriers to market en-
try, would display, on average, higher degrees of underpricing. This institutional
variable was the inspiration for expanding the qualitative cross-site investigation
into institutional factors as well.
8.4.1 Market Inuence by the State
Market inuence by the state is extensive in China. It directly controls the
courts, the media and the regulators.38 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
(2011) recommended that the Chinese government liberalise the banking sec-
tor and allow the banks freedom to make lending decisions based upon purely
commercial goals(IMF, 2011:9). The IMF noted that the Chinese government
had been able to cover the cost of nancial distortions, e.g., giving preferential
37 In China, investment banking and underwriting come under the auspices of securities
companies.
38See the Chinese governments o¢ cial website for a comprehensive overview of the state
organs (including the judiciary system):
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/state_structure/64401.htm
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treatment to SOEs in the market place, through high productivity gains. How-
ever, in the future, this would not be a sustainable policy. Haggard & Huang
(2008:361) state:
There is general agreement among China scholars that the coun-
trys nancial sector is closely tied to the SOE sector. As a result,
it su¤ers from a number of ine¢ ciencies, manifest in the extraor-
dinarily high level of nonperforming loans even at a time when the
economy was growing rapidly.
The Chinese state exerts market inuence through its SOEs. It is widely
documented that China has reduced the size of its SOE sector since the 1980s,
for example, see Frazier (2005). As illustrated by Figure 8.1, the share of SOE
involvement in Chinese manufacturing has declined approximately 36 percentage
points between 1999 and 2008 (Xu, 2010).
Figure 8.1: Share of SOEs in the Industrial Sector, 1999 to 2008
Source: Xu (2010), the World Bank.
However, the full picture may be more complex and non-transparent. Szamosszegi
& Kyle (2011) note that although prior research estimates that the Chinese pri-
vate sector accounts for approximately 70 percent of GDP, when taking into
account other ownership structures with state involvement and round-trip FDI,
the state sector may account for, in excess, of 50 percent of GDP.39 As BC and
39FDI round-tripping relate in China mostly to funds transfered from Hong Kong and Macau
back into China. Until 2008 it also served as a vechile to reduce tax liability (Szamosszegi
& Kyle, 2011). See Salidjanova (2011), cited by Szamosszegi & Kyle, on round-tripping and
Chinas outward FDI ows. See Whalley & Xin (2006) on Chinas inward FDI ows.
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EC , among others, noted, Beijing is the centre of control. Information cascades
down from Beijing, to the provinces, which can create an unclear message, as
interpretations vary. Both BC and CC noted that government o¢ cials gain in-
uence and power through this interpretation process. It helps being on goods
terms with the person tasked to apply the rules and regulation to your company,
added CC . When GC , a private equity Director, was asked whether people and
businesses enjoy good/fair legal protection in China, they replied: No. Inter-
pretation of law is always very murky. Everything is grey.This may relate to
guanxi, the Chinese approach to networking, which is discussed in, for example,
Park & Luos (2001) and Xin & Pearces (1996) widely cited papers.
In China, as in India and Russia, the government/regulators interfere in the
running of the nancial markets. The motivation may vary between the coun-
tries but, invariably, equity prices will deviate from their market value when
articial barriers are erected. In the UK, on the other hand, the government
is trying to stay more-or-less out of running the nancial markets. In Septem-
ber 2011, the European Commission (EC) proposed that an EU-wide Financial
Transaction Tax (FTT) should be levied on securities transactions. This ini-
tiative has considerable backing from the German government. The tax would
constitute minimum 0.1 percent of the value of equity and bond transactions.
Moreover, derivative transactions would be taxed at a minimum of 0.01 percent
of the notional value traded.40
The motivation for the intervention is three-fold, according to the EC:
 To create a uniform taxation approach to the nancial services, in order
to avoid potentially fragmenting unilateral action.
 To recuperate sovereign funds used to stabilise the nancial systems during
the recent crisis, while also ensuring that the sector is brought in line with
taxation on other industries.
 To create appropriate disincentives for transactions that do not enhance
the e¢ ciency of nancial markets thereby complementing regulatory mea-
sures aimed at avoiding future crises.41
The City is worried that this proposal, if extended to the UK, could divert
business away from London. This is a view shared by the UK Government, and
Prime Minister David Cameron vetoed this proposal in early 2012, excluding the
UK from this agreement. According to Managing Director, GU , of an interna-
tional nancial services company, the EU Directive on Alternative Investment
Fund Managers (AIFM) proposal is another example of Germany versus the
UK in terms of perspectives on management of the nancial services (with the
legislation drafted by the German power-block).42 They add that this proposal
40European Commission, 2011.
41European Commission, 2011:2.
42The Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMs): The directive is focused on the
regulation of the alternative investment fund manager rather than the fund vehicle itself [...]
Financial Services Authority, 2011:2.
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would have a negative impact on London. It had been expected earlier in the
2000s that Paris and Frankfurt would take business away from London but this
did not happen. Indeed, no other European city is seen to be able to compete
with London, at least in the medium-term, according to interviewees.
8.4.2 Regulatory bodies
There are four powerful nancial regulatory bodies in the Chinese market, all
rmly under the inuence of the government. They operate by law and have
taken inspiration from the European and US regulatory frameworks, although
they have more inuence over the market participants and they are still learning.
They have the power to penalise o¤enders. If, for example, if there is a big
corporate governance issue, they can suspend the licence of or close down the
o¤ending company.
There is the Peoples Bank of China (PBC), which is the most powerful of
the four; it regulates the monetary & nance policies.43 The China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) regulates stocks, bonds, derivatives, asset man-
agement and the futures market.44 The China Bank Regulatory Commission
(CBRC) regulates all retail banks and their businesses.45 Lastly, there is the
China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC), which regulates all insurance
companies.46 They are all quite separate in their areas of work and expertise.
They operate quite independently of each other but can co-ordinate. They are
currently very cautious, with a lot of bad nancial news coming from the EU and
US, noted DC . Although the structure of the UK nancial regulatory system is
much simpler, some market participants nd it overly cumbersome, while others
are satised with the current arrangement. However, as JU , an equity Analyst,
noted, there will always be an inherent conict between market participants and
the regulators.
8.4.3 Stock Exchange
The Chinese stock exchanges are seen as credible entities and provide certi-
cation value to listed companies. However, relationships are important in this
process and companies can allegedly bribe the regulator (CSRC) and the stock
exchange to obtain listing approval, according to CC and DC . CC added that
the government is getting tougher on rogue listings, hence more companies are
listing overseas in Hong Kong.
The stock exchange listings are under the direct control of the government,
through the CSRC. As such, they are used to adjust economic growth. The
government adjusts the ow of capital into the nancial markets according to
43Peoples Bank of China (PBC): www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/963/index.html
44China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC): www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/
45China Bank Regulatory Commission (CBRC): www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/index.htm
46China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC): http://english.gov.cn/2005-10/01
/content_74050.htm
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their overall plan through IPO approvals, as opposed to the LSE, where market
forces determine the ow of new equity to the markets.
8.4.4 Market Maturity
The markets are still immature and insider trading is rampant in A-share
listed stocks, according to GC .47 However, according to DC , there used to
be considerably more insider trading in China. This notwithstanding, insider
trading is common across all three markets (Russia, India and China). However,
in London this was not mentioned at all as an issue in UK markets by the
interviewees.
In China, 2005 marked a turning point in the approach to regulating the
markets and the authorities became more proactive in reducing insider trading,
when in September 2005, the Shanghai Stock index hit it lowest point in ten
years, noted DC . Many brokerage companies went bankrupt as they were not
sound and systemic risk became apparent. As a result, the regulators became
more proactive in building up the reputation of the market. This was followed
by three years of bull markets. However, in 2008, global nancial markets
experienced a downturn and the Shanghai Composite Index lost 65 percent
in value, the RTS Index, Moscow, saw a 72 percent reduction in value, while
Mumbais BSE Sensex lost 52 percent in value in 2008. In contrast, the UK
and the US saw more tempered reductions in equity indices, with respectively
a 31 percent drop in the FTSE 100 and a 34 percent decline in the Dow Jones
index.48
On the capital markets, equity is developing at a faster rate than the Chinese
debt capital market. FC observed that China still needs to work on company
credit rating and soundness instruments. In fact, the debt market should over-
take the IPO market in the future, stated FC and went on to note that the
debt market is just not there at the moment.
London is the market maker for many products and is unparalleled in Eu-
rope, only being matched by the US. Publicly traded equity responds quite well
to information. However, there are periods where the price is driven away from
the fundamental underlying price, according to AU , a Chief Economist, and
other interviewees.
8.5 Competitive Strategy
This section is inspired by three books on competition by Porter. Porter (1980,
1985) examined rm competition and the framework was extended to countries
in Porters (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations. This section seeks
to examine the rivalry within the di¤erent nancial sectors, to understand the
47 Insider trading is known as rat tradingin China.
48Kollewe (31 Deceber, 2008) on the 2008 indices performances, expect for India and the
US.
Franklin Templeton (2009) for India and the US.
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driving motivation behind the primary clients and to look at the barriers to
entry. Market barriers to entry is a key variable in the econometric model con-
structed in Chapter 5. This examination complements and extends the analysis
carried out under the Institutional Structure heading (8.4).
8.5.1 Rivalry
Banking Sectors
The investment bank sector is somewhat competitive in China. The sector is
overseen and controlled by the Peoples Bank of China (i.e. the Central Bank).
Foreign banks are still quite restricted in their operations and cannot open
fully-edged branches in China. Moreover, foreign security rms need JVs to
enter China. Goldman Sachs works with ICBC, Bank of America works with
BCCB, HSBC works with BoCom and Citi works with PDB. The market is still
dominated by domestic security rms.
The retail bank sector is dominated by the Big Fourstate-owned listed com-
mercial banks of China (whereas in the UK the state endeavours to leave retail
banking to the private sector).49 It is very di¢ cult to compete against their
branch network across China, noted FC , Branch Manager of an international
retail chain. However, HSBC, Citi and Standard Chartered are trying to catch
up by building branches at a high speed across China. The China Bank Regula-
tory Commission (CBRC) regulates all retail banks and their lending practises.
China is currently experiencing high ination and, to counter this phenomenon
the regulator has imposed a managed credit crunch, where banks have quotas
imposed on their lending or are told to stop all lending, according to CC among
others. Although, in theory, UK retail banking should be quite competitive
and uid, it may actually share some similarities with the retail bank sectors
in Russia, India and China. The three countries all have a substantial state
ownership in the their retail banking sectors, with large entrenched banks. On
the surface the UK retail banking market may appear competitive, but in fact,
the markets are somewhat static. In terms of the retail banking sector, IU , a
Senior European Economist, observed that there is collusion among the retail
segment in the UK. There are incredibly high entry costs. Although it would be
great to have, say, seven Middle Eastern retail banks come into the market, but
entry costs, but barriers to entry are too high. HSBC and Santander (stronger
balance sheets) are currently the stronger banks that are pushing the others,
though with little price di¤erence. AU , a Chief Economist, added that there is a
very low propensity for households to change bank. It can be seen as a natural
monopoly, from a local perspective.
High ination was mentioned as a topical problem by several interviewees in
September 2011, although o¢ cial gures reported ination of around 6 percent
at the time, which has dropped to around 4 to 4.5 percent by February 2012.
49The Big Four are: The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China
Construction Bank (CCB) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).
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Figure 8.2 shows o¢ cial ination gures for China between January 2008 and
February 2012
Figure 8.2: China Ination Rate, annual change on the consumer
price index (CPI)
Source: By TradingEconomics.com, National Bureau of Statistics China
BC stated that food ination was running at 10 percent o¢ cially but that in
reality ination was approximately 20 percent. The issue of under-stated ina-
tion gures was highlighted by Jim Chanos, President and Founder of Kynikos
Associates, who, in February 2012, noted that analysis by his company would
suggest that the Chinese government is under-reporting ination by around 4
to 5 percent per annum, in an e¤ort to exaggerate economic growth.50
8.5.2 Auditor Sector
Competition is high among the Big Four auditing rms, which all have a good
reputation in China.51 China is a big market for them, to the extent that, for
example, KPMG employ approximately 9,000 people divided over 13 o¢ ces in
China. Local rms are growing as well. There are also some quite good local
auditors, with much lower fees, yet good quality work. Some mid-tier audit
rms have very good relationships with the government, which facilitate some
issues and provide exibility. The Big Four also recruit from the government
tax department, noted CC . Again, as rules and regulations are very uid and
non-transparent, it is essential to be well-connected with state o¢ cials in China.
Other local rms provide servicesas a formality and sign o¤ on reports without
asking questions, according to CC and EC .
The A shareIPO market (i.e., mainland China shares) is dominated by local
rms due to their lower fees and greater exibility in signing reports, noted AC ,
a Manager with a Big Four auditing rm in Shanghai. This is in contrast to the
FTSE 100, where all 100 companies are audited by one of the Big Four auditors.
In contrast to Chinas still somewhat fragmented auditing market, the UK is
decisively consolidated and represents the fact that on the international capital
50CNN Money, 2012, February 16.
51See DeAngelos (1981) seminal analysis on the link between auditor size and audit quality.
For a more recent analysis on the topic, see Sirois & Simunic (2011).
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markets it is expected that companies use one of the Big Four auditors. Compe-
tition is high between the Big Four auditing companies. CU , a Chief European
Economist, stated that auditors cover very complex issues and that a big house
is needed to manage big clients in London. As such, it is the Big Four and the
rest in the UK. DU , a Global Chief Economist, added that it is a relationship
based business arrangement; banks tend to stay with the same auditors, even if
they charge more. This is to say, the relationship is more important than the
fees. A 2006 UK Government report summed up the key gures around the UK
auditing sector:
The Big Four audit rms [...] audit all but one of the FTSE
100 companies, and represent 99% of audit fees in the FTSE 350.
The high degree of concentration in the market became more marked
after the Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand merger in 1998 (six-
to-ve) and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen in 2002 (ve-to-four).
In addition, switching rates are low (around 4% on average for all
listed companies, 2% on average for FTSE 100 companies), and com-
petitive tendering does not occur frequently.DTI (2006:3)
8.5.3 Brokerage Sector
The retail brokerage sector is closed to foreign entities but it is a very com-
petitive area for the domestic players. Most Chinese security companies have
a brokerage business. Banks have a huge retail client base, which means that
historically they have made great prots from this activity. Indeed, the highest
revenue generation for banks is retail brokerage; trading comes second. This is
in contrast to most, if not all, Western markets where security trading is the
largest prot generator. Hence, when a foreign investment bank forms a JV
with a domestic security company, the only platform put into the JV is the
investment bank (IB) function (i.e., underwriting and M&As - corporate gover-
nance advisory services). Brokerage JVs cannot be formed, your partner will
not give you this, according to FC .
8.5.4 Customers
Institutional Investors
Institutional investors provide approximately U2 trillion RMB [$3.130 billion]
in liquidity, with market capitalisation of around U200 trillion RMB [$3,130
billion] in total between Shanghai and Shenzhen, according to DC .52 DC went
on to explain that mutual funds stand out in the market, with 62 funds in total
and that they constitute 10 percent of the market capitalisation. Insurance
companies are the second largest segment. Both mutual funds and insurance
companies trade internationally. Third in terms of size, is the National Social
52Exchange rate of yuan to dollar: $0.156521 USD, September 23, 2011. http://www.x-
rates.com/cgi-bin/hlookup.cgi
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Security Fund (NSSF), which only trades domestically.53 This is one single,
although massive, fund: a legal entity. This is wholly owned by the government.
The capital comes from local governments, as social security contributions from
individuals. CC observed that employers contribute considerably to welfare
funds in China but that these statutory contributions are not channeled to the
employees. This money goes to the government and they invest it. Pension
funds are quite small. However, private equity funds, although relatively new to
the market, are growing at a rapid pace. In the UK market, on the other hand,
there are some signicantly large pension funds that are capable of moving the
markets.
Shareholder activism by institutional investors is not common but, accord-
ing to EC , the asset management and insurance companies, in particular, are
starting to work on improving corporate governance practises. In the UK, share-
holder activism is also something that institutional investors are increasingly
involved with and are increasingly interested in, to the extent that shareholder
activism funds are sold in the UK. Some institutional investors attend annual
shareholder meetings and inuence board composition and dividend payments.
However, according to HU , a Managing Director, institutional investors activism
often tends to happen quite quietly and less visibly.
Retail Investors
Retail investors go through brokers to invest in the Chinese equity market.
Once the account is open, it is very popular to trade online. Some brokers
provide mobiles with the required software already installed, which may be
more advanced than in many other countries, even the UK. However, retail
customers wishing to invest internationally have two options. They can either
invest through a Qualied Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) or move funds
to an international bank account and trade through this arrangement.
The Qualied Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) are local asset man-
agement companies that raise money from domestic investors and invest abroad.54
Local investors buy structured products from them. There are index funds, eq-
uity funds and xed income funds, but investors cannot buy specic stock such
as Apple, Inc. The quota is $50,000 to invest per person per year. So, if you are
a couple with two children, you can invest up to $200,000 per year. If you move
your currency abroad, you can buy specic stocks and trade online, although
the same quote applies.
There is also a third option, according to CC amongst others. People physi-
cally bring large amounts of RMB to Hong Kong and open a brokerage account
there. Is it illegal but the law is not enforced. Moreover, there is a large under-
ground Chinese banking sector that can facilitate cash transfers.55 First, you tell
53National Social Security Fund (NSSF): http://www.ssf.gov.cn/Eng_Introduction/
54Qualied Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII): See China Knowledge for an overview
of the current institutional investors www.chinaknowledge.com/Finance/QDII.aspx
55China is a cash driven society. Cars are bought with cash and driven out of the showroom,
195
people in China what you need in terms of cash. You then go to Hong Kong and
the cash is given to you there. Subsequently, the cash is deducted against your
Chinese bank account.56 Lopez (2011) reports that the Chinese government
estimates that the underground banking system totals $400 billion. However,
Lopez quote Societe Generale economist Wei Yao, as estimating the gure to be
around $470 to $627 billion. Allen, Qian & Qian (2005) note that China dees
nance, law, institutions, and growth theory by experiencing high growth in
the private sector, despite weak banking and judicial frameworks. They suggest
that alternative nancing channels may partly explain this discrepancy.57
Qualied Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) are used by foreign indi-
viduals as they cannot invest directly in China.58 H-shares (Hong Kong) are
freely traded and not restricted in terms of market participation. SAFE (State
Administration of Foreign Exchange), which comes under the Central Bank,
awards quotas to big nancial institutions (such as Citi Bank, Morgan Stanley,
UBS etc.), commercial and investment banks. For example, Citi could be given
a $2 billion quota. It would then structure products around this allocation and
raise money in Europe and the US among retail investors.
Across Russia, India and China, it was often mentioned that local retail
investors were not skilled in the nancial markets and that they either followed
advise blindly or saw the stock market as a pure gamble. In the UK, the picture
is more nuanced. Interestingly, nancial sophistication may be very high in
the UK, according to IU . People speculate a lot on interest rates on their
mortgages. However, on the other hand, there is also spread bettingwhere
bets are place on nancial developments. It is basically a future. Nine out
of ten investors/speculators lose money on this, noted IU . Retail activism is
limited. Most retail investors do not even go to the AGMs anymore to make
their voices heard.
8.5.5 Suppliers
There would seem to be a good mixture of companies seeking to list. For
example smaller startup companies with venture capitalists involvement. SOEs
only list a small part of the company, which may relate to activism, suggested
DC , who continued by noting that shareholders have no say in the running of
these companies. Transparency is often an issue. State-owned companies will
tell you what they want to tell youaccording to BC . In the UK on the other
hand, the rules and regulations are evenly applied to all (issuing) companies.
By law, once a company seeks to list, it will need to be transparent. However,
there are issues. As CC noted, some things can be manipulated internally (e.g.,
sales), there is a bias in the judicial system, bias in auditors, a lot of biases to
turn a weak company into a fantastic looking company; hence I do not personally
noted CC . Credit is still not common.
56 Interviewee CC , 2011.
57 cf Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic (2008).
58Qualied Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII): See China Knowledge for an overview of
the current institutional investors: www.chinaknowledge.com/Finance/QFII.aspx
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invest in China,concluded CC .
8.5.6 Potential entrants
China still has highly regulated markets with regulatory barriers to entry. It is
very di¢ cult to get a banking or securities licence in China, although member-
ship of WTO in 2001 has helped open up the sectors.59 Potential entrants need
to deal with regulators and local governments for licences and it is determined
on a case-by-case basis, explained FC , depending on the type of licence and the
region. The stages for a foreign bank to enter China are as follows: First they
open a representative o¢ ce (which is mostly a symbolic entity in the country),
next a branch can be opened, followed by reaching certain trade/volume size,
then a Local Incorporated Bank Licencecan be obtained. Once a the general
licence is secured, you still need licences for all your products. It is very di¢ cult
to compete with local banks that have many branches, developed systems and
distribution channels. Local banks also have a huge retail base, so have access
to cheap funds. Foreign banks, on the other hand, have wholesale funding.
Moreover, state owned banks have considerable domestic market power. How-
ever, foreign entities are well placed for cross-border services in either direction,
which also ties in with London. Several interviewees note that London acts as
a global pool of expertise. The nancial or legal expert working on a project
may be based in London but their clients are based overseas.
China seems to be opening the market in stages after the WTO agreement,
realising that they need foreign expertise to bring their markets up to an in-
ternational standard, observed CC . As mentioned in Chapter 6, the Shanghai
Stock Exchange is planning to launch an International Sector, so international
companies can list in China. HSBC may be the rst to list, suggested DC . The
stock exchange tried to launch the sector in 2011 but it has now been postponed
and is expected to happen in 2012. The motivation for this project is to bring
in foreign companies to improve corporate governance locally.
Chinese consumers tend to trust well-known foreign entities more as they
assume that international companies are following the rules and regulations.
People view foreign brands as better, but advertisement is needed, as CC
observed. This perception extends to basic necessities as well. After the con-
taminated milk powder scandal, middle-class families buy baby milk powder
directly in Japan, Hong Kong or Singapore now. Still, the educated middle-
classes is smaller in China than in India and, as a result, it is projected that
India will grow more over the next 20 years, due to the growth fulled by their
middle class consumers.60
International product penetration is currently focused on the rst tier cities:
Beijing, Shanghai, Dongguan and Shenzhen. Later, by the second tier cities will
be the focus. They are also developing at a fast rate, noted CC .
59See e.g. Lin, Cai & Li (2005).
60See Bhalla (2007) for a comparative study on the Indian and Chinese middle classes.
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For domestic individual retail investors it is very straightforward to partake
in the equity market. As DC noted, there are more than one hundred brokerage
rms in China now and you will see their signs on most streets.
Although large Chinese cities have embraced Western goods and brands, the
stock exchanges are still closed to foreign companies wishing to list in mainland
China. As a result, the Chinese equity market is still driven by local players and
the state. The UK, in contrast, is famously open to foreign talent and businesses
and it has welcomed foreign companies seeking liquidity and an international
prole to the LSE. Especially AIM has proven a success with foreign (e.g.,
Russian) entities.
8.6 Conclusion
China has come a long way over the past 30 years in terms of both economic
and social changes. The socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics
has resulted in an amalgamation of cultures and value systems. The nexus of
power is still Beijing but it must become increasingly di¢ cult to balance this
unique system.
China has benetted immensely from manufacturing of low value added ex-
port goods over the past decades. Joint ventures with foreign companies have
provided a signicant inow of technology, know-how, ideas and foreign talent
and moving workers from agriculture into manufacturing netted considerable
productivity gains. However, in the future China will need to rely more on
knowledge intensive sectors. It will need to innovate more as it will has ex-
hausted its options to easily promote growth. Today, Chinas business environ-
ment is a facsimile of the Western business model. The framework is in place
but the substance is missing. It will need to profoundly change its approach
to corporate governance. Transparency and accountability will need form an
integral part of this process.
The latest ve year plan endeavours to rebalance the economy more toward
domestic demand driven growth and to address some of the inequalities that
have arisen over the past decades through inclusive growth initiatives. The
Chinese government has become more proactive in punishing corruption and
information is owing more freely within the country. However, to move to the
next stage of development may prove more di¢ cult for the country.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The 2008 global nancial crisis highlighted the interconnectedness of nancial
markets across the world, it reminded us of the fragility of the nancial sys-
tems as we witnessed unprecedented market volatility and, as Stiglitz (2010)
notes, it exposed shortsighted and risky corporate behaviour.1 This thesis is
concerned with the e¢ cacy of markets and it uses global IPO underpricing data
as a barometer for corporate governance failure. Part II of this thesis was a
quantitative data analysis, which notably identied Russia, India and China
as outliers in the IPO data set.2 Part II also identied a number of variables
that inuence cross-country IPO underpricing. This was accomplished by using
exploratory data analysis and econometric modelling. As this thesis made use
of the multiple method approach, where qualitative and quantitative analyses
are combined in synergy, the qualitative analysis in Part III built-upon and ex-
tended the framework established through the quantitative analysis (Part II) by
further exploring the variables on the ground in Russia, India and China. The
eldwork made use of four key overarching sections: globalisation, corporate
governance, institutional structure and competition strategy in Russia, India
and China. This comparative work was subsequently benchmarked against the
UK.
The benet of using a multi-methods approach can be summarised as follows:
With a multi-methods approach, the limitations of one method can be overcome
through the use of another(Buchanan, Chai & Deakin, 2012:ch 2). The analysis
carried out in Part II of the thesis provided us with a number of variables that
on a cross-country level related to corporate governance within an economic,
demographic and institutional framework. However, to more fully understand
the specic impact of the variables on corporate governance practises in Russia,
India and China it is necessary to conduct eldwork in these countries.
1See e.g. Kishan & Kearns (2011) on record market volatility in the US market.
2 IPO data obtained from Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2008).
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9.1 Overview and key ndings of Thesis: Chap-
ters 2-8
Chapter 2 of the thesis reviewed some key literature on market e¢ ciency and
corporate governance. The market e¢ ciency literature posits that arbitrage
should counteract market ine¢ ciencies. E¢ cient markets should impose pricing
discipline on equity. However, that is not to say that all markets are e¢ cient.
La¤ont & Maskins (1990) paper, for example, which analyses imperfect compe-
tition and the e¢ cient market hypothesis (EMH), suggests that insider trading
can render markets ine¢ cient. Interviewees in both Russia and China noted that
insider trading is common in these countries. Moreover, Malkiel (2006) specif-
ically argues that China is not an e¢ cient market. In India insider trading
was not highlighted as an important issue; nonetheless, India has experienced a
number of trading scandals after the early 1990s liberalisation of the nancial
markets and it is still a somewhat immature market.
Corporate governance, going back to Adam Smith (1776) and the inception
of agency problems, still remains an important area of research. The 2008 nan-
cial crisis exposed poor corporate governance practises in even the most mature
and developed of nancial markets, namely, the US and the UK. However, the
crisis was not restricted to only mature nancial markets. As the world has be-
come increasingly globalised and interconnected, the nancial crisis spilled over
into the emerging markets. The devastating e¤ect of this occurrence was most
evident in Russia (Moscow), where capital ight in 2008 resulted in a signicant
loss of jobs in the nancial sector, property prices fell and the retail market
contracted. India and China also experienced the repercussions of the global
nancial crisis in their nancial markets, however, both countries were some-
what insulated from the shock. India still employs protectionistic policies in its
nancial sector, limiting foreign participation. Moreover, mainland Chinas A-
share market is heavily restricted to foreign investors and is directly controlled
by the Chinese government. Yet both countries experienced a contraction of
their equity markets as, for example, exports dropped and external corporate
borrowing channels were reduced. Moving forward in the wake of the crisis,
corporate governance issues will undoubtedly remain high on the policy agenda.
However, as we are seeing increased globalisation and the emergence of more
multinational companies (often through joint ventures (JVs) in Russia, India
and China), the question remains as to whether the next phase of corporate
governance will become a race to the bottomor a race to the topin coun-
try convergence. Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu (2004) suggest that cross-country
competitive forces may result in a race to the bottom, where managers seek
countries with weak corporate governance which would allow them to pursue
their own agenda. On the other hand, Hansmann and Kraakmans (2001) argue
that the shareholder-oriented model is becoming the norm and that this model
will have spillover e¤ects into policy making, which in turn will ensure that cor-
porate governance will converge on this model in law making and in practice.
However, Clarke (2011) nds that despite repeated warnings about poor corpo-
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rate governance practises in Russia and China, Western companies continue to
invest in these countries. It may be that if the risk premium is su¢ ciently high,
poor corporate governance practises are not a primary concern when companies
look to expand internationally.
In covering some of the key corporate governance literature, Chapter 2 also
provided us with a brief analytical framework which can be applied to the eld-
work ndings in Russia, India, China and United Kingdom. Chapter 2 considers
some of the functions and ideals associated with corporate social responsibility
(CSR), and it outline internal and external corporate governance controls. How-
ever, as we will discover and discuss in Part III of the thesis, the best practises
and corporate governance dynamics outlined in Chapter 2 do not always apply
on the ground. For example, as covered in Chapter 6, The Russian Bear, CSR
may be used as a front for asset stripping.
Chapter 3 marked the start of Part II of the thesis, which encapsulates the
quantitative analysis. In particular, Chapter 3 reviewed some key empirical
and theoretical literature contributions to IPO underpricing. The emphasis,
reecting the thesis as a whole, is on the empirical evidence. To recall, IPO un-
derpricing (Undpri) is normally calculated as the percentage di¤erence between
the price the issuing company sells at (the o¤er price) and the following market
price (normally taken as the share price after one day of trading).3
When looking at IPO pricing behaviour over an extended period in the
US, Ritters (2012) divides the 1980 to 2011 time period into the sub-periods
1980-1989, 1990-1998, 1999-2000 and 2000-2011. For these subperiods, IPO un-
derpricing was found at 6.1 percent, 13.0 percent, 51.4 percent and 11.5 percent,
respectively. These price uctuations (with the exception of the 1999-2000 pe-
riod) place the US among the countries with modest average IPO underpricing,
as will become evident in Chapter 4. We in fact argue, in Chapter 4, that
the US with deep, mature and robust markets may provide us with an interna-
tional benchmark. The benchmark can serve as an indicator against which other
country results can be examined to determine whether they are experiencing ab-
normal IPO pricing. However, the 1999-2000 period proved to be exceptional,
in terms of US IPO underpricing. The dot-com bubble of 1999-2000 saw exces-
sive IPO underpricing. Chapter 3 provides a number of explanations why this
happened. We conclude on the basis of the reviewed literature that it may have
been the perfect storm, caused by investment banks becaming less careful in
pricing IPOs in the pursuit of higher prots, at the same time as a number of
schemes were introduced that gave banks and managers incentives to purpose-
fully underprice the issues. Moreover, retail investors may have driven up the
prices in the secondary market due to overenthusiastic buying behaviour.
Chapter 3 also highlighted the potential agency problems that exist between
the issuing company, the investment bank and the investors. This relationship
was explored further within the bookbuilding pricing mechanism framework.
Bookbuilding is today the most commonly used IPO mechanism, according to
3Underpricing is calculated as Undpri = (Issue price = Closing price of first day of
trading)  100:
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Jagannathan & Sherman (2006), and is used in Russia, India, China and the UK.
However, the dynamics governing this widely used tool are complex and open to
manipulation. The process most certainly relies on strong corporate governance
standards and transparency to ensure fairness for all participants. We discussed
the motivations of the di¤erent agents in the IPO markets, and noted that Rus-
sia, India and China all struggle with ensuring transparency during and after
the IPO process. Moreover, across all three countries, retail investors are in
general lacking the skills to make informed investment decisions, which places
more emphasis on the ethical behaviour of mediators (e.g., brokers). However,
notwithstanding this, as we see ever increasingly complex derivatives and nan-
cial instruments that even nancial experts do not fully understand, investors
in the UK may not fully appreciate the risk that they undertake when entering
the nancial markets either. These issues were discussed in more depth in Part
III. Considerations on the motivation and skills of the market participants led
into our review of three key theoretical asymmetric information models (Rock
(1986), Beatty & Ritter (1986) and Chowdhry & Nanda (1996)). In this stylised
environment we discussed the paramount role of information ows in the pricing
of IPOs. Moreover, the theoretical framework provided us with a tool to better
assess the noisynancial markets we will discuss in more detail in Part III.
Chapter 4, which is an exploratory data analysis (EDA), examined Loughran,
Ritter & Rydqvists (2008) country IPO average underpricing data set and re-
lates it to Drehers (2006) KOF Index of Globalization.4 However, rstly we
focused solely on the average IPO underpricing data. From Table 4.1 it was pos-
sible to make a number of observations in regard to country groupings and IPO
activity level. For example, it was clear to see that Russia (4.2 percent for 1999-
2006) on one hand, with India (92.7 percent for 1990-2007) and China (164.5
percent for 1990-2005) on the other hand, represent the two extreme ends of the
underpricing scale. This is a key observation for this thesis. We argued that
average underpricing at both ends of the scale represent market ine¢ ciencies in
the allocation of resources. It is intriguing why these three countries, which have
a number of things in common (e.g., transiting from socialistic/Marxist regimes,
they are all large emerging economies, with immature nancial markets), are
seemingly driven by di¤erent market dynamics and corporate governance issues.
In this context we carried out further country analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, to
identify a number of variables that inuence cross-country IPO underpricing.
These variables in turn provided the basis for the eldwork (carried out in Rus-
sia, India and China, with benchmarking against the UK) in Part III of the
thesis.
We also noted in Chapter 4 that moderate underpricing may in fact be ef-
cient. Investors looking to invest in IPOs will require to be compensated for
asymmetric information (as discussed in Chapter 3) and risk bearing (e.g., liq-
uidity risk). We posit that a possible international benchmark for e¢ cient
underpricing may arguably be found at the US (16.9 percent average under-
4See for example Hoaglin, Mosteller & Tukey (1983) and Martinez, Martinez & Solka (2010)
on important contributions to the EDA literature.
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pricing) and the UK (16.8 percent average underpricing) data points, which are
clustered together in the middle of the barchart (Figure 4.1).
Subsequently, we examined the KOF Index of Globalization in relation to
average IPO underpricing. The EDA found that Iran was an outlier, which
may be explained by the increased isolation the country has experienced after
in began to pursue an independent nuclear programme.5 As a result, Iran was
dropped from the country sample as we constructed a simple regression model,
with IPO underpricing (Undpri) as the right hand variable and the KOF In-
dex of Globalization (GloIndex ) as the left hand variable. The regression found
that there is a statistically signicant negative correlation between IPO under-
pricing and globalisation. In other words, as a country becomes increasingly
connected to the wider global community (measured in the KOF Index through
economic, social and political factors), it should experience a decline in average
IPO underpricing. We argue that globalisation can be used as a proxy for in-
creased transparency, higher accountability and improved corporate governance
standards. As such, a negative correlation between globalisation and IPO un-
derpricing may not be unexpected. This paper is, to the best of our knowledge,
the rst study to explicitly demonstrate this relationship. The globalisation
index variable was left out of the subsequent econometric modelling of Chapter
5. As the model was expanded in Chapter 5 to include economic, demographic
and institutional factors, the globalisation variable was swamped by other more
dominating factors and ultimately fell out of statistical signicance. It is a
well know phenomenon that some factors (classically, demographic variables)
can crowd out other variables. However, that is not to say that globalisation
is not an important variable in explaining IPO underpricing. Fortunately as
we constructed this thesis around the multi-method approach, we were able to
incorporate globalisation into the analysis carried out in Part III. In fact, it was
one of the four key sections that in their totality formed the semi-structured in-
terview agenda which was covered in Russia (Moscow), India (Mumbai), China
(Shanghai) and benchmarked against the UK (London).
Moreover, we also made use of kernel density estimates to examine poten-
tial di¤erences in regional IPO underpricing behaviour. Most importantly the
analysis suggested that both Asia and Europe were quite di¤erent from the over-
all group of countries. The Asian underpricing were generally found to be at
the higher end of the underpricing scale, while the European underpricing dis-
tribution was found to be at the lower end of the scale. It was more di¢ cult to
draw conclusions on the distributions of the other regions. Although the kernel
density estimates made for interesting reading, they did not tell us whether the
distributions were statistically signicantly di¤erent. To achieve this objective,
we used a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The test strongly suggested
that both Asia and Europe displayed signicantly di¤erent underpricing distri-
butions to that of the sample in general. These ndings were also in accordance
with the market characteristics that we explored and discussed in Part III. Eu-
rope consists of relatively mature and developed markets, whereas the Asian
5See for example Katzman (2009) on the USs e¤orts to isolate Iran from 1995 and onwards.
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markets on the whole are still developing.
Chapter 5, the econometric modelling chapter, marked the last of the quanti-
tative analysis. The econometric model established that economic, demographic
and institutional variables inuence cross-country IPO underpricing. In partic-
ular we determined that six variables were statistically and economically signif-
icant in inuencing IPO cross-country underpricing.
The two economic explanatory variables were PSD and MCG. The private
sector development (PSD) variable, domestic credit extended to the private
sector, was found to be positively correlated with underpricing (Undpri). As
growth is being stimulated through the injection of credit, nancial markets
will expand and underpricing will become more pronounced. This relationship
may partly reect the market dynamics in India and China. Both countries
have displayed impressive growth gures, but at the same time also experienced
signicant IPO underpricing. Market value growth (MCG), the ratio of nominal
market value in 2001 to the market value in 1991, is found to be negatively
correlated with UndPri. This would suggest that stronger market growth should
be associated with lower underpricing. This may not be the case, as exemplied
by the expansion of nancial markets in Brazil, India and China. The US dot-
com bubble, discussed in Chapter 3, also displayed considerable underpricing
during a period of high growth. As a result, we argued that this correlation may
reect the European, the US and their satellite markets pricing data. These
markets experienced signicant (and stable) growth during the 1990s but at
the same time avoided excessive IPO underpricing. Notwithstanding this, with
an elasticity of -0.0764 calibrated for MCG, it displays the lowest elasticity in
the regression model, which would indicate it is the least e¤ective underpricing
policy tool amongst the examined variables.
The demographic explanatory variable used in this regression model, was
country population (Pop). This explanatory variable is positively correlated
with IPO underpricing. In other words, countries with larger populations are
associated with more pronounced underpricing. China and India both exempli-
ed this relationship well, as they were to be found at the top of both the sample
of average underpricing scale and they both also have the highest population
gures in the world. Russia with around 143 million inhabitants, should also dis-
play signicant underpricing according to this explanatory variable. However,
this was of course not the case, which only increased the Russian pricing enigma
and again highlighted the benets of undertaking eldwork to complement and
expand the quantitative analysis. We argued that the population size may be
related to the degree of transparency in a country since larger populations are
more complex to manage. This may be the case and the eldwork in Part III
allowed us to form a more full understanding of these issues.
The institutional explanatory variables used in this regression model were
FreqRep, MCR and FreeAltCur. The frequency of interim corporate reports
(FreqRep) also captured the number disclosed items and consolidation of in-
terim reports. This explanatory variable was negatively correlated with IPO
underpricing. As a country increases its accounting standards and in doing so
facilitates transparency and reduces asymmetric information in the markets, it
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should expect to see a decline in IPO underpricing. Minimum capital require-
ment as a percentage of GNI per capita to start a business (MCR) is here seen
as a proxy for barriers to entry. This explanatory variable was found to be posi-
tively correlated with underpricing. We argued that higher barriers to entry may
lead to more collusion between incumbent agents, which in turn may translate
into higher underpricing. Freedom to use alternative currencies (FreeAltCur)
was used as a proxy for the availability of money in the economy, the openness
and e¢ ciency of an economy. FreeAltCur was found to be negatively correlated
with IPO underpricing. As an economy becomes increasingly open, it can for
example adapt more e¢ cient corporate governance controls.
The three highest calibrated elasticities were from MCR, PSD and FreqRep.
That indicated that in terms of inuencing country IPO underpricing, policy
makers would nd the most leverage from using these three variables. However,
all six variables have a direct inuence on IPO underpricing and can be used as
valid policy tools.
However, to more fully understand the dynamics behind the variables dis-
cussed in Chapter 4 and 5 and to investigate how they specically apply to
Russia, India and China, with benchmarking against the UK, it was necessary
to conduct eldwork in each of their nancial centres, that is, in Moscow, Mum-
bai, Shanghai and London. As we outlined in Chapter 1, this was in accordance
with the mixed method approach. In short, the quantitative analysis carried out
in Part II of the thesis, gave rise to and substantiated the qualitative analysis
carried out in Part III.
Chapter 6, The Russian Bear, was the rst of the three chapters outlining
the eldwork ndings. In this Chapter found that Russia is facing signicant
corporate governance and transparence issues. Almost all large privately owned
companies are held o¤shore and the ownership structure is often not publicly
known. According to the Russian investment bank, VTB Capital, the two
primary reasons for this arrangement is to obtain greater legal protection and
obscure the ownership structure. The lack of rule of law in Russia was one of the
main concerns raised by interviewees. As one interviewee noted, it is di¢ cult
to be an honest auditor in a corrupt environment. However, this statement can
arguably be extended to any business sector. As such, the onus is companies
to choose their business partners with great care. Moreover, and also as a
comment on the English legal system, when companies invest into Russia, the
sale and purchase agreements are often drafted under the English law structure
(and London courts are used to settle disputes). The eldwork also highlighted
the benet of going behind the guresby extending the quantitative analysis.
For example, interviewees noted that Russian inward FDI is often disguised
domestic funds returning to the country.
However, there were also some encouraging corporate governance signs in
Russia. There is an increased focused on the importance of independent di-
rectors (with some state initiatives). Although, for now, most directors may
be independent in name only, it is a step in the right direction. In addition,
politicians were saying all the right thingsaccording to interviewees, but in-
terviewees were waiting to see concrete action. However, as long as Russia,
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the worlds largest oil producer today, can balance its state budget through oil
revenues, there seems to be little impetus to implement substantial economic
reforms that can move Russia away from its economys dependence on oil.
We observed in Chapter 4 that the Russian IPO market (4.2 percent for
1999-2006) was notable for its lack of activity and its very modest underpricing
level. The Russian pricing behaviour did not conform with the notion that, in
an e¢ cient market, investors should be rewarded according to the level of risk
they were willing to incorporate into their portfolio. As documented, Russian
corporate governance issues are severe and yet investors earned an average of
4.2 percent on IPOs during the period 1999 to 2006. This thesis argued that
Russias oil fortune, coupled with its managed democracy, has to some extent
sidelined traditional market forces. The Russian elite, who are the ultimate
owners of issuing companies, are not dependent on nancial markets, rather
they rely on personal connections.
Chapter 7, The Indian Tiger, found that the Indian government was su¤ering
from signicant inertia. A number of high-prole political corruption scandals,
on both local and national levels, combined with a fragile government coalition,
has somewhat paralysed the decision process of the country. India has trans-
formed signicantly since its gradualismreform programme was introduced in
the early 1990s (in sharp contrast to the Russian shock therapy approach).
India now has a relatively free press that plays an active part in functioning
as part of the external corporate governance mechanism. Moreover, India re-
cently opened the door more to the entry of foreign retailers into India, which
was found to be another encouraging development. However, Chapter 7 found
that the state is still signicantly interfering with market forces, for instance
by imposing sector lending requirements on banks. Interestingly, although the
Indian nancial regulators signicantly restrict the market participants and im-
pose state objectives on the industry, it was found that they were held in high
esteem by market participants. It was evident from the analysis carried out
in Chapter 7 that India still has some way to go before it has fully embraced
the concept of a free market economy. India still to some extend empowers the
license-permit-quota raj(Rodrik & Subramanian, 2004:3).
The Indian IPO market experienced signicant underpricing, 92.7 percent on
average, from 1990 to 2007. Based on the eldwork evidence, this thesis would
argue that the pronounced mispricing of the IPOs may be the result of an
immature, inexperienced and somewhat thinly traded IPO market during that
period. Although India has an impressive number of listed companies, many
are not genuinely traded companies. They were vanity listings - something that
used to be a common motivation behind listings in London, according to one
senior nance interviewee in the UK.
Chapter 8, The Chinese Dragon, found that China has transformed signi-
cantly over the past 30 years, both economically and socially. However, it has
been on its own conditions. The socialist market economy with Chinese charac-
teristicshas proven immensely e¤ective in generating signicant and consistent
growth over a long period. However, as noted in Chapter 8, some observers
are sceptical about the o¢ cial Chinese growth gures. Notwithstanding this,
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the transformation of the country has been rapid and profound. Beijing is the
centre of power in China, however, rules and regulations are decisively open to
interpretation. Chapter 8 found that this lack of clarity empowers local o¢ -
cials as they are tasked with interpreting the law. As one interviewee noted in
Chapter 8: "Interpretation of law is always very murky. Everything is grey."
Chapter 8 also found that China has benetted immensely from its manu-
facturing base over the past decades. China has harvested technology and ideas
through joint ventures with Western companies and it has recorded signicant
productivity gains by moving workers from the agriculture sector into manu-
facturing. However, in the future the country will need to innovate to secure
future stable growth. Chapter 8 concluded that today the Chinese business en-
vironment is a facsimile of the Western business/corporate governance model.
The framework is in place, but it is far from functioning. As the economy will
eventually experience a slowdown in growth (be it a crash or a soft landing),
China will have to develop a more sustainable corporate governance approach.
It will need to promote transparency and signicantly increase accountability
as it moves toward a functioning corporate governance system.
Like India, China still makes use of the ve year plan. Interviewees noted
that the plan brings some certainty to the future trajectory of the country, as it
is a publicly available document. Chapter 8 found that the current ve year plan
is aiming to rebalance the economy towards domestic demand driven growth and
to promote inclusive growth. It will be a signicant challenge to reengineer the
Chinese economy in the endeavour to achieve the new growth agenda. Chapter 8
also found that Chinese government has become more proactive in its attempts
to reduce corruption. However, it will not be an easy task to accomplish change
in this area. As interviewees noted in China, corruption may not be seen as
ethically wrong by many locals.
The mainland China IPO market experienced the most pronounced degree of
underpricing in the country sample, with average underpricing of 164.5 percent
from 1990 to 2005. Based on the eldwork evidence, this thesis posited that it
may be partly explained by government intervention. The Chinese government
directly controls the ow of new companies onto the stock exchanges (IPOs),
like a tap. Moreover, the government, through the nancial regulators, also has
to approve the o¤er price. It may be that the signicant underpricing arose
as a result of the restricted ow of companies, articially set IPO prices (not
necessarily demand based) and overenthusiastic retail investors who saw the
participation in (often SOEs i.e., the state) IPOs as a safe betno matter the
price.
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9.2 Potential Research Extensions
In 2001, Jim ONeill, Head of Global Economic Research at Goldman Sachs,
published a report titled Building Better Global Economic BRICs. This report
marked the inception of the BRIC country grouping (Brazil, Russia, India and
China). The report emphasised the signicant size of the four economies and
their considerable growth potential. On this basis the report concluded that
policymaking forums (e.g., the G7) should include these economies. Moreover,
the OECD produce research and policy recommendations on the BRIICS (where
Indonesia and South Africa are included).6
This thesis focused on Russia, India and China, due to their somewhat sim-
ilar past market forms but di¤erent growth trajectories according to their re-
spective average IPO underpricing performance. However, as noted in Chapter
4, Brazil with 48.7 percent IPO underpricing (1979 - 2006) is only three coun-
tries removed from India in Table 4.1. Despite not sharing the socialist/Marxist
backgrounds of the countries examined in this thesis, it would be very interest-
ing to extend this research framework to include Brazil. Sally (2009) notes that
Brazil since the mid-1990s has prioritised macroeconomic stability over trade
liberalisation and attracting FDI. As Brazil becomes more integrated into the
world economy, its corporate governance standards will become increasingly im-
portant to the wider world community. The research framework of this thesis
could readily serve this objective.
As we experience increased globalisation and emerging markets become more
outward looking, improved corporate governance standards across the world are
arguably required to ensure that investors can make informed buying decisions.
This applies equally to investors looking to invest directly in overseas markets as
it does to individuals looking to buy into the FTSE 100. Finance and business
have become global. Undoubtedly, caveat emptor will remain an essential re-
quirement in any nancial market, but corporate governance policies will have
to facilitate increased transparency and accountability across both developed
and emerging markets.7 A corporate governance paradigm shift is required
to ensure sustainable and inclusive growth. However, this applies not only in
emerging markets, but as recent events have illustrated in the US and UK, even
the paragon markets of nance will need to reexamine their corporate gover-
nance framework. Indeed, it would seem that the lessons that should have been
learnt from the excessive risk taking behaviour leading up to the 2008 crisis have
at present not been learnt.
6See for example Sallys (2009) OECD report on Globalisation and the Political Economy
of Trade Liberalisation in the BRIICS.
7Caveat emptor is here used in its wider meaning, not as a legal term.
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SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (SSI 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(WHITE)  FRONTPIECE 
 
 
Semi-structured interview agenda 
 
 
Name of the interviewer:……………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Interviewee code:……………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Date of the interview:…………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Time interview started:………………………………………………………………... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(WHITE)  PRE-AMBLE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[The content of this pre-amble should be explained to the interviewee] 
 
 
 
Pre-amble 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this interview. Your information will be treated 
in the strictest of confidence and I will not attribute any comments to specific named 
individuals, unless I have their specific approval. This interview will have some 
structure to it, as I have a pre-set number of areas that I would like to cover with you.  
These areas all cover aspects surrounding your country’s position within the wider 
global context.  
 
Scotland, with for example Adam Smith and Andrew Carnegie, has a long and 
distinguished record in being at the forefront of market analysis. This work will 
endeavour to build on this knowledge. 
   
Where ever possible please provide quantitative backing to any statement you make. 
This interview is broken down into subsections, with a number of headings. To give 
you a general idea of the outline of this interview, please consult the provided agenda.   
 
Please note that you are free to terminate this interview at any stage or decline to 
comment on any questions, if so desired.  
 
[Hand respondent the agenda outline overleaf] 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(WHITE)  AGENDA OUTLINE: RESPONDENT’S COPY 
 
Agenda outline 
 
1 Globalisation  
1.1 Economic Effects on Market Functions  
1.1.1 Relative Importance of Actual Flows 
1.1.2 Relative Importance of Restrictions 
1.2 Social Effects on Market Functions 
1.2.1 Relative Importance of Personal Contact 
1.2.2 Relative Importance of Information Flows 
1.2.3 Relative Importance of Cultural Proximity 
1.3 Political Effects on Market Functions 
       
2 Corporate Governance  
2.1 Stakeholders 
2.1.1 Internal Stakeholders 
2.1.2 External Stakeholders        
2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility 
2.3 Business Ethics 
2.4 Enforcement & Control 
2.5 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
2.6 Mergers and Acquisitions and Initial Public Offerings   
 
3 Institutional Structure 
3.1 Market Influence by the State  
3.2 Regulatory bodies  
3.3 Stock Exchanges 
3.4 Market Maturity 
 
4 Competitive Strategy 
4.1 Rivalry 
4.1.1 Banking Sectors  
4.1.2 Auditor Sector  
4.1.3 Brokerage Sector 
4.2 Customers 
4.2.1 Institutional Investors (dominant and/or active) 
4.2.2 Retail Investors (process to invest in the markets?)  
4.3 Suppliers (issuing companies) 
4.4 Potential entrants   
4.4.1 Investment Banks, Auditors and Brokers     
4.4.2 Issuing companies  
4.4.3 Investors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (WHITE)  AGENDA OUTLINE: INTERVIEWER’S COPY 
 
Agenda outline 
 
1 Globalisation  
1.1 Economic Effects on Market Functions  
1.1.1 Relative Importance of Actual Flows 
1.1.2 Relative Importance of Restrictions 
1.2 Social Effects on Market Functions 
1.2.1 Relative Importance of Personal Contact 
1.2.2 Relative Importance of Information Flows 
1.2.3 Relative Importance of Cultural Proximity 
1.3 Political Effects on Market Functions 
       
2 Corporate Governance  
2.1 Stakeholders 
2.1.1 Internal Stakeholders 
2.1.2 External Stakeholders        
2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility 
2.3 Business Ethics 
2.4 Enforcement & Control 
2.5 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
2.6 Mergers and Acquisitions and Initial Public Offerings   
 
3 Institutional Structure 
3.1 Market Influence by the State  
3.2 Regulatory bodies  
3.3 Stock Exchanges 
3.4 Market Maturity 
 
4 Competitive Strategy 
4.1 Rivalry 
4.1.1 Banking Sectors  
4.1.2 Auditor Sector  
4.1.3 Brokerage Sector 
4.2 Customers 
4.2.1 Institutional Investors (dominant and/or active) 
4.2.2 Retail Investors (process to invest in the markets?)  
4.3 Suppliers (issuing companies) 
4.4 Potential entrants   
4.4.1 Investment Banks, Auditors and Brokers     
4.4.2 Issuing companies  
4.4.3 Investors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(BLUE)  GLOBALISATION 
 
1 Globalisation  
   1.1 Economic Effects on Market Functions  
         1.1.1 Relative Importance of Actual Flows 
                  
      Probe on: 
                  Trade 
                  Foreign Direct Investment, flows  
                  Foreign Direct Investment, stocks  
                  Portfolio Investment  
                  Income Payments to Non-Nationals  
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(BLUE)  GLOBALISATION 
 
1.1 Economic Effects on Market Functions 
      1.1.2 Relative Importance of Restrictions 
          
      Probe on: 
      Hidden Import Barriers 
                  Mean Tariff Rate 
                  Taxes on International Trade  
                  Capital Account Restrictions 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(BLUE)  GLOBALISATION 
 
1.2 Social Effects on Market Functions 
      1.2.1 Relative Importance of Personal Contact 
                
      Probe on: 
                  Telephone Traffic 
                  Transfers  
                  International Tourism (abroad and domestically) 
                  Foreign Population  
                  International letters/emails  
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(BLUE)  GLOBALISATION 
       
1.2 Social Effects on Market Functions 
      1.2.2 Relative Importance of Information Flows 
                
      Probe on:                  
                  Internet Users  
                  Television 
                  Trade in Newspapers  
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(BLUE)  GLOBALISATION 
 
1.2 Social Effects on Market Functions 
      1.2.3 Relative Importance of Cultural Proximity 
     
      Probe on:          
                  Growth of Foreign Retail Chains in General: 
                  e.g. Number of McDonald’s Restaurants  
                  e.g. Number of IKEAs 
                  e.g. Number of Apple Stores 
                  Trade in imported books  
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(BLUE)  GLOBALISATION 
 
1.3 Political Effects on Market Functions 
 
      Probe on: 
                  Embassies in Country 
                  Membership in International Organisations 
                  Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions 
                  International Treaties 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(PINK)  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2 Corporate Governance  
   2.1 Stakeholders 
         2.1.1 Internal Stakeholders 
    
      Probe on:                   
                  Employees (involvement in daily decisions and job prospects)    
                  Managers (accountability and job prospects)  
       Owners (structure, e.g., flat or hierarchal) 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(PINK)  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1 Stakeholders 
      2.1.2 External Stakeholders          
          
      Probe on:                  
                  Customers (consumer protection) 
                  Suppliers (legal protection) 
                  Lenders/Creditors (legal protection) 
                  Unions (influence)             
                  Government (influence) 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(PINK)  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility 
       
      Probe on:      
                  Recruitment/Retention of staff 
                  Risk Management (e.g., environmental or corporate behaviour issues)  
                  Brand Differentiation (e.g., competitive advantage) 
                  License to Operate (e.g., promote diversity or the environment)             
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(PINK)  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.3 Business Ethics 
       
      Probe on:       
                  Are corporate scandals publicised and discussed?  
                  Some companies seek competitive advantages through unethical means?  
                  Is the state proactive in reducing this behaviour? 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(PINK)  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.4 Enforcement & Control 
       
      Probe on:      
                  Internal Corporate Governance Controls (e.g., audits) 
                  External Corporate Governance Controls (e.g., divulging financial  
                  statements, media scrutiny and managerial labour market vs. golden   
                  parachutes) 
                  Enforcement 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes 
 
 
 
 
 
(PINK)  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.5 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
       
      Probe on:         
                  Board Composition 
                  Remuneration/Compensation 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(PINK)  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.6 Mergers and Acquisitions and Initial Public Offerings   
       
      Probe on:         
      Frequency 
      Motivation (e.g., asset raids, diversification, complementary or empire   
      building)  
      Takeover Defences (e.g. firm/state level: poison pill, golden parachute,   
      supermajority rules, staggered boards/freeze-out, fair price, poison pill   
      endorsement laws, control share acquisition and constituency) 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(GREEN) INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
3 Institutional Structure 
   3.1 Market Influence by the State  
       
      Probe on:                   
                  Is market regulation a topical political issue? 
      Proactive or reactive in regulating the markets? 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(GREEN) INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
3.2 Regulatory Bodies 
  
      Probe on: 
      (Seen as) Independent? 
                  Operate by law or voluntary code of conduct?  
                  Power to prosecute criminal or civil cases?   
                  Seen as a positive force by market participants?   
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(GREEN) INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
3.3 Stock Exchanges 
  
      Probe on: 
      Seen as credible entities? Certification value? 
                  Openness to entry? 
                  Disseminating information fairly/publically?    
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(GREEN) INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
3.4 Market Maturity 
  
      Probe on: 
                  Market efficiency (Is the market efficient? Why and how? e.g., Pareto   
                  efficient, consumer/producer surplus driven or arbitrage-free condition?)   
                  Companies listings (e.g., maturity, size, sector and nationality)      
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(YELLOW) COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
 
4 COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
   4.1 Rivalry 
      4.1.1 Banking Sectors  
       
      Probe on: 
                  Degree of competitiveness within the Investment Bank sector?  
                  Degree of competitiveness within the Retail Bank Sector? 
                  Conflict of interest issues? (e.g., sell side analysts recommendations) 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 (YELLOW) COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
 
4.1 Rivalry 
      4.1.2 Auditor Sector 
       
      Probe on: 
                  Degree of competitiveness within the Auditing sector? 
                  Seen as independent to audited company?  
                  Conflict of interest issues? (e.g., provide consulting services to the same   
                   clients) 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(YELLOW) COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
 
4.1 Rivalry 
      4.1.3 Brokerage Sector 
       
      Probe on: 
      Degree of competitiveness within the Brokerage sector? 
                  Affiliations (independent, retail or investment side)    
                  Conflict of interest issues? (e.g., serve/owned by a specific bank) 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(YELLOW) COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
 
4.2 Customers 
      4.2.1 Institutional Investors (dominant and/or active) 
                
      Probe on: 
                  Predominant entities?  
                  High profile in the markets? 
                  Trade on foreign exchanges?  
                  Activism? (Do they exercise their rights as shareholders?)    
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(YELLOW) COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
 
4.2 Customers 
4.2.2 Retail Investors (process to invest in the markets?)  
 
      Probe on:  
                  Primary way of interacting with the markets? 
                  General level of financial sophistication?   
                  Trade on foreign exchanges? 
                  Activism? (Do they exercise their rights as shareholders?)       
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(YELLOW) COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
 
4.3 Suppliers (issuing companies) 
 
      Probe on:  
                  Ownership structure?  
                  Transparency?  
                  Competitiveness in archiving listing?  
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(YELLOW) COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
 
4.4 Potential entrants   
      4.4.1 Investment Banks, Auditors and Brokers: 
 
      Probe on: 
                  Openness of the markets? (to domestic and foreign entities)  
                  Openness of the domestic participants? (to domestic and foreign entities) 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(YELLOW) COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
 
4.4 Potential entrants   
      4.4.2 Issuing companies  
 
      Probe on:  
                  Openness of the markets? (to domestic and foreign entities)  
                  Openness of the domestic participants? (to domestic and foreign entities) 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
(YELLOW) COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
 
4.4 Potential entrants   
      4.4.3 Investors 
 
      Probe on:  
                 Openness of the markets? (to domestic and foreign participants) 
Field notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary notes: 
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Semi-Structured Interview Agenda 
 
1 Globalisation  
 
1.1 Economic Effects on Market Functions  
         
      1.1.1 Relative Importance of Actual Flows 
               Probe on: 
                 Trade  
                 Foreign Direct Investment, flows  
                 Foreign Direct Investment, stocks  
                 Portfolio Investment  
                 Income Payments to Non-National  
 
      1.1.2 Relative Importance of Restrictions 
               Probe on: 
                 Hidden Import Barriers 
                 Mean Tariff Rate 
                 Taxes on International Trade  
                 Capital Account Restrictions 
 
1.2 Social Effects on Market Functions 
 
      1.2.1 Relative Importance of Personal Contact 
               Probe on: 
                 Telephone Traffic 
                 Transfers  
                 International Tourism (abroad and domestically) 
                 Foreign Population  
                 International letters/emails  
 
      1.2.2 Relative Importance of Information Flows 
               Probe on: 
                 Internet Users  
                 Television  
                 Trade in Newspapers  
 
      1.2.3 Relative Importance of Cultural Proximity 
    Probe on: 
      Growth of Foreign Retail Chains in General: 
                 e.g., Number of McDonald’s Restaurants  
                 e.g., Number of IKEAs  
      e.g., Number of Apple Stores  
                 Trade in imported books 
 
1.3 Political Effects on Market Functions 
      Probe on: 
        Embassies in Country 
        Membership in International Organisations 
        Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions 
        International Treaties 
 
2 Corporate Governance  
 
2.1 Stakeholders 
      
      2.1.1 Internal Stakeholders 
   Probe on: 
                 Employees (involvement in daily decisions and job prospects)    
                 Managers (accountability and job prospects)  
      Owners (structure, e.g., flat or hierarchal) 
 
      2.1.2 External Stakeholders          
               Probe on: 
                 Customers (consumer protection) 
      Suppliers (legal protection) 
                 Lenders/Creditors (legal protection) 
      Unions (influence) 
                 Government (influence) 
 
2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility 
      Probe on: 
        Recruitment/Retention of staff 
        Risk Management (e.g., environmental or corporate behaviour issues)  
        Brand Differentiation (e.g., competitive advantage) 
        License to Operate (e.g., promote diversity or the environment)     
 
2.3 Business Ethics 
      Probe on: 
        Are corporate scandals publicised and discussed?  
        Do some companies seek competitive advantages through unethical means?  
        Is the state proactive in reducing this behaviour? 
 
2.4 Enforcement & Control 
      Probe on:  
        Internal Corporate Governance Controls (e.g., audits) 
        External Corporate Governance Controls (e.g., divulging financial statements,  
        media scrutiny and managerial labour market vs. golden parachutes) 
        Enforcement 
        Moving towards international standards?  
 
2.5 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
      Probe on:         
        Board Composition 
        Remuneration/Compensation 
 
2.6 Mergers and Acquisitions and Initial Public Offerings   
      Probe on: 
        Frequency 
        Motivation (e.g., asset raids, diversification, complementary or empire building)  
        Takeover Defences  
 
 
3 Institutional Structure 
 
3.1 Market Influence by the State  
      Probe on: 
        Is market regulation a topical political issue? 
        Proactive or reactive in regulating the markets? 
 
3.2 Regulatory Bodies 
      Probe on: 
        (Seen as) Independent? 
        Operate by law or voluntary code of conduct?  
        Power to prosecute criminal or civil cases?   
        Seen as a positive force by market participants?   
 
3.3 Stock Exchanges 
      Probe on: 
        Seen as credible entities? Certification value? 
        Openness to entry? 
        Disseminating information fairly/publically?    
 
3.4 Market Maturity 
      Probe on: 
        Market efficiency (Is the market efficient? Why and how? e.g., Pareto efficient,     
        consumer/producer surplus driven or arbitrage-free condition?)   
        Companies listings (e.g. maturity, size, sector and nationality)      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Competitive Strategy 
 
4.1 Rivalry 
 
      4.1.1 Banking Sectors  
               Probe on: 
                 Degree of competitiveness within the Investment Bank sector?  
                 Degree of competitiveness within the Retail Bank Sector? 
                 Conflict of interest issues? (e.g., sell side analysts recommendations) 
 
      4.1.2 Auditor Sector  
               Probe on: 
                 Degree of competitiveness within the Auditing sector? 
                 Seen as independent to audited company?  
                 Conflict of interest issues? (e.g., provide consulting services to the same   
                                                             clients) 
 
      4.1.3 Brokerage Sector 
               Probe on: 
                 Degree of competitiveness within the Brokerage sector? 
                 Affiliations (independent, retail or investment side)    
                 Conflict of interest issues? (e.g., serve/owned by a specific bank) 
 
4.2 Customers 
 
      4.2.1 Institutional Investors (dominant and/or active) 
               Probe on: 
                 Predominant entities?  
                 High profile in the markets? 
                 Trade on foreign exchanges?  
                 Activism? (Do they exercise their rights as shareholders?)    
 
      4.2.2 Retail Investors (process to invest in the markets?)  
               Probe on:  
                 Primary way of interacting with the markets? 
                 General level of financial sophistication?   
                 Trade on foreign exchanges? 
                 Activism? (Do they exercise their rights as shareholders?)       
 
4.3 Suppliers (issuing companies) 
      Probe on:  
        Ownership structure?  
        Transparency?  
        Competitiveness in archiving listing?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Potential entrants   
 
      4.4.1 Investment Banks, Auditors and Brokers: 
               Probe on: 
                 Openness of the markets? (to domestic and foreign entities)  
                 Openness of the domestic participants? (to domestic and foreign entities) 
     
      4.4.2 Issuing companies  
               Probe on:  
                 Openness of the markets? (to domestic and foreign entities)  
                 Openness of the domestic participants? (to domestic and foreign entities) 
  
      4.4.3 Investors 
               Probe on:  
                 Openness of the markets? (to domestic and foreign participants) 
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       Form  FRA 1  
University of St Andrews 
 
 
Fieldwork Risk Assessment Form 
 
 
 
NOTES: 
1. The associated guidance notes should be read before completing this form. 
2. The completed form should be held in an accessible location within the School/Unit 
3. This form has been designed to be completed as a Microsoft Word document and is available 
at the following URL:  
http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/services/safety/webpages/forms/index.html 
 
 
 
1.   School/Unit School of Economics & Finance 
2.   Title of Project The underpricing of initial public 
offerings (IPOs): A cross-country analysis 
  
3.   Location of Fieldwork 
 
      (Indicate also any FCO warnings.) 
Russia (Moscow), India (Mumbai) and 
China (Shanghai) 
mentioned for all three destinations 
4.   Staffing at Fieldwork Site  
 
5.   Dates of Fieldwork: 
         Start 
 
         Finish (if known) 
Russia (Moscow): 5
th
 Aug – 20th Aug 
China (Shanghai): 16
th
 Sep – 3rd Oct 
India (Mumbai): 29
th
 Oct – 12th Nov 
 
6.   Brief Description of Fieldwork 
Please include in this section the objectives of the fieldwork and as much detail as is reasonably 
practicable about the work activity.  
 
My PhD is on the pricing of new company shares, also known as initial public offerings 
(IPOs). In particular, an IPO is when a company issues shares to the public for the first time 
and, in so doing, becomes a publicly traded entity. The initial pricing of these shares is 
fraught with uncertainty and conflict of interests.    
IPOs are on average underpriced, measured by the difference between the share price 
realised by the issuing company and the retailing price in the after-market.  
The conundrum of why Russia (4.2 percent underpriced), India (92.7 percent) and China 
(164.5 percent) differ greatly in the degree of underpricing of their IPOs, is a peculiarity that 
has remained unexplored. And yet it is crucial for potential investors to understand the 
market forces in these countries before committing funds.  
To further explore these issues, I will be conducting semi-structured interviews with 
finance professionals and regulators in these three countries. I will have some 
interviews booked before travelling to these destinations and hope to secure further 
interview opportunities through networking on location.  
 
7.   Who is at risk? Me 
School / UnitProject 
Number:  
 
..................................
...................... 
 
  8.   Hazards and Control Measures 
 
Some risks may remain after all reasonably practicable control measures have been implemented. 
These are the residual risks. Please list the residual risks in the left column. In the right column 
estimate the “degree of residual risk” using the scale provided in the guidance notes. 
 
Hazards of Fieldwork 
Activities 
(Please list main hazards below) 
Control Measures to eliminate or 
minimise the risks of the hazards 
Residual 
Risk 
Number 
(1-36) 
 
Transportation 
 
Personal safety 
 
 
Illness  
 
 
Only use licensed taxies and 
busses   
Stay in reputable hotels and 
not move around the cities at 
night 
Take out comprehensive travel 
insurance and ensure my  
vaccinations are up-to-date  
3-6 
 
3-6 
 
 
3-6 
 
 
9.   Emergency Actions  
      This section should detail the actions to be undertaken in the event of an emergency. 
 
Foreseeable Emergencies Predetermined Actions by 
Worker 
Predetermined 
Actions by 
Supervisor 
*(Serious) Accident  Seek treatment (and 
consult Danish Embassy)  
 
*(Serious) illness Ditto  
*Assault  Treatment, police and 
embassy 
 
*Lose passport Contact the police and 
Danish Embassy  
 
Lose credit cards/cash Keep spare cash in 
different location 
 
* Also info the university   
 
 
10.   Contacts 
 
Names of 
Participants in the 
Fieldwork 
Telephone  
(Fieldwork Site) 
E-mail 
(Fieldwork  
Site) 
Name of Next of 
Kin 
Next of Kin 
Tel. & E-mail 
 
Morten 
Dyrmose 
077 xxxx xxxx Md284@st-
andrews.ac.
uk 
xxxx xxxx 
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UTREC Ethical Application Form (Human) –2010/2011  v2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Please Tick:  (click on the box then click ‘Checked’ for a cross to appear in the box) 
   
  Undergraduate          Postgraduate Research  √        Postgraduate Taught            Staff        
     
     Lecturer/Course Controller on behalf of Taught module      Module Code:  
 
Researchers 
Name(s): 
Morten Dyrmose 
Project Title: The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs): A cross-country analysis 
School/Unit: 
(Please indicate) 
School of Economics & Finance Supervisor: Prof Gavin C Reid 
Emails Md284@st-nadrews.ac.uk 
Date 
Submitted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rationale:  Please detail the project in „lay language‟.  This summary will be reviewed by UTREC and may be 
published as part of the reporting procedures.  DO NOT exceed 75 Words (for database reasons).   Elucidation, 
if required can be given in Q.29 
Although Russia, India and China share somewhat similar characteristics historically/economically they now 
seem on very different trajectories financially. Institutional impediments to market efficiency are like to play a 
considerable role in pricing new shares in these countries. It is crucial to my research that I visit these countries 
in order to get behind the figures and understand the underlining issues; no degree of data analysis would be 
able to compensate for the fieldtrips.     
Ethical Considerations: Please detail the main ethical considerations raised by the project, concentrating on 
any issues raised specifically in the red sections, and addressing, where appropriate, the issue of whether basic 
ethical criteria has been met in all supporting documentation and if not why not.   This summary will be reviewed 
by UTREC and may be published as part of its reporting procedures.  DO NOT exceed 75 words (for database 
reasons).   Elucidation, if required can be given in Q.29 
Interviews will be conducted with finance professionals in Russia, India and China i.e. „vulnerable persons‟ will 
not be involved in the process. The main ethical issue may be confidentiality. I address this in the pre-amble to 
the interview: “Information will be treated in the strictest of confidence and I will not attribute any comments to 
specific named individuals, unless I have their specific approval”. Moreover, no electronic recording will take 
place; only note taking.  
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS  
TEACHING AND RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (UTREC) 
 
ETHICAL APPLICATION FORM 
 
Approval Code:     
(official Use Only)    
Applications must be submitted electronically to the School Ethics Committee Secretary/Convenor.   
Please submit directly to the S.E.C convenor only if the S.E.C has no appointed secretary. 
https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/SEC/SECMembers/ Please DO NOT submit directly to UTREC.   
The Ethical Applications must contain all relevant supporting documents, added to the end of this document.   
It is advised that you include the Researcher(s)‟ name in the email subject box e.g. „Smith-Ethical 
Application‟. One original hard copy must also be submitted with the signatures of all applicants  
and supervisors. 
Please do not type out with text boxes provided, note that the Text Boxes are fixed in size and will not 
allow any viewing beyond the word limit permitted. 
 
UTREC Ethical Application Form (Human) –2010/2011  v2 
 
If ethical approval has been obtained from the University of St Andrews for research so similar to this 
project that a new review process may not be required, please give details of the application and the 
date of its approval. 
 
Approval Code:  
Date Approved:  
Project Title:  
Researchers Name(s):  
 
RESEARCH INFORMATION 
1. Estimated Start Date: 5
th
 of August 2011 
2. Estimated Duration of Project: Three tips, each lasting approximately 2 weeks 
3. Is this research funded by any external sponsor or agency? 
 
YES √ NO  
If YES please give details:  
The Gilchrist Educational Trust has contributed £500 to this project; covering some 
travel expenses  
 
For projects funded by ESRC please be aware of the Ethical and Legal Considerations found at 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/aandp/create/ethical.asp 
4. Does this research entail collaboration with researchers from other  
    institutions and/or across other University Schools/Units? 
 
YES  NO √ 
    If YES state names and    
    institutions of collaborators: 
 
5. If the research is collaborative has a framework been devised to ensure  
    that all collaborators, including all University Staff, External Researchers,       
    and Students, are given appropriate recognition in any outputs?    
N/A √ YES  NO  
 
6. Where projects raise ethical considerations to do with roles in research,  
    intellectual property, publication strategies/authorship, responsibilities to    
    funders, research with policy or other implications etc., have you taken    
    appropriate steps to address these issues? 
N/A √ YES  NO  
 
 
7. Location of Research  
    Fieldwork to be conducted: 
 
Mostly at the place of work for the interviewees; Moscow (Russia), Shanghai 
(China) and Mumbai (India)  
8. Are you using only library, internet sources or unpublished data  
    (with appropriate licenses and permissions) and so have no human    
    involvement such as interviewing of people?  
 
 
 
    
YES  NO √ 
9. a.  Who are the intended Participants     
         (e.g. students aged 18-21) and how     
         will your recruit them (e.g. advertisement) 
They are finance professionals and access will obtained 
through a combination of networking and cold solicitation   
    b.   Estimated duration of Participant  
          Involvement. 
 
Around two hours per interview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you have answered YES to Q8 but the project has other Ethical Considerations  
please go to Q.29.  If there are no other Ethical Considerations please sign and submit. 
UTREC Ethical Application Form (Human) –2010/2011  v2 
 
 
ETHICAL CHECKLIST 
 
 
10.  Have you obtained permission to access the site of research? 
       
 
 
 
N/A √ YES  NO  
 
If YES please state agency/authority etc. & provide documentation. 
If NO please indicate why in Q.29 
 
 
11.  Will inducement i.e. other than expenses, be offered to participants? 
       If YES, please give details of the inducement being offered and justify  
       in Q29. 
       Q31 
N/A  YES  NO √ 
 
 
12.  Has ethical approval been sought and obtained from any external body   
       e.g. REC(NHS)/LEA and or including other UK Universities?  If YES,  
       please attach a copy of the external application and approval. 
 
N/A √ YES  NO  
 
13.  Will you tell participants that their participation is voluntary? 
 
  YES √ NO  
 
14.  Will you describe the main project/experimental procedures to  
       participants in advance so that they can make an informed decision  
       about whether or not to participate? 
 
  YES √ NO  
 
15.  Will you tell participants that they may withdraw from the research at  
       any time and for any reason, without having to give an explanation? 
 
  YES √ NO  
 
16.  Please answer either a. or b. 
       a.   Will you obtain written consent from participants? 
 
  YES √ NO  
 
       b.  (ONLY: Social Anthropology, Geography/Geoscience, 
                          International Relations & Biology) 
Will you obtain written consent from participants, in those cases        
where it is appropriate? 
  YES  NO  
 
 
17.  Please answer either a. or b. 
       a.  If the research is photographed or videoed or taped or  
            observational, will you ask participants for their consent to being         
            Photographed, videoed, taped or observed? 
 
 
N/A √ YES  NO  
 
            
 
       b.  (Social Anthropology & Biology ONLY) 
            Will participants be free to reject the use of intrusive research  
            Methods such as audio-visual recorders and photography? 
 
N/A  YES  NO  
 
 
18.   Please answer either a. or b. 
        a.  Will you tell participants that their data will be treated with full  
             confidentiality and that if published, it will not be identifiable as   
             theirs? 
        b.  Will you tell participants their work /contribution will be credited  
             unless they specifically request anonymity? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  YES √ NO  
 
 
     
 
 
 YES  NO  
  
19.   Will participants be clearly informed of how the data will be stored,    
        who will have access to it, and when the data will be destroyed? 
 
 
  YES √ NO  
 
  
20.   Will you give participants a brief explanation in writing of the study?  
        i.e. a debrief  
 
 
  YES √ NO  
 
 
21.   With questionnaires and/or interviews, will you give participants the  
        option of omitting questions they do not want to answer? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A  YES √ NO  
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you have answered NO to any question 12- 21, please give a brief explanation in the statement of  
Ethical Considerations on Page 1 and expand in Q29 if necessary. 
If you have answered YES, it must be clearly illustrated in the relevant paperwork which must be attached i.e. 
Participants Information Sheet, Consent Form, Debriefing Form, Questionnaire, Letters etc…… 
UTREC Ethical Application Form (Human) –2010/2011  v2 
 
WORKING WITH CHILDREN AND OR VULNERABLE PEOPLE 
 
Do participants fall into any of the following special groups?   
 
 
a. Children (under the age of 16 in Scotland or 18 in England)    ☐ Yes  √ No 
b. Vulnerable Adult, receiving care or welfare services     ☐ Yes  √ No 
c. People with learning or communicative difficulties     ☐ Yes  √ No 
d. Residents/Carers in a specific location, e.g. Care Home     ☐ Yes  √ No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e.  NHS Patients or Staff         ☐ Yes  √ No 
f.  Institutionalised persons         √ No 
  
 
 
 
 
 
g. People in custody         ☐ Yes  √ No 
h. People engaged in illegal activities, e.g., drug-taking    ☐ Yes  √ No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24.    Are you a UK National?         ☐ Yes  √ No 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ETHICAL RISK  
 
This section is for ethical use only and does not replace the University official procedures on Risk and Safety 
measures.   In addition to completing this section you must review the following https://www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/utrec/EthicalApplication/riskassessment/  and http://www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/staff/policy/Healthandsafety/Publications/Fieldwork/  and follow the relevant procedures. 
 
 
25.   Are any of the participants in a dependant relationship with the  
        investigator e.g. lecturer/student? If YES, give explanation in Q.29. 
 
 YES  NO √ 
 
26.   Will your project involve deliberately misleading participants in any way?   
         If YES, give details in Q.29 and state why it is necessary and explain how  
        debriefing will occur 
 
 
 
 YES  NO √ 
 
 
27.   Is there any significant risk to any paid or unpaid participant(s), field  
        assistant(s), helper(s) or student(s), involved in the project,  
        experiencing either physical or psychological distress or discomfort?   
        If Yes, give details in Q.29 and state what you will do if they should  
        experience any problems e.g. who to contact for help. 
 
 YES  NO √ 
 
If you answer YES to a. – d.  it is likely you will be required to obtain Protection of Vulnerable Groups 
(Scotland)/Disclosure approval (to include all research carried out outside the UK).   If working in England / 
Wales please obtain the England/Wales equivalent – Police Check 
 
Refer to the UTREC Working with Children and Vulnerable Groups webpage for further guidance 
If you answer YES to e. or f. it is likely you will be required to obtain approval from the NHS.  This should be 
sought prior to approval from the relevant SEC or UTREC. 
If you answer YES to g. or h. you should ensure that the relevant Risk Assessment Checklist has been 
completed 
If NO an equivalent disclosure/PVG/Police check must also be obtained from your main country of residence 
and submitted with your application.   This is in addition to a PVG approval. 
UTREC Ethical Application Form (Human) –2010/2011  v2 
 
28.   Do you think the processes, including any results, of your research  
        have the potential to cause any damage, harm or other problems for  
        people in your study area?   If YES, please explain in Q.29 and    
        indicate how you will seek to obviate the effects. 
 
  YES  NO √ 
 
 
 
 
Gf 
 
 
ETHICAL STATEMENT 
 
29.  Write a clear but concise statement of the ethical considerations raised by the project and how you intend  
       to deal with them.   It may be that in order to do this you need to expand on the Ethical Considerations  
       section on page 1.  (continue on additional pages if necessary) 
 
 
  
Confidentiality: 
 
No interviewee will be mentioned by name or described in a manner which makes identification possible, unless 
prior concrete permission has been granted by the subject.  
 
The responses will be recorded solely by note taking. No electronic recording devises will be used in this 
project. 
 
All correspondence with potential interviewees and any follow-up from the meetings will be conducted through 
Unimail. As such, all correspondence will be stored on external servers housed at a Tier 3+ Data Centre in 
Dundee. This facility, managed by Brightsolid, currently holds secure data for the commercial, public and 
financial sectors.      
 
General observations: 
 
All participants will be volunteering their time and knowledge; no remuneration will be made. 
 
In the pre-amble participants will be reminded that they can terminate the interview at any stage and are free to 
not answer any specific questions or topics.    
 
 
 
 
There is an obligation on the Lead Researcher & Supervisor to bring to the attention of the School Ethics 
Committee (SEC) any issues with ethical implications not clearly covered by the above 
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 Participant Consent Form 
Anonymous Data 
 
Project Title:  
The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs): A cross-country analysis 
 
Researcher Name 
Morten Dyrmose  
School of Economics & Finance 
University of St Andrews 
Email: md284@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Supervisors Names 
Prof Gavin C Reid 
School of Economics & Finance 
University of St Andrews 
Email: gcr@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
The University of St Andrews attaches high priority to the ethical conduct of research.  We therefore ask you to 
consider the following points before signing this form. Your signature confirms that you are happy to participate 
in the study. 
 
What is Anonymous Data? 
 
The term ‘Anonymous Data’ refers to data collected by a researcher that has no identifier markers so that even 
the researcher cannot identify any participant. Consent is still required by the researcher, however no link 
between the participant’s signed consent and the data collected can be made. 
 
Consent 
 
The purpose of this form is to ensure that you are willing to take part in this study and to let you understand what 
it entails. Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do not wish to do and you are free to withdraw 
at any stage. 
 
Material gathered during this research will be anonymous, so it is impossible to trace back to you. It will be 
securely stored on university property. Please answer each statement concerning the collection and use of the 
research data. 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet.  Yes   No 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.  Yes  No 
I have had my questions answered satisfactorily.  Yes  No 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time without having to give an 
explanation. 
 Yes  No 
I understand that my data once processed will be anonymous and that only the 
researcher(s) (and supervisors) will have access to the raw data which will be kept 
confidentially. 
 Yes   No 
I agree to my data (in line with conditions outlined above) being kept by the researcher and 
being archived and used for further research projects / by other bona fide researchers.   
 Yes  No 
I agree to take part in the study  Yes   No 
Participation in this research is completely voluntary and your consent is required before you can participate in 
this research.   
 
Name in Block Capitals 
 
Signature 
 
Date 
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Dear [Prefix and Surname],  
I am currently a third-year PhD student at the School of Economics & Finance, University of 
St Andrews, Scotland. My research is centred on the globalisation of financial markets and 
pricing of shares.  
 
As a crucial part of my research I am visiting [City e.g. Shanghai] to better understand 
[Country e.g. China] and its markets. In particular, I am looking at [Country’s] integration 
into the wider world economy from the perspective of the different stakeholders in your 
financial system. In this respect [Company Name] is of course one of the key players and I 
would be very interested in meeting with you, as [Full Job Title]. 
 
I will be in [City e.g. Shanghai] from [Day and Date] to [Day and Date] and I am very 
interested in learning more about your views on these topics. Ideally, I would like to conduct 
a semi-structured interview with you. Depending on your availability this interview may last 
around an hour or so. I understand this is a significant amount of time and I would be very 
flexible in adapting to your schedule.  
 
Your information will be treated confidentially and I will not attribute any comments to 
specific individuals or institutions, unless I have their specific approval. 
 
I look forward to hearing back from you. Again, I would like to stress that your assistance 
would be extremely helpful and much appreciated.  
 
Please find attached a letter of introduction by my supervisor, Professor Gavin C Reid. 
 
Thank you for your time.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Morten Dyrmose  
--  
Morten Dyrmose 
PhD candidate 
School of Economics & Finance 
Castlecliffe, The Scores 
University of St Andrews 
St Andrews, Fife  
KY16 9AL, Scotland, UK 
 
Tel: +44 (0) 1334 462475 
Mobile: +44 (0) 77 xxxx xxxx 
Fax: +44 (0) 1334 462444 
Email: md284@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
The University of St Andrews is a charity registered in Scotland : No SC013532 
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 Agenda Outline 
 
 
1 Globalisation  
1.1 Economic Effects on Market Functions  
1.1.1 Relative Importance of Actual Flows  
1.1.2 Relative Importance of Restrictions  
1.2 Social Effects on Market Functions  
1.2.1 Relative Importance of Personal Contact  
1.2.2 Relative Importance of Information Flows  
1.2.3 Relative Importance of Cultural Proximity  
1.3 Political Effects on Market Functions  
 
2 Corporate Governance  
2.1 Stakeholders  
2.1.1 Internal Stakeholders  
2.1.2 External Stakeholders  
2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility  
2.3 Business Ethics  
2.4 Enforcement & Control  
2.5 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance  
2.6 Mergers and Acquisitions and Initial Public Offerings  
 
3 Institutional Structure  
3.1 Market Influence by the State  
3.2 Regulatory Bodies  
3.3 Stock Exchanges  
3.4 Market Maturity  
 
4 Competitive Strategy  
4.1 Rivalry  
4.1.1 Banking Sectors  
4.1.2 Auditor Sector  
4.1.3 Brokerage Sector  
4.2 Customers  
4.2.1 Institutional Investors (dominant and/or active)  
4.2.2 Retail Investors (process to invest in the markets?)  
4.3 Suppliers (issuing companies)  
4.4 Potential Entrants  
4.4.1 Investment Banks, Auditors and Brokers  
4.4.2 Issuing companies  
4.4.3 Investors 
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Dear [Prefix and Surname], 
I am currently a third-year PhD student at the School of Economics & Finance, University of 
St Andrews, Scotland. My research is centred on the globalisation of financial markets and 
pricing of shares.  
As a crucial part of my research, I have recently travelled to Russia (Moscow), China 
(Shanghai) and India (Mumbai) to learn more about their integration into the wider world 
economy from the perspective of the different stakeholders in their financial systems. The 
next, and final, stage is now to benchmark my findings on the UK (London). In this respect 
[Company Name] is of course a key player and I would be very interested in meeting with 
you, as [Full Job Title]. 
I will be in London from Monday the 28
th
 of November to Friday the 9
th
 of December and I 
am very interested in learning more about these topics from a UK perspective. Ideally, I 
would like to conduct a semi-structured interview with you. Depending on your availability 
this interview may last around an hour or so. I understand this is a significant amount of time 
and I would be very flexible in adapting to your schedule.  
Your information will be treated confidentially and I will not attribute any comments to 
specific individuals or institutions, unless I have their specific approval. 
I look forward to hearing back from you. Again, I would like to stress that your assistance 
would be extremely helpful and much appreciated.  
Please find attached a letter of introduction by my supervisor, Professor Gavin C Reid. 
Thank you for your time.  
Yours sincerely, 
 
Morten Dyrmose  
--  
Morten Dyrmose 
PhD candidate 
School of Economics & Finance 
Castlecliffe, The Scores 
University of St Andrews 
St Andrews, Fife  
KY16 9AL, Scotland, UK 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1334 462475 
Mobile: +44 (0) 77 xxxx xxxx  
Fax: +44 (0) 1334 462444 
Email: md284@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
The University of St Andrews is a charity registered in Scotland : No SC013532 
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Dear [Prefix and Surname], 
 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today and for sharing your thoughts on these 
topics with me. It was very interesting indeed. 
 
Once I have completed my trips to Russia, China & India and benchmarked my interview 
agenda on the UK (London), I plan to write up a brief initial overview of my preliminary 
findings, which I would like to share with you. 
  
Thank you again for your time.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Morten 
--  
Morten Dyrmose 
PhD candidate 
School of Economics & Finance 
Castlecliffe, The Scores 
University of St Andrews 
St Andrews, Fife  
KY16 9AL, Scotland, UK 
 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1334 462475 
Mobile: +44 (0) 77 xxxx xxxx  
Fax: +44 (0) 1334 462444 
Email: md284@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
The University of St Andrews is a charity registered in Scotland : No SC013532 
 
 
Appendix L
Initial Findings, Fieldwork
257
 
 Morten Dyrmose, PhD Candidate, School of Economics & Finance, University of St Andrews, UK 
 
 Objective and Methodology  
 
My research centred on the globalisation of financial markets and the pricing of shares (stocks). From early 
August to mid-November 2011 I travelled to Russia (Moscow), India (Mumbai) and China (Shanghai) to meet 
experts and opinion formers who could help me to understand better the functioning (and efficacy) of financial 
markets in these countries. Subsequently, I have benchmarked my findings against the UK (London).  
 
I visited each country for two weeks. In interviews with leading financial figures and opinion formers I 
examined how each country integrated into the wider world economy, from the perspective of the different 
stakeholders in each financial system. I have since synthesised my findings for these three countries, and have 
compared them with the corresponding experience of the United Kingdom.  
 
The principal findings are as follows:  
 
It appears that India has made the most progress in increasing openness and accountability, on the basis of the 
brief comparisons it has been possible to make.  
 
However, analyses of this nature raise complex issues of comparability, and this brief overview is not meant to 
provide a definitive answer. There remain considerable advantages to investing and doing business in all three 
countries – indeed the BRIC economies, as a whole, offer substantial and attractive alternatives to opportunities 
in G7 economies.  
 
Board composition  
 
All three countries are increasingly recognising the importance of appointing independent directors to boards.  
 
Information flows  
 
In India, information has been almost completely free since the liberalisation of the media in the 1990s. China, 
to a great extent, has also made significant progress in this regard, and Russia has progressed, but to a lesser 
extent.  
 
Judicial system  
 
In India, legal processes can be burdensome and subject to undue influence, whereas in China compliance 
might be incomplete, but the rule of law is unchallenged. By contrast, in Russia rapid transition, whilst 
conferring many benefits, has resulted in an erosion of the primacy accorded to the rule of law.  
 
Stock exchanges  
 
Russia has proactively merged its two main stock exchanges, which is seen as a positive development. China’s 
government fully controls the flow of companies listing and adjusts accordingly. In India the NSE has 
overtaken the BSE in terms of credibility and momentum.  
 
Financial regulators  
 
The Central Bank may be the most effective entity amongst Russia’s main regulators, although it appears 
independent in name only. China’s regulators have a strong direct influence on the markets and its participants. 
In India, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is the most prominent regulator and it is held in high esteem (despite 
its imposing severe restrictions on market participants).  
 
The UK (London) seems to have relatively efficacious free markets and is a noted facilitator of free trade. 
However, in moving forward under crisis conditions, the UK will need to reconcile and clarify its relationships 
with the EU and the US, in order to establish firmly a new framework for growth priorities. 
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Dear [Prefix and Surname],  
You were kind enough to speak to me about corporate governance in [Country]. At that point, 
I said I would report back to you on my main findings. Since completing my field trips to 
Russia, India and China, I have been analysing all the evidence. A brief summary of my 
findings is now attached. I trust it will be of interest to you.  
To update you, I should mention that my doctoral thesis should be examined this summer, 
after which a copy of my complete work will be available online. I can provide the URL for 
this, if it would be of interest to you. 
Thank you again for taking time out of your busy day to meet me, and for your helpful input 
to my research. 
Your comments are always welcomed. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Morten Dyrmose 
--  
Morten Dyrmose 
PhD candidate 
School of Economics & Finance 
Castlecliffe, The Scores 
University of St Andrews 
St Andrews, Fife  
KY16 9AL, Scotland, UK 
 
Telephone: +44 (0) 1334 462475 
Mobile: +44 (0) 77 xxxx xxxx  
Fax: +44 (0) 1334 462444 
Email: md284@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
The University of St Andrews is a charity registered in Scotland : No SC013532 
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 Citi Investment Research & Analysis is a division of Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (the "Firm"), which does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its 
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 The Russian Hunter 
 How to Invest in the Russian Rentier System 
 
 The distribution of rents is key to the Russian market. In our inaugural strategy 
piece, we look at how $500bn in annual rent from commodities moves through the 
economy. In broad terms, we believe oil rents flow via the government to voters, gas 
rents go directly to the economy, and metals rents are captured by oligarchs. Of the 
rent, 58% goes to taxation, 18% to subsidy, 16% to capex and 8% to shareholders. 
 How to invest. We believe investors should buy suppliers of domestic goods and 
services as the rent ends up with them, stick with oligarchs who are successful at 
accessing rental flows, trade the shifts in rental allocation for government 
companies, and watch the commodity cycle, as the system depends on this. 
 MSCI Russia Index target of 1,100. Two key factors determine our index target – 
the oil price and Western perception of reform. At present, we expect the former to 
drift down and a slight improvement in the latter, giving a year-end target of 1,100, 
with most money made on sector rotation. 
 Buy domestics and Gazprom. In a flat commodity price environment, domestics 
tend to outperform as they have superior growth and can resist inflationary 
pressures better. Gazprom should benefit from a marginal shift of rent in its favour, 
as well as improving global gas pricing and better use of capex. 
 Top picks. Among domestics we prefer Sberbank, Nomos, MTS, X5, Synergy, 
Integra and Globaltrans. Among exporters we prefer Gazprom, Rosneft, Severstal, 
Raspadsya, Uralkali and Norilsk Nickel.  
 
Kingsmill Bond 
+7-495-643-1489 
kingsmill.bond@citi.com 
Andrey Kuznetsov 
+7-495-643-1431 
andrey.p.kuznetsov@citi.com 
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What rentier characteristics does Russia have? Russia has many of the 
hallmarks of a rentier economy: hydrocarbon revenues make up half the federal 
budget, the value of commodity rents is over a quarter of GDP, and the surplus 
transferred to the population in social payments over the last seven years has 
increased from $10bn to over $200bn. 
Where does the rent go? Of the $500bn in annual rent that comes from the 
Russian commodity sector at current prices, we calculate that 58% goes to the 
government in taxation and then onto the voters, 18% passes through the economy 
as subsidy, 16% is spent on capex, and just 8% is left for shareholders. 
How to invest in this environment? Having rentier characteristics by no means 
makes Russia uninvestable; it just means that the rules of the game are different. 
We deduce six rules for how to invest under these circumstances, thereby steering 
a course between Russia’s detractors and its believers. 
Rent ends up with domestic players. Once the rent works its way through the 
system, albeit with generous cuts for the intermediaries, we believe the key 
beneficiaries are providers of goods and services to consumers and industry. 
Russia is still bursting with secular growth stories in banking, construction, 
infrastructure, retail and consumption. 
Ally with successful commodity oligarchs. Certain oligarchs, mainly in the 
metals and mining sector, have been successful in extracting commodity rents. 
They are prepared to share the upside with investors, and the presence of portfolio 
investors can serve to limit the threat of government interference. However, 
investors should be aware that the high rents accruing to these companies are 
anomalous and may be subject to change if leadership changes. 
Government-controlled companies are often beneficiaries of the system. 
Whether it is Aeroflot receiving flyover cash, VTB receiving state-backed loans for 
the Bank of Moscow bailout, or Rosneft and Gazprom getting inexpensive licences, 
companies controlled by the government have benefited from the system.  
Always keep an eye on the commodity cycle. Oil prices determine the level of 
rent not just for the oil sector but for the entire economy, as we saw in 2008. If the 
cycle rolls over, the rouble, the market and the economy will follow it down. 
Investors should not expect a dramatic increase in their share of rents. The 
government may adjust the distribution of the rent in the hydrocarbon sector, 
thereby providing trading opportunities, but with rapidly rising fiscal spending there 
is little room to give much more to investors. 
Avoid industry and agriculture. In rentier systems the currency inevitably 
appreciates, providing a difficult environment for providers of tradeable goods and 
the agriculture sector. It is notable that the rouble is trading near its all-time highs in 
real terms. 
What do we like today? Within the context of this analysis, we tend to prefer the 
long-term secular growth stories to be found in banking (Sberbank), logistics 
(Globaltrans), telecoms (MTS), retail (X5), and oil capex (Integra). Among oligarch-
controlled companies, we favour Severstal, Uralkali and Norilsk Nickel, and we 
believe Gazprom should benefit from change to its rent distribution. 
How to Invest in the Russian Rentier System 
Kingsmill Bond 
+7 495 643 1489 
kingsmill.bond@citi.com 
Andrey Kuznetsov 
+7 495 643 1431 
andrey.p.kuznetsov@citi.com 
Elina Ribakova 
+44 20 7986 4356 
elina.ribakova@citi.com 
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How the rentier system works 
Why use a rentier framework? 
We believe that it is instructive to look at the Russian system from the perspective 
of a rentier framework as this can throw a light on how to invest in the market and 
steer a middle path between Russia’s detractors, who argue that the market is 
uninvestable, and Russia’s believers, who see no fragility in the current setup. 
It is worth saying up front that Russia is not yet a pure rentier economy, but as Willem 
Buiter points out in Global Growth Generators - Moving beyond ‘Emerging Markets’ 
and ‘BRIC’, 21 February 2011, it is in danger of becoming one, with some of the less 
appealing aspects of rentier economies. Commodity taxation makes up over half of 
federal revenue, rents to the level of over a quarter of GDP are generated by the 
commodity sector, the economy is highly vulnerable to external price shocks, as we 
saw in 2008, rent is transferred from the government to the people, and so on. The 
fiscal breakeven level of the Russian budget gives some indication of the degree to 
which the system has become ever-more dependent on oil. 
Figure 3. The Russian budget break-even oil price, $/bbl 
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Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis estimates, Ministry of Finance 
 
Rentier economies typically split into three parts – the natural resource (usually 
commodities and usually oil); the intermediary (usually the government); and the 
beneficiary (sometimes foreign bank accounts, sometimes the people). In simple 
terms, the rent is derived from the natural resources sector, taken by the government 
and passed on to the people. Rentier economies have several key characteristics: the 
elite fight over the division of spoils rather than seeking to improve the system; the 
population remains quiescent provided enough of the rent is passed down to them; 
property rights are relatively weak, the currency rises; the industrial sector stagnates; 
the elite indulge in white elephant projects; and so on. The paradigm for rentier 
economies is of course OPEC countries in the 20th century, although the Spanish 
economy of the 16th century is a frequently cited example. 
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Who provides the rent? 
If we define rent as the gap between world prices and extraction costs, then, in 
broad terms, there are three providers of rent in the Russian system: oil, gas and 
metals (ferrous and other). On top of this, it is also worth mentioning the 
infrastructure sector, which has been providing an effective subsidy to the economy 
as prices have been set at less than replacement cost for many years. 
We estimate that at world market prices, the value of Russian  production of oil, gas 
and metals is some $650bn, and extraction costs are $150bn, leaving a total level of 
rent generation of $500bn. 
We lay out below an approximate calculation of the level of rent in the system, 
based on the current level of prices (oil at $100 per barrel, gas at $400 per 
thousand cubic metres (000 m3), and steel at $600 per tonne) and Citi analysts’ 
perspective on cost and tax structures that will be in place by the end of 2011. We 
seek where possible to tie these numbers back to our actual sector forecasts, 
although of course they will not tally perfectly, as not all commodities are produced 
by listed companies, and certain companies (such as Gazprom) have additional 
product lines passing through their accounts. While of necessity we simplify some 
fairly complex issues, we believe that the conclusion accurately reflects the nature 
of rent generation and distribution.  
 Oil: The size of the oil rent is relatively easy to calculate. Russia produces around 
10m barrels of oil a day, and the extraction cost plus transport is less than $15. If 
we take the world market price of $100 a barrel, then that implies some $310bn of 
rent from the oil sector, in theory, and a little less when adjusted for the fact that 
some is turned into oil products and sold in Russia. 
 Gas: Russia produces around 600 bcm a year of gas. The all-in extraction and 
transportation cost, based on Novatek’s accounts, is no more than $65 per 000 m3, 
while the rule of thumb for the European price is that it is 4 times the oil price, or 
$400 in this analysis. For the sake of argument, we remove the $70 per 000 m3 
cost to transit Ukraine, and this implies a total rent of around $160bn. 
 Ferrous metals: Russia produces around 70m tonnes of steel at an operating cost 
of the integrated iron ore, coal and steel plants of around $300 per tonne when the 
global price is around $600. This gives a rent of over $20bn. 
 Other metals and mining: There are other sources of rent (in gold, potash, or 
Norilsk Nickel) where one can simply take the difference between sales and 
operating costs to get a sense of the size of the rent. We estimate that this is 
around another $20bn. 
There are two other areas which we have not included in our totals as the situation 
is changing so rapidly and the subsidy is being removed, but we also comment on 
them below as the situation is fluid. 
 Utilities: It might appear odd to include utilities in a list of rent providers in the 
Russian economy, as this is not a sector which is traditionally thought of as a 
provider of rent. However, we would argue that it has been a provider of subsidy to 
the rest of the economy, as the government deliberately underinvested in the sector 
and exploited the Soviet legacy. For example if the true cost of producing electricity 
is say 10 cents per KWh and an electricity company is selling it for say 4 cents, 
then this is a subsidy of 6 cents per KWh to the economy. This subsidy traditionally 
came from two areas – cheap gas (which we have already accounted for above) 
and the failure to invest in new power stations, which is why the sector has such old 
equipment. We estimate that in the past the underinvestment has been in the order 
of $30bn a year. 
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 Transport: The same argument applies to the transport sector, where for years 
the government failed to invest enough to maintain the infrastructure. We 
estimate the total at around the same level as in the utility sector. 
Figure 4. Rents available from the Russian commodity sector, $ bn 
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Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis 
 
Who are the intermediaries? 
It is when we look at the intermediaries that this exercise starts to get rather more 
interesting. For in Russia, unlike in a normal rentier economy, it is not the 
government that is the sole intermediary. We believe that there are four principal 
uses for the rent: taxation paid to the government; subsidy arising from selling raw 
materials to the economy at less than the global price; capital expenditure; and 
returns to shareholders. 
In a nutshell it is the government that takes the rents from the oil sector and passes 
it on to the voters, the economy and capex benefit from the gas sector, oligarchs 
from the metals sector, and the economy and oligarchs from the infrastructure 
sector.  
Overall, we calculate that 58% of the rent is taken in taxation, 18% is subsidy to the 
economy, 16% is spent in capex, and just 8% is available for shareholders. We lay 
out below our estimate of the distribution of the total rent (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. The distribution of rent by sector in the Russian system 
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We consider the distribution of rent according to these four areas below. 
Government 
The tax framework can be seen at a glance if we look at the direct taxation of the 
different commodities in Russia. Oil is very heavily taxed, gas has some taxation, 
and the metals and mining sector has very low taxes. 
Figure 6. Direct taxation as a percentage of the final selling price in Russia 
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Oil: As is widely appreciated, the government takes nearly 70% of the sales value 
of $100 oil in export tax and MET. In addition, it takes excise tax on domestic 
product sales as well as profit tax. 
Gas: The gas sector is much less heavily taxed, paying an MET of just 2% of the 
value of exports and export tax of 25%. 
Metals: The metals sector has very light taxation. There is minimal mineral 
extraction tax and relatively light export taxes on nickel, copper and PGMs. Potash, 
famously, has no export tax at present. 
Figure 7. Russia commodity taxation $bn 
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The government is able to use this commodity windfall money to run low tax rates 
for much of the rest of the economy (the income tax rate in Russia is 13%), and to 
transfer much of the money back to voters via social expenditure. This is most 
clearly seen when comparing the revenues from oil with money spent on social 
expenditure. As the oil windfall has risen, so has government spending on social 
expenditure (mostly pensions). 
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Figure 8. Government direct oil and gas revenues and social expenditures $bn 
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Subsidy 
The value of subsidy within the system is rather more subject to interpretation. In 
our analysis it is only really the gas sector that is giving much subsidy to the 
economy. 
Oil: In theory the oil sector should be subsidising the domestic economy as crude oil 
and oil products have export taxes, and the price of domestic oil products should be 
at a discount to the international price. However, in practice domestic oil product 
prices are not at a major discount to the international price, suggesting that it is the 
oil companies that benefit from this arrangement. 
Gas: The level of gas subsidy to the Russian economy has no correct answer and 
there are many ways to calculate it. We take a European price of $400 per 000 m3 
(which corresponds to $100 oil), and remove the $70 for transiting Ukraine to give a 
market price of $330 per 000 m3. We then compare that to the current price in 
Russia of $100 per 000 m3. This implies a subsidy of $92bn to the economy for the 
400 bcm of gas consumed. 
Metals and mining: The metals and mining sector provides little in the way of subsidy 
to the rest of the economy. The potash sector makes a subsidy to Russian farmers by 
selling potash at below the global price, but this is not a major factor. There are also 
some small export taxes on a few metals, as we have seen, which provide some 
support to the economy. However, the total level of subsidy is not large. 
Infrastructure: As we have already seen, the infrastructure sector has been 
providing subsidy to the rest of the economy of many tens of billions of dollars in 
underinvestment for years, although this is now drawing to a close.   
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Capex 
Once we have accounted for costs, subsidy and taxation, the operating cashflow of 
the commodity sector is relatively small, at $120bn, for the system as a whole. The 
question then is how this cashflow is distributed between capex and the owners of 
debt and equity capital. As debt levels and interest payments are relatively low, we 
take “shareholders” as shorthand for what happens to the cash after capex. It is 
also important to understand that it is necessary to take capex rather than 
depreciation, as Russian companies as a rule under-depreciate – depreciation is 
half the level of capex amongst listed stocks in Russia as a whole, and a quarter for 
Gazprom. 
 Oil: Capex runs at around 70% of operating cash flow. 
 Gas: For many years, capex has been at about the same level as operating cash 
flow. 
 Metals: Capex runs at around half the level of operating cash flow. 
If we take Citi numbers for operating cashflow and capex by sector in 2011E we see 
this process clearly. 
Figure 9. Operating cashflow and capex for Russian sectors $bn 2011E 
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Shareholders 
Among commodity companies, at present, it is only really in the metals sector and a 
couple of hydrocarbon companies, like Novatek and TNK BP, that there is much 
money left for shareholders. 
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Who are the end beneficiaries? 
It is possible to identify a number of key end beneficiaries of the system. 
 Providers of consumer goods: As we have seen, much of the money amassed by 
the government through commodity taxation is passed back to the people though 
social transfers and low taxation rates. Moreover, individuals benefit from cheap 
electricity and gas, as well as the impact of high commodity revenues trickling 
through the economy. This is one of the reasons that despite relatively low 
wages, Russian consumers have tremendous spending capacity and are able to 
buy such large amounts of consumer goods. 
 The banking sector: The impact of a rentier environment on the banking sector is 
mixed. On the one hand, high rents encourage demand for financial services, but 
on the other it enables companies to borrow directly abroad. On balance we 
believe that the sector should be seen as a beneficiary in the same way as other 
providers of consumer services. 
 Providers of goods and services for industry: As much of the money is spent on 
capex, so it is that companies servicing industry (such as oil services, IT 
services, pipes or logistics) are able to benefit. 
 Companies able to capture the rent for themselves: If companies are able to buy 
cheap commodities in Russia and sell them aboard with no tax at global prices, 
then they are in a strong position. Examples include Rusal (cheap electricity) or 
the nitrogen fertiliser (cheap gas) sector. Other examples of companies that have 
been able to capture the rent are those in the metals and mining sector that have 
been able to resist the high taxation levels prevalent in the hydrocarbon sector, or 
Novatek which has been able to combine low production costs with low domestic 
taxation on gas and success in being chosen for lucrative projects. 
 Government companies: With so much rent available, the government is able to 
distribute some of it to some companies, usually those it controls. Examples 
include the recent payment to VTB to help it with the Bank of Moscow purchase, 
the payment to Aeroflot of overflight revenues, or the awarding of oil and gas 
licenses at low cost to Gazprom or Rosneft. 
 Providers of high-end services: The high-end service sector is booming, with 
Moscow widely known to be home to more billionaires than New York. 
 Foreign bank accounts, a certain proportion of the rent (we estimate capital flight 
of around $50bn a year based on the capital account data) is taken abroad. 
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What else can we learn from the rentier system approach? 
There are several other aspects of operating in Russia that become much clearer 
when we consider the system from the perspective of a rentier economy. 
 The whole system depends on the level of rent, which in Russia basically means 
oil prices, as hydrocarbons make up over 90% of the rental pie. It is for this 
reason that when the oil price falls the market responds so rapidly. So this is why 
Russia’s nominal GDP tracks the oil price so closely (Figure 9). 
Figure 10. Russian nominal GDP vs oil price 
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 Patronage is key: This is especially true in the rent-generating sectors of the 
economy, where the tax level is far more important than their growth or operating 
activity. However, as we saw recently with VTB, it is also true of the domestic 
sector at times. The implication is that investors should focus more on the 
relations between the core shareholder and the government than on the 
operating plans of management. 
 Portfolio investors are useful for a reason: it is important to realise the function of 
foreign capital for rentier companies controlled by oligarchs. Apart from providing 
long-term capital, foreign portfolio investors can also provide protection from any 
parties that might be tempted to reduce its access to rents. Public companies are 
much less at risk than private ones, as can be seen from the contrasting 
experiences of Ryblovev (Uralkali) compared with Gutseriev (Russneft) or 
Chichvarkin (Evroset). So in a sense a function of portfolio investors for oligarch-
controlled companies is to provide them with insurance. 
 Rentier economies find it hard to reform unless there is a major fall in the price of 
their core product, as entrenched interests see no need to encourage change 
which would threaten their rents. Until the oil price falls we should, therefore, 
perhaps be more cautious regarding potential reform. 
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What is changing? 
However, there are a series of changes to the system taking place and which we 
summarise below. 
Oil: We have already factored into our analysis the proposed 60-66 tax system, 
which will have little impact on the overall level of returns to investors compared to 
the current system. In future, we expect the government to shift the system so as to 
encourage investment in the greenfield sector, with proposed returns of around 
18%. However, it should be noted that these new projects, if returns are capped, will 
not have a dramatic impact on NPVs for shareholders. 
Gas: The government plans to increase the domestic gas price from $100 per 000 
m3 to $180 over the next few years. This implies that $32bn of rent will be moved 
from subsidy to other areas. Our working assumption is that the majority of the rent 
will end up with the government (through a higher MET) or in capex, but it is also 
likely that returns to shareholders will be higher, coming from a low base. 
Metals: There has been much talk about increasing the export tax rates for the 
metals companies from their current very low level. We believe that this is a clear 
risk as the sector is so egregiously under-taxed compared to hydrocarbons, and 
these stocks will be most volatile around the time of the Presidential election in 
2012. This implies a constant higher risk to investors in the metals and mining 
sector. 
Infrastructure: The government is increasing the price of electricity and transport 
tariffs and we believe that these will soon reach their cost price, meaning that the 
sectors will no longer be subsidising the rest of the economy. 
How to invest in Russia’s rentier system? 
We lay out below how the various different sectors in Russia fit into this framework. 
As stock prices fluctuate, any of these sectors may be attractive at different times, 
but we seek to place them into four types of opportunity – fundamental, higher risk, 
trading, and unattractive. 
Fundamental buys 
Russian providers of non-tradeable domestic goods and services for consumers: It 
is these companies which are the lucky end-recipients of the rent cascading through 
the system, and which provide the attractive secular growth stories that have proven 
so successful in Russia over the years. Sectors include banks, telecoms, retail, 
media, and construction. 
Russian producers of goods and services for companies: They are also major 
beneficiaries as large amounts of capex are recycled into the Russian market. 
Sectors include oil services, IT services, and logistics. 
Russian government-controlled companies: They are most likely to benefit from any 
spare rent. 
Higher risk buys 
Companies able to exploit the loopholes in the system: Typical examples are those 
in the fertilizer and aluminium sectors. These companies are able to take cheap 
Russian goods, such as gas or electricity, turn them into global commodities and 
sell them on the international markets at a global price. As long as the government 
does not close the loophole this is a good business. 
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Oligarch-controlled companies in the metals and mining sectors as well as a couple 
of hydrocarbon companies, such as Novatek, have been able to capture rent for 
shareholders. While the controlling oligarch remains in favour with the government 
and the company is able to continue to gain direct access to the rent, then inventors 
should also prosper. However, it should be noted that this play is not without risk in 
the long term, as the taxation paid by the metals and mining sector in Russia is so 
low, and the risk always exists that the government will seek to appropriate some of 
it. 
Trades 
Crumbs from rentier companies’ table: Oil sector companies have been able to 
produce some returns for shareholders when the government allows them, and from 
time to time their valuation becomes too low. However, with the ever-rising oil price 
breakeven, investors should not expect spectacular returns in the foreseeable future. 
Buy into change, as that may create opportunity: Some sectors are ripe for change 
and this will likely create short-term opportunities for investors. One recent example 
was the removal of the Gazprom ring-fence in 2005-06, another was the decision to 
liberalise the electricity sector, which initially saw a lot of money made as the sector 
rerated, even though in the end it was not especially beneficial to investors. 
Therefore, any talk of change at Gazprom is likely to create interesting trading 
opportunities, as it trades at such low ostensible multiples. 
Areas which do not look attractive 
Tradeable goods: As the currency tends to rise in a rentier environment, then 
manufacturers of tradeable goods find it hard to compete with imports. 
Agriculture: This is a low-margin business which tends to be damaged by a rising 
currency and high wages. Investors would do better to look for attractive agriculture 
opportunities in Ukraine, where they are assisted by a weaker currency. 
Electricity: We believe that it will be hard for the government to allow reasonable 
investor returns in the electricity sector, and that it will always be inclined to use the 
sector to subsidise the economy in times of stress. So, with elections approaching, 
we have seen the government pull back on tariff increases once again. In the 
meantime, investors in the sector are obliged to sink in large amounts of capital with 
minimal short-term dividends.  However, it should also be noted that many foreign 
investors avoid this sector, and stock prices fluctuate based on local developments 
which focus less on such long-term considerations. 
Other factors 
Beware the commodity cycle, if it rolls over then the whole system will be under 
immense stress, as we saw in 2008. Constant vigilance is required. Just because a 
company is able to exploit the rentier system today does not mean that it will be in 
favour tomorrow. 
Stock picks 
In the current environment we favour the following groups of stocks: 
Cheap domestic consumption: We like Sberbank, X5 and MTS 
Domestic capex: We like Globaltrans and Integra. 
Plays on systemic change: We like Gazprom 
Oligarch-controlled companies: We like Uralkali, Norilsk Nickel, and Severstal. 
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For most of the last decade it has been possible to forecast the Russian index with 
respect to two variables – the oil price, which is of course a hard number, and 
Western perceptions of Russia, which is more conceptual and therefore difficult to 
quantify. 
The reason why the oil price matters so much is that three quarters of the MSCI 
Russia index is made up of commodity stocks whose profits are affected by the oil 
price, while the ruble and spreads also move with the oil price. The reason why 
Western perception matters is that there is little domestic long-term money in 
Russia, meaning it is foreign investors who set the index level at either above or 
below its oil price link. The more foreign investors believe in the long-term story of 
Russia the more likely they are to focus on the relatively low PE and ignore the poor 
cashflow of the Russian market. 
This link can be seen from the chart below of the MSCI index and the oil price, 
where it is clear that the index trades at around 10 times the oil price. During the 
YUKOS affair the market traded cheap to the oil price; the Gazprom ringfence 
removal saw the MSCI index accelerate; and when foreign hopes were high about 
reform in 2006-08, it traded expensive to oil. Although it is hard to tell from the chart, 
it is notable that the Russian market started to fall in the summer of 2008 before the 
oil price fell as a result of the Georgian war, which made global investors nervous 
about the market. 
Figure 11. MSCI Russia vs oil price 
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To lay out our thoughts on these two variables: 
The oil price: The Citi view, pretty much in line with consensus, is that the oil price 
will end the year at around $100/bbl, drifting down from today’s level of $110/bbl. 
There is, however, a chance that it will be much lower than this if the various risk 
scenarios in China or Europe play out unfavourably or more supply than expected is 
forthcoming from the Middle East. We ascribe a 30% chance to a lower oil price, at 
say $70 by year-end.  
Index Target 
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Reform: We think Western perceptions on reform will be mainly determined by the 
decision on the favoured candidate for the Presidential election as well as progress 
on WTO accession. We are positive on the likelihood of WTO accession, believing 
that few obstacles remain, and we expect the substantive decisions on this to be 
made this year. Although the election is not until March 2012, it is likely that the 
candidate will be chosen in December 2011 after the Parliamentary elections. We 
believe that the most likely scenario is a return of Vladimir Putin as President, and 
that this would cause the market to trade close to its oil price link, with further small 
upside for the year end and the WTO story. The upside risk, to which we ascribe a 
30% probability, is that either current President Dmitry Medvedev is selected as the 
preferred candidate, or Mr. Putin returns with, say, current Finance Minister Alexei 
Kudrin as Prime Minister and leads a more reformist government. 
Figure 12. Scenarios for MSCI Russia index for year-end 2011E 
                  Oil price at year-end 
  Low High 
Low 800 1100 Reform perception High 1000 1300  
Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis 
 
So our year-end MSCI Russia index target of 1,100 (8% upside from the current 
level of 1,020) is selected from the most likely of these scenarios – high oil price 
and little excitement about reform. The downside (800) would be a lower oil price 
and the upside (1,300) more enthusiasm about reform. 
Our EMEA strategist, Andrew Howell, is also overweight on the market in the 
regional context. 
The reason the index target implies relatively limited upside from current levels is 
simply that we have a year-end forecast oil price some $10 below current levels. So 
if oil drifts down but belief in Russia moves up, we would see a narrowing of the 
discount to the oil price. 
Index movement during the year 
The seasonality of the Russian market is well known and has played out roughly 
this year already, as a strong first quarter gave way to a weak early summer on 
concerns about global cyclicality. 
Assuming this pattern holds we would expect to see fragility over the summer and 
then a year-end rally if concerns about cyclicality fade. As a rule, the MSCI Russia 
index trades up by around 50 points at the end of the year, a factor we have 
included in our forecast. 
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Blue chip valuations – highest and lowest  
Figure 13. Deep value, P/B 2011E  Figure 14. Cash generation, FCF yield 2012E 
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Figure 15. PEG 2012E  Figure 16. Dividend yield (highest only) 2011E 
3.8
1.3
1.1
0.9
0.8
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Polyus Gold*
CTC Media*
Mail.ru*
NOVATEK
Magnit
Eurasia Drilling Company
VTB
Alliance Oil Company
Bank of Moscow*
Transneft
 
 
8.2%
7.5%
6.9%
5.1%
4.6%
3.7%
3.6%
3.2%
3.2%
3.0%
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%
MTS
TNK-BP Holding
KazMunaiGas EP
Gazprom Neft
Uralkali
LUKoil
Norilsk Nickel
CTC Media*
Mechel
Tatneft
 
Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis estimates, * Datastream consensus  Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis estimates, * Datastream consensus 
Figure 17. Stock performance relative to GEM peers  Figure 18. Stock absolute performance 
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Key developments to come 
We anticipate an uncertain but positive environment for the Russian market over the 
second half of the year. Positive factors for Russia include greater clarity on WTO 
accession, the additional liquidity likely to result from the merger of the RTS and the 
MICEX exchanges, more talk from the government about privatisation, the sale of 
the Sberbank stake, and a possible year-end reform story after the Presidential 
election. Set against this is the jockeying for power over the Presidential election 
and the ever-rising oil price breakeven level, as the government ramps up subsidies 
prior to the polls. From a global perspective, Citi anticipates positive news on growth 
in the US, a postponement of resolution of the Greek crisis and continued growth in 
China, setting the scene for global markets to grind higher. At the same time, 
uncertainty is likely to persist over the summer with regards to Greece and China, 
and we forecast an environment of slowly falling commodity prices. 
Strategy view 
As a deep cyclical, the main driver for the Russian market is the global commodity 
cycle, and until there is greater clarity on this, we do not anticipate strong 
performance from the market. If one adds to this the traditional seasonal weakness 
faced by the market over the summer, it is hard to escape the consensus view that 
we will have a summer of drifting markets with an autumn rally if global and local 
factors play out as we assume. 
Under these circumstances, the main call is to be long the domestic sectors, which 
make up a quarter of the MSCI Russia index, because they are able to resist 
inflation and have strong growth. Domestic stories usually outperform in a flat 
commodity price environment. Moreover, valuations do not look stretched, with the 
domestic sector trading at a 2012E PE of 7.7x, with 12% earnings growth expected, 
compared to emerging markets as a whole which trade at a 2012E PE of 9.8x, with 
similar earnings growth.  
The second strategic call is to be long Gazprom, some 29% of the MSCI Russia 
index, as investors are likely to start to receive some benefits from the rent 
cascading through the company, as domestic prices rise by slightly faster than tax 
rises and capex can soak them up. At a 2012E PE of 4x and with the possibility of 
change in the sector, we believe that the company is attractively priced. 
Top picks 
We select three groups of top picks: 
Gazprom, as identified above. 
The banking sector, trading at 7.7x 2012E PE and 1.4x price to book, with ROEs of 
20% and a strong long-term story of low loan penetration. We prefer Sberbank and 
NOMOS. 
Consumer stocks due to their good long-term growth profile. We like X5, MTS and 
Synergy. 
Strategy 
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Figure 19. Sector absolute performance  Figure 20. MSCI Russia performance relative to MSCI GEM and World 
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Figure 21. MSCI Russia versus oil price  Figure 22. Russian sector valuations as % of GEM peers, 2012E P/E 
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Figure 23. Russian sector valuation 
 Mcap  P/E EV/EBITDA EPS gth P/BV Div yield FCF yield  
 $ bln 2011E 2012E 2011E 2012E 2011E 2012E 2011E 2011E 2011E 2012E 
Oil 283.1 5.3 6.1 3.4 3.5 32% -13% 0.9 3.3% 9% 9% 
Gas 217.8 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 19% 13% 0.9 1.8% 1% 3% 
Banks 120.9 8.1 7.7   81% 5% 1.7 2.0%   
Utilities 87.9 8.5 7.7 4.8 4.6 82% 11% 0.7 1.0% -3% 0% 
Steel 76.2 10.1 7.9 6.0 5.1 77% 28% 1.7 2.6% 5% 10% 
Base metals 75.4 6.5 6.0 4.6 3.8 38% 9% 1.7 2.5% 9% 11% 
Telecoms 39.8 5.8 4.8 4.0 3.4 27% 21% 2.0 9.9% 20% 23% 
Retail 30.8 29.6 20.0 12.5 9.6 24% 48% 4.8 0.2% -6% -3% 
Fertilizers 27.2 12.2 11.6 10.1 9.5 96% 5% 6.7 4.9% 5% 7% 
Media* 22.1 30.8 23.2 20.1 15.0 52% 33% 4.0 1.0%   
Coal 17.3 7.0 4.9 5.9 4.8 134% 44% 2.1 2.8% 6% 14% 
Transport* 11.1 11.2 8.7 6.0 5.1 18% 26% 1.8 1.8%   
Precious metals 7.0 14.3 14.1 9.1 8.4 118% 1% 4.7 0.0% 7% 5% 
Food producers 5.2 11.4 9.4 8.1 6.4 13% 22% 2.1 0.0% -4% 1% 
Russia 983.8 6.6 6.3 4.3 4.0 37% 4% 1.1 2.6% 5% 7% 
Russia-Exporters 686.6 6.0 5.8 4.1 3.8 31% 2% 1.1 2.7% 6% 7% 
Russia-Domestics 297.2 8.6 7.7 5.4 4.9 65% 12% 1.3 2.5% 2% 5% 
EM  11.2 9.8 6.5 5.8 26% 14% 1.7 3.0% 3% 5% 
DM  13.1 11.4 6.3 5.7 2% 24% 1.7 2.7% 5% 7%  
Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis estimates. Items marked with * are sourced from Datastream consensus 
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Key developments 
Consumption growth remains robust (5.5%YoY in May) driven by the non-food 
sector (+10.7%). With inflation still high (9.6% in end-May) consumers continue 
increasing the share of durable goods in their consumption goods basket. Real 
disposable income fell 7% (partially due to the base effect of the substantial rises in 
social spending last year) and real wages grew by only 2.6%YoY, suggesting that 
growth was partially financed by a decline in savings. Consumer confidence fell in 
1Q2011 compared to 4Q2011, as more consumers expect a worsening of economic 
conditions and income. However, this is hardly surprising as the index is already 
near the pre-crisis level. 
Investment posted signs of recovery in May (+7.4%YoY, 26%MoM) driven by 
machinery and equipment, after a sluggish performance in 1Q. Construction 
and investment activity differ significantly across regions with Far East, Southern 
and Siberian districts leading the race – up 38%YoY, 9%YoY and 31%YoY in 1Q – 
due to government-sponsored projects (including preparation for the 2014 Winter 
Olympics) and investments by the oil and gas companies. A fall in investments and 
construction by 15-30%YoY in the Central district (including Moscow) and North-
Western district (including St Petersburg) – covering over 30% of total investments 
– explains poor performance of investments in 1Q2011. We believe the negative 
capital and financial account in 1Q2011 (-US$22bn) was also at least partially 
related to the slow pick-up in investments and low domestic interest rates, as 
opposed to the market consensus that attributes it solely to political uncertainty. 
Current views 
More fiscal stimulus in 2H should keep consumption growth at about 5%, but 
unlikely to push GDP growth above 4.3-4.5%. Uneven growth performance, in 
our view, makes hikes in public sector wages and pensions in 2H2011 more likely. 
Public wages were raised by 6.5% on 1 June, and are likely to be increased by 
another 6.5% in September. We do not rule out further increases to pensions in 3Q 
in addition to a 9% hike in January. Selected budget salaries will be increased by 
50%, according to the Ministry of Economy’s baseline scenario. We expect stronger 
investments in the coming months mostly by the state-controlled enterprises. We 
think expansion of internal demand will be partially offset by strong import growth. 
With inflation decelerating we do not expect any rate hikes in 3Q, however 
CBR may resume rate hikes if pressure on the ruble intensifies at end-2011. In 
June, the CBR left rates unchanged, stressing balanced risks to growth and likely 
inflation over the next few months. We think inflation will moderate in the summer 
and will be near 8%YoY at end-2011. We do not expect further tightening in 
monetary policy in 3Q, however should the ruble be pressured, we would expect the 
CBR to hike the deposit rate by at least 50bp in 4Q, especially as we approach 
parliamentary elections in December and the Presidential election in March 2012. 
We expect the ruble to stay at 34-35 against the basket in 2011. 
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Figure 24. RUB/USD history  Figure 25. M2 and forex reserves, $ bln 
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Figure 26. Key Russian ruble interest rates  Figure 27. Investments, industrial production, retail sales 
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Figure 28. Inflation and lending rates  Figure 29. Economic data summary and forecasts 
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 2009 2010 2011F 2012F 
Nominal GDP, $ bln 1 232 1 477 1 814 2 038 
Real GDP growth -7.8% 4.0% 4.3% 4.1% 
Private consumption 
growth 
-4.8% 3.0% 5.1% 5.3% 
Investments growth -14.4% 6.1% 10.0% 10.3% 
CPI 8.8% 8.8% 7.9% 6.6% 
CA balance, % GDP 3.9% 4.9% 4.7% 1.6% 
Fiscal balance, % GDP -5.9% -4.1% -2.2% -2.1% 
RUB/USD, average 31.8 30.4 28.5 28.9 
Oil Urals, $/bbl, year 
avg. 
60.9 78.3 103.1 98.4 
 
Source: Rosstat, Bank of Russia  Source: Rosstat, Citi Investment Research and Analysis estimates 
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Impact of the rentier system on oil companies 
Rents from the oil industry are largely extracted by the government, as the sector is 
the single largest contributor to the federal budget (c40%, by our estimates). The oil 
taxation system is structured to take 87% of any marginal rise in oil prices above 
$25/bbl (i.e., if Urals rises from $90 to $100/bbl, the government will get $8.7 more 
for every barrel of oil produced and exported from the country). Additional rents are 
legitimately extracted via the oilfield services (OFS) industry, which benefits from 
the production declines in West Siberian brownfields which, in spite of their age, still 
hold massive reserves, although the effort required to extract them grows inexorably 
year after year. 
Strategy view 
It is difficult as an equity investor to find a share of the rents of the oil sector. Oil 
taxation accounts for the bulk of the rents available in the industry, which naturally 
flows to the government. As we pointed out in our Russian Oil Sector Overview - No 
Room for Tax Breaks, 8 June), this will not materially change in future and will 
actually get somewhat heavier rather than lighter. Capex will rise as the marginal 
barrel gets more difficult to produce, and can be accessed partially via the OFS 
industry. Dividend payouts will likely remain in the range of 20% of net income per 
international accounting standards, and earnings will likely grow only with difficulty. 
Among the integrated oil companies, we recommend that investors align 
themselves with the government via Rosneft, which has the best exposure to the 
tax regime via a combination of: a) its relatively young West Siberian brownfields, 
and b) a substantial number of new licenses that it may develop under the effective 
regulate-return greenfield taxation system. Investors can also gain some exposure 
to the sector trends and capex outlays in the sector via the oilfield services names. 
Top picks 
 Rosneft – While the government extracts most of the rents in the oil sector, 
Rosneft has the enviable position of being the best-positioned oil company within 
the sector. Its West Siberian brownfield assets – particularly its crown jewel 
Priobskoye field – are among the youngest and best in the region. With a tax 
system geared to strip out nearly all excess cash flows from the system at large, 
relative winners are absolute winners. The company also has preferential access 
to new resources in East Siberia and offshore (where only government-owned 
companies can operate). The development plan for Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye, 
Rosneft’s next big field, is to be submitted to the government in 4Q. If 
development and the necessary tax breaks are approved by the government, this 
will act as a catalyst for the stock. 
 Integra (OFS) – Integra is our top pick among the Russian oilfield services 
companies as: 1) it is the cheapest on ’12e P/E at 9.6x (CAT Oil 10.7x, Eurasia 
13.8x), 2) EBITDA growth in ’11e could hit 23%, 7% from improved margins & 
15.7% from order book growth; 3) margin expansion potential has not been 
exhausted yet due to better orders in the drilling & formation evaluation 
segments; and 4) debt restructuring last year freed up resources as interest costs 
now consume only 11% of EBITDA vs. 30% in 2010.  
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Impact of the rentier system on gas companies 
Rents from the gas industry are only partially extracted via taxation. The export duty 
regime only takes 30% of marginal price increases vs. 65% in the oil industry, and 
the gas Mineral Extraction Tax, while rising sharply, is still well below that applied to 
oil. However, additional rents have traditionally been levied on the industry via low 
regulated prices on domestic gas sales. Tallied up and converted to a combination 
of offsetting higher revenues and taxes, these rents have historically kept 
Gazprom’s tax burden in line with that of the oil companies. 
Additional rent extraction from the gas industry takes two forms: First, Novatek has 
become the favored gas company in the country, winning numerous new customers 
and production assets at the expense of Gazprom. Second, Gazprom’s $30-$40/bn 
per annum capex outlays have been a major source of rent redistribution. 
Strategy view 
Gas taxation will also be rising, and strongly, albeit from a relatively low base, and 
will be more than offset by higher domestic gas prices. We should see the rise in 
the gas MET for 2012 finalized in the coming days or weeks, which we think will 
likely come in near the MinFin’s desired 100% increase for Gazprom, and a much 
lower 6% for independent gas producers. Tariff increases for 2012 will take a bit 
longer to be determined, and we may not know their breakdown until well into 
autumn, if history is any guide. However, in spite of pre-election indications of only 
‘inflation-level’ increases of c6% rather than the currently approved plan of a 15% 
increase from 1 January 2012, we expect the full-year increase to be substantially. 
Novatek is an intriguing idea, but as a concept stock, the value of which will exceed 
the value of current producing assets by some indefinable amount, we cannot 
recommend it currently and rate it Hold (2M). 
Top picks 
 Gazprom – We like Gazprom not because we think the rentier system will be 
shifted in its favor – if anything, Novatek is winning domestically at Gazprom’s 
expense on the back of rentier-related transactions – but rather due to the rapidly 
improving outlook for the company’s export business. Gazprom strongly 
underperformed the market in 2009 on: a) fears surrounding its oil-linked 
European export contract structure, and b) falling export volumes. The fears have 
proven misplaced and export volumes are recovering rapidly. In our view it is time 
the stock regained its lost ground relative to other Russian oil & gas names. 
Specific catalysts we see in the next 6 to 12 months include: a) the start-up of the 
Nord Stream pipeline, which brings along an additional 22bcm of new contracts, 
volumes which roll in over 3-5 years; b) the Final Investment Decision for the 
Shtokman field, which we expect to be taken in December; c) the Chinese 
contract, which we expect to be signed by year-end or, failing that, some 
combination of; d) a decision to develop a 3rd LNG train at Sakhalin 2; and/or e) 
the development of a standalone LNG project at Vladivostok using some of the 
gas reserves currently intended to serve the Chinese market via pipeline. 
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Figure 30. Oil and gas stock performance  Figure 31. Russian energy sector relative performance  
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Figure 32. Oil and gas prices  Figure 33. 12m forward P/E 
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Figure 34. Energy stock valuation  
 Price, $ Target Rating Mcap  P/E EV/EBITDA EPS gth P/BV Div yld FCF yield  
 01/07/11 price, $  $ bln 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2011 2011 2012 
Gazprom 7.37 11.00 1M 174.4 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 17% 13% 0.7 1.8% 1% 3% 
Rosneft 8.46 11.30 1M 89.6 6.7 8.9 4.8 5.2 16% -24% 1.2 1.4% 10% 7% 
LUKoil 64.45 76.30 1M 54.8 4.2 4.4 2.8 2.8 33% -4% 0.7 3.7% 9% 10% 
TNK-BP Holding 3.17 3.27 2M 48.7 5.1 5.6 3.7 3.8 54% -9% 1.9 7.7% 10% 12% 
NOVATEK 13.12 130.00 2M 43.4 21.6 18.7 16.7 14.3 50% 15% 6.4 1.6% 2% 4% 
Surgutneftegaz 1.02 1.21 2H 40.2 10.3 9.3 2.1 2.0 -4% 11% 0.8 1.7% 17% 7% 
Gazprom Neft 4.74 6.30 1M 22.5 3.9 5.5 2.4 2.7 67% -29% 0.9 5.0% 14% 14% 
Tatneft 6.65 4.69 3H 15.0 6.5 6.7 5.6 5.5 49% -2% 1.0 3.0% 0% 10% 
Transneft 1477.42 2156.71 1H 9.2 2.0 2.5 2.4 2.7 20% -22% 0.3 0.9% -24% -13% 
KazMunaiGas EP 20.20 29.50 1M 8.5 4.4 5.2 1.4 0.9 24% -16% 0.9 7.1% 8% 8% 
Eurasia Drilling Company 30 40 1M 4.0 15.7 13.8 6.8 6.3 33% 14% 3.0 1.3% -1% 1% 
Alliance Oil Company 17.54 24.08 1H 3.0 5.5 5.7 4.1 3.9 180% -3% 1.2 0.0% -8% 14% 
Integra 3.15 5.50 1M 0.5 17.5 9.6 4.3 3.7 181% 79% 1.3 0.0% 3% 6% 
CAT Oil 9.85 14.53 1M 0.5 15.0 10.7 5.1 4.1 14% 40% 1.4 1.7% -15% 7% 
Russia-Oil & gas    500.9 5.3 5.4 3.7 3.5 26% -2% 0.9 2.7% 6% 6% 
EM-Oil    1836.0 8.4 8.3 5.2 5.0 27% 2% 1.4 2.9% 2% 4% 
DM-Oil    2817.0 10.8 10.0 7.7 5.2 -378% 87% 1.7 3.0% 3% 5%  
Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis 
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Impact of the rentier system on steel and coal companies 
Rents from the Russian steel and steel-related sector are largely extracted by the 
major controlling shareholders. While there was talk of introducing coal export 
duties, these never materialized. Likewise, there is no duty on exports of finished 
steel, and such duty has never been discussed. On the contrary, there is a 5% 
import duty on coking coal, and pipe imports from Ukraine are kept at bay by anti-
dumping duties on these pipes. It is fair to note though that the steel companies, 
even vertically integrated, are not as highly profitable as the mining companies. In 
the past few quarters, EBITDA margins in the sector have been in the 17-30% 
range. The pure mining plays are more profitable. Raspadskaya, a pure coking coal 
play, posted a 43% EBITDA margin in 2010, even though operations were heavily 
affected by an accident. The risks of heavier taxation are potentially significant for 
the pure play miners in our view, but not for the steel companies, especially non-
vertically integrated, such as NLMK or MMK, which is in fact an importer of iron ore. 
Strategy view 
Although often viewed as export-oriented, the sector partially fits the concept of 
investing into sectors where the rent ends up with domestic players. Indeed, 
domestic steel demand has largely reached the 2008 level, while domestic 
shipments by Russian mills well exceed exports, in both flat and long segment. 
We believe steel prices should be resilient in 3Q, while domestic apparent 
consumption could be close to 10% above that in 2010. Barring negative surprises 
from the Chinese steel pricing, most of the Russian steel companies should be able 
to maintain well above 20% EBITDA margins in 3Q. Vertical integration will remain a 
key theme. Since 2Q10, we have noticed a steady margin expansion at such 
vertically integrated companies like Severstal, but at the same time a marginal 
deterioration at non-integrated companies, such as NLMK. 
The sector has been an underperformer YTD, just as it was in 1H10. At the end of 
1H10, the Russian steel stocks were in the negative territory, down close to 15% on 
the average from the beginning of 2010. They traded on current (2010E) 
EV/EBITDA of 6.1, which represented a 4% discount to global steel peers. In 2H10, 
the steel stocks gained close to 40% as margins expanded. The stocks also rerated 
and were trading at close to 20% premium to global peers by the end of 2010. 
Top picks 
 Severstal – is our favourite vertically integrated play in the Russian steel sector, 
based on its strongly improving profitability still coupled with undemanding 
valuation aided by the exposure to gold, which should be helpful to reduce 
volatility.  The press reports (Bloomberg, 16 June 2011) that management is 
increasingly considering a gold company spin-off, possibly in the form of 
unbundling/ 
distributing shares in the new company to existing shareholders, as opposed to 
previous plans to do an IPO and offer stock to new investors. 
 Raspadskaya – against the backdrop of resilient global coking coal prices (note 
that our global commodity strategists just increased 2013 coking coal price 
forecast – see Bulk Commodities - No more tough times for the Coal Miner’s 
Daughter, by Daniel Hynes and team, 4 July 2011), we see Raspadskaya as a 
strongly undervalued domestic coal demand play, even on accident-depressed 
2011 forecasts. 
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Figure 35. Ferrous and steel-related stock performance  Figure 36. Russian ferrous sector relative performance  
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Figure 37. Steel and iron ore prices, $/ton  Figure 38. 12m forward P/E 
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Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis  Source: Datastream 
Figure 39. Ferrous stock valuation  
 Price, $ Target Rating Mcap  P/E EV/EBITDA EPS gth P/BV Div yld EBITDA margin  
 01/07/11 price, $  $ bln 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2011 2011 2012 
Novolipetsk Steel 4.07 5.30 1M 21.2 12.9 9.9 6.6 5.2 41% 30% 2.0 2.7% 37% 35% 
Severstal 18.76 24.00 1M 18.7 8.9 7.3 5.6 4.6 53% 23% 2.0 2.9% 26% 28% 
ENRC 12.86 16.06 1H 16.6 7.1 6.6 4.0 3.8 7% 6% 1.4 2.8% 53% 53% 
Evraz Group 31.50 38.00 3M 13.8 15.4 10.8 6.4 5.5 273% 43% 1.6 2.6% 23% 22% 
Mechel 24.64 40.00 1H 12.7 6.6 4.6 6.0 5.2 138% 42% 2.0 3.0% 30% 31% 
Magnitogorsk Steel 11.50 17.00 2M 9.7 9.9 10.0 5.1 4.8 61% -1% 1.0 1.5% 24% 23% 
Raspadskaya Coal 5.97 9.00 1H 4.7 8.5 5.8 5.6 3.6 124% 47% 2.3 2.4% 70% 72% 
TMK 18.80 17.00 3H 4.4 37.4 13.7 10.7 8.2 0% 174% 1.7 0.6% 14% 17% 
Russia-Steel    76.2 10.1 7.9 6.0 5.1 77% 28% 1.7 2.6% 28% 27% 
EM-Steel    463.5 8.1 7.7 5.3 4.7 42% 5% 1.5 3.1% 28% 28% 
DM-Steel    171.8 13.9 10.2 6.3 5.3 122% 37% 1.4 1.6% 12% 13%  
Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis 
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Impact of the rentier system on the non-ferrous sector 
Rents from the Russian non-ferrous metals and mining sector are largely extracted 
by major controlling shareholders, although the state is more proactive in 
administering taxation by export duties than in the steel sector. Norilsk Nickel is the 
most significant contributor, especially after the recent introduction of a variable 
LME-linked nickel export duty. We estimate that 2011 export duties on Norilsk will 
account for 8% of its total mining revenues and will as such amount to more than 
US$1bn. The mining tax should add close to 2% of revenue, but even bearing that 
in mind, we estimate that 2011 EBITDA margin will be above 50%. There are no 
export duties on potash or aluminium. Gold and silver production is not subject to 
any meaningful royalty taxes. As such, Uralkali generated an EBITDA margin of 
60% in 2010, Polymetal 41%, and Rusal 24% - bear in mind though that Rusal had 
an effective tax rate of 5%. We believe that if a more consistent taxation policy were 
pursued by the government, then the mining companies could be vulnerable to 
significantly higher export duties/royalties. 
Strategy view 
We now expect that India may have to settle at above the Chinese price as Arab 
Potash’s new contract with China (300kt) limits the options for India. It may well be 
the case that the Asian spot potash markets (currently priced at US$510/t) will move 
towards the LatAm spot price of US$550/t. Uralkali expects the spot price to reach 
US$600/t by year end, which, if it materializes, could put upward pressure on our 
and consensus estimates. 
In other segments, as commodities may remain flat to oscillating on a 3-month 
horizon, Norilsk may remain more resilient as management may continue investing 
its strong cash flows into buy-backs. YTD, Rusal has become much more 
attractively valued given its performance, but lacks catalysts. 
Overall, the investing success in the sector may remain dependent on being in the 
right commodity while allying oneself with the right commodity oligarch. 
Top picks 
 Uralkali – the stock appears fairly valued as compared to international potash 
and fertilizer peers. Having said that, we see upside risk to our forecasts if the 
company continues to successfully achieve premium prices on international 
markets, while domestic prices are more reflective of export parity (at least to 
NPK producers). The discounted sales to domestic farmers are the reason used 
by the group’s well-connected core shareholders to lobby the government not to 
impose export duties. Finally, our production estimates are conservative and do 
not fully reflect the announced 23% 2010-12 production growth through 
brownfield debottlenecking and optimization. 
 Norilsk Nickel – on 12-month forward-looking multiples, the stock is trading at 
close to a 10% discount to global diversified metals and mining peers, which is a 
historically low reading. Having said that, we are positive on Norilsk for two main 
reasons, the first being the price-driven increase in platinum group metals’ share 
in the company’s revenues. We are positive on palladium and Norilsk should 
benefit as it controls close to 40% of the global market share. The stock may also 
benefit form the higher valuation multiples prevailing in the global PGM sector. 
Secondly, the management seems to be committed to buying stock back on any 
weakness, which may not necessarily be driven by value-creation considerations, 
but could still be supportive in volatile market conditions. 
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Figure 40. Non-ferrous stock performance  Figure 41. Russian non-ferrous sector relative performance 
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Figure 42. Key metals prices, $/ton ($/oz for gold)  Figure 43. 12m forward P/E 
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Figure 44. Non-ferrous stock valuation  
 Price, $ Target Rating Mcap  P/E EV/EBITDA EPS gth P/BV Div yld EBITDA margin  
 01/07/11 price, $  $ bln 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2011 2011 2012 
Norilsk Nickel 264.30 320.00 1H 49.9 7.0 6.7 4.4 3.9 37% 5% 1.9 3.6% 53% 53% 
Uralkali 43.90 52.00 1H 27.2 12.2 11.6 10.1 9.5 96% 5% 6.7 4.9% 65% 63% 
Rusal 1.37 1.93 2H 20.9 5.4 4.8 5.0 3.6 34% 13% 1.3 0.0% 27% 28% 
Polyus Gold* 31.00  NR 11.8 13.5 10.6 10.4 8.1 124% 24% 2.9 1.6% 49% 52% 
Kazakhmys 22.49 24.92 1H 12.0 6.9 7.0 5.9 6.2 18% -2% 1.3 4.4% 55% 52% 
Polymetal 19.29 22.00 2M 7.0 14.3 14.1 9.1 8.4 118% 1% 4.7 0.0% 53% 48% 
Uranium One* 2.77  NR 2.7 16.4 10.6 7.5 5.3 1534% 42% 0.9 0.0% 63% 64% 
Petropavlovsk 12.03 13.38 2M 2.3 7.0 7.1 5.0 5.1 579% -1% 1.3 0.7% 45% 45% 
Russia-Base metals    75.4 6.5 6.0 4.6 3.8 38% 9% 1.7 2.5% 43% 44% 
Russia-Precious metals    7.0 14.3 14.1 9.1 8.4 118% 1% 4.7 0.0% 53% 48% 
EM-Base metals     8.5 8.0 5.2 4.6 46% 7% 1.9 3.0% 32% 32% 
EM-Precious metals     15.4 14.0 8.0 7.3 247% 9% 2.6 1.9% 43% 42%  
Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis. Items marked with * are sourced from Datastream consensus as non-rated 
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The impact of the rentier system on the banks 
The fortunes of the banking sector are intricately linked to the ebb and flow of 
Russia’s rentier economy. Rents extracted from the economy ultimately find their 
way into the banking sector (unless taken abroad) and are a key source of funding 
(both directly and indirectly). The high price of oil, and the currency appreciation that 
tends to follow, encourages foreign investors to lend to the sector which further 
reduces funding pressure. This reduces demand for retail deposits and, coupled 
with stubbornly high inflation, means real deposit rates often tend to be negative, 
which encourages borrowing and spending over frugality and saving. The banks 
thus benefit from healthy demand for high margin loans to the still under-banked 
consumer (retail lending amounts to just 9% of GDP). 
The largest banks are not only listed – providing them with some of the same 
“insurance” that listed resource companies enjoy, but they also remain controlled by 
the State. In a rentier environment, this provides additional protection as during the 
inevitable down cycles of the oil price the full balance sheet of the sovereign back 
these systemically important institutions. 
Strategy view 
We remain bullish on the Russian banking sector as we expect ongoing 
acceleration in loan growth, a stabilization of margins, and nomalisation of risk cost 
to continue to drive strong earnings growth. Now that inflation is trending upwards 
and real deposit rates have returned to negative territory we anticipate a bottoming 
of corporate lending yields and a pick up in demand for retail credit. Having lagged 
the oil and gas sectors, we expect banks, along with other consumer sectors, to 
rebound assuming the oil price stabilizes at current levels. 
Restructuring is another theme that supports our positive view on the sector: 
Sberbank is working to re-engineer the bank into a modern provider of universal 
banking services, VTB is working to integrate two new acquisitions (Transcreditbank 
and Bank of Moscow) with substantial State support in the case of the later, while 
NOMOS Bank is also integrating the recently acquired Bank Khanty Mansiysk. 
Top picks 
 Sberbank – We like Sberbank because of the bank’s strong franchise (just under 
50% retail deposit market share and a true nationwide presence) and an 
optimistic view on management’s efforts to restructuring the bank into a modern 
provider of financial services, which we expect will lead to increased sales of 
financial services and better efficiency. We expect the bank to maintain an ROE 
above 20%, which we think justifies a P/BV multiple higher than the bank’s 
current rating of 1.8x 2011 book. Additionally, the bank trades at an undemanding 
2011E P/E of 7.5x despite forecast CAGR in earnings of 34% from 2010-12E. 
 NOMOS Bank – We expect NOMOS Bank to continue to deliver on achieving its 
target of growing loans faster than the sector, to integrate Bank Khanty Mansiysk, 
and ultimately generate an ROE of 20% or more this year, which is considerably 
higher than VTB and Vozrozhdenie, and just below our forecast of Sberbank’s 
long-term sustainable ROE. Yet this doesn’t appear to be fully discounted in the 
current rating of the stock, which is trading at 1.57x 2011E book. We also note 
that we forecast the bank to generate a CAGR in 2010-12E proforma earnings of 
25%, which compares with a P/E of 8.7x this year and 7.1x next year. 
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Figure 45. Banks stock performance  Figure 46. Russian banking sector relative performance 
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Figure 47. Russian banks loan portfolio, $ bln  Figure 48. 12m trailing PB 
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Source: Bank of Russia  Source: Datastream 
Figure 49. Banks valuation  
 Price, $ Target Rating Mcap  P/E P/BV ROE EPS gth NIM  
 01/07/11 price, $  $ bln 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
Sberbank 3.76 5.00 1M 83.9 7.5 7.6 1.8 1.5 29% 22% 83% -2% 6.7% 6.4% 
VTB 6.28 7.67 1M 32.8 10.0 8.0 1.4 1.2 16% 17% 74% 25% 5.0% 4.9% 
NOMOS Bank 38.08 21.98 1M 3.3 8.7 7.1 1.6 1.3 21% 20% 64% 26% 4.8% 4.8% 
Halyk Bank 8.97 13.20 1M 2.4 11.8 7.4 1.5 1.3 13% 20% 16% 61% 4.5% 4.7% 
Kazkommertsbank 5.50 6.30 2H 2.1 13.1 6.2 0.8 0.7 6% 11% 23% 83% 2.5% 3.6% 
Bank of St. Petersburg* 5.04  NR 1.4 7.2 6.1 1.4 1.2 23% 23% 73% 18%   
Vozrozhdenie 33.04 50.20 1M 0.8 13.6 7.8 1.2 1.0 9% 14% 196% 74% 4.2% 4.6% 
Russia-Banks    120.9 8.1 7.7 1.7 1.4 24% 20% 81% 5% 6.1% 5.8% 
EM-Banks     9.5 8.0 1.6 1.4 18% 19% 30% 19% 3.2% 3.3% 
DM-Banks     10.5 8.5 0.9 0.8 8% 10% 27% 23% 1.7% 1.8%  
Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis. Items marked with * are sourced from Datastream consensus as non-rated 
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Impact of the rentier system on the consumer sector 
On the surface, the rentier system would appear to naturally favor consumer/retail 
stocks for two main reasons: consumer/retail companies are eventual recipients of 
the economic rents, primarily in the form of social payments, which are given to 
consumers, who eventually pass it on to consumer companies; and such companies 
are insulated against the risks/uncertainties around tax breaks and power shifts. 
However, in practice, such an investment case is not so straightforward. On the one 
hand, the majority of consumer stories available to equity investors (food retail, 
vodka, protein production) are driven more by structural elements than by pure 
consumption dynamics. In food retail, for instance, the majority of growth can be 
explained by selling space expansion and food inflation, which consumption trends 
have only a marginal effect on overall reported growth. On the other hand, while the 
Russian government has traditionally been hands-off when it comes to the 
consumer sector, this changed during the financial crisis in 2009. Recently, it has 
become increasingly active in the sector (the Retail Law in FY10, anti-alcohol 
reform, export bans on grain, increased social tax payments in FY11), which have 
created more uncertainty and volatility in the sector over the past two years. 
Strategy view 
We continue to maintain a favorable view on the consumer/retail sector in 2H11. 
While the deceleration in food inflation is likely to lead to declining LFL among food 
retailers, margins are likely to recover as the year progresses, maintaining positive 
earnings growth. On a lower inflation base in 2H11, we believe consumption trends 
are likely to look progressively better, further improving sentiment for the sector 
overall. 
Top picks 
 Synergy – A good stock in a tough sector: 1) stock underperformed due to SPO 
and to issues from more-liquid peer CEDC; 2) volume momentum remains strong 
and we expect double-digit growth in a declining market overall; 3) we believe the 
company’s strategy to leverage the regulatory changes to its advantage is likely 
to lead to volume growth above the 10% y-o-y targets; and 4) valuations remain 
compelling at a 50% discount to peers. 
 X5 Retail Group – Execution in FY11 should help close discount to Magnit: We 
believe the market is overly skeptical about X5’s ability to execute on organic 
rollout. We believe the company will meet or exceed FY11 targets of over 100 
organic openings and integration of 600 Kopeika stores, which implies 
management bandwidth for accelerating organic growth into FY12. 
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Figure 50. Consumer stock performance  Figure 51. Russian consumer sector relative performance 
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Figure 52. Retail sales, real  Figure 53. 12m forward P/E 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Jan
 08
Jul
 08
Jan
 09
Jul
 09
Jan
 10
Jul
 10
Jan
 11
Food retail, real y-o-y Non-food retail, real y-o-y
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Jan
 07
Jul
 07
Jan
 08
Jul
 08
Jan
 09
Jul
 09
Jan
 10
Jul
 10
Jan
 11
Jul
 11
Russian consumer EM consumer DM consumer
 
Source: Rosstat  Source: Datastream 
Figure 54. Consumer stock valuation  
 Price, $ Target Rating Mcap  P/E EV/EBITDA EPS gth P/BV Div yld EBITDA margin  
 01/07/11 price, $  $ bln 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2011 2011 2012 
Magnit 142.53 158.00 1M 12.7 30.8 21.6 15.3 11.4 23% 42% 6.0 0.3% 7.6% 7.9% 
X5 Retail Group 39.50 54.00 1M 10.7 33.0 20.6 12.3 9.4 16% 60% 4.5 0.0% 7.2% 7.5% 
Pharmstandard 22.30 26.00 1M 3.4 13.3 11.4 8.6 6.9 15% 17% 3.1 0.0% 39.9% 39.7% 
O'Key 11.10 15.00 1M 3.0 23.3 15.8 11.2 8.3 23% 48% 5.2 0.0% 7.9% 8.0% 
MHP 16.50 22.50 1M 1.8 8.5 8.3 6.8 6.8 8% 3% 2.1 0.0% 33.5% 32.9% 
Dixy Group 13.73 21.00 1M 1.2 42.7 25.7 8.4 6.8 109% 66% 5.1 0.0% 6.1% 6.3% 
M.Video 9.01 10.75 1M 1.6 15.1 11.4 6.4 4.7 34% 33% 3.6 1.3% 5.3% 5.7% 
Cherkizovo Group 18.55 21.00 2M 1.2 9.2 7.0 9.0 6.9 -8% 33% 1.5 0.0% 15.0% 17.7% 
Avangard 16.70 22.50 1M 1.1 5.7 5.7 5.0 4.8 2% 1% 1.2 0.0% 38.6% 35.8% 
CEDC 11.96 17.00 1H 0.9 11.4 9.1 8.9 7.9 94% 26% 0.5 0.0% 20.4% 21.3% 
Synergy Group 34.82 55.00 1H 0.7 8.7 7.4 5.4 4.4 46% 22% 1.2 0.0% 17.1% 17.4% 
Seventh Continent 8.26 10.00 2S 0.6 14.2 11.7 6.0 5.3 0% 22% 0.9 0.0% 7.7% 7.5% 
Rosinter 12.54 18.00 2H 0.2 18.1 9.5 7.0 4.7 12% 90% 3.6 0.0% 9.0% 11.2% 
Russia-Retail    30.8 29.6 20.0 12.5 9.6 24% 48% 4.8 0.2% 7.1% 7.4% 
Russia-Food products    5.2 11.4 9.4 8.1 6.4 13% 22% 2.1 0.0% 22.4% 23.4% 
EM-Retail     20.4 16.7 11.2 9.3 22% 23% 3.3 1.7% 9.2% 9.5% 
EM-Food products     18.1 13.2 10.7 9.3 22% 38% 2.9 2.2% 17.3% 17.6%  
Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis 
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The impact of the rentier system on the sector 
The benefit to the telecom sector from the rentier economy is twofold, in our view. 
First, it enjoys growth in the population’s consumption capacity, as the rents trickle 
down through the economy. Secondly, the ability of the owners to extract some of 
the rents in an environment of favourable regulation, which in can be viewed as a 
type of subsidy from the state. Examples of the latter include free mobile licenses 
(GSM 900/1800 MHz and UMTS 1.9-2.1GHz), historically little state intervention in 
pricing of mobile services, and regulatory approvals of price increases in fixed line. 
More recently, however, there has been a notable reduction in “subsidies” to the 
sector, especially in mobile, as we are seeing more resistance from the state to 
allocate remaining frequencies (LTE), more aggressive intervention into mobile 
pricing policies (international and regional roaming for example). This has coincided 
with the reorganization of the state-controlled fixed telecom sector, and therefore, 
could be interpreted as an attempt to redistribute some of the rent from the owners 
of mobile operators to the owners of incumbent fixed-line operators. 
Consumption capacity, which continue to increase as the benefits of higher 
commodity prices are passed down to the population, remains a driver of telecom 
growth. Despite SIM penetration over 150% (of population) and fixed penetration 
over 90% (of households) telecom revenue in Russia is growing in the high single 
digits. Industry profitability has been something of a concern in the past 12 months 
due to increased competition, but we see signs of competition subsiding which 
should drive a margin recovery, in mobile in particular, from 2Q11. 
Strategy view 
Year-to-date Russian mobiles have been one of the worst performers due to 
concerns over margin declines in the sector, driven primarily by the competition 
from No 2 operator MegaFon (not rated). Comments from the operators, as well as 
a decline in overall subscriber growth on the market so far this year, make us 
believe that margins are likely to recover (at least on the back of lower commission 
costs) from 2Q11. 
Top picks 
 MTS – We believe investor concerns over margin performance are well priced in; 
consensus expectations have come down in the past two months (consensus 
EBITDA margin forecast came down by 1.1pp to 42.4% for FY11, and by 0.4pp to 
42.5% for FY12). The stock is trading at 4.1x EV/EBITDA 2012e cons (8.8x 
PE12e) at discount to CEEMEA peers and offers 6.5% dividend yield FY11e (8% 
12e). 
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Figure 55. Russian mobile: Service revenue 
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Figure 56. Telecom and media stock performance  Figure 57. Telecom sector relative performance 
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Figure 58. Mobile market subscriber net adds (‘000s) - by Operator  Figure 59. 12m forward P/E 
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Figure 60. Telecom and media stock valuations  
 Price, $ Target Rating Mcap  P/E EV/EBITDA EPS gth P/BV Div yld EBITDA margin  
 01/07/11 price, $  $ bln 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2011 2011 2012 
Vimpelcom 12.78 27.00 1M 20.8 4.7 4.0 4.2 3.7 19% 18% 1.5 11.6% 49% 49% 
Rostelecom* 6.77  NR 19.9 16.3 14.6 5.9 5.5 12% 13% 2.0 1.5% 38% 39% 
MTS 19.14 28.00 1M 19.0 7.5 6.0 3.7 3.1 38% 25% 3.2 8.0% 48% 49% 
Mail.ru* 34.00  NR 7.1 44.9 31.8 31.5 22.1 99% 42% 4.0 0.0% 47% 49% 
CTC Media* 22.29  NR 3.5 18.8 15.0 11.5 9.1 27% 26% 3.9 3.1% 36% 37% 
Russia-Telecoms    39.8 5.8 4.8 4.0 3.4 27% 21% 2.0 9.9% 49% 49% 
EM-Telecoms    927.2 12.0 10.7 5.0 4.5 14% 11% 2.0 4.8% 38% 38%  
Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis. Items marked with * are sourced from Datastream consensus as non-rated 
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The impact of the rentier system on the sector 
Characteristics of the rentier economy are present mostly in the regulated rail 
sector, in our view. The current tariff structure is set up in a way to benefit 
commodity producers where cost of transportation is a meaningful portion of the 
commodity price. A suitable example of such commodity producers are coal 
companies where rail infrastructure and locomotive tariffs are set below the cost of 
providing these services. To fill in these profit shortfalls, higher tariffs are applied by 
RZhD (the government-owned national rail carrier) to commodities where 
transportation costs make up a smaller percentage of the commodity price. A good 
example of this cross-subsidization can be observed with ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals. The on-going rail reform is expected to harmonize these differences and to 
diminish the role of cross-subsidization. From a historical perspective, Russian 
railways often played the role of an intermediary between commodity producers and 
end users in the rentier economy. Tariff increases over the past few years have not 
been sufficient to cover elementary needs of the rail monopoly, with the government 
having to step in to provide capital injections in the form of direct subsidies. The 
most recent discussions on RZhD’s upcoming tariff rate increases advocated 
limiting annual hikes to the rate of inflation. Privatization of RZhD subsidiaries is one 
potential source of filling in the profit shortfall although this is unlikely to be sufficient 
to meet the monopoly’s needs and the government will likely have to step in with 
additional capital injections. 
Rail reforms were instrumental in liberalizing the railcar segment and attracting 
much-needed private capital to renew ageing rolling stock (e.g. Globaltrans). 
Liberalization of pricing in the locomotive segment and introduction of attractive 
terms may similarly allow private operators to participate in the renewal of the 
locomotive stock. 
Private ownership in the port segment is quite widespread in the Russian 
Federation with operators allowed to apply for tariff increases to the FTS (Federal 
Tariff Service) as long as they are justified by capital spending in port infrastructure 
or to offset inflationary pressures. In some geographic areas, where competition 
among port operators is high (e.g. Port of St. Petersburg), stevedoring operators are 
allowed to change pricing based on evolving market conditions. 
Strategy view 
Transport stocks are likely to be range-bound over July-August on an expected 
dearth of meaningful newsflow. That said, September is likely to breathe some life 
into the sector as a number of companies start reporting financial results (e.g. 
Globaltrans, TransContainer, Novorossiysk Commercial Seaport), the sale of a 75% 
stake in Freight One by auction (currently 100% owned by RZhD) should be 
underway and investors will be coming back from summer holidays searching for 
fresh ideas. 
Top picks 
 Globaltrans – Globaltrans is due to report 1H11 results in early September and 
we believe the data won’t disappoint. New railcar deployment coupled with 
positive dynamics in the company’s key cargoes gleaned from industry data 
should be key drivers behind the group’s 1H11 results. In addition, we believe the 
company will participate in the September Freight One auction. The stock trades 
at discounts of 22% and 19% on 2012E EV/EBITDA relative to DM and EM rail 
operators. 
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Figure 61. Transport and infrastructure stock performance  Figure 62. Russian transport sector relative performance 
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Figure 63. Rail transportation volumes  Figure 64. Airlines transportation volumes 
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Source: Rosstat  Source: Rosstat 
Figure 65. Transport and infrastructure stock valuation  
 Price, $ Target Rating Mcap  P/E EV/EBITDA EPS gth P/BV Div yld EBITDA margin  
 01/07/11 price, $  $ bln 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2011 2011 2012 
Globaltrans 18.55 24.25 1M 2.9 12.3 9.9 7.0 5.8 35% 24% 3.1 2.0% 41% 44% 
Transcontainer* 11.90  NR 1.7 19.9 12.3 7.9 5.9 193% 58% 2.2 5.1% 29% 32% 
Novorossiisk Commercial Seaport* 8.99  NR 2.3 8.4 6.8 4.4 3.3 8% 23% 1.8 0.7% 61% 62% 
FESCO* 0.47  NR 1.4 17.8 11.7 7.2 6.2 155% 42% 0.8 0.4% 20% 21% 
Aeroflot* 2.49  NR 2.8 9.0 7.3 5.6 5.4 -3% 18%  1.8% 14% 14% 
Mostotrest* 8.44  NR 2.4 15.5 11.8 6.4 4.9 144% 33% 5.2 1.0% 10% 11% 
LSR Group* 7.85  NR 4.0 18.3 9.5 10.1 6.3 278% 94% 2.1 0.3% 25% 30% 
PIK Group* 3.80  NR 1.9 82.6 15.8 14.8 9.2 119% 583% 4.6 0.0% 15% 17% 
Russia-Transport*    11.1 11.2 8.7 6.0 5.1 18% 26% 1.8 1.8% 24% 25% 
Russia-Real estate*    5.4 23.4 10.5 11.7 7.4 340% 157% 1.0 0.2% 30% 36% 
EM-Transport    215.4 18.0 13.7 8.4 7.3 -14% 31% 1.6 2.5% 20% 22% 
EM-Real estate*    864.9 12.0 10.4 10.3 8.6 22% 16% 1.1 2.7% 34% 34%  
Source: Citi Investment Research and Analysis. Items marked with * are sourced from Datastream consensus as non-rated 
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Figure 66. Currency performance  Figure 67. Country performance, MSCI USD indices 
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Figure 68. Global sector performance, MSCI World, USD  Figure 69. VIX 
2.7%
1.9%
1.8%
0.6%
0.5%
0.5%
0.1%
-0.2%
-0.2%
-1.4%
6.9%
1.6%
6.3%
1.6%
1.8%
0.9%
7.9%
12.2%
5.5%
6.7%
-4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14%
Consumer discretionary
Utilities
Industrials
Financials
IT
Materials
Energy
Healthcare
Telecoms
Comsumer staples
1m YTD
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
Jan
 10
Ma
r 1
0
Ma
y 1
0
Jul
 10
Se
p 1
0
No
v 1
0
Jan
 11
Ma
r 1
1
Ma
y 1
1
Jul
 11
 
Source: Datastream  Source: Datastream 
Figure 70. EMBI spreads  Figure 71. Commodity performance and forecasts 
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 Price 1M YTD Q4_2011 Q4_2012 
Oil WTI, $/bbl 95.42 -4.9% 4.4% 90 95 
Oil Brent, $/bbl 113.11 -3.1% 21.9% 100 100 
Oil Urals, $/bbl 110.04 -3.4% 21.0%   
Aluminium, $/ton 2 503.25 -5.6% 1.7% 2 772 2 671 
Copper, $/ton 9 414.00 3.6% -2.4% 9 727 9 248 
Zinc, US¢/lb 2 342.00 4.6% -4.2% 2 218 2 621 
Nickel, $/ton 23 395.00 0.7% -5.3% 28 224 27 090 
Steel, HRC Europe, 
$/ton 
761.45 1.4% 10.1% 819 819 
Gold, $/oz 1 510.78 -2.2% 6.6% 1 450 1 300 
Platinum, $/oz 1 722.00 -5.8% -1.9% 1 850 1 900 
Palladium, $/oz 761.00 -2.4% -4.5% 850 975 
Wheat, $/ton 236.81 -14.7% -17.4%    
Source: Datastream  Source: Datastream, Citi Investment Research and Analysis 
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Figure 72. 12m forward P/E  Figure 73. 12m trailing P/B 
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Source: Datastream  Source: Datastream 
Figure 74. Countries P/E  Figure 75. Currency PPP vs GDP per capita 
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Source: Datastream, Citi Investment Research and Analysis  Source: IMF 
Figure 76. Real effective ruble exchange rate  Figure 77. PE 2012 
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Transneft, VimpelCom, Bank VTB. 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. or an affiliate received compensation for products and services other than investment banking services from United Company 
Rusal, CEDC, Severstal, Dixy Group, Gazprom, Globaltrans, Norilsk Nickel, Evraz Group, Halyk Bank, Kazakhmys Plc, Kazkommertsbank, Kazmunaigas 
E&P, Lukoil, MMK, Mobile Telesystems OJSC, Mechel, Novatek OAO, Pharmstandard, X5 Retail Group, Rosneft, Rosinter, Sberbank RF, Gazpromneft, 
Surgutneftegaz, Tatneft, TNK-BP Holding, Transneft, VimpelCom, Bank VTB in the past 12 months. 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. currently has, or had within the past 12 months, the following as investment banking client(s): Bank VTB, CEDC, Severstal, 
Gazprom, Norilsk Nickel, Halyk Bank, Kazakhmys Plc, Kazmunaigas E&P, Lukoil, Mobile Telesystems OJSC, NOMOS-BANK OAO, Novatek OAO, 
Pharmstandard, Rosneft, Sberbank RF, Gazpromneft, Tatneft, Transneft, VimpelCom. 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. currently has, or had within the past 12 months, the following as clients, and the services provided were non-investment-
banking, securities-related: United Company Rusal, CEDC, Severstal, Dixy Group, Gazprom, Norilsk Nickel, Evraz Group, Halyk Bank, Kazakhmys Plc, 
Kazkommertsbank, Kazmunaigas E&P, Lukoil, MMK, Mobile Telesystems OJSC, Novatek OAO, Pharmstandard, X5 Retail Group, Rosneft, Sberbank RF, 
Gazpromneft, Surgutneftegaz, Tatneft, TNK-BP Holding, Transneft, VimpelCom, Bank VTB. 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. currently has, or had within the past 12 months, the following as clients, and the services provided were non-investment-
banking, non-securities-related: United Company Rusal, CEDC, Severstal, Dixy Group, Gazprom, Globaltrans, Norilsk Nickel, Evraz Group, Halyk Bank, 
Kazakhmys Plc, Kazkommertsbank, Kazmunaigas E&P, Lukoil, MMK, Mobile Telesystems OJSC, Mechel, Novatek OAO, Pharmstandard, X5 Retail Group, 
Rosneft, Rosinter, Sberbank RF, Gazpromneft, Surgutneftegaz, Tatneft, TNK-BP Holding, Transneft, VimpelCom, Bank VTB. 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. or an affiliate received compensation in the past 12 months from Bank VTB. 
Analysts' compensation is determined based upon activities and services intended to benefit the investor clients of Citigroup Global Markets Inc. and its 
affiliates ("the Firm"). Like all Firm employees, analysts receive compensation that is impacted by overall firm profitability which includes investment banking 
revenues. 
The Firm is a market maker in the publicly traded equity securities of United Company Rusal, CEDC, Gazprom, Norilsk Nickel, Lukoil, Gazpromneft, 
Surgutneftegaz. 
For important disclosures (including copies of historical disclosures) regarding the companies that are the subject of this Citi Investment Research & Analysis 
product ("the Product"), please contact Citi Investment Research & Analysis, 388 Greenwich Street, 28th Floor, New York, NY, 10013, Attention: 
Legal/Compliance. In addition, the same important disclosures, with the exception of the Valuation and Risk assessments and historical disclosures, are 
contained on the Firm's disclosure website at www.citigroupgeo.com.   Valuation and Risk assessments can be found in the text of the most recent research 
note/report regarding the subject company. Historical disclosures (for up to the past three years) will be provided upon request. 
Citi Investment Research & Analysis Ratings Distribution       
 12 Month Rating Relative Rating 
Data current as of 30 Jun 2011 Buy Hold Sell Buy Hold Sell
Citi Investment Research & Analysis Global Fundamental Coverage 54% 36% 11% 10% 81% 10%
% of companies in each rating category that are investment banking clients 45% 41% 42% 50% 42% 44%
Citi Investment Research & Analysis Quantitative World Radar Screen Model Coverage 30% 40% 30%  
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% of companies in each rating category that are investment banking clients 26% 21% 20%  
Citi Investment Research & Analysis Quantitative Decision Tree Model Coverage 48% 0% 52%  
% of companies in each rating category that are investment banking clients 53% 0% 43%  
Citi Investment Research & Analysis Asia Quantitative Radar Screen Model Coverage 20% 60% 20%  
% of companies in each rating category that are investment banking clients 26% 23% 19%  
Citi Investment Research & Analysis Australia Radar Model Coverage 49% 0% 51%  
% of companies in each rating category that are investment banking clients 35% 0% 8%  
Guide to Citi Investment Research & Analysis (CIRA) Fundamental Research Investment Ratings: 
CIRA's stock recommendations include a risk rating and an investment rating. 
Risk ratings, which take into account both price volatility and fundamental criteria, are: Low (L), Medium (M), High (H), and Speculative (S). 
Investment ratings are a function of CIRA's expectation of total return (forecast price appreciation and dividend yield within the next 12 months) and risk 
rating. 
Analysts may place covered stocks “Under Review” in response to exceptional circumstances (e.g. lack of information critical to the analyst's thesis) 
affecting the company and/or trading in the company's securities (e.g. trading suspension). Stocks placed “Under Review” will be monitored daily by 
management. As soon as practically possible, the analyst will publish a note re-establishing a rating and investment thesis. 
To satisfy regulatory requirements, we correspond Under Review to Hold in our ratings distribution table for our 12-month fundamental rating system. 
However, we reiterate that we do not consider Under Review to be a recommendation. 
Relative three-month ratings: CIRA may also assign a three-month relative call (or rating) to a stock to highlight expected out-performance (most 
preferred) or under-performance (least preferred) versus the analyst's coverage universe over a 3 month period. The relative call may highlight a specific 
near-term catalyst or event impacting the company or the market that is anticipated to have a short-term price impact on the equity securities of the 
company. Absent any specific catalyst the analyst(s) will indicate the most and least preferred stocks in his coverage universe, explaining the basis for this 
short-term view. This three-month view may be different from and does not affect a stock's fundamental equity rating, which reflects a longer-term total 
absolute return expectation. For purposes of NASD/NYSE ratings-distribution-disclosure rules, most preferred calls correspond to a buy recommendation 
and least preferred calls correspond to a sell recommendation. Any stock not assigned to a most preferred or least preferred call is considered non-relative-
rated (NRR). For purposes of NASD/NYSE ratings-distribution-disclosure rules we correspond NRR to Hold in our ratings distribution table for our 3-month 
relative rating system. However, we reiterate that we do not consider NRR to be a recommendation. 
For securities in developed markets (US, UK, Europe, Japan, and Australia/New Zealand), investment ratings are:Buy (1) (expected total return of 10% or 
more for Low-Risk stocks, 15% or more for Medium-Risk stocks, 20% or more for High-Risk stocks, and 35% or more for Speculative stocks); Hold (2) (0%-
10% for Low-Risk stocks, 0%-15% for Medium-Risk stocks, 0%-20% for High-Risk stocks, and 0%-35% for Speculative stocks); and Sell (3) (negative total 
return). 
For securities in emerging markets (Asia Pacific, Emerging Europe/Middle East/Africa, and Latin America), investment ratings are:Buy (1) (expected total 
return of 15% or more for Low-Risk stocks, 20% or more for Medium-Risk stocks, 30% or more for High-Risk stocks, and 40% or more for Speculative 
stocks); Hold (2) (5%-15% for Low-Risk stocks, 10%-20% for Medium-Risk stocks, 15%-30% for High-Risk stocks, and 20%-40% for Speculative stocks); 
and Sell (3) (5% or less for Low-Risk stocks, 10% or less for Medium-Risk stocks, 15% or less for High-Risk stocks, and 20% or less for Speculative stocks). 
Investment ratings are determined by the ranges described above at the time of initiation of coverage, a change in investment and/or risk rating, or a change 
in target price (subject to limited management discretion). At other times, the expected total returns may fall outside of these ranges because of market price 
movements and/or other short-term volatility or trading patterns. Such interim deviations from specified ranges will be permitted but will become subject to 
review by Research Management. Your decision to buy or sell a security should be based upon your personal investment objectives and should be made 
only after evaluating the stock's expected performance and risk. 
Guide to Citi Investment Research & Analysis (CIRA) Quantitative Research Investment Ratings: 
CIRA Quantitative Research World Radar Screen recommendations are based on a globally consistent framework to measure relative value and momentum 
for a large number of stocks across global developed and emerging markets. Relative value and momentum rankings are equally weighted to produce a 
global attractiveness score for each stock. The scores are then ranked and put into deciles. A stock with a decile rating of 1 denotes an attractiveness score 
in the top 10% of the universe (most attractive). A stock with a decile rating of 10 denotes an attractiveness score in the bottom 10% of the universe (least 
attractive). 
CIRA Asia Quantitative Radar Screen model recommendations are based on a regionally consistent framework to measure relative value and momentum for 
a large number of stocks across regional developed and emerging markets. Relative value and momentum rankings are equally weighted to produce a 
global attractiveness score for each stock. The scores are then ranked and put into quintiles. A stock with a quintile rating of 1 denotes an attractiveness 
score in the top 20% of the universe (most attractive). A stock with a quintile rating of 5 denotes an attractiveness score in the bottom 20% of the universe 
(least attractive). 
CIRA Australia Quantitative Radar Screen model recommendations are based on a robust framework to measure relative value and momentum for a large 
number of stocks across the Australian market. Stocks with a ranking of 1 denotes a stock that is above average in terms of both value and momentum 
relative to the stocks in the Australian market. A ranking of 10 denotes a stock that is below average in terms of both value and momentum relative to the 
stocks in the Australian market. 
CIRA Quantitative Decision Tree model recommendations are based on a predetermined set of factors to rate the relative attractiveness of stocks. These 
factors are detailed in the text of the report. The Decision Tree model forecasts whether stocks are attractive or unattractive relative to other stocks in the 
same sector (based on the Russell 1000 sector classifications). 
For purposes of NASD/NYSE ratings-distribution-disclosure rules, a Citi Investment Research & Analysis (CIRA) Quantitative World Radar Screen 
recommendation of (1), (2) or (3) most closely corresponds to a buy recommendation; a recommendation from this product group of (4), (5), (6) or (7) most 
closely corresponds to a hold recommendation; and a recommendation of (8), (9) or (10) most closely corresponds to a sell recommendation.  An (NR) 
recommendation indicates that the stock is no longer in the screen. 
For purposes of NASD/NYSE ratings distribution disclosure rules, a CIRA Asia Quantitative Radar Screen recommendation of (1) most closely corresponds 
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to a buy recommendation; a CIRA Asia Quantitative Radar Screen recommendation of (2), (3), (4) most closely corresponds to a hold recommendation; and 
a recommendation of (5) most closely corresponds to a sell recommendation.  An (NR) recommendation indicates that the stock is no longer in the screen. 
For purposes of NASD/NYSE ratings-distribution-disclosure rules, a CIRA Quantitative Research Decision Tree model or Quantitative Research Australia 
Radar Screen recommendation of "attractive" (1) most closely corresponds to a buy recommendation. All other stocks in the sector are considered to be 
"unattractive" (10) which most closely corresponds to a sell recommendation.  An (NR)/(0) recommendation indicates that the stock is no longer in the 
screen. 
Recommendations are based on the relative attractiveness of a stock, thus can not be directly equated to buy, hold and sell categories. Accordingly, your 
decision to buy or sell a security should be based on your personal investment objectives and only after evaluating the stock's expected relative 
performance. 
NON-US RESEARCH ANALYST DISCLOSURES 
Non-US research analysts who have prepared this report (i.e., all research analysts listed below other than those identified as employed by Citigroup Global 
Markets Inc.) are not registered/qualified as research analysts with FINRA. Such research analysts may not be associated persons of the member 
organization and therefore may not be subject to the NYSE Rule 472 and NASD Rule 2711 restrictions on communications with a subject company, public 
appearances and trading securities held by a research analyst account. The legal entities employing the authors of this report are listed below: 
ZAO Citibank Kingsmill Bond; Andrey Kuznetsov; Mikhail Seleznev, CFA; Brady Martin, CFA; Ronald Paul 
Smith; Kirill Kazanli, CFA; Daniel Yakub; Maria Semikhatova; Natalia Novikova 
Citigroup Global Markets Ltd Kenan Najafov; Rhys D Summerton; Simon Nellis; Mark C Fletcher; Elina Ribakova; Jon H 
Bergtheil; Anindya Mohinta; Andrew Howell, CFA 
OTHER DISCLOSURES 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. and/or its affiliates has a significant financial interest in relation to United Company Rusal, Severstal, Gazprom, Rosneft, 
Gazpromneft, VimpelCom, Bank VTB. (For an explanation of the determination of significant financial interest, please refer to the policy for managing 
conflicts of interest which can be found at www.citigroupgeo.com.) 
For securities recommended in the Product in which the Firm is not a market maker, the Firm is a liquidity provider in the issuers' financial instruments and 
may act as principal in connection with such transactions. The Firm is a regular issuer of traded financial instruments linked to securities that may have been 
recommended in the Product. The Firm regularly trades in the securities of the issuer(s) discussed in the Product. The Firm may engage in securities 
transactions in a manner inconsistent with the Product and, with respect to securities covered by the Product, will buy or sell from customers on a principal 
basis. 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. or its affiliates acts as a corporate broker to Severstal, Kazakhmys Plc. 
Securities recommended, offered, or sold by the Firm: (i) are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (ii) are not deposits or other 
obligations of any insured depository institution (including Citibank); and (iii) are subject to investment risks, including the possible loss of the principal 
amount invested. Although information has been obtained from and is based upon sources that the Firm believes to be reliable, we do not guarantee its 
accuracy and it may be incomplete and condensed. Note, however, that the Firm has taken all reasonable steps to determine the accuracy and 
completeness of the disclosures made in the Important Disclosures section of the Product. The Firm's research department has received assistance from 
the subject company(ies) referred to in this Product including, but not limited to, discussions with management of the subject company(ies). Firm policy 
prohibits research analysts from sending draft research to subject companies. However, it should be presumed that the author of the Product has had 
discussions with the subject company to ensure factual accuracy prior to publication. All opinions, projections and estimates constitute the judgment of the 
author as of the date of the Product and these, plus any other information contained in the Product, are subject to change without notice. Prices and 
availability of financial instruments also are subject to change without notice. Notwithstanding other departments within the Firm advising the companies 
discussed in this Product, information obtained in such role is not used in the preparation of the Product. Although Citi Investment Research & Analysis 
(CIRA) does not set a predetermined frequency for publication, if the Product is a fundamental research report, it is the intention of CIRA to provide research 
coverage of the/those issuer(s) mentioned therein, including in response to news affecting this issuer, subject to applicable quiet periods and capacity 
constraints. The Product is for informational purposes only and is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of a security. Any decision 
to purchase securities mentioned in the Product must take into account existing public information on such security or any registered prospectus. 
Investing in non-U.S. securities, including ADRs, may entail certain risks. The securities of non-U.S. issuers may not be registered with, nor be subject to the 
reporting requirements of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. There may be limited information available on foreign securities. Foreign 
companies are generally not subject to uniform audit and reporting standards, practices and requirements comparable to those in the U.S. Securities of 
some foreign companies may be less liquid and their prices more volatile than securities of comparable U.S. companies. In addition, exchange rate 
movements may have an adverse effect on the value of an investment in a foreign stock and its corresponding dividend payment for U.S. investors. Net 
dividends to ADR investors are estimated, using withholding tax rates conventions, deemed accurate, but investors are urged to consult their tax advisor for 
exact dividend computations. Investors who have received the Product from the Firm may be prohibited in certain states or other jurisdictions from 
purchasing securities mentioned in the Product from the Firm. Please ask your Financial Consultant for additional details. Citigroup Global Markets Inc. 
takes responsibility for the Product in the United States. Any orders by US investors resulting from the information contained in the Product may be placed 
only through Citigroup Global Markets Inc. 
Important Disclosures for Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC Customers: Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated (Morgan Stanley) research reports may 
be available about the companies that are the subject of this Citi Investment Research & Analysis (CIRA) research report. Ask your Financial Advisor or use 
smithbarney.com to view any available Morgan Stanley research reports in addition to CIRA research reports. 
Important disclosure regarding the relationship between the companies that are the subject of this CIRA research report and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney 
LLC and its affiliates are available at the Morgan Stanley Smith Barney disclosure website at www.morganstanleysmithbarney.com/researchdisclosures. 
The required disclosures provided by Morgan Stanley and Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. on Morgan Stanley and CIRA research relate in part to the 
separate businesses of Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. and Morgan Stanley that now form Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, rather than to Morgan Stanley 
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Smith Barney LLC in its entirety. For Morgan Stanley and Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. specific disclosures, you may refer to 
www.morganstanley.com/researchdisclosures and https://www.citigroupgeo.com/geopublic/Disclosures/index_a.html. 
This CIRA research report has been reviewed and approved on behalf of Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC. This review and approval was conducted by 
the same person who reviewed this research report on behalf of CIRA. This could create a conflict of interest. 
The Citigroup legal entity that takes responsibility for the production of the Product is the legal entity which the first named author is employed 
by.  The Product is made available in Australia through Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd. (ABN 64 003 114 832 and AFSL No. 240992), participant 
of the ASX Group and regulated by the Australian Securities & Investments Commission.  Citigroup Centre, 2 Park Street, Sydney, NSW 2000.  The Product 
is made available in Australia to Private Banking wholesale clients through Citigroup Pty Limited (ABN 88 004 325 080 and AFSL 238098). Citigroup Pty 
Limited provides all financial product advice to Australian Private Banking wholesale clients through bankers and relationship managers.  If there is any 
doubt about the suitability of investments held in Citigroup Private Bank accounts, investors should contact the Citigroup Private Bank in Australia.  Citigroup 
companies may compensate affiliates and their representatives for providing products and services to clients.  The Product is made available in Brazil by 
Citigroup Global Markets Brasil - CCTVM SA, which is regulated by CVM - Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, BACEN - Brazilian Central Bank, APIMEC - 
Associação dos Analistas e Profissionais de Investimento do Mercado de Capitais and ANBID - Associação Nacional dos Bancos de Investimento.  Av. 
Paulista, 1111 - 11º andar - CEP. 01311920 - São Paulo - SP.  If the Product is being made available in certain provinces of Canada by Citigroup Global 
Markets (Canada) Inc. ("CGM Canada"), CGM Canada has approved the Product.  Citigroup Place, 123 Front Street West, Suite 1100, Toronto, Ontario M5J 
2M3.  This product is available in Chile through Banchile Corredores de Bolsa S.A., an indirect subsidiary of Citigroup Inc., which is regulated by the 
Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros. Agustinas 975, piso 2, Santiago, Chile. The Product is made available in France by Citigroup Global Markets 
Limited, which is authorised and regulated by Financial Services Authority.  1-5 Rue Paul Cézanne, 8ème, Paris, France.  The Product is distributed in 
Germany by Citigroup Global Markets Deutschland AG ("CGMD"), which is regulated by Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin). CGMD, 
Reuterweg 16, 60323 Frankfurt am Main. If the Product is made available in Hong Kong by, or on behalf of, Citigroup Global Markets Asia Ltd., it is 
attributable to Citigroup Global Markets Asia Ltd., Citibank Tower, Citibank Plaza, 3 Garden Road, Hong Kong.  Citigroup Global Markets Asia Ltd. is 
regulated by Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission.  If the Product is made available in Hong Kong by The Citigroup Private Bank to its clients, it is 
attributable to Citibank N.A., Citibank Tower, Citibank Plaza, 3 Garden Road, Hong Kong.  The Citigroup Private Bank and Citibank N.A. is regulated by the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority.  The Product is made available in India by Citigroup Global Markets India Private Limited, which is regulated by Securities 
and Exchange Board of India.  Bakhtawar, Nariman Point, Mumbai 400-021.  The Product is made available in Indonesia through PT Citigroup Securities 
Indonesia.  5/F, Citibank Tower, Bapindo Plaza, Jl. Jend. Sudirman Kav. 54-55, Jakarta 12190.  Neither this Product nor any copy hereof may be distributed 
in Indonesia or to any Indonesian citizens wherever they are domiciled or to Indonesian residents except in compliance with applicable capital market laws 
and regulations. This Product is not an offer of securities in Indonesia. The securities referred to in this Product have not been registered with the Capital 
Market and Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency (BAPEPAM-LK) pursuant to relevant capital market laws and regulations, and may not be offered or 
sold within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia or to Indonesian citizens through a public offering or in circumstances which constitute an offer within the 
meaning of the Indonesian capital market laws and regulations.  The Product is made available in Israel through Citibank NA, regulated by the Bank of Israel 
and the Israeli Securities Authority. Citibank, N.A, Platinum Building, 21 Ha'arba'ah St, Tel Aviv, Israel.   The Product is made available in Italy by Citigroup 
Global Markets Limited, which is authorised and regulated by Financial Services Authority.  Foro Buonaparte 16, Milan, 20121, Italy.  The Product is made 
available in Japan by Citigroup Global Markets Japan Inc. ("CGMJ"), which is regulated by Financial Services Agency, Securities and Exchange 
Surveillance Commission, Japan Securities Dealers Association, Tokyo Stock Exchange and Osaka Securities Exchange.  Shin-Marunouchi Building, 1-5-1 
Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-6520 Japan. If the Product was distributed by Nikko Cordial Securities Inc. it is being so distributed under license.  In 
the event that an error is found in an CGMJ research report, a revised version will be posted on the Firm's Global Equities Online (GEO) website.  If you 
have questions regarding GEO, please call (81 3) 6270-3019 for help.   The Product is made available in Korea by Citigroup Global Markets Korea 
Securities Ltd., which is regulated by the Financial Services Commission, the Financial Supervisory Service and the Korea Financial Investment Association 
(KOFIA). Citibank Building, 39 Da-dong, Jung-gu, Seoul 110-180, Korea.   KOFIA makes available registration information of research analysts on its 
website.  Please visit the following website if you wish to find KOFIA registration information on research analysts of Citigroup Global Markets Korea 
Securities Ltd.  http://dis.kofia.or.kr/fs/dis2/fundMgr/DISFundMgrAnalystPop.jsp?companyCd2=A03030&pageDiv=02.  The Product is made available in 
Malaysia by Citigroup Global Markets Malaysia Sdn Bhd, which is regulated by Malaysia Securities Commission.  Menara Citibank, 165 Jalan Ampang, 
Kuala Lumpur, 50450.  The Product is made available in Mexico by Acciones y Valores Banamex, S.A. De C. V., Casa de Bolsa, Integrante del Grupo 
Financiero Banamex ("Accival") which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Citigroup Inc. and is regulated by Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores. Reforma 
398, Col. Juarez, 06600 Mexico, D.F.  In New Zealand the Product is made available through Citigroup Global Markets New Zealand Ltd. (Company 
Number 604457), a Participant of the New Zealand Exchange Limited and regulated by the New Zealand Securities Commission.  Level 19, Mobile on the 
Park, 157 Lambton Quay, Wellington.  The Product is made available in Pakistan by Citibank N.A. Pakistan branch, which is regulated by the State Bank of 
Pakistan and Securities Exchange Commission, Pakistan. AWT Plaza, 1.1. Chundrigar Road, P.O. Box 4889, Karachi-74200.  The Product is made available 
in the Philippines through Citicorp Financial Services and Insurance Brokerage Philippines, Inc., which is regulated by the Philippines Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 20th Floor Citibank Square Bldg. The Product is made available in Poland by Dom Maklerski Banku Handlowego SA an indirect 
subsidiary of Citigroup Inc., which is regulated by Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego.  Dom Maklerski Banku Handlowego S.A. ul.Senatorska 16, 00-923 
Warszawa.  The Product is made available in the Russian Federation through ZAO Citibank, which is licensed to carry out banking activities in the Russian 
Federation in accordance with the general banking license issued by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and brokerage activities in accordance with 
the license issued by the Federal Service for Financial Markets.  Neither the Product nor any information contained in the Product shall be considered as 
advertising the securities mentioned in this report within the territory of the Russian Federation or outside the Russian Federation.  The Product does not 
constitute an appraisal within the meaning of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation of 29 July 1998 No. 135-FZ (as amended) On Appraisal Activities in 
the Russian Federation.  8-10 Gasheka Street, 125047 Moscow.  The Product is made available in Singapore through Citigroup Global Markets Singapore 
Pte. Ltd., a Capital Markets Services Licence holder, and regulated by Monetary Authority of Singapore.  1 Temasek Avenue, #39-02 Millenia Tower, 
Singapore 039192.  The Product is made available by The Citigroup Private Bank in Singapore through Citibank, N.A., Singapore branch, a licensed bank in 
Singapore that is regulated by Monetary Authority of Singapore. This report is distributed in Singapore by Citibank Singapore Ltd ("CSL") to selected 
Citigold/Citigold Private Clients. CSL provides no independent research or analysis of the substance or in preparation of this report. Please contact your 
Citigold//Citigold Private Client Relationship Manager in CSL if you have any queries on or any matters arising from or in connection with this report.   
Citigroup Global Markets (Pty) Ltd. is incorporated in the Republic of South Africa (company registration number 2000/025866/07) and its registered office 
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is at 145 West Street, Sandton, 2196, Saxonwold. Citigroup Global Markets (Pty) Ltd. is regulated by JSE Securities Exchange South Africa, South African 
Reserve Bank and the Financial Services Board.  The investments and services contained herein are not available to private customers in South Africa.  The 
Product is made available in Spain by Citigroup Global Markets Limited, which is authorised and regulated by Financial Services Authority.  29 Jose Ortega 
Y Gassef, 4th Floor, Madrid, 28006, Spain.  The Product is made available in Taiwan through Citigroup Global Markets Taiwan Securities Company Ltd., 
which is regulated by Securities & Futures Bureau. No portion of the report may be reproduced or quoted in Taiwan by the press or any other person. 14 and 
15F, No. 1, Songzhi Road, Taipei 110, Taiwan. If the Product is related to non-Taiwan listed securities, neither the Product nor any information contained in 
the Product shall be considered as advertising the securities or making recommendation of the securities.  The Product is made available in Thailand 
through Citicorp Securities (Thailand) Ltd., which is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand.  18/F, 22/F and 29/F, 82 North 
Sathorn Road, Silom, Bangrak, Bangkok 10500, Thailand.  The Product is made available in Turkey through Citibank AS which is regulated by Capital 
Markets Board.  Tekfen Tower, Eski Buyukdere Caddesi # 209 Kat 2B, 23294 Levent, Istanbul, Turkey.  In the U.A.E, these materials (the "Materials") are 
communicated by Citigroup Global Markets Limited, DIFC branch ("CGML"), an entity registered in the Dubai International Financial Center ("DIFC") and 
licensed and regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority ("DFSA" to Professional Clients and Market Counterparties only and should not be relied 
upon or distributed to Retail Clients. A distribution of the different CIRA ratings distribution, in percentage terms for Investments in each sector covered is 
made available on request.  Financial products and/or services to which the Materials relate will only be made available to Professional Clients and Market 
Counterparties.  The Product is made available in United Kingdom by Citigroup Global Markets Limited, which is authorised and regulated by Financial 
Services Authority.  This material may relate to investments or services of a person outside of the UK or to other matters which are not regulated by the FSA 
and further details as to where this may be the case are available upon request in respect of this material.  Citigroup Centre, Canada Square, Canary Wharf, 
London, E14 5LB.  The Product is made available in United States by Citigroup Global Markets Inc, which is a member of FINRA and registered with the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 388 Greenwich Street, New York, NY 10013.   Unless specified to the contrary, within EU Member States, the 
Product is made available by Citigroup Global Markets Limited, which is regulated by Financial Services Authority.  
Pursuant to Comissão de Valores Mobiliários Rule 483, Citi is required to disclose whether a Citi related company or business has a commercial relationship 
with the subject company. Considering that Citi operates multiple businesses in more than 100 countries around the world, it is likely that Citi has a 
commercial relationship with the subject company.  
Many European regulators require that a firm must establish, implement and make available a policy for managing conflicts of interest arising as a result of 
publication or distribution of investment research. The policy applicable to CIRA's Products can be found at www.citigroupgeo.com.   
Compensation of equity research analysts is determined by equity research management and Citigroup's senior management and is not linked to specific 
transactions or recommendations.   
The Product may have been distributed simultaneously, in multiple formats, to the Firm's worldwide institutional and retail customers.  The Product is not to 
be construed as providing investment services in any jurisdiction where the provision of such services would not be permitted.  
Subject to the nature and contents of the Product, the investments described therein are subject to fluctuations in price and/or value and investors may get 
back less than originally invested. Certain high-volatility investments can be subject to sudden and large falls in value that could equal or exceed the amount 
invested. Certain investments contained in the Product may have tax implications for private customers whereby levels and basis of taxation may be subject 
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via the aforementioned distribution channels. 
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trademarks and service marks of Citigroup Inc. and its affiliates and are used and registered throughout the world. All rights reserved. Any unauthorized use, 
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BANK OF ENGLAND
Public Information and Enquiries Group
Public Communications and Information Division
T 020 7601 4878
F 020 7601 5460
enquiries@bankofengland.co.uk
Morten Dyrmose
School of Economics & Finance
University of St Andrews
via email to:
md284@st-andrews.ac.uk
6 February 2012
Please quote ref. FF 26277 on all
correspondence
Dear Mr Dyrmose
Thank you for your email dated 8 January, in which you ask:
7 would like to know the names of the Bank of England's auditor firms and law firms going back to
the year 1850; or the closest year to this if a firm was employed before the year 1850 (e.g. 1848).
In addition, I would like to know the actual period (dates) that each firm was employed by the
Bank of England.'
The Bank of England {'the Bank') first employed an external auditor in 1919, Deloitte, which became
Deloitte Haskins & Sells in 1952. In 1990 the Bank was audited by Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte following
a merger between Deloitte Haskins and Sells (UK) and Coopers and Lybrand. In 1993 Coopers &
Lybrand were the Bank's auditors, after Deloitte was dropped from the firm's name, and in 1998 Coopers
& Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse to become PricewaterhouseCoopers, who were then the Bank's
auditors from 1999 onwards. In 2006, as you are aware, KPMG Audit pic was appointed as the Bank's
external auditors.
Turning now to law firms, it was the Bank's practice in 1850 and for many years thereafter to appoint an
individual lawyer rather than a law firm as such as the Bank's 'attorney and solicitor'. Based on some
research we have conducted in the Bank in response to your request, the following individuals held that
office from 1850, in some cases the office was held on a joint basis: J Freshfield (1840-57); C Freshfield
(1840-70); H Freshfield (1857-77); W D Freshfield (1869-1903); E Freshfield (1869-1918); E H Freshfield
(1892-1921); SirWH Leese (1916-1937?). Following the death of Sir William Leese, no successors were
formally appointed as the Bank's 'Attorney and Solicitor1. The Bank maintained a close connection with
the firm of Freshfields after the Second World War, but worked increasingly with an ever-widening range
of law firms and barristers, as and when necessary. Since 1992 the Bank has had its own in-house legal
department and much of the Bank's legal work has been handled in-house. During the last 20 years or so
the Bank has worked with a vast number of different law firms and external counsel in the UK and
overseas in relation to individual transactions, projects or matters. If you are interested in learning more
Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London EC2R 8AH T +44 (0)20 7601 4444 www.bankofengland.co.uk

